# Compromised TLS Certificates

DevFeed: [Compromised TLS Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-tls-certificates-97564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/10/compromised-tls-certificates.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-10-23T11:04:22Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [elliptic-curve-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curve-cryptography.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [encrypted-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted-traffic.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

## AI overview

Eight TLS certificates issued by India's eMudhra had private keys with only 3 to 8 bits of entropy, far below the roughly 384 bits cited for a typical NIST P-384 key. The excerpt says the immediate concern may be VPN users, particularly where governments could intercept traffic. Exploitation still requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack to intercept and relay TLS traffic; local-network control makes that easier, while some attacks may demand well-resourced actors. Transparency logs help reveal unauthorized certificates, but require active monitoring and work only after issuance. The excerpt says end users may need to wait for assurances that updates are in place before using some non-browser TLS communications.

## Source excerpt

The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys: The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that's challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237...