# APNIC Blog

Regional Internet Registry for the Asia Pacific

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## Solar photovoltaics for Internet resilience (Part 2): Choosing suppliers and components

DevFeed: [Solar photovoltaics for Internet resilience (Part 2): Choosing suppliers and components](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/solar-photovoltaics-for-internet-resilience-part-2-choosing-suppliers-and-components-137040.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/17/solar-photovoltaics-for-internet-resilience-part-2-choosing-suppliers-and-components/>)

Author: Ulrich Speidel

Published: 2026-11-16T22:36:10Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [cyber resilience act](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resilience-act.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [apnic-foundation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-foundation.md>), [application-programming-interfaces](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-programming-interfaces.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [batteries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batteries.md>), [capacity-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity-development.md>), [components](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/components.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [installation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/installation.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [photovoltaics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/photovoltaics.md>), [pv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pv.md>), [quality](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quality.md>), [questions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/questions.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [solar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solar.md>), [suppliers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/suppliers.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/system.md>), [system-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/system-design.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

Selecting a solar PV supplier for Internet infrastructure requires checking long-term operational reliability, not just upfront price. The excerpt recommends asking who will maintain software, deliver security updates, and need remote access, and whether monitoring can work locally during Internet outages or if vendor support ends. Confirm component compatibility, battery charging paths, islanding and grid-connection plans, export limits, and continuous island-mode capacity. Also establish access to training, settings, documentation, optimization help, and hardware support; check installer experience, structural and wind requirements, safety practices, and roof protection. Get responses in writing, compare them, and test proposed components in the system model. The excerpt emphasizes these procurement checks; it does not provide specific supplier or component comparisons.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: Choosing a solar PV supplier involves more than comparing prices. Ask the right questions about support, cybersecurity, system design, and installation quality to ensure your system remains reliable for years to come.

## Could pigeons deliver the Internet?

DevFeed: [Could pigeons deliver the Internet?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/could-pigeons-deliver-the-internet-131302.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/13/could-pigeons-deliver-the-internet/>)

Author: Tijana Milentijevic

Published: 2026-11-12T23:37:47Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/communications.md>), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ietf.md>), [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-models.md>), [ai-training](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-training.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [april-fools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/april-fools.md>), [area](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/area.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [birds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/birds.md>), [cables](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cables.md>), [carrier](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/carrier.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [need](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/need.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

The paper models pigeon delivery as a directed communication network and minimizes the number of birds, which fly only to their home location and cannot be reused for another delivery. Direct single-hop delivery needs one pigeon per source-destination pair; for 20 communicating locations, that is 380. Allowing messages to stop and be combined reduces bird use but makes the two-hop and multihop optimization problems NP-hard. The polynomial-time Coordinator algorithm gathers messages at the location with the most links, then distributes them by destination; it uses 38 pigeons in the 20-location example and is guaranteed to use at most twice the optimum. Integer linear programs can find exact optima for small two-hop and multihop instances. The model assumes unlimited carrying capacity and known demands, and counts pigeons rather than delay or transport energy. The authors connect the optimization approach to predictable data-centre traffic and vehicle or commodity routing.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: What happens when we replace network cables with carrier pigeons? We worked out how many birds you would need.

## \[Podcast\] Submarine cable resilience and economics

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] Submarine cable resilience and economics](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-submarine-cable-resilience-and-economics-130789.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/12/podcast-submarine-cable-resilience-and-economics/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-11-11T23:01:13Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/communications.md>)

Tags: [economics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/economics.md>), [evolution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evolution.md>), [fibre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fibre.md>), [global](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/global.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [submarine-cable](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/submarine-cable.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

The global submarine cable network comprises more than 600 systems and carries essential inter-economy Internet traffic, including DNS and live communications. Modern fibre cables use optical repeaters to span vast distances and are described as highly reliable, but they remain vulnerable to accidental cuts from anchors and trawlers, possible state attacks, and geological chokepoints such as the Luzon Strait. The excerpt also traces a shift in financing: telecommunications companies once funded much of the infrastructure, while private-sector investment now plays a larger role, raising questions about whose interests the model serves.

### Source excerpt

How resilient is the global submarine cable network? Geoff Huston explores its evolution, vulnerabilities, economics, and who has an interest in keeping it running.

## SIDN publishes RSSAC002 traffic metrics for .nl

DevFeed: [SIDN publishes RSSAC002 traffic metrics for .nl](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/sidn-publishes-rssac002-traffic-metrics-for-nl-129383.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/11/sidn-publishes-rssac002-traffic-metrics-for-nl/>)

Author: Giovane Moura

Published: 2026-11-11T01:48:26Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [authoritative name server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authoritative-name-server.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>)

Tags: [2015](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2015.md>), [academic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/academic.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [automate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automate.md>), [batches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batches.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [code-of-conduct](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-of-conduct.md>), [collaboration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collaboration.md>), [compare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compare.md>), [computer-science](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-science.md>), [course](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/course.md>), [daily](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/daily.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-warehouse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-warehouse.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/labs.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [metrics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/metrics.md>), [root-servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-servers.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>)

### AI overview

SIDN Labs publishes daily RSSAC002-formatted statistics for traffic reaching the authoritative .nl name servers, making the data directly comparable with root-server metrics. The site provides YAML files, graphs, metric definitions and methodology; the dataset is also on GitHub. Metrics cover query and response volumes, response codes and unique sources. The article says .nl handles about as much traffic on a typical day as D-Root and 50% more than B-Root. Researchers and operators can use the data to study trends such as IPv6 and TCP adoption, non-existent-domain queries and unusual traffic changes; existing RSSAC002 tools can process it without changes. Data comes from ENTRADA and is computed with an open-source tool fork that ENTRADA users can run for their own servers. Published files contain aggregated daily statistics, with no IP addresses, individual queries or queried domain names. Releases are currently batched; SIDN Labs plans to automate daily publication.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: SIDN Labs shares insight into traffic to the authoritative .nl nameservers.

## The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC

DevFeed: [The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-dos-and-don-ts-of-post-quantum-dnssec-123783.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/09/the-dos-and-donts-of-post-quantum-dnssec/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-11-09T05:34:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [responses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/responses.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [udp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/udp.md>)

### AI overview

The example shows ML-DSA-44 DNSSEC responses can exceed the recommended UDP payload size: one measured response was 2,551 bytes versus 191 bytes with ECDSA P-256, triggering UDP truncation and a TCP retry. The text explains that IP fragmentation is unreliable, while TCP is already part of DNS, and that the DO bit requests DNSSEC records rather than validation. An Internet draft proposes that non-validating resolvers clear DO and cache responses by DO setting, fetching signatures only when later requested; this could reduce unnecessary large responses and TCP load but adds resolver complexity and queries. The authors present the proposal as an unresolved idea. Measurements cited show 60% of users' queries set DO, while 48% are behind resolvers expected to validate; caching and the small share of queried names in signed zones temper the infrastructure impact.

### Source excerpt

Post-quantum signatures could dramatically enlarge DNSSEC responses, shifting many queries from UDP to TCP. Should resolvers limit unnecessary DNSSEC data, or is greater TCP use inevitable?

## PCAP-LM: Helping AI assistants read network traffic

DevFeed: [PCAP-LM: Helping AI assistants read network traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pcap-lm-helping-ai-assistants-read-network-traffic-121502.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/06/pcap-lm-helping-ai-assistants-read-network-traffic/>)

Author: Xavier Marjou

Published: 2026-11-06T00:04:21Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [network-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-intelligence.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>), [Network Operations](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-operations.md>)

Tags: [4g](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/4g.md>), [5g](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/5g.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-workflows.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-assistants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assistants.md>), [ai-model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-model.md>), [ai-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-services.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [analyst](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analyst.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [network-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-operations.md>), [network-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-traffic.md>), [operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operations.md>), [packet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packet.md>), [pcap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pcap.md>), [scale](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scale.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>)

### AI overview

PCAP-LM makes packet captures small enough for an AI model to read in full by translating each conversation into compact PacketGlyphs that preserve direction, type, size, and timing while dropping payloads and other detail. It folds repeated patterns and combines frequent symbols. In tests on 30 captures from a 5G/4G measurement campaign, the rewritten files averaged about 800 times smaller than detailed Wireshark command-line text, and a model answered ten forensic questions with 99.3% accuracy. Conventional text truncated to the same length yielded 51%, partly because it exposed only the first few dozen packets. The tests covered large encrypted downloads from one server; retransmissions were missed in about a quarter of affected captures. PCAP-LM omits payload contents, sequence numbers, and exact timings, and encrypted content remains opaque. A side-index can point analysts or AI tools to original frames for follow-up. The excerpt proposes local address and hostname substitution before sharing and suggests testing other protocols, which may require new symbols or vocabulary training.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: Packet captures are the ground truth of network operations, but analysing them is slow, requires specialist expertise, and does not scale. PCAP-LM rewrites captures into a form that AI assistants can read, helping address that mismatch.

## The Internet didn't break; we just forgot what it was leaning on

DevFeed: [The Internet didn't break; we just forgot what it was leaning on](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-internet-didn-t-break-we-just-forgot-what-it-was-leaning-on-119369.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/05/the-internet-didnt-break-we-just-forgot-what-it-was-leaning-on/>)

Author: Imteaz Chowdhury

Published: 2026-11-05T04:29:18Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [navigation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/navigation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [bangladesh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bangladesh.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [dependencies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dependencies.md>), [fail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fail.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [here](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/here.md>), [international](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/international.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [just](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/just.md>), [links](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/links.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [operators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operators.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [take](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/take.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

Bangladesh's July 2024 Internet blackout followed access restrictions, not a cable failure, and exposed how local services can stop when they depend on infrastructure outside the economy. Examples include foreign-hosted DNS resolvers, cloud application components, remote APIs, time synchronization and mobile payment platforms. Operators are urged to map these dependencies, strengthen local DNS, identify content and services that could be served locally, and test continuity during extended international outages. Bangladesh's submarine and terrestrial routes, and India's concentration of international links at Mumbai and Chennai, illustrate why geographic and network diversity matter alongside capacity. More routes can improve resilience but do not eliminate hidden service dependencies.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: When international links fail, hidden dependencies can take local services with them. Here's how operators can design for local resilience.

## Solar PV for Internet resilience (Part 1): Designing your system

DevFeed: [Solar PV for Internet resilience (Part 1): Designing your system](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/solar-pv-for-internet-resilience-part-1-designing-your-system-117602.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/04/solar-pv-for-internet-resilience-part-1-designing-your-system/>)

Author: Ulrich Speidel

Published: 2026-11-04T04:16:29Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Networking hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/networking-hardware.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [addition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/addition.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [apnic-foundation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-foundation.md>), [battery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/battery.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [capacity-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity-development.md>), [equipment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/equipment.md>), [good](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [know](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/know.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [network-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-infrastructure.md>), [photovoltaics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/photovoltaics.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [pv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pv.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [solar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solar.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/system.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

Reliable solar PV and battery power for network infrastructure starts with auditing every load, including hidden or heat-generating equipment, and estimating peak and typical use before seeking quotes. The excerpt contrasts standalone systems, which must cover extended bad-weather periods and cannot export surplus, with grid-connected systems, which can export excess power but require more complex controls and UPS coverage for brief inverter shutdowns during grid outages. It then recommends modelling output for the site's location, panel orientation, roof area and shading, and iterating panel, inverter, battery and load choices. It suggests five days of battery storage without incoming charge and, for systems under 10 kW, a hybrid inverter rated for at least ten times average power demand. These are presented as planning guidance; actual capacity depends on the model and site.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: Solar photovoltaics and battery storage can provide reliable power for network infrastructure, even in remote locations. Here's what's good to know before selecting equipment.

## Restating the case for DNSSEC

DevFeed: [Restating the case for DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/restating-the-case-for-dnssec-114864.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/03/restating-the-case-for-dnssec/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-11-03T03:41:45Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [argument](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/argument.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [challenges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenges.md>), [complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complexity.md>), [content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [outages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/outages.md>), [real-world](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/real-world.md>), [risks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risks.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

DNSSEC adds signed, verifiable proof of origin for information published by a domain, a capability TLS alone does not provide. A browser must resolve a name through DNS before validating a TLS certificate, so redirected DNS can send users elsewhere; absent strongly enforced certificate pinning, an attacker may still obtain a certificate authority-backed TLS connection, and homograph attacks can further undermine trust. The excerpt also weighs concerns about state control and incomplete deployment: it says jurisdictional controls arise from broader legal and social frameworks, while acknowledging partial deployment as a real challenge and citing IPv6 and RPKI as examples of technologies that take time to reach useful adoption. It references the IANIX record of DNSSEC-related outages, but gives no outage analysis or detailed deployment guidance.

### Source excerpt

Does TLS make DNSSEC unnecessary? An examination of common DNSSEC assumptions challenges that argument and considers DNSSEC's role in establishing trust, the risks of partial deployment, and the evidence from real-world outages.

## Same place, different view: How VPNs shape what we learn about the Internet

DevFeed: [Same place, different view: How VPNs shape what we learn about the Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/same-place-different-view-how-vpns-shape-what-we-learn-about-the-internet-107545.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/30/same-place-different-view-how-vpns-shape-what-we-learn-about-the-internet/>)

Author: Sachin Kumar Singh

Published: 2026-10-30T04:12:54Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>)

Tags: [content-delivery-networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content-delivery-networks.md>), [cross-border](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-border.md>), [data-localization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-localization.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [internet-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-infrastructure.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [providers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/providers.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vpn.md>), [web-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-traffic.md>)

### AI overview

VPN provider choice can substantially change where web traffic appears to be served, affecting geographic conclusions drawn from Internet measurements. In a study using VPN-Scope, four providers and 14 economies, Chile measurements showed 9.5% of analyzed requests associated with Chilean server addresses through ExpressVPN, versus 62.7% through Surfshark and 64.2% through NordVPN. DNS answers differed across providers in about 12% of initial-domain comparisons and 31% of dependency-domain comparisons, while compared answers shared at least one hosting organization in 98% and 96%, respectively. The authors link variation to DNS, CDN server selection, and routing: connections from Milan reached serving locations in Milan or Frankfurt, even with a shared destination address. They recommend reporting provider and connection settings, verifying VPN exit locations, checking DNS behavior, and considering multiple providers for geographic studies. These steps cannot eliminate all variation; hosting-organization findings were generally more stable than endpoint geography or apparent domestic traffic.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: A study found that changing VPN providers can change where web traffic appears to be served, affecting conclusions about domestic infrastructure, cross-border traffic, and data localization.

## \[Podcast\] Quad 9 -- Measurement in the privacy-preserving public DNS service

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] Quad 9 -- Measurement in the privacy-preserving public DNS service](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-quad-9-measurement-in-the-privacy-preserving-public-dns-service-105645.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/29/podcast-quad-9-measurement-in-the-privacy-preserving-public-dns-service/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-10-28T23:44:09Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [online privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/online-privacy.md>), [Security & Privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>)

Tags: [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [asia-pacific](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asia-pacific.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [collaboration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collaboration.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [end-user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/end-user.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [ibm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ibm.md>), [intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intelligence.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [users](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/users.md>)

### AI overview

Quad9 combines DNS-based protection from known malicious destinations with measurement designed to keep identifiable user data local. The excerpt says information that could identify an individual stays where it is collected; Quad9 instead uses aggregate data and anonymized source addresses. It uses threat intelligence feeds to block malicious destinations and shares information with providers to help refine their signals and understand regional risks. That exchange requires anonymization to prevent end-user data from leaking and one provider's intelligence from being exposed to another. The episode also discusses Quad9's architecture and management, and Kara seeks more threat-intelligence collaboration in Asia Pacific.

### Source excerpt

Darren Kara discusses how the Quad 9 Public DNS server balances privacy, measurement, and global threat intelligence to help protect users from malicious destinations.

## Global Internet infrastructure at NANOG 98

DevFeed: [Global Internet infrastructure at NANOG 98](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/global-internet-infrastructure-at-nanog-98-103527.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/28/global-internet-infrastructure-at-nanog-98/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-10-28T05:18:13Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet Trends](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-trends.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/communications.md>), [centralization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/centralization.md>), [digital sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-sovereignty.md>)

Tags: [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [broadband](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/broadband.md>), [cables](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cables.md>), [capacity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity.md>), [capital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capital.md>), [centralization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/centralization.md>), [competition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/competition.md>), [global](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/global.md>), [hyperscaler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hyperscaler.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [internet-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-infrastructure.md>), [investment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/investment.md>), [leo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leo.md>), [nanog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nanog.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [satellite](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/satellite.md>), [submarine-cable](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/submarine-cable.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

International bandwidth demand is still growing about 30% annually, even as growth rates decline; the article says annual added capacity is now about 2 Pbps and could exceed 10 Pbps by 2035. Aging cables, demand, and route diversity are driving an estimated USD 5-6 billion in annual new cable investment for 2026-2029. Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon fund 38% of cable projects for private use and invest in another 25% through consortia; the transatlantic route is 85% privately hyperscaler-funded. The article links this shift to hyperscalers' capital and the risks of consortium dependence, while noting concerns about foreign ownership and repair-vessel control. LEO systems use large satellite constellations and inter-satellite laser links to provide last-mile service in remote locations. The text presents LEO and submarine cables as complementary: LEO serves specialized access needs, while cables carry bulk data in core networks. It attributes Starlink's reported high returns to its retail position and limited competition, and says Amazon's entry could challenge that position.

### Source excerpt

Hyperscaler investment in submarine cables and the rise of LEO satellite systems are reshaping who builds, owns, and operates the networks that underpin global connectivity.

## The EVPN trust challenge: How to detect and contain internal MAC hijacks

DevFeed: [The EVPN trust challenge: How to detect and contain internal MAC hijacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-evpn-trust-challenge-how-to-detect-and-contain-internal-mac-hijacks-103528.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/28/the-evpn-trust-challenge-how-to-detect-and-contain-internal-mac-hijacks/>)

Author: Sabina Anja

Published: 2026-10-27T22:32:41Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [evpn](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/evpn.md>), [Routing Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/routing-security.md>), [Ethernet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethernet.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>), [Monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/monitoring.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [arp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arp.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [bgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bgp.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [dhcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dhcp.md>), [ethernet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethernet.md>), [evpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evpn.md>), [fabric](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fabric.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [mac-address](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac-address.md>), [mobility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mobility.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [network-operators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-operators.md>), [route](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/route.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spoofing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spoofing.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>), [visibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/visibility.md>), [vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vpn.md>)

### AI overview

EVPN MAC mobility can turn a forged source MAC into a fabric-wide forwarding change: a leaf advertises the learned address with a higher sequence number, and other PEs prefer that route until the legitimate host advertises again. The article describes interception, denial of service, control-plane churn and possible IP hijacking, and notes that duplicate-MAC safeguards vary by platform: Juniper suppresses until manually cleared, while Nokia SR OS flushes and retries after 90 minutes. Detection recommendations include exporting route-reflector updates via BMP, tracking MAC moves over longer periods, and investigating sequence jumps, unexpected sticky flags, tie-break flapping and routes that conflict with access-layer records. It emphasizes validating host identity at the edge with controls such as MAC limits, DHCP snooping, ARP/ND inspection, IEEE 802.1X and sticky entries for critical systems.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: EVPN MAC mobility enables seamless workload movement, but it can also amplify the impact of MAC spoofing. A forged MAC address can redirect traffic across the fabric through BGP, making access-layer controls, route-reflector visibility, and MAC-move monitoring critical defences.

## APNIC 62 workshops help build network security, automation, and routing expertise across the region

DevFeed: [APNIC 62 workshops help build network security, automation, and routing expertise across the region](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/apnic-62-workshops-help-build-network-security-automation-and-routing-expertise-across-the-region-101319.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/27/apnic-62-workshops-help-build-network-security-automation-and-routing-expertise-across-the-region/>)

Author: Sheryl Hermoso

Published: 2026-10-27T01:27:49Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [Network Operations](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-operations.md>), [Automation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automation.md>), [IP routing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ip-routing.md>), [saltstack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/saltstack.md>), [Routing Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/routing-security.md>), [Network Configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-configuration.md>), [BGP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bgp.md>)

Tags: [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [apnic-academy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-academy.md>), [apnic-training](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-training.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [bgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bgp.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [ddos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ddos.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [distributed-denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed-denial-of-service.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-security.md>), [ethernet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethernet.md>), [event-driven](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event-driven.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [evpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evpn.md>), [flex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flex.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [network-operators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-operators.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [region](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/region.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [skills](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/skills.md>), [workshops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workshops.md>)

### AI overview

APNIC 62's workshops gave network engineers practical training in security, automation, and advanced service provider routing. The APNIC Academy security and automation workshops drew 55 participants; a separately organized INNOG routing workshop drew 27. Security exercises covered topics including DDoS mitigation, BGP and DNS security, RPKI, and open-source tools. The automation workshop covered configuration management, SALT, YAML and Jinja, and event-driven workflows, using a train-the-trainer format so participants could share skills with their teams and communities. INNOG's three-day routing workshop was designed for experienced provider engineers and used hands-on labs for Segment Routing, EVPN, Flex-Algo, Containerlab, and telemetry-driven monitoring. Participant feedback described plans to apply the training to security practices, incident response automation, and safer network operations.

### Source excerpt

More than 80 network engineers and operators strengthened their skills at APNIC 62 through hands-on workshops in network security, automation, and next-generation service provider routing.

## One week on the APNIC honeynet: 99,000 IP addresses and 173 million events

DevFeed: [One week on the APNIC honeynet: 99,000 IP addresses and 173 million events](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/one-week-on-the-apnic-honeynet-99-000-ip-addresses-and-173-million-events-100414.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/26/one-week-on-the-apnic-honeynet-99000-ip-addresses-and-173-million-events/>)

Author: Adli Wahid

Published: 2026-10-26T04:15:47Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/logging.md>), [password spraying](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/password-spraying.md>), [IoT botnets](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot-botnets.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>)

Tags: [2017](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2017.md>), [2020](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2020.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [backdoor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backdoor.md>), [botnets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/botnets.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [honeynet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/honeynet.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [ip](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ip.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [smb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smb.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [telnet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telnet.md>), [vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vpn.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>)

### AI overview

APNIC's rebuilt honeynet recorded nearly 99,000 distinct source IPs and 173 million events during 21-27 September 2026. Activity ranged from SSH and Telnet credential attempts to persistent RDP and VNC retries, VPN password spraying, and probes for vulnerabilities spanning 2017-2025. Malware deliveries included Mozi and Mirai botnet files, WannaCry components associated with likely unpatched Windows systems, and cryptomining activity targeting exposed Linux and Android devices. APNIC counts distinct IPs to estimate how many devices reached its sensors, since event volumes vary widely per source; regional origin reflects compromised systems and scanning infrastructure, not necessarily attacker location. The article recommends disabling Telnet, changing default passwords, keeping SMB/RDP/VNC/database services off the public Internet, checking Linux authorized_keys for unfamiliar keys, promptly patching VPN appliances and checking for prior compromise, and blocking public access to Android Debug Bridge.

### Source excerpt

Nearly 99,000 unique IP addresses interacted with APNIC's honeynet in just one week, generating 173 million events across SSH, Telnet, SMB, VPN, web, and Android services. The results show that long-known botnets, weak credentials, and unpatched vulnerabilities continue to drive large-scale malicious activity across the Internet.

## Your most pressing questions about ASPA, answered

DevFeed: [Your most pressing questions about ASPA, answered](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/your-most-pressing-questions-about-aspa-answered-94020.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/22/your-most-pressing-questions-about-aspa-answered/>)

Author: Tom Harrison

Published: 2026-10-22T00:39:37Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Routing Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/routing-security.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [aspa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aspa.md>), [bgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bgp.md>), [border](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/border.md>), [deploy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deploy.md>), [environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/environments.md>), [faq](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/faq.md>), [ixp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ixp.md>), [questions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/questions.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

ASPA records let ASN holders declare provider ASNs for BGP path validation. An AS counts as a provider when it offers transit, even for only some routes, locations, or periods; in complex relationships, each AS lists the other as a provider. At a transparent Layer 2 IXP, participants omit the IXP ASN, while retaining relevant provider relationships with one another. At a non-transparent Layer 3 IXP, participants include the IXP ASN; the IXP itself uses a single AS0 entry and has no ASPA providers. Misconfigured ASPAs can invalidate routes involving a customer ASN. APNIC's MyAPNIC interface offers BGP-based recommendations and checks changes against existing routes before submission. APNIC also advises enabling validation early to make misconfigurations easier to find while fewer ASPAs exist. Members create an ASPA in MyAPNIC Route Management, review it in Pending, then Commit to publish.

### Source excerpt

Answering some of the most frequently asked questions about ASPA.

## Turning IPv6 tunnels into programmable delay lines for pulsing DoS

DevFeed: [Turning IPv6 tunnels into programmable delay lines for pulsing DoS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/turning-ipv6-tunnels-into-programmable-delay-lines-for-pulsing-dos-94019.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/22/turning-ipv6-tunnels-into-programmable-delay-lines-for-pulsing-dos/>)

Author: Le Gai

Published: 2026-10-21T23:48:20Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Network Segmentation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-segmentation.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>)

Tags: [delay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delay.md>), [dos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dos.md>), [extension-headers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/extension-headers.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [ipv6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv6.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [ted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ted.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [tunnelling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tunnelling.md>)

### AI overview

TED uses permissive tunnel decapsulation, IPv6 Extension Header processing delays, nested paths, and reverse-order packet scheduling to concentrate traffic sent over seconds into a short burst. In controlled tests, 35,029 packets sent over 4.2 seconds produced a peak above 180 times the sender's average rate in a 20 ms window; this is temporal concentration, not byte amplification. The study also found many tested hosts forwarded tunneled traffic and that EH insertion often increased processing delay, but results are limited to the measured protocols, targets, and period. The technique depends on raw-packet capability, permissive paths, and accurate delay estimates; filtering, loss, route changes, and drift reduce fidelity. Suggested defenses include restricting tunnel peers, validating outer and inner sources, limiting nesting, constraining unnecessary EH chains, inspecting after decapsulation, and monitoring short-window traffic bursts.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: TED shows how permissive tunnel decapsulation and inconsistent IPv6 Extension Header handling can focus low-rate traffic into short, high-rate bursts.

## Rolling the root key: What happened?

DevFeed: [Rolling the root key: What happened?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rolling-the-root-key-what-happened-91974.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/21/rolling-the-root-key-what-happened/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-10-21T01:01:24Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TTL in DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ttl-in-dns.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [acceptance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceptance.md>), [acceptance-rate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceptance-rate.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [advertisement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advertisement.md>), [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [apnic-labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-labs.md>), [area](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/area.md>), [article](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/article.md>), [articles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/articles.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-roll](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-roll.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [october](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/october.md>), [october-2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/october-2026.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

APNIC Labs' measurements indicate that the 11 October 2026 DNS root KSK rollover succeeded overall: the global DNSSEC validation rate rose from 39.7% before the roll to 40.6% afterward, with no major DNS outage indicated. Estimated validating users increased by 45.8 million, to about 1.70 billion. Outcomes varied: an Indian ISP alerted to a likely problem raised its measured validation rate from 55% to 59%, while Brazil's fell from 54% to 50%. Among 13,538 networks sampled, 660 saw validation rates drop by at least 10%, while 594 rose by at least 10%. The author concludes the roll was successful while recognizing variation in a loosely coupled system. Findings are based on advertisement-based measurements and population estimates.

### Source excerpt

The DNS root key was rolled on 11 October 2026. Was the key roll a success?

## Being connected is not enough: Territorial inequalities in fixed-Internet access and performance

DevFeed: [Being connected is not enough: Territorial inequalities in fixed-Internet access and performance](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/being-connected-is-not-enough-territorial-inequalities-in-fixed-internet-access-and-performance-90554.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/20/being-connected-is-not-enough-territorial-inequalities-in-fixed-internet-access-and-performance/>)

Author: Wilson Ramirez

Published: 2026-10-20T04:36:37Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [DuckDuckGo](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/duckduckgo.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [case-study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/case-study.md>), [connectivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connectivity.md>), [digital-divide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-divide.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [internet-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-infrastructure.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

This analysis uses the Dominican Republic as a case study to examine territorial gaps in fixed-Internet access and network performance. It finds that access inequality and polarization declined between 2017 and 2024, while substantial provincial differences in penetration, speeds, and latency remain.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: High aggregate Internet penetration can mask significant territorial inequalities. Using the Dominican Republic as a case study, this analysis shows that access and network performance vary widely across provinces, highlighting why the digital divide is about more than simply being connected.

## INNOG 9 at APNIC 62: Building resilient infrastructure for the next Internet

DevFeed: [INNOG 9 at APNIC 62: Building resilient infrastructure for the next Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/innog-9-at-apnic-62-building-resilient-infrastructure-for-the-next-internet-89880.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/19/innog-9-at-apnic-62-building-resilient-infrastructure-for-the-next-internet/>)

Author: Timothy Hildred

Published: 2026-10-19T05:38:05Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [Routing Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/routing-security.md>), [ip-address-planning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ip-address-planning.md>), [national security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/national-security.md>)

Tags: [ai-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-infrastructure.md>), [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [ipv6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv6.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [submarine-cable](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/submarine-cable.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

The INNOG 9 session at APNIC 62 covered network resilience across India and Bangladesh, including IPv6-first infrastructure, local dependencies during Internet disruptions, enterprise security, submarine cable concentration, and AI-driven network demand. Speakers discussed operational measures such as local DNS and critical-service copies, routing security, abuse monitoring, and planning for cable outages.

### Source excerpt

INNOG 9, co-located with APNIC 62, offered a distinctly operational perspective, drawing on experiences from India and Bangladesh. Topics ranged from IPv6 deployment and submarine cable infrastructure, to lessons learned from Internet disruptions.

## APNIC 62: Automation, trust, and the future of Internet infrastructure

DevFeed: [APNIC 62: Automation, trust, and the future of Internet infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/apnic-62-automation-trust-and-the-future-of-internet-infrastructure-89879.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/19/apnic-62-automation-trust-and-the-future-of-internet-infrastructure/>)

Author: Dan Fidler

Published: 2026-10-19T04:44:56Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Automation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automation.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [certs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certs.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-infrastructure.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

At APNIC 62, two keynote speakers discussed complementary needs for the future Internet. Amajit Gupta argued that AI workloads make latency a critical network constraint and called for automated, software-driven networks that can respond to changing conditions. Yukako Uchida emphasized that effective cybersecurity incident response depends on trust built through repeated relationships and collaboration across organizations and borders.

### Source excerpt

At APNIC 62, keynote speakers Amajit Gupta and Yukako Uchida showed how the future Internet will depend on both autonomous, AI-driven networks and trusted human relationships.

## Timor-Leste's Internet ecosystem enters a new phase of development

DevFeed: [Timor-Leste's Internet ecosystem enters a new phase of development](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/timor-leste-s-internet-ecosystem-enters-a-new-phase-of-development-88349.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/16/timor-lestes-internet-ecosystem-enters-a-new-phase-of-development/>)

Author: Samantha Douglas

Published: 2026-10-15T23:20:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [IXP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ixp.md>), [Routing Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/routing-security.md>)

Tags: [cdn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cdn.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [connectivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connectivity.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [economy-report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/economy-report.md>), [ipv6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv6.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [rpki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rpki.md>), [timor-leste](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/timor-leste.md>)

### AI overview

Timor-Leste is expanding Internet connectivity through submarine fibre, mobile networks, and satellite services. A planned Internet exchange point could improve local traffic exchange, while routing security has advanced and IPv6 adoption remains limited. The article also examines cybersecurity coordination, incident-response capabilities, and efforts to strengthen local technical skills.

### Source excerpt

As Timor-Leste deepens its integration with ASEAN and the global digital economy, continued progress in technical capability, resilience, and Internet governance will be critical to ensuring connectivity delivers broader economic and social benefits.

## \[Podcast\] The (dismal) economics of AI

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] The (dismal) economics of AI](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-the-dismal-economics-of-ai-87497.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/15/podcast-the-dismal-economics-of-ai/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-10-14T23:14:02Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>)

Tags: [ai-investment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-investment.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [data-centres](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-centres.md>), [economics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/economics.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

Geoff Huston discusses the economic risks of the AI investment boom and associated data centre expansion. He argues that uncertain returns and persistent debt could expose investors to losses, while demand for components, construction resources and electricity creates pressures beyond the technology sector.

### Source excerpt

As capital, labour, and energy are redirected towards AI infrastructure, the economic risks and consequences could be felt by investors, communities, and consumers worldwide. Geoff Huston discusses the economics of the AI investment boom.

## Submarine cable resilience

DevFeed: [Submarine cable resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/submarine-cable-resilience-86516.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/14/submarine-cable-resilience/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-10-14T07:15:54Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Critical Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/critical-infrastructure.md>), [Distributed Systems & Parallel Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/distributed-systems-parallel-computing.md>)

Tags: [critical-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical-infrastructure.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [submarine-cable](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/submarine-cable.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

The article examines the resilience of submarine communications cables, including physical risks, routing choices, repair delays, and the aging repair fleet. It argues that resilience depends on coordinated investment, route diversity, and faster repair permissions, while ownership and maintenance are increasingly concentrated among private operators.

### Source excerpt

The estimated 1.5M kilometres of subsea communications cables underpins our global telecommunication services. This critical infrastructure faces serious challenges in the coming years.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTE0VDA3OjE1OjU0KzAwOjAwIiwgIjNmZGQ1MWRhLTYzNDctNGM1My1hMDU0LTVkOGUwOGNjMGNjMyJd>)