# Qubes OS

Qubes is a security-oriented, free and open-source operating system for personal computers that allows you to securely compartmentalize your digital life.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## QSB-124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2

DevFeed: [QSB-124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-124-partial-filtering-bypass-in-split-gpg2-134194.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/14/qsb-124/>)

Published: 2026-11-14T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Sanitization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sanitization.md>), [exploit chaining](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit-chaining.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [allowed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allowed.md>), [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [apply](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apply.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [capabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capabilities.md>), [cases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cases.md>), [cause](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cause.md>), [combined](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/combined.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [commands](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commands.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [split](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/split.md>)

### AI overview

QSB-124 describes a split-gpg2 filtering bypass caused by overlong lines: escaping percent characters can push an inquiry response past the protocol's line limit, after which GnuPG may parse the excess as a new command. In supported configurations, a malicious qube could make the backend gpg-agent show a prompt with attacker-chosen text and capture the user's response, but the limited "extra" agent socket prevents extracting or manipulating secret keys. A configuration with `allow_keygen = yes` can permit key extraction, but the bulletin says that setup is unsupported. All supported Qubes OS releases are affected if they use split-gpg2; split-gpg1 is distinct. Update normally; the listed Qubes 4.3 fix is split-gpg2 1.1.16. After installation, shut down relevant templates and restart split-gpg2 backend qubes. Updates may first be in security-testing, then move to stable after community testing.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 124 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 124 ]===--- 2026-11-13 Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2 User action ------------ Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. Summary -------- Split-gpg2 filters incoming gpg-agent commands by parsing them and then reconstructing allowed commands, in some cases by removing or replacing some of their parts. Due to a bug, it is possible for lines to be sent that exceed the line length limit of the protocol. Combined with GnuPG's handling of such overlong lines, this allows commands to be injected that split-gpg2's filtering would normally not allow. Impact ------- In the supported split-gpg2 configuration, a malicious qube can cause the gpg-agent to display a password prompt with arbitrary text and receive the response that the user enters. Such a prompt would have the window borders of the backend (for example, vault) qube, so an attacker could use this to try to trick the user into entering a passphrase. However, if the user's PGP key does not have a passphrase, then such a request might not make sense (e.g., the user might be confused about the passphrase being requested and may not have one to provide). Moreover, in the supported configuration, the vulnerability under discussion does not allow for extracting or manipulating secret keys, since split-gpg2 uses an "extra" gpg-agent socket that has limited capabilities. Therefore, even if the user's PGP key does have a passphrase, and even if the attacker manages to steal that passphrase, the passphrase should be useless to the attacker without the secret key. In

## XSAs released on 2026-11-10

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-11-10](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-11-10-127634.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/xsas-released-on-2026-11-10/>)

Published: 2026-11-10T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [investigation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/investigation.md>), [os](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/os.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisories.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

The Xen Project's XSAs released on 2026-11-10 include issues affecting Qubes OS, but the excerpt does not identify them; it points readers to QSB-123 for details. XSA-529 and XSA-530 do not affect Qubes because Qubes does not use XAPI, and XSA-531 is denial-of-service only; no user action is necessary for these. XSA-532 remains under investigation. Qubes uses Xen, and its XSA tracker records whether each publicly disclosed Xen advisory affects Qubes; QSBs confirm affected advisories but do not confirm unaffected ones.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: XSA-524: See QSB-123. XSA-525: See QSB-123. XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-529: Qubes OS does not use XAPI. XSA-530: Qubes OS does not use XAPI. XSA-531: Denial of service only. XSAs that are still under investigation The Qubes security team is still analyzing the security implications of the following XSA: XSA-532 Once the status of this XSA has been determined, we will update this announcement and the XSA tracker. About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

## QSB-123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)

DevFeed: [QSB-123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-123-amd-cpu-vulnerabilities-xsa-524-xsa-525-127633.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/qsb-123/>)

Published: 2026-11-10T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [IOMMU](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iommu.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [amd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amd.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

QSB-123 covers two Xen advisories published on 2026-11-10. XSA-524 affects some AMD EPYC systems with a specific device configuration: an affected IOMMU may read beyond its configured device table, potentially letting a malicious qube write to arbitrary memory pages and compromise Qubes OS. XSA-525 affects AMD Zen 5 CPUs; a malicious qube may be able to leak data from other qubes. Intel CPUs are not affected by either advisory. For Qubes 4.3, install Xen 4.19.6-4 in dom0 through normal updates. Updates move from security-testing to stable after community testing, usually in one to two weeks; enabling security-testing can deliver them sooner but carries greater risk of bugs. Restart dom0 after installing. Anti Evil Maid users must reseal their secret passphrase because the Xen update changes PCR18+19.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ]===--- 2026-11-10 AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525) User action ------------ Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. Summary -------- On 2026-11-10, the Xen Project published the security advisories below. XSA-524 [5] "AMD IOMMU Out-of-Bounds Device Table Read": | With AMD IOMMUs, the OS or Hypervisor chooses the position and size of | the Device Table, which holds the main configuration information for | devices. | | AMD have disclosed a vulnerability in some IOMMUs, whereby under | specific circumstances they read beyond the size chosen by the OS or | Hypervisor. This gets interpreted as valid configuration data for | certain devices. | | For more information, see: | https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html XSA-525 [6] "x86: Transient Scheduler Attacks (update)": | AMD have discovered further properties of Transient Scheduler Attacks. | | The previously published XSA-471 dealt with two TSA variants, TSA-SQ | and TSA-L1 on Zen3 and Zen4 CPUs. For details, see XSA-471. | | AMD had previously said that Zen5 CPUs were not vulnerable to TSA-SQ and | TSA-L1. This statement has been corrected, and is being tracked as | AMD-SB-7073 using the existing CVE-2024-36350 and CVE-2024-36357. | | AMD have also disclosed a new TSA variant, TSA-Fill, which is being | tracked as AMD-SB-3031 and CVE-2026-0004. | | For more information, see: | https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-471.html | https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/bulletin/technical-guidance-for

## XSAs released on 2026-11-06

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-11-06](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-11-06-122323.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/08/xsas-released-on-2026-11-06/>)

Published: 2026-11-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisories.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

The Xen Project released XSAs on 2026-11-06, and the supplied summary says none affect Qubes OS; XSA-526, XSA-527, and XSA-528 are described as denial-of-service only, with no user action necessary. Qubes OS tracks XSAs because Xen vulnerabilities can sometimes affect it, while Qubes security bulletins confirm affected advisories but cannot confirm unaffected ones. The excerpt omits the XSA list, so those advisory details rely on the supplied summary.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-526: Denial of service only. XSA-527: Denial of service only. XSA-528: Denial of service only. About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

## QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

DevFeed: [QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-122-package-verification-bypass-in-apt-dsa-6607-1-119777.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/06/qsb-122/>)

Published: 2026-11-06T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [apt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/apt.md>), [Command-line interface](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cli.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [apt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apt.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automatically](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automatically.md>), [built-in](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/built-in.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dsa.md>), [package](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/package.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

APT can merge package downloads after an HTTP redirect and mishandle a resumed download, allowing a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package after verification and potentially run code as root. Debian and Whonix qubes are affected; Fedora-only systems are not. Default HTTPS removes the stated network-tampering attack path, but mirror control and manually configured HTTP repositories remain risks. Qubes users should update through the Qubes Update tool, or update dom0 first with `qubes-dom0-update`, then Debian and Whonix templates and standalones with `qubes-vm-update`; do not use `apt` directly. Restart those qubes after updating. The bulletin identifies Qubes 4.3 dom0 fixes in `qubes-core-dom0-linux` 4.3.25 and `qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-update` 4.3.4.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ]===--- 2026-11-06 Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1) User action ------------ If you update Qubes OS using the Qubes Update tool, continue to update normally in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. If you update Qubes OS using command-line tools instead of the Qubes Update tool, you must first update dom0 by itself (without any other qubes) via `qubes-dom0-update` in a dom0 terminal. Only after dom0 has been successfully updated should you update all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones via `qubes-vm-update` in a dom0 terminal. (The Qubes Update tool automatically handles updating in the correct order.) Do not attempt to update any qube using the `apt` command directly, as this bypasses built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Use only the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents in the order described above. [1] After updating dom0 and all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones, we recommend restarting all Debian and Whonix qubes to ensure the updates take effect. Summary -------- On 2026-11-04, the Debian security team published DSA 6607-1, "apt security update" (CVE-2026-109518) [3]: | Max Justicz discovered a vulnerability in the APT package manager. APT | can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives | them the same URI. Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP | download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package | after verification, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code as | root. Also see "APT-2026-11-01 security update." [4] Impact ------- An attacker who controls an update mirror or who ca

## XSAs released on 2026-11-03

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-11-03](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-11-03-115873.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/xsas-released-on-2026-11-03/>)

Published: 2026-11-03T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [os](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/os.md>), [project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/project.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tracker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tracker.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

The November 3, 2026 Xen advisory notice says Qubes OS is affected by XSA-523 and directs readers to QSB-121 for details. It lists no XSAs as unaffected. The notice explains that Xen vulnerabilities can affect Qubes OS because it uses the Xen hypervisor; QSBs confirm affected advisories, while Qubes tracks all disclosed XSAs separately to record whether each affects the OS.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: XSA-523: See QSB-121. XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: (none) About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

## QSB-121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)

DevFeed: [QSB-121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-121-arbitrary-read-write-via-grant-copy-xsa-523-115872.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/qsb-121/>)

Published: 2026-11-03T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [batch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batch.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [cases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cases.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [contain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contain.md>), [copy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/copy.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptographic-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic-signatures.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [details](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/details.md>), [frame](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/frame.md>), [general](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/general.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/write.md>)

### AI overview

QSB-121 reports Xen XSA-523 (CVE-2026-102703 and CVE-2026-102704), in which incorrect revalidation of cached data during batched grant-copy operations could mix frame numbers with grant references or misapply a restriction on copying by frame number. A malicious qube could consequently read or write arbitrary memory in other qubes, including dom0. All supported Qubes OS releases and configurations are affected. For Qubes 4.3, the bulletin identifies Xen 4.19.6-3 in dom0 as the fix; it is to move from security-testing to stable after community testing. Users should continue normal updates, install the package through the Qubes Update tool or command-line equivalent when available, then restart dom0. Anti Evil Maid users must reseal their secret passphrase because PCR18 and PCR19 change with the new Xen binaries.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 121 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 121 ]===--- 2026-11-03 Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523) User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- On 2026-11-03, the Xen Project published XSA-523, "arbitrary read/write via grant copy" (CVE-2026-102703,CVE-2026-102704) [3]: | A common access pattern is a batch of Grant Copy operations acting on | adjacent address ranges in the same source or destination page. For | performance reasons, Xen caches details internally to reuse already | validated data. The conditions on when to re-validate the internal | data were not correct in some cases: | | - Frame numbers and grant references could wrongly be mixed up. This | is CVE-2026-102703. | | - Copying by frame number (rather than grant reference) is permitted | only when operating on the caller's own memory. The check to | enforce this restriction was misplaced. This is CVE-2026-102704. Impact ------- A malicious qube can read and write arbitrary memory belonging to other qubes, including dom0. Affected systems ----------------- All supported Qubes OS releases and configurations are affected. Patching --------- The following packages contain security updates that address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.3, in dom0: - Xen packages, version 4.19.6-3 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed via the Qubes Update too

## Fedora 43 approaching end of life

DevFeed: [Fedora 43 approaching end of life](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/fedora-43-approaching-end-of-life-111010.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/01/fedora-43-approaching-end-of-life/>)

Published: 2026-11-01T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Fedora](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fedora.md>), [upgrade](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/upgrade.md>), [dnf](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnf.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [advanced](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [dnf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnf.md>), [end-of-life](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/end-of-life.md>), [eol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eol.md>), [fedora](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fedora.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [install](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/install.md>), [recommended](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recommended.md>)

### AI overview

Fedora 43 is scheduled to reach end of life on 2026-12-09, so Fedora templates and standalone installations should be upgraded by then. The recommended route is to install a replacement template: it is simpler, but does not retain custom modifications, which must be redone, and existing users must be switched to the new template. The `dnf history` command can show package manager actions in the old template. An in-place upgrade preserves modifications but may be harder for less experienced users. No action is needed for dom0's OS version.

### Source excerpt

Fedora 43 is currently scheduled to reach end of life (EOL) on 2026-12-09 (approximately one month from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL. There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release: Recommended: Install a new template to replace an existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won't preserve any modifications you've made to your template. After you install the new template, you'll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the dnf history command. Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. This option will preserve any modifications you've made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users. Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

## Qubes OS Summit 2026 starts today!

DevFeed: [Qubes OS Summit 2026 starts today!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-summit-2026-starts-today-109513.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/30/qubes-os-summit-2026-starts-today/>)

Published: 2026-10-30T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Developer Events](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-events.md>), [AdventureX 2026](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/adventurex2026.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [berlin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/berlin.md>), [computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing.md>), [conference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conference.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [discussion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/discussion.md>), [exclusive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exclusive.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [friday](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/friday.md>), [germany](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/germany.md>), [hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackathon.md>), [interactive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interactive.md>), [live](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/live.md>), [live-stream](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/live-stream.md>), [livestream](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/livestream.md>), [matrix](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matrix.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [os](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/os.md>), [summit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/summit.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes OS Summit 2026 runs October 30 to November 1 in Berlin, with a public livestream. Attendees can join in person with a paid ticket, participate online with a free virtual ticket, or watch the livestream and recordings without registering. In-person access includes the hackathon, scheduled design sessions, live audience participation, and presentations withheld from livestream and recording. The virtual ticket supports remote presenters and audience questions or discussion in the Matrix room, but excludes those in-person activities and non-streamed presentations. Passive viewing offers no live interaction or event access. Presentations marked "no recording" are available only to on-site attendees.

### Source excerpt

Qubes OS Summit 2026 is finally here! Today, Friday, October 30, marks the first day of the Summit, which will begin at 9:30am CET (UTC+1) in Berlin, Germany. Whether you're joining us in person at Refugio Berlin or online via the livestream, we're excited for you to see the presentations our speakers have prepared for you! Still need a ticket, or not sure if you do? There are three ways to attend the Summit: In person at Refugio Berlin Requires a paid on-site ticket Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule) Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member Actively participate online Requires a free virtual ticket For those who are presenting remotely For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in the Matrix room (#qubes-summit:matrix.org) during the presentations Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member Passively view online No ticket or registration required For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public live stream and recorded videos Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Does not grant

## Qubes OS Summit 2026: Nitrokey sponsorship; last call for tickets!

DevFeed: [Qubes OS Summit 2026: Nitrokey sponsorship; last call for tickets!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-summit-2026-nitrokey-sponsorship-last-call-for-tickets-93949.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/qubes-os-summit-2026-nitrokey-sponsorship-last-call-for-tickets/>)

Published: 2026-10-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Developer Events](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-events.md>), [Digital Public Good](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-public-goods.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [berlin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/berlin.md>), [conference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conference.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [desktops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/desktops.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackathon.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [interactive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interactive.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [laptops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptops.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [os](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/os.md>), [presentations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/presentations.md>), [smartphones](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smartphones.md>), [sponsorship](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sponsorship.md>), [summit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/summit.md>), [tickets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tickets.md>)

### AI overview

Nitrokey joined Qubes OS Summit 2026 as a Silver-tier sponsor; several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS. The summit runs October 30-November 1 at Refugio Berlin, with three attendance options: paid in-person tickets include hackathon workshops, possible design sessions, and access to presentations, including sessions not streamed or recorded; a free virtual ticket allows remote presenters and attendees to participate in live chat but excludes those in-person activities and presentations; passive livestream and video viewing requires no registration but does not allow questions or discussion. Presenters may opt out of recording, in which case only on-site attendees can view that presentation. The source says on-site tickets are over halfway gone.

### Source excerpt

We're proud to announce that Nitrokey has joined as a Qubes OS Summit 2026 Silver-tier sponsor! Nitrokey is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS. In addition, with the conference nearly a week away and on-site tickets over halfway gone, this serves as our last call for tickets! If you'd like to join us in person, please see below for details. When and where Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM -- Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1) Refugio Berlin Lenaustraße 3-4 12047 Berlin View on OpenStreetMap Attend in person or online There are three ways to attend the Summit: In person at Refugio Berlin Requires a paid on-site ticket Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule) Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member Actively participate online Requires a free virtual ticket For those who are presenting remotely For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member Passively view online No ticket or registration required For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and

## The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is Qubes certified!

DevFeed: [The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is Qubes certified!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-star-labs-starbook-horizon-is-qubes-certified-93950.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starbook-horizon-qubes-certified/>)

Author: The Star Labs; Qubes teams

Published: 2026-10-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [coreboot](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/coreboot.md>)

Tags: [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [certification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certification.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [coreboot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coreboot.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [horizon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/horizon.md>), [install](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/install.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [intel-core-i3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel-core-i3.md>), [kill-switch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kill-switch.md>), [labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/labs.md>), [laptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptop.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [operating-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operating-system.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>), [releases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/releases.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [star](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/star.md>)

### AI overview

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is certified for Qubes OS Release 4 when configured with the Standard Intel Core i3-N305 base option, any listed storage option, and Qubes OS 4.3.1 or newer. Older Qubes versions are not certified. Star Labs may preinstall Qubes or users may install it themselves without affecting certification. The Plus Intel Core i5-1334U configuration has not been tested or certified; the source says the vendor does not anticipate significant barriers but has not yet received the unit for testing. Qubes certification applies to a specific hardware configuration supported by Qubes and requires vendors to offer that same configuration for at least one year. It does not cover vendor practices or guarantee that hardware remains unmodified during shipping.

### Source excerpt

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarBook Horizon is officially certified for Qubes OS Release 4! The Star Labs StarBook Horizon The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is a 13.4-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, up to 32 GB of memory, Wi-Fi kill switch, integrated webcam cover, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more. Qubes-certified options The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below. Base Configuration Certified: Standard (Intel Core i3-N305) The Plus configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification. Storage Certified: All of the available options in these sections Operating System Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.1 or newer (within Release 4). Releases older than 4.3.1 are not certified. You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification. Disclaimers As mentioned above, the "Plus" base configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification. What is Qubes-certified hardware? Qubes-certified hardware is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements, and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year. Qubes-certified computers are specific models that

## The Star Labs StarFighter is Qubes certified!

DevFeed: [The Star Labs StarFighter is Qubes certified!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-star-labs-starfighter-is-qubes-certified-93951.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starfighter-qubes-certified/>)

Author: The Star Labs; Qubes teams

Published: 2026-10-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [coreboot](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/coreboot.md>), [virtual machines](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/virtual-machines.md>)

Tags: [4k](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/4k.md>), [amd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amd.md>), [announce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announce.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [certification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certification.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [coreboot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coreboot.md>), [display](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/display.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [kill-switch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kill-switch.md>), [labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/labs.md>), [laptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptop.md>), [lpddr5x](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lpddr5x.md>), [me](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/me.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [operating-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operating-system.md>), [os](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/os.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [star](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/star.md>)

### AI overview

The Star Labs StarFighter is certified for Qubes OS Release 4 with Standard (Core Ultra 5 125H, 32GB, QHD) and Ultra (Core Ultra 9 285H, 64GB, 4K) configurations; the AMD configuration is not certified. Certification requires Qubes OS 4.3.2 or newer within Release 4, and preinstallation by Star Labs is optional. All listed storage options are certified. The 4K model works at Full HD by default because Qubes OS lacks proper HiDPI support; manually selecting 4K may cause UI scaling and full-screen video performance issues. Certification covers support for the specified hardware configuration, not vendor practices or hardware changes during shipping.

### Source excerpt

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarFighter is officially certified for Qubes OS Release 4! The Star Labs StarFighter The Star Labs StarFighter is a 16-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, disabled Intel ME, up to 64 GB of memory, wireless kill switch, removable webcam, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more. Qubes-certified options The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below. Base Configuration Certified: Standard (Intel Core Ultra 5 125H + 32GB LPDDR5X + QHD display) Certified: Ultra (Intel Core Ultra 9 285H + 64GB LPDDR5X + 4K display) The AMD configuration is not certified. Warning: While both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release. Operating System Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.2 or newer (within Release 4). Releases older than 4.3.2 are not certified. You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification. Storage & Additional Storage Certified: All of the available options in these sections Disclaimers As mentioned above, while both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release. What is

## XSAs released on 2026-10-13

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-10-13](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-10-13-85901.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/13/xsas-released-on-2026-10-13/>)

Published: 2026-10-13T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [Fedora Project Community](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fedora-project-community.md>)

Tags: [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisories.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>), [xen-4-22](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen-4-22.md>)

### AI overview

The Xen Project released XSAs 514-521, and Qubes OS reports that none affect its security. The notice explains why each advisory does not apply, including differences in Xen versions, unused features, disabled grant tables, hardware requirements, and supported architectures. It says no user action is necessary.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-514: Affects only Xen 4.22 or higher; Qubes OS 4.3 uses Xen 4.19. Affects only Xenstore live update, which is not used in Qubes OS. XSA-515: Up-to-date systems are not affected. Only systems running outdated AMD microcode from before 2023 are affected. XSA-516: Only systems with 5 TiB of RAM or higher are affected, which is not the target hardware class for Qubes OS. XSA-517: Grant tables v2 are disabled at build time in Qubes OS. XSA-518: Denial of service only. In-VM only. XSA-519: ARM only. Qubes OS does not support ARM. XSA-520: Denial of service only. XSA-521: Tapdisk is not used in Qubes OS. About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security o

## XSAs released on 2026-10-09

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-10-09](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-10-09-83993.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/09/xsas-released-on-2026-10-09/>)

Published: 2026-10-09T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [least privilege](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/least-privilege.md>)

Tags: [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

The Xen Project released security advisories, but none affect Qubes OS. XSA-522 is a denial-of-service issue, and the announcement says no user action is necessary. Qubes OS tracks disclosed Xen advisories and publishes notices about their impact.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-522: Denial of service only. About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

## QSB-120: Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities

DevFeed: [QSB-120: Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-120-two-ctap-proxy-vulnerabilities-67012.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/08/qsb-120/>)

Published: 2026-10-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>), [Bug Bounty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bugbounty.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passkeys.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 120 describes two vulnerabilities in the Qubes CTAP proxy. The flaws can let a qube send request types or use credentials beyond those permitted by configured RPC policies. The bulletin says affected users should update normally; the patched qubes-ctap package is version 2.0.8 for Qubes 4.3, followed by restarting USB qubes after updating their templates.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 120: Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 120 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 120 ]===--- 2026-10-08 Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Background ----------- The Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) is a standard governing the interoperation of authentication devices, such as hardware security keys, with client platforms, such as laptops. Qubes OS has a feature known as the Qubes CTAP proxy [3] that enables a USB authentication device to be used in a given qube without exposing that qube to the full USB stack, similar to the way the USB keyboard and mouse proxies [4] work in Qubes. There are multiple versions of CTAP, different ways it can be used, and various related components that can work with it, so there's a variety of other terms that you might see associated with CTAP, such as U2F, CTAP1, CTAP2, FIDO2, WebAuthn, and passkeys. Qubes users can write RPC policies [5] to control the way CTAP requests forwarded through the CTAP proxy are handled. There are various request types that are handled by different qrexec services: ctap.ClientPin, ctap.GetInfo, u2f.Authenticate, and u2f.Register. In addition, users can limit the u2f.Authenticate service to specific credentials by allowing only specific qrexec service arguments. Summary -------- This QSB describes two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities: Vulnerability 1: CTAP requests are supposed to match their requested service types, but the CTAP proxy fails to enforce this. Vulnerability 2: When RPC policies limit a qube to sending requests with specific service arguments, the u2f.Authenticat

## Qubes OS 4.3.2 has been released!

DevFeed: [Qubes OS 4.3.2 has been released!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-4-3-2-has-been-released-64243.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/02/qubes-os-4-3-2-has-been-released/>)

Published: 2026-10-02T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [known exploitable vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/known-exploitable-vulnerabilities.md>)

Tags: [end-of-life](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/end-of-life.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>), [releases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/releases.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes OS 4.3.2 is a stable patch release that consolidates security updates and bug fixes. It upgrades the default Fedora template to Fedora 44 and kernel-latest to Linux 7.2. Users on Qubes 4.3 can update normally; users on 4.2 are urged to upgrade because that release is end of life. The release also documents a known issue affecting some templates restored from pre-4.3 backups.

### Source excerpt

We're pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.3.2! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security updates and bug fixes that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files are available on the downloads page. Announcements Qubes OS Summit 2026 is coming up soon! This year's Summit will take place from October 30 to November 1 in Berlin. As a reminder, Qubes 4.2 has reached end of life (EOL). If you're still using Qubes 4.2, we urge you to upgrade to Qubes 4.3 immediately. What's new in Qubes 4.3.2? Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 44 kernel-latest upgraded to Linux 7.2 Security updates Numerous bug fixes For an overview of what's new in Qubes 4.3, see the Qubes 4.3 release notes. How to get Qubes 4.3.2 If you'd like to install Qubes for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there's never been a better time to do so! Simply download the Qubes 4.3.2 ISO and follow our installation guide. If you're currently on Qubes 4.3 (including 4.3.0, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2-rc1), update normally (which includes upgrading any EOL templates and standalones you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.3.2 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required. If you're still using Qubes 4.2, you should upgrade from 4.2 to 4.3 immediately, since Qubes 4.2 has already reached end of life (EOL). In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup beforehand. Known issues in Qubes 4.3.2 It's possible that templates restored in 4.3.2 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos (#8701). After restoring such templates in 4.3.2, enter the following additional commands in a dom0 terminal: sudo qubes-dom0-update -y qubes-dist-upgrade sudo qubes-dist-upgrad

## Qubes OS Summit 2026: Freedom of the Press Foundation and NovaCustom sponsorships; conference schedule available!

DevFeed: [Qubes OS Summit 2026: Freedom of the Press Foundation and NovaCustom sponsorships; conference schedule available!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-summit-2026-freedom-of-the-press-foundation-and-novacustom-sponsorships-conference-schedule-available-60544.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/27/qubes-os-summit-2026-freedom-of-the-press-foundation-and-novacustom-sponsorships-conference-schedule-available/>)

Published: 2026-09-27T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [QCon Software Development Conference](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/qcon-software-development-conference.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [coreboot](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/coreboot.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [conference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conference.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes OS Summit 2026 announced Gold-tier sponsorship from the Freedom of the Press Foundation and Silver-tier sponsorship from NovaCustom, and shared its conference schedule. The article describes SecureDrop and Qubes OS development, NovaCustom's privacy-focused devices and coreboot firmware, and options for attending the summit in person or online.

### Source excerpt

We're proud to announce two new Qubes OS Summit 2026 sponsorships: Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) as a Gold-tier sponsor and NovaCustom as a Silver-tier sponsor! The FPF is a long-standing Qubes Partner. As a nonprofit organization, it is dedicated to supporting and defending public interest journalism. It leads the development of SecureDrop, an open-source whistleblower submission platform used by more than 50 media organizations around the world to securely accept documents from anonymous sources. FPF uses Qubes OS in the development of an integrated SecureDrop Workstation. NovaCustom builds custom laptops, mini PCs, and smartphones with a focus on privacy, security, and customization. They offer the freedom of Dasharo coreboot firmware, true repairability, and a plethora of customization options. Several NovaCustom models are officially certified for Qubes OS. Conference schedule We're also pleased to share the official conference schedule, including a list of sessions and speakers, which you can find here: https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/schedule/ (Please note that we're still waiting on a few speakers to confirm their attendance, so this schedule is subject to change.) On-site tickets are nearly halfway sold out, so if you'd like to join us in person, we recommend getting your tickets soon! See below for details. When and where Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM -- Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1) Refugio Berlin Lenaustraße 3-4 12047 Berlin View on OpenStreetMap Attend in person or online There are three ways to attend the Summit: In person at Refugio Berlin Requires a paid on-site ticket Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule) Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Grants access to attend

## Qubes OS 4.3.2-rc1 is available for testing

DevFeed: [Qubes OS 4.3.2-rc1 is available for testing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-4-3-2-rc1-is-available-for-testing-55322.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/18/qubes-os-4-3-2-rc1-available-for-testing/>)

Published: 2026-09-18T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Software Testing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-testing.md>), [Fedora](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fedora.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bug.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [patches](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/patches.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [fedora](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fedora.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [patches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patches.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>), [releases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/releases.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/testing.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes OS 4.3.2-rc1 is available for testing. The patch release consolidates security patches, bug fixes, and other updates since Qubes 4.3.1, including an upgrade to Fedora 44 and Linux 7.2. The release process will continue through bug reporting, triage, and fixes before stable publication.

### Source excerpt

The first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.3.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the release of Qubes 4.3.1. What's new in Qubes 4.3.2? Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 44 kernel-latest upgraded to Linux 7.2 Numerous bug fixes When is the stable release? That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we're left with an RC that's good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict with certainty, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses. Since the changes between 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are relatively minor, we currently don't anticipate any major problems requiring a second RC. We currently expect to be able to publish the stable 4.3.2 release around the end of September. How to test Qubes 4.3.2-rc1 If you'd like to help us test this RC, the best way to do so is by performing a clean installation with the new ISO. As always, we strongly recommend making a full backup beforehand and updating Qubes OS immediately afterward in order to apply all available bug fixes. As an alternative to a clean installation, there's also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.3.2 is a patch release, it's essentially Qubes 4.3 inclusive of all updates to date, which largely amounts to just using a fully-updated 4.3 installation. By contrast, a clean installation covers other areas that could also benefit from testing, such as the installation procedure, which

## QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm

DevFeed: [QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-119-potential-attacker-controlled-format-string-in-qvm-open-in-vm-47159.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/15/qsb-119/>)

Published: 2026-09-15T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [Debian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/debian.md>)

Tags: [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [debian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/debian.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 119 describes a potential attacker-controlled format-string vulnerability in qvm-open-in-vm. Under certain conditions, exploiting an attacker-controlled filename or path could allow code execution in the qube where the command was invoked. Supported Qubes OS releases are affected, with Debian templates identified among the affected official templates; users should continue updating normally.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ]===--- 2026-09-15 Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- Under certain circumstances (see "Technical details" below), if the user invokes qvm-open-in-vm (either directly or through the "Edit in disposable qube" GUI integration) on a file with an attacker-controlled filename or path, the attacker might be able to execute code in the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm. Impact ------- An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can take control over the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm. Affected systems ----------------- All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Among official Qubes OS templates, only Debian templates are affected. Technical details ------------------ When qvm-open-in-vm is invoked with a file (not an URI), the source-side part of the qrexec call is handled by the qopen-in-vm helper program. After sending the file content to the other side, qopen-in-vm tries to open a temporary file alongside the original file in order to save the response in case the user has edited the file in the target qube. If creating this file fails (e.g., because the directory is read-only), qopen-in-vm creates a temporary file in /tmp and shows an error message to the user. When printing this error message, it incorrectly invokes the gui_nonfatal function, such that the original filename ends up in a printf format string, which is unsafe. For this vul

## Qubes Canary 048

DevFeed: [Qubes Canary 048](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-canary-048-47158.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/09/canary-048/>)

Published: 2026-09-09T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [canary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/canary.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Canary 048 announces a new signed security canary for the Qubes project. It includes statements about the issue date, security bulletins, the master signing key fingerprint, warrants, and the expected publication window for the next canary.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Canary 048. The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement. Qubes Canary 048 ---===[ Qubes Canary 048 ]===--- Statements ----------- The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1] state the following: 1. The date of issue of this canary is September 09, 2026. 2. There have been 118 Qubes security bulletins published so far. 3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce backdoors). 5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first fourteen days of December 2026. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special announcements ---------------------- None. Disclaimers and notes ---------------------- We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads. This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to produce false declarations. The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance. This declaration is merely

## XSAs released on 2026-09-08

DevFeed: [XSAs released on 2026-09-08](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/xsas-released-on-2026-09-08-47157.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/08/xsas-released-on-2026-09-08/>)

Published: 2026-09-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [DDoS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ddos.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

The Xen Project released XSAs 509 through 513. None affect Qubes OS, so no user action is required. The notice explains how Qubes OS tracks Xen advisories and determines their impact.

### Source excerpt

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected. XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS: (none) XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary: XSA-509: Denial of service only. XSA-510: Denial of service only. XSA-511: Qubes OS does not use XSM silo. XSA-512: Qubes OS does not use oxenstored. XSA-513: Qubes OS does not use tapdisk. About this announcement Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

## QSB-118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting

DevFeed: [QSB-118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-118-dom0-arbitrary-code-execution-in-qvm-copy-to-vm-error-reporting-47156.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/29/qsb-118/>)

Published: 2026-08-29T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [Command-line interface](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cli.md>)

Tags: [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploit.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 118 describes a vulnerability in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting. A compromised qube can inject an arbitrary command into dom0 when a user copies a file from dom0 to that qube. Users should continue updating normally to receive the security fixes.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 118 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 118 ]===--- 2026-08-28 Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- If `qvm-copy-to-vm` is used to copy a file from dom0 to a malicious qube, that qube can inject an arbitrary command into dom0. Impact ------- If an attacker has compromised a qube, and if the user initiates a `qvm-copy-to-vm` call from dom0 to the compromised qube, then the attacker can exploit this vulnerability in order to inject an arbitrary command into dom0, which allows the attacker to take control of Qubes OS. Technical details ------------------ The `qvm-copy-to-vm` tool allows copying files from dom0 to a specified qube. It uses the "qfile" protocol, which is a simplified archive format, including simple file metadata (much simpler than `tar` or `cpio`). The protocol also includes transfer confirmation at the end, which is sent by the target back to the source. This confirmation includes a checksum of all the transferred files, an error code (if any), and the name of the last received file. In the case of an error, as reported by the error code field, dom0 displays a GUI message that includes the error information and the name of the affected file, as reported by the target qube. The vulnerability exists in the processing of that file name: 1. The `wait_for_result()` function calls `sanitize_remote_filename()` on the received name before passing it to the error handler: linux-utils/qrexec-lib/pack.c: 55 static v

## QSB-117: Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities

DevFeed: [QSB-117: Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-117-intel-cpu-firmware-vulnerabilities-47155.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/28/qsb-117/>)

Published: 2026-08-28T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/intel.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cpu.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/systems.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [pgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pgp.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 117 reports that several Intel processor firmware advisories may affect Qubes OS. The bulletin says affected systems could permit cross-qube attacks, including inferring data from other qubes or escalating privileges. Users should continue normal updates to receive the relevant security fixes.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 117: Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 117 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 117 ]===--- 2026-08-28 Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- On 2026-08-11, Intel published "microcode-20260811 Release," [3] which is associated with several Intel security advisories. Among these security advisories, we suspect the following may apply to Qubes OS: - "2026.3 IPU, Intel Processor Load Value Injection Zero Data Advisory" (INTEL-SA-01423) [4] - "Intel Processor Firmware Advisory - 01428" (INTEL-SA-01428) [5] - "Intel Processor Firmware Advisory - 01435" (INTEL-SA-01435) [6] - "2026.3 IPU, Intel Processor Firmware Advisory" (INTEL-SA-01441) [7] - "2026.3 IPU, Intel Xeon Processor Firmware Advisory" (INTEL-SA-01442) [8] Unfortunately, these advisories do not provide sufficient information for us to make a definitive assessment about the extent to which these vulnerabilities affect the security of Qubes OS. Based on the limited information available, we cannot exclude possibility of a cross-qube attack. Impact ------- On affected systems, an attacker who has managed to compromise one qube can attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities in order to infer data belonging to other qubes or escalate their privileges. Affected systems ----------------- Only systems with one of the following Intel CPUs are affected by at least some of the advisories: - 10th Generation Intel Core - 11th Generation Intel Core - Intel Core Ultra, Series 1 to 3 - various Xeon variants For a more detailed list of affected products see Intel's advisories. No

## Qubes OS Summit 2026: Proposals closing soon; tickets still available!

DevFeed: [Qubes OS Summit 2026: Proposals closing soon; tickets still available!](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qubes-os-summit-2026-proposals-closing-soon-tickets-still-available-47154.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/22/qubes-os-summit-2026-proposals-closing-soon-tickets-still-available/>)

Published: 2026-08-22T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/computing.md>), [Hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hackathon.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [berlin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/berlin.md>), [conference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conference.md>), [hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackathon.md>), [livestream](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/livestream.md>), [summit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/summit.md>), [virtual](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virtual.md>), [workshops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workshops.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes OS Summit 2026 is accepting presentation proposals until August 31, 2026. The summit will take place in Berlin from October 30 to November 1, with in-person and online participation options, including a hackathon and workshops for on-site attendees.

### Source excerpt

As previously announced, the call for proposals for Qubes OS Summit 2026 will end on 2026-08-31. If you'd like to present at the Summit, please submit your proposal soon! As a reminder: You may present either on site or virtually from anywhere in the world. If your proposal is accepted and you wish to present in person, you'll be issued an on-site ticket free of charge, no purchase necessary. If you select "Don't record this session" when submitting your proposal, your presentation will not be livestreamed or recorded. Online attendees will not be able to view it. When and where Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM -- Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1) (A more specific schedule will be published after the speaker lineup is finalized.) Refugio Berlin Lenaustraße 3-4 12047 Berlin View on OpenStreetMap Attend in person or online There are three ways to attend the Summit: In person at Refugio Berlin Requires a paid on-site ticket Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule) Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member Actively participate online Requires a free virtual ticket For those who are presenting remotely For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below) Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member Passively view online No ticket or registra

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