# CVE-2026-115770 - Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-115770 - Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-115770-pocket-id-email-verification-token-remains-valid-after-address-change-enabling-arbitrary-verified-email-spoofing-117871.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115770>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-04T23:17:18Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>)

Tags: [2-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2-2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-115770](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-115770.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [email-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email-verification.md>), [impact](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impact.md>), [link](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/link.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passkeys.md>), [pocket-id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pocket-id.md>), [provisioning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/provisioning.md>), [spoofing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spoofing.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

## AI overview

Pocket ID versions 2.2.0 through before 2.12.0 can mark an unintended email address as verified: verification tokens are bound to a user ID, and changing the account email does not invalidate an outstanding token. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an unused address, then redeem the token to have that current address published with `email_verified=true`. The described default affected configuration has `emailsVerified=false` and `allowOwnAccountEdit=true`. A relying application that matches or provisions accounts based on verified email may link the attacker's identity to another user; this downstream consequence does not apply to applications relying exclusively on the stable OIDC `sub` claim. The issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

## Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-115770 Published : Nov. 4, 2026, 11:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 20 minutes ago Description :Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0. Severity: 9.6 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...