# Elastic Security Labs

Trusted security news & research from the team at Elastic.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## Mapping the AI threat landscape: MITRE ATLAS comes to Elastic Security

DevFeed: [Mapping the AI threat landscape: MITRE ATLAS comes to Elastic Security](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mapping-the-ai-threat-landscape-mitre-atlas-comes-to-elastic-security-146683.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/mitre-atlas-elastic-security-detection-coverage>)

Author: Davis Plumlee

Published: 2026-11-20T16:30:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [shadow AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/shadow-ai.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [atlas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atlas.md>), [elastic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic.md>), [elastic-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic-security.md>), [mitre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitre.md>), [mitre-atlas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitre-atlas.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-operations.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security 9.6 adds MITRE ATLAS mappings alongside ATT&CK for prebuilt AI platform and GenAI detection rules, giving users a separate view of coverage for AI threats such as prompt injection, jailbreaks, stolen model API keys, and poisoned agent tools. Users can inspect coverage in a new table, add or edit both frameworks' mappings in rule creation workflows, and use Agent Builder to query covered threats or find rules for ATLAS techniques. A managed MITRE data service stores framework entities as Kibana Saved Objects and serves them through a data client and API, enabling queries and filtering and supporting multiple frameworks. Elastic says this may allow framework updates to follow the prebuilt-rule release cycle; the feature timing remains at its discretion.

### Source excerpt

Elastic Security 9.6 adds MITRE ATLAS to our detection rules and the tools you use to manage them, so you can see which AI attacks your rules already cover.

## We caught the agent-framework PyPI compromise six minutes after it published

DevFeed: [We caught the agent-framework PyPI compromise six minutes after it published](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/we-caught-the-agent-framework-pypi-compromise-six-minutes-after-it-published-141250.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/we-caught-the-agent-framework-pypi-compromise-six-minutes-after-it-published>)

Author: Elastic Security Labs

Published: 2026-11-18T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Microsoft Agent Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft-agent-framework.md>), [PyPI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pypi.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [DevSecOps](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/devsecops.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [agent-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-framework.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [azure-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-ai.md>), [azure-ai-foundry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-ai-foundry.md>), [azure-devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-devops.md>), [azure-pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-pipelines.md>), [base64](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/base64.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [malware-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-analysis.md>), [pypi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pypi.md>), [pypi-compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pypi-compromise.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

Compromised agent-framework releases 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 used Python .pth startup hooks to run a credential stealer on every interpreter launch, without requiring the package to be imported. The malware gathered matching environment variables from the host and up to 300 processes, searched common credential files, and sought Azure DevOps, Azure managed identity, and--added in 1.26.2--GitHub Actions tokens. It bundled collected data and sent it to one webhook.site endpoint. The Azure DevOps OIDC requests omitted the documented serviceConnectionId, so the research says whether they yielded usable federated tokens is unclear; any resulting access would depend on the identity's assigned permissions. PyPI removed both versions. The excerpt advises checking site-packages for the listed hook files, pinning 1.26.0, treating readable host secrets as compromised, rotating long-lived credentials, reviewing short-lived token activity, and searching network logs for the endpoint and stated user agents.

### Source excerpt

Versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 stole Azure, Azure DevOps and GitHub Actions tokens from a .pth hook that ran on every Python launch, so if either one touched a build agent or a laptop, assume every secret on that host is gone.

## Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission

DevFeed: [Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/inside-the-loop-five-ai-attack-frameworks-that-never-ask-permission-133227.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/agentic-offensive-frameworks-detection-artex>)

Author: Mika Ayenson

Published: 2026-11-13T16:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [agent observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agent-observability.md>), [alert triage](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/alert-triage.md>), [Agentic SOC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-soc.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/act.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-attack.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [artex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artex.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [cairn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cairn.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cyberstrikeai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberstrikeai.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [es-ql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/es-ql.md>), [frameworks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/frameworks.md>), [inside](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inside.md>), [leave](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leave.md>), [none](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/none.md>), [offensive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/offensive.md>), [pentagi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pentagi.md>), [permission](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permission.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

Five examined AI offensive frameworks--ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, Cairn, PentAGI, and HexStrike--act autonomously by default and none enforces authorization in code. Their planning loops can issue actions seconds apart, but each still produces observable processes, web requests, cloud API calls, or sign-ins. The article recommends behavior based detection over framework fingerprints, measuring action tempo and sequences per identity across longer windows, and deciding in advance which detections trigger containment. It includes an ES|QL hunt for bursts of requests from multiple client tool families, with thresholds to baseline and tune because legitimate automation can match the pattern and changing source addresses split windows. Blocking an address should be paired with credential or session revocation and confirmation that access stopped; revocation may have propagation delays. The analysis covers five frameworks, and their defaults can change between releases.

### Source excerpt

Five agentic offensive frameworks act in bursts of two to 25 seconds, and none enforces authorization in code. What ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, Cairn, PentAGI, and HexStrike leave in your telemetry, and the ES|QL hunt that catches them.

## 56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion

DevFeed: [56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/56-aws-api-calls-in-141-milliseconds-inside-an-ai-run-intrusion-133228.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/cyberstrikeai-aws-cloudtrail-intrusion>)

Author: Samir Bousseaden,Bryan Porras Blanch,Terrance DeJesus

Published: 2026-11-13T15:27:20Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [AWS CloudTrail](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-cloudtrail.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [Amazon EC2](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-ec2.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon GuardDuty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-guardduty.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-platform.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-assisted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assisted.md>), [ai-assisted-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assisted-attacks.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [cloudtrail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudtrail.md>), [cyberstrikeai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberstrikeai.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [detection-rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-rules.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

The article documents a 16-day intrusion in which one server attributed to CyberStrikeAI used eight AWS identities across four accounts. Activity included validating credentials, harvesting secrets, reading EC2 user data, decrypting an SSM parameter, and issuing an SSM command; the audit log does not reveal the command or whether it succeeded. The authors characterize the activity as AI-assisted based on attribution and machine-speed behavior, but cannot establish that an LLM agent made decisions or how credentials were obtained. Six Elastic rules produced 78 mostly medium- and low-severity alerts; shared source IP and a 14-day gap made correlation essential. The article proposes two high-severity detections for bulk user-data and account enumeration, behavioral CloudTrail hunts, and an Elastic Workflows proof of concept to deactivate keys and restrict IAM access. Its response steps include rotating credentials and sessions, reviewing SSM history, treating user-data secrets as exposed, and limiting access to userData. IPs are offered for retrospective hunting, while behavioral indicators are described as more durable.

### Source excerpt

A CyberStrikeAI server spent 16 days in four AWS accounts using eight identities, and the CloudTrail record shows why six detection rules each caught only part of it.

## 0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining

DevFeed: [0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/0-gpu-utilization-how-sansar-hides-linux-cryptomining-130923.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware>)

Author: Salim Bitam

Published: 2026-11-12T10:48:47Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [gpu monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gpu-monitoring.md>), [Linux Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux-kernel.md>), [tor](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tor.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [systemd](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/systemd.md>)

Tags: [backdoor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backdoor.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [elastic-security-labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic-security-labs.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-monitoring.md>), [gpu-utilization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-utilization.md>), [hooks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hooks.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [malware-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-analysis.md>), [orchestrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/orchestrator.md>), [rootkit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rootkit.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

REF3364 combines Linux cryptomining with several methods to conceal activity. After exploiting an internet-reachable Ray job agent that accepted unauthenticated submissions, the actor gained access, established persistence, and deployed the toolkit on three GPU hosts. Its Rust orchestrator SANSAR manages CPU and GPU miners over Tor, gathers host and GPU inventory, and supports miner control and interactive shells. A kernel module hides configured processes, files, and socket entries; an NVML wrapper passes calls to NVIDIA's library but reports 0% GPU utilization and substitutes temperature and power readings. A separate backdoor, netns, obtains an IP address from an Ethereum contract and connects over TCP, then can open a shell connection to a supplied destination; the command loop lacks application authentication and integrity checks. The source recommends checking who can submit jobs and whether GPU monitoring libraries have been modified.

### Source excerpt

Elastic Security Labs analyzes SANSAR, a Linux cryptomining orchestrator that manages miners over Tor, alongside a kernel rootkit, GPU monitoring hooks and a backdoor that retrieves its C2 address from Ethereum.

## Monitoring AI agent sessions: Leveraging embedding models to aid threat hunting and attack discovery workflows

DevFeed: [Monitoring AI agent sessions: Leveraging embedding models to aid threat hunting and attack discovery workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/monitoring-ai-agent-sessions-leveraging-embedding-models-to-aid-threat-hunting-and-attack-discovery-workflows-117862.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/ai-agent-session-monitoring-embedding-models>)

Author: Marcus Jeffes

Published: 2026-11-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [Embeddings](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embeddings.md>), [Threat Hunting & Intel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-hunting-intel.md>), [alert triage](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/alert-triage.md>), [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attack-discovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack-discovery.md>), [discovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/discovery.md>), [embedding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedding.md>), [i](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/i.md>), [leveraging](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leveraging.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [more](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/more.md>), [my](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/my.md>), [one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one.md>), [prompt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prompt.md>), [questions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/questions.md>), [reasoning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reasoning.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sessions.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [threat-hunting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-hunting.md>), [workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workflows.md>)

### AI overview

Embedding agent-session turns by channel and storing their vectors in Elastic enables repeatable semantic hunts against old data without rerunning an LLM over every session. In the author's six-month sample of 399 Claude Code and Cursor sessions (7,454 turns), an LLM labeler marked 56 real sessions for review; agent reasoning carried more incident signal than user prompts. Vector and BM25 search were close, with vectors performing better on the normalized data, while keyword search remained competitive for literal commands. Exemplar searches worked well for repeated instances of known workflows; written hunts were still needed to find different workflows with similar risks. The approach depends on suitable queries and thresholds, and results may not generalize: the sample was one person's security-focused work, the embedding model was not trained on agent transcripts, and some ATLAS areas showed weak retrieval. Claude Code telemetry omits reasoning, the strongest channel in this evaluation. The author also notes that vectors remain personal data and monitoring requires jurisdiction-specific legal review and access controls.

### Source excerpt

I tested vector search on 7,454 turns of my own agent sessions. One in seven sessions needed review, the agent's reasoning carried more signal than the prompt, and the stored vectors answer questions nobody thought to ask at ingest.

## When trust becomes the payload: Inside the threats, etc quarterly report

DevFeed: [When trust becomes the payload: Inside the threats, etc quarterly report](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/when-trust-becomes-the-payload-inside-the-threats-etc-quarterly-report-117863.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/reports/threats-etc-report-november-2026-trouble-with-trust>)

Author: Terrance DeJesus,Jason Pappalexis,Andrew Pease

Published: 2026-11-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [AI in cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-in-cybersecurity.md>), [npm security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm-security.md>)

Tags: [17](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/17.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [adversary-in-the-middle-aitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary-in-the-middle-aitm.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-assistants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assistants.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [management-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management-tools.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [supply-chains](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chains.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tools.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>), [weaponizing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/weaponizing.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security reports that adversaries are abusing trusted enterprise software and identity workflows to gain access, often without conventional malware. Its April-September 2026 findings include 23 confirmed cases of remote monitoring and management tool abuse, most often involving ScreenConnect; one attack chain reached MSI delivery and DLL sideloading in about 16 seconds. The report also describes AI applications used directly in attacks and infostealer credentials used for cloud logins in as little as eight minutes. It recommends behavioral detection, cross-domain visibility and correlation, monitoring system activity regardless of the initiating application, and automation to handle increased alert volume and response speed. The supplied excerpt does not include the full report's technical breakdowns or detection guidance.

### Source excerpt

The newest threats, etc report details how adversaries are weaponizing trust across the entire enterprise stack, abusing everything from AI assistants and npm supply chains to identity flows and legitimate management tools.

## Kernel eviction notice: What wesp.sys reveals about the Windows Endpoint Security Platform

DevFeed: [Kernel eviction notice: What wesp.sys reveals about the Windows Endpoint Security Platform](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/kernel-eviction-notice-what-wesp-sys-reveals-about-the-windows-endpoint-security-platform-101091.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/windows-endpoint-security-platform-wesp>)

Author: Pavel Yosifovich

Published: 2026-10-26T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Endpoint Security & XDR](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security-xdr.md>), [Endpoint security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [Post Mortem](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-mortem.md>)

Tags: [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [binaries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binaries.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [edr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edr.md>), [endpoint-protection-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/endpoint-protection-security.md>), [endpoint-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/endpoint-security.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [let](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [nothing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nothing.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [preview](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/preview.md>), [process](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/process.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-platform.md>), [show](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/show.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>), [wants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wants.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

Microsoft's Windows Endpoint Security Platform (WESP) aims to reduce third-party EDR code in the kernel after the 2024 CrowdStrike outage. In the preview build described, Microsoft's wesp.sys is a file-system mini-filter at altitude 329500; it uses a filter communication port to send events to the user-mode espclient.dll, whose API includes event rules and filters. This design could let Microsoft maintain one kernel component while EDR services handle more work in user mode. The binaries also suggest a current limitation: espclient.dll imports FilterGetMessage and FilterSendMessage but not FilterReplyMessage, so the author infers that clients cannot yet reply with a decision such as vetoing process creation. The platform is early, undocumented, and its capabilities may change; the excerpt says user-mode blocking is a requirement for adoption, not an observed feature.

### Source excerpt

Microsoft wants EDR out of the Windows kernel, and the preview binaries show wesp.sys telling a user-mode client that a process is starting, with nothing in its imports to let that client block it.

## php2shell: Assessing Elastic detection coverage relevant to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

DevFeed: [php2shell: Assessing Elastic detection coverage relevant to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/php2shell-assessing-elastic-detection-coverage-relevant-to-cve-2026-109618-and-cve-2026-109619-92963.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/php2shell-php-rce-detection>)

Author: Ruben Groenewoud,Bryan Porras Blanch

Published: 2026-10-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Threat Research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-research.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>), [Endpoint security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/core.md>), [coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coverage.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-109618](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-109618.md>), [cve-2026-109619](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-109619.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [elastic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic.md>), [exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploitation.md>), [php](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/php.md>), [php2shell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/php2shell.md>), [rce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rce.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [shell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/shell.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

The article reports two critical, unauthenticated PHP core RCE flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, and says PHP has released fixes in versions 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35. The flaws arise from OOM corruption and stale global state; the article says no complete configuration mitigation exists, so patching is the safe choice. For detection before a reliable public PoC, Elastic focuses on convergent post-exploitation behavior: web server processes spawning shells or unusual children, downloading payloads, and creating suspicious files. Endpoint rules can terminate matching processes when prevention is enabled; SIEM rules alert, including baseline-based `new_terms` rules. Preparation requires enabling the specified process and file detection rules on PHP hosts; the high-entropy file rule requires Elastic Stack 9.3.0 or later and file entropy telemetry. The article also recommends inventorying bundled and standalone PHP installations, prioritizing internet-facing systems, and treating documented PHP settings only as temporary exposure reduction.

### Source excerpt

CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are critical PHP core RCE flaws that leaked ahead of disclosure. We cover what is verified, why exploitation converges on a web server spawning a shell, and the Elastic detections developed to catch this behavior.

## Apex Accelerator uses malicious npm packages and attacker-controlled AI services to target Web3 founders

DevFeed: [Apex Accelerator uses malicious npm packages and attacker-controlled AI services to target Web3 founders](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/auditing-the-auditor-unmasking-apex-accelerator-85246.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/apex-accelerator-malicious-npm-packages>)

Author: Jia Yu Chan,Daniel Stepanic

Published: 2026-10-12T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [npm security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm-security.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [PowerShell](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powershell.md>)

Tags: [ai-coding-assistant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-assistant.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-analysis.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security Labs investigated a fake Web3 accelerator distributing malicious npm packages disguised as coding and security-auditing tools. The packages deliver Windows and macOS malware, route coding-agent requests through attacker-controlled infrastructure, and generate fabricated audit findings. The research traces delivery chains and data collection, while distinguishing observed behavior from capabilities and execution failures.

### Source excerpt

REF8801 exposes how Apex Accelerator combines convincing Web3 services with malicious npm packages, attacker-controlled AI infrastructure, and cross-platform malware delivery.

## Introducing AlertZero: Inbox zero for your alert queue

DevFeed: [Introducing AlertZero: Inbox zero for your alert queue](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/introducing-alertzero-inbox-zero-for-your-alert-queue-77113.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/ai-soc-automation-alertzero>)

Author: James Spiteri

Published: 2026-10-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Agentic SOC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-soc.md>), [alert triage](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/alert-triage.md>), [human in the loop agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/human-in-the-loop-agent.md>), [Loop Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/loop-engineering.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [ai-soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-soc.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [soc-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc-automation.md>)

### AI overview

AlertZero is an agentic layer for Elastic Security that assigns AI agents to alert triage, threat hunting, detection engineering, and endpoint forensics. Its Watches gather evidence and propose actions for analysts to approve, modify, escalate, or dismiss, with configurable autonomy for each task. The article describes using it to investigate suspicious sign-ins, develop detection rule changes, and coordinate security investigations.

### Source excerpt

AlertZero brings AI SOC automation to Elastic Security with four agents, one job each, so the queue stops setting your priorities. Nothing changes in your environment without your approval.

## Behind the tags: How Elastic SIEM grades 1,781 detection rules on noise, speed, and threat coverage

DevFeed: [Behind the tags: How Elastic SIEM grades 1,781 detection rules on noise, speed, and threat coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/behind-the-tags-how-elastic-siem-grades-1-781-detection-rules-on-noise-speed-and-threat-coverage-64837.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/elastic-siem-detection-rule-tags>)

Author: Kseniia Ignatovych,Samir Bousseaden,Terrance DeJesus

Published: 2026-10-05T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Splunk Enterprise Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/splunk-enterprise-security.md>), [Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/siem-security.md>), [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>), [Elastic Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/elastic-cloud.md>)

Tags: [automated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [dimensions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dimensions.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [score](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/score.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-operations.md>), [siem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/siem.md>), [speed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic SIEM refreshes tags on prebuilt detection rules monthly using a 30-day window of deployment telemetry. Code scores noise, performance, and deployment profile, while threat tags are matched through heuristics with an LLM fallback subject to human review. The resulting tags help teams judge which rules to enable broadly and which need closer evaluation.

### Source excerpt

This article explains how Elastic SIEM uses a monthly automated telemetry pipeline to score prebuilt detection rules across noise, performance, threat, and profile dimensions, helping security teams decide which rules to enable first.

## No MDM for Linux? A 68-line Elastic workflow keeps every endpoint's config current

DevFeed: [No MDM for Linux? A 68-line Elastic workflow keeps every endpoint's config current](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/no-mdm-for-linux-a-68-line-elastic-workflow-keeps-every-endpoint-s-config-current-61689.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/linux-endpoint-management-elastic-workflows>)

Author: Wieger van der Meulen,Spencer Niemi

Published: 2026-09-29T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Endpoint Security & XDR](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security-xdr.md>), [Endpoint security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security.md>), [Command-line interface](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cli.md>)

Tags: [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [codex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codex.md>), [cursor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cursor.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [elastic-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic-agent.md>), [endpoint-protection-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/endpoint-protection-security.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mobile-device-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mobile-device-management.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic InfoSec describes a production workflow for managing Linux endpoint configuration through Elastic Defend. It checks endpoints every six hours and queues Cursor and Codex configuration where needed, avoiding duplicate queued actions for offline hosts. The post outlines the required Elastic Stack features, endpoint setup, and permissions.

### Source excerpt

Elastic InfoSec runs Linux endpoint management through Elastic Defend with a scheduled workflow that gets Cursor and Codex config onto new laptops without piling up duplicate actions on offline hosts, and it works for other config too.

## Quarantined isn't contained: Agentic phishing response with Elastic and Sublime

DevFeed: [Quarantined isn't contained: Agentic phishing response with Elastic and Sublime](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/quarantined-isn-t-contained-agentic-phishing-response-with-elastic-and-sublime-60984.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/phishing-incident-response-sublime-security>)

Author: Sandiya Ramamoorthy

Published: 2026-09-28T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Incident response](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/incident-response.md>), [Endpoint Security & XDR](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security-xdr.md>), [Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/siem-security.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>)

Tags: [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [edr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edr.md>), [elastic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic.md>), [email-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email-security.md>), [incident-response](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident-response.md>), [integrations-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrations-tools.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>)

### AI overview

The native Sublime Security integration sends email detections to Elastic Security, where teams can correlate phishing activity with endpoint, identity, and network signals. This can help connect a quarantined email to related activity and support response across both platforms. The article argues that combining telemetry is a first step toward faster phishing incident response, while retaining human control over automated actions.

### Source excerpt

The native Sublime Security integration sends email detections into Elastic Security, where phishing incident response can tie a quarantined email to what happens next on the endpoint and pull the threat from every mailbox it reached.

## Cloud Threat Emulation on Autopilot: Context is Everything

DevFeed: [Cloud Threat Emulation on Autopilot: Context is Everything](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloud-threat-emulation-on-autopilot-context-is-everything-55758.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/cloud-threat-emulation-methodology>)

Author: Terrance DeJesus,Bryan Porras Blanch

Published: 2026-09-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/telemetry.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>)

Tags: [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [cloud-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>)

### AI overview

This article presents a plan-first methodology for cloud threat emulation and detection engineering. It emphasizes scoping, threat modeling, provisioning identities and resources, executing behaviors, verifying telemetry, and cleaning up, while discussing how AI can help automate emulations.

### Source excerpt

Cloud threat emulation is more than detonation. A plan-first methodology for cloud detection engineering: scope, victim model, telemetry, coverage, cleanup. Learn how to properly leverage AI to automate your emulations.

## One SOC, 100 projects: running centralized alert triage on Elastic Security Serverless

DevFeed: [One SOC, 100 projects: running centralized alert triage on Elastic Security Serverless](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/one-soc-100-projects-running-centralized-alert-triage-on-elastic-security-serverless-48855.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/centralized-alert-triage-cross-project-search>)

Author: Chuddy Park

Published: 2026-09-18T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Security Operations Center](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-operations-center.md>), [Elastic Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/elastic-cloud.md>), [elasticsearch](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/elasticsearch.md>), [software-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-architecture.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>)

Tags: [alert-triage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert-triage.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [elastic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic.md>), [elastic-cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic-cloud.md>), [elasticsearch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elasticsearch.md>), [isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isolation.md>), [scale](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scale.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-operations.md>), [security-operations-center](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-operations-center.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [threat-hunting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-hunting.md>)

### AI overview

This technical post explains how Elastic Security Serverless uses cross-project search to support centralized alert triage across 100 linked projects. It describes the tested SOC workflow, detection-rule behavior, data isolation, query patterns, scaling considerations, and operational limitations.

### Source excerpt

We linked one Elastic Security project to 100 others and ran the full prebuilt detection catalog from the origin, with all the ingest landing in the linked projects. It held up, and where it deliberately does not reach is the interesting part.

## The extension you never installed: KREMLIN forges Chrome's own integrity checks to steal banking sessions

DevFeed: [The extension you never installed: KREMLIN forges Chrome's own integrity checks to steal banking sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-extension-you-never-installed-kremlin-forges-chrome-s-own-integrity-checks-to-steal-banking-sessions-49078.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/malicious-browser-extension-kremlin-banking-malware>)

Author: Cyril François,Andrew Pease

Published: 2026-09-14T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Docro Hijacker](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/docro-hijacker.md>), [WebExtension](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/webextension.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [C2](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/c2.md>), [Edge](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/edge.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [JavaScript](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/javascript.md>), [C++](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/c-plus-plus.md>)

Tags: [c-plus-plus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c-plus-plus.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [extensions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/extensions.md>), [javascript](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/javascript.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-analysis.md>), [obfuscation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/obfuscation.md>), [payload](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payload.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sensitive-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensitive-data.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security Labs analyzes KREMLIN, a malicious browser-extension malware operation targeting Brazilian banking users across seven campaigns over 15 months. The report details its JavaScript loaders, C++ installers, Chrome and Edge persistence techniques, and use of Ethereum smart contracts to manage C2 configuration.

### Source excerpt

Elastic Security Labs tracked this malicious browser extension across seven campaigns and 15 months, through Brazilian bank lures and the Ethereum smart contracts that hold its C2 configuration.

## Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation

DevFeed: [Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/linux-detection-engineering-local-privilege-escalation-49070.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/linux-privilege-escalation-detection-framework>)

Author: Ruben Groenewoud

Published: 2026-09-11T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [eBPF](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ebpf.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/anthropic.md>)

Tags: [cves](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cves.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [ebpf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ebpf.md>), [exploits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploits.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [local-privilege-escalation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local-privilege-escalation.md>), [privilege-escalation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privilege-escalation.md>)

### AI overview

An analysis of Linux local privilege escalation detection engineering. It examines recurring copy-on-write vulnerabilities across kernel interfaces, reviews exploit and misconfiguration testing, and reports which Elastic detection and endpoint rules fired.

### Source excerpt

Seven of the thirteen Linux privilege escalation CVEs we tracked in 2026 turned out to be the same copy-on-write bug pointed at different kernel interfaces. We ran the public proof-of-concept for eleven exploits and two misconfigurations, and noted which rules fired.

## Why 2026 is the Year to Upgrade to an Agentic AI SOC

DevFeed: [Why 2026 is the Year to Upgrade to an Agentic AI SOC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-2026-is-the-year-to-upgrade-to-an-agentic-ai-soc-48957.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/why-2026-is-the-year-to-upgrade-to-an-agentic-ai-soc>)

Author: Sandiya Ramamoorthy,Sumana Mannem

Published: 2026-09-08T21:00:00Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [Security Operations Center](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-operations-center.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-automation.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>)

### AI overview

The article argues that 2026 is a practical inflection point for enterprise security operations centers to adopt agentic AI. It describes systems that prioritize attacks, investigate signals, execute controlled containment, and provide traceable reasoning, while noting that governance, architecture standards, and risk controls are maturing.

### Source excerpt

Agentic AI SOCs differ from copilot-only models by autonomously prioritizing attacks over alerts, executing closed-loop containment, and providing traceable reasoning for every decision, allowing analysts to focus on high-value investigations.

## Data access: the hidden cost of security vendor lock-in

DevFeed: [Data access: the hidden cost of security vendor lock-in](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/data-access-the-hidden-cost-of-security-vendor-lock-in-48933.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/siem-data-export-comparison>)

Author: Mike Nichols,Jamie Hynds

Published: 2026-09-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [vendor lock-in](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vendor-lock-in.md>), [Open Data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-data.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/telemetry.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>), [Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/siem-security.md>)

Tags: [doing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/doing.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [open-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-data.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-operations.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>), [vendor-lock-in](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vendor-lock-in.md>)

### AI overview

This commentary argues that security vendors often make data ingestion easy while imposing costs, delays, or degraded access on data export. It defines open data access as ownership without extra charges, full-fidelity records, and real-time availability, and presents export restrictions as a form of security vendor lock-in.

### Source excerpt

Getting data into a security platform is always easy; getting it back out is where vendors add cost, extra tooling, and latency, and it is the part of the evaluation most teams overlook.

## How to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data

DevFeed: [How to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-correlate-kubernetes-audit-logs-with-container-runtime-data-49069.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/kubernetes-audit-logs-container-escape>)

Author: Isai Anthony

Published: 2026-09-03T15:19:21Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kubernetes.md>), [container escape](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/container-escape.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/container.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/audit.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>), [Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/siem-security.md>), [Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service.md>)

Tags: [amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [container-escape](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container-escape.md>), [control-plane](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control-plane.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes.md>), [kubernetes-audit-logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes-audit-logs.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [pod](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pod.md>), [process](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/process.md>)

### AI overview

This practical Elastic security post explains how to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data. It identifies shared fields, join strategies, context fields, and queries for investigating activity such as secret access, privileged pod creation, and attempted container escape.

### Source excerpt

Two fields join the Kubernetes API to what ran inside the pod, and one turns up a container escape your process events never recorded.

## REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming infostealer

DevFeed: [REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming infostealer](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/revstealer-ramps-up-analysis-of-up-and-coming-infostealer-49106.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer>)

Author: Daniel Stepanic,Salim Bitam,Jia Yu Chan

Published: 2026-09-02T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Malware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/malware.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Social engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/social-engineering.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [VirusTotal](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/virustotal.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>)

Tags: [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [credential-theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-theft.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-analysis.md>), [reporting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reporting.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-labs.md>), [social-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/social-engineering.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [virustotal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virustotal.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security Labs analyzes REVSTEALER, an emerging infostealer that targets browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, gaming accounts, VPN and chat applications, and password managers. The research covers its distribution, credential-harvesting features, anti-analysis mechanisms, blockchain-based infrastructure, and observed campaigns targeting gamers.

### Source excerpt

Elastic Security Labs deep dives into REVSTEALER, an emerging infostealer targeting browsers, wallets, and gaming accounts.

## Linux Detection Engineering - Fileless Execution

DevFeed: [Linux Detection Engineering - Fileless Execution](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/linux-detection-engineering-fileless-execution-49080.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/memfd-create-linux-fileless-execution>)

Author: Ruben Groenewoud

Published: 2026-09-01T14:26:37Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [eBPF](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ebpf.md>), [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>)

Tags: [compression](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compression.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [ebpf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ebpf.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [process](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/process.md>), [processes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processes.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic researchers reproduce five Linux fileless execution patterns, including memfd_create staging, interpreter one-liners, deleted binaries, and in-memory kernel module loading. The publication maps these behaviors to Elastic Defend detection rules and telemetry, explaining why memory-based execution can still be detected through observable process and kernel activity.

### Source excerpt

We reproduced five Linux fileless execution patterns with FENIX, including memfd_create staging, interpreter one-liners, deleted binaries, and in-memory kernel module loads, then mapped each to the Elastic Defend rules that catch it.

## From 88 lines to 1: Detecting DLL hijacking with Elastic Defend

DevFeed: [From 88 lines to 1: Detecting DLL hijacking with Elastic Defend](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/from-88-lines-to-1-detecting-dll-hijacking-with-elastic-defend-49019.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/dll-search-order-hijacking-elastic-defend>)

Author: Ian Garratt,Tamás Péter

Published: 2026-08-28T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [DLL hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dll-hijacking.md>), [ClickFix](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/clickfix.md>), [Endpoint Security & XDR](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security-xdr.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [Microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft.md>), [native aot](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/native-aot.md>), [.NET](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/net.md>)

Tags: [clickfix](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clickfix.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [dll](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dll.md>), [dll-hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dll-hijacking.md>), [edr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edr.md>), [nativeaot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nativeaot.md>), [net](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net.md>), [privilege-escalation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privilege-escalation.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic describes how Elastic Defend 9.5.0 detects DLL search-order hijacking, including a ClickFix campaign that sideloaded a malicious mscoree.dll beside a signed Microsoft binary. The team recreated the attack with a NativeAOT .NET library and observed the load being flagged.

### Source excerpt

The ClickFix campaign that sideloads a malicious mscoree.dll also ships a driver to kill Elastic Endpoint. We rebuilt that DLL as a NativeAOT library, dropped it beside a signed Microsoft binary, and Elastic Defend 9.5.0 flagged the load.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTA4LTI4VDAwOjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjlkMDZmMWY0LTQxODYtNGFhMi1iNjA0LTkxNjM0NjQxMmIxZSJd>)