# CVE-2026-82391 - Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr HTTP/2 server static-filesystem handler via corrupted receive-buffer length

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-82391 - Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr HTTP/2 server static-filesystem handler via corrupted receive-buffer length](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-82391-out-of-bounds-write-in-zephyr-http-2-server-static-filesystem-handler-via-corrupted-receive-buffer-length-127476.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82391>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-10T22:21:05Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Memory Safety](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/memory-safety.md>), [Zephyr RTOS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zephyr-rtos.md>)

Tags: [buffer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/buffer.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-82391](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-82391.md>), [file](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/file.md>), [filesystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/filesystem.md>), [frame](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/frame.md>), [handler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handler.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [http-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-2.md>), [http-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-server.md>), [out-of-bounds-write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/out-of-bounds-write.md>), [resource](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resource.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [socket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/socket.md>), [state-machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/state-machine.md>), [static](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/static.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/write.md>), [zephyr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zephyr.md>), [zephyrproject](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zephyrproject.md>)

## AI overview

In Zephyr HTTP/2, serving a static file can overwrite the receive-buffer length with the file's on-disk size: the handler passes `&client->data_len` where `http_server_find_file()` expects a file-size output. If that value exceeds the 256-byte default buffer, subsequent parsing, buffer compaction, and socket receive operations can access or write beyond the buffer, corrupting server memory. The excerpt says an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET can reach the flaw in applications using static-filesystem resources with `CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y`; HTTP/2 is enabled by default, and this path requires neither TLS nor credentials. The result may be a device crash or hang, with code execution described as plausible. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 handlers are unaffected. The stated fix is to use a local `size_t file_size` in the HTTP/2 handler.

## Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-82391 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 10:21 p.m. | 10 minutes ago Description :The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards. The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request. The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx -- including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler -- and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(cli