# Where Does MCP Security End? A Three-Tier Mitigation Mapping Framework for the OWASP MCP Top 10

DevFeed: [Where Does MCP Security End? A Three-Tier Mitigation Mapping Framework for the OWASP MCP Top 10](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/where-does-mcp-security-end-a-three-tier-mitigation-mapping-framework-for-the-owasp-mcp-top-10-114082.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02611>)

Author: Christopher Krakauer, Andreas Schaad

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [prompt injection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/prompt-injection.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attack-surface](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack-surface.md>), [confidence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/confidence.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [go](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/go.md>), [guidance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guidance.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [language-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-models.md>), [large-language-models-llms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large-language-models-llms.md>), [mapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mapping.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-security.md>), [mitigation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitigation.md>), [model-context-protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model-context-protocol.md>), [natural-language](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/natural-language.md>), [owasp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/owasp.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

## AI overview

The framework maps OWASP MCP Top 10 vulnerabilities to server-primary, gateway-primary, or protocol-primary tiers using a four-question cascading decision tree that produces reproducible assignments and confidence levels. In validation with an enterprise-grade Managed File Transfer MCP server built in Go, high-confidence server-tier controls worked as predicted, while low-confidence protocol-tier controls failed for architectural reasons beyond server implementation. The authors identify this architectural ceiling as a limit on what secure server development can achieve: it can reduce the MCP attack surface but cannot fully mitigate it.

## Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.02611v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a leading standard for connecting Large Language Models (LLMs) to external tools, software, and data sources. MCP architecture favors ease of integration over security, blending the data and control planes into a single natural language channel. This introduces confused deputy and prompt injection vulnerabilities that cannot be completely mitigated in the software development lifecycle (SDLC) of an MCP server. Structured security guidance for server developers has been outpaced by this adoption trend, leaving them without a clear way to identify where vulnerabilities can be addressed at the server layer and where architectural constraints create hard limits. This paper presents a framework based on OWASP MCP Top 10 mapped to three architectural tiers, developed using Design Science Research (DSR). Vulnerabilities are classified as server-primary, gateway-primary, or protocol-primary applying a cascading decision tree following four questions, resulting in reproducible tier assignments and confidence levels independent of who applies it. The framework was validated against an enterprise-grade Managed File Transfer (MFT) MCP server built in Go. Validation results showed that high-confidence server-tier controls worked as predicted, and low-confidence protocol-tier controls failed for architectural reasons beyond server implementation. The architectural ceiling encountered during practical validation is the main contribution and shows how secure-by-design development can reduce the MCP attack surface but not completely mitigate it.