# Is Anatoly Dyatlov to blame? DevFeed: [Is Anatoly Dyatlov to blame?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Marc Brooker Published: 2019-06-17T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Marc Brooker's Blog](), [Marc Brooker's Blog]() Topics: [systems]() Tags: [history](), [safety](), [systems]() ## AI overview The article examines whether Anatoly Dyatlov should be blamed for the Chernobyl disaster. It argues that operator actions and leadership mattered, but emphasizes broader reactor design flaws, unsafe operating conditions, inadequate control and cooling systems, manually disabled safety measures, and the absence of effective corrective changes before the 1986 explosion. ## Source excerpt Is Anatoly Dyatlov to blame? Without a good safety culture, operators are bound to fail. (Spoiler warning: containers spoilers for the HBO series Chernobyl, and for history). Recently, I enjoyed watching HBO's new series Chernobyl. Like everybody else on the internet, I have some thoughts about it. I'm not a nuclear physicist or engineer, but I do think a lot about safety and the role of operators. The show tells the story of the accident at Chernobyl in April 1986, the tragic human impact, and the cleanup and investigation in the years that followed. One of the villains in the show is Anatoly Dyatlov, the deputy chief engineer of the plant. Dyatlov was present in the control room of reactor 4 when it exploded, and received a huge dose of radiation (the second, or perhaps third, large dose in his storied life of being near reactor accidents). HBO's portrayal of Dyatlov is of an arrogant and aggressive man whose refusal to listen to operators was a major cause of the accident. Some first-hand accounts agree2, 3, 6, and others disagree1. Either way, Dyatlov spent over three years in prison for his role in the accident. There's little debate that the reactor's design was deeply flawed. The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) found4 that certain features of the reactor "had a primary influence on the course of the accident and its consequences". During the time before the accident, operators had put the reactor into a mode where it was unstable, with reactivity increases leading to higher temperatures, and further reactivity increases. The IAEA (and Russian scientists) also found that the design of the control rods was flawed, both in that they initially increased (rather than decreasing) reactivity when first inserted, and in that they machinery to insert them moved too slowly. They also found issues with the control systems, cooling systems, and the fact that some critical safety measures could be manually disabled. Authorities had been aware of many o