# Gheist turns GitHub Actions into a secret extraction service

DevFeed: [Gheist turns GitHub Actions into a secret extraction service](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gheist-turns-github-actions-into-a-secret-extraction-service-104379.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4241628/gheist-turns-github-actions-into-a-secret-extraction-service-2.html>)

Author: Shweta Sharma

Published: 2026-10-28T12:11:01Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [self-hosted runner](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted-runner.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>)

Tags: [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [branch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/branch.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [credential-harvesting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-harvesting.md>), [development-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development-tools.md>), [development-tools-security-software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development-tools-security-software-development.md>), [encoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encoding.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [github-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-api.md>), [github-enterprise-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-enterprise-server.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [masking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/masking.md>), [production](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/production.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-development.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>)

## AI overview

Wiz Research describes Gheist using compromised GitHub accounts to steal credentials through malicious GitHub Actions workflows. The "sync-check" workflow prints secrets to logs after base32 encoding them to evade verbatim secret masking; attackers retrieve the logs through GitHub's API and quickly delete the workflow run. The campaign reportedly affected over 850 accounts and created more than 13,500 malicious branches. GitHub's collaborator-approval control prevented observed runs in public repositories, but did not cover private repositories or GitHub Enterprise Server. A later variant also searches self-hosted runners for credentials and other sensitive access, though implementation bugs mean successful extraction of every target is not established. Wiz recommends investigating branches named "ci-sync-" plus six random characters, "ci: sync config" commits, and quickly deleted runs; examining related cloud role assumptions; revoking compromised tokens; and rotating secrets accessible to affected workflows. Deleting runs or branches does not undo exposure.

## Source excerpt

A threat actor dubbed Gheist is turning compromised GitHub accounts into credential-harvesting platforms. By planting malicious GitHub Actions workflows in private repositories, attackers can expose repository and environment secrets, then retrieve them through GitHub APIs before deleting evidence of the activity. Tracked since September 15 by Wiz Research, the campaign has left more than 13,500 malicious branches across over 850 compromised accounts, spanning personal projects and private enterprise repositories. The campaign's weapon is GitHub Actions, the platform's automation service, which attackers are using to turn stolen access into harvested credentials. The automation creates a branch, adds a workflow named "sync-check" that attempts to print secrets into execution logs, retrieves those logs through the GitHub API, and deletes the workflow run seconds later. "Because the secrets leave through GitHub's own API, there is no attacker domain or outbound connection to block," Wiz researchers said in a blog post. GitHub has introduced a control that holds potentially malicious workflow runs in public repositories for collaborator approval. Wiz reported that this measure successfully prevented the public-repository Gheist runs from executing. However, the protection does not extend to private repositories or GitHub Enterprise Server, where the researchers observed successful execution and subsequent activity. Base32 encoding used for bypassing secret masking Gheist actors were seen taking advantage of a gap between GitHub Actions' secret-masking mechanism and the way workflows can access sensitive values. GitHub masks secret values when they appear verbatim in logs. However, a Gheist-created workflow encodes these secrets in base32 before printing them, so they no longer match the original values. Consequently, they appear in logs without being masked. In repositories that use deployment environments, such as production, Gheist created multiple workflow jobs to t