# Gheist: Attempted Scaled Abuse of Stolen GitHub Tokens Stumbles

DevFeed: [Gheist: Attempted Scaled Abuse of Stolen GitHub Tokens Stumbles](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gheist-attempted-scaled-abuse-of-stolen-github-tokens-stumbles-99335.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/gheist-attempted-scaled-abuse-of-stolen-github-tokens-stumbles>)

Author: Hila Ramati

Published: 2026-10-25T17:55:33Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/wiz-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [self-hosted runner](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted-runner.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anthropic.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-js](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-js.md>), [artex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artex.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [automated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [disrupted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disrupted.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [repository](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repository.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>), [workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workflows.md>)

## AI overview

Gheist abuses stolen GitHub tokens by adding a `sync-check` workflow to every accessible repository, encoding and printing repository secrets into workflow logs, then retrieving and deleting the logs through GitHub's API. Researchers report more than 13,500 planted branches across 850+ accounts. GitHub's approval hold has stopped the observed runs in public repositories, but does not cover private repositories or GitHub Enterprise Server, where workflows have run; a newer self-hosted runner payload also attempts to search hosts for credentials, though the article says it has bugs. Defenders should hunt for `ci-sync-` branches, short-lived completed runs and the `gheist` user agent, and check cloud audit logs for role assumptions from those branches. For affected repositories, rotate accessible secrets and revoke tokens; treat a host as compromised if the self-hosted payload ran. The source also recommends protected environment approvals, scoped OIDC trust, short-lived fine-grained credentials and ephemeral self-hosted runners.

## Source excerpt

An automated campaign is planting secret-dumping workflows in every repository that stolen GitHub tokens can reach. It uses no C2 server, is actively evolving, and has been significantly disrupted by recent GitHub security improvements.