# Janus Vehicles: Entity-Centric Threat Modelling of Protocol-Conformant Vehicles under a Malicious-Manufacturer Assumption

DevFeed: [Janus Vehicles: Entity-Centric Threat Modelling of Protocol-Conformant Vehicles under a Malicious-Manufacturer Assumption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/janus-vehicles-entity-centric-threat-modelling-of-protocol-conformant-vehicles-under-a-malicious-manufacturer-assumption-103374.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37059>)

Author: Jaeung Franciskus Yoo, Huy Kang Kim

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Threat Research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-research.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automotive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive.md>), [behaviour](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behaviour.md>), [capabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capabilities.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [components](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/components.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [environment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/environment.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hidden](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hidden.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [interaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interaction.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [modelling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/modelling.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [vehicles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vehicles.md>)

## AI overview

The paper models malicious-by-design vehicles that remain authentic and protocol-conformant while carrying out undeclared sensing, communication, or context-triggered actuation. Its Entity-Centric Threat Model distinguishes four malign entity types: peer-benign but purpose-malicious vehicles, compromised vehicles, reappropriated genuine components, and imitated vehicles or components. It identifies two assurance gaps: authenticity does not prove conformance to declared purpose, and malicious functions may evade detection based on behavioral history or evidence visible to peers. Reappropriated genuine components may retain identities or capabilities outside authorized contexts, weakening signal fingerprinting and certificate-based authentication. A Behaviour-Locus Matrix organizes covert, overt, and concealment actions across hardware, software, and network loci; a Behavioural Interaction Model traces contextual activation and manifestation of hidden capabilities and whether they are observed or concealed.

## Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.37059v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Automotive cybersecurity commonly assumes benign end-product manufacturers and design authorities, focusing on supply-chain threats, external attacks, and compromised network participants observable through misbehaviour. This assumption overlooks malicious-by-design vehicles that remain authentic and protocol-conformant while performing undeclared sensing, communication, or context-triggered actuation. We formulate an Entity-Centric Threat Model spanning three subcomponents. The first, Malign Entity Archetypes, describes four types of malign entity: peer-benign, purpose-malicious vehicles; compromised vehicles; reappropriated genuine components; and imitated vehicles or components. The model exposes two assurance gaps: authenticity does not establish declared-purpose conformance, while malicious functionality can evade detection based on behavioural history or peer-visible evidence. Reappropriated components can remain genuine and retain usable identities or capabilities outside authorised contexts, reducing the effectiveness of signal fingerprinting and certificate-based authentication. To structure this threat space, we introduce a Behaviour-Locus Matrix that maps covert, overt, and concealment actions across hardware, software, and network loci. For peer-benign, purpose-malicious vehicles, we further present a Behavioural Interaction Model that represents how hidden capabilities are contextually activated, realised through actions, manifested within the vehicle and its environment, and potentially observed or concealed.