# RIPE Labs Latest articles from RIPE Labs This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia DevFeed: [CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Anastasiya Pak Published: 2026-09-17T17:29:36Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Routing Security](), [networking](), [Networks]() Tags: [2026](), [adoption](), [aspa](), [atlas](), [central](), [connectivity](), [country](), [events](), [internet](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [progress](), [region](), [report](), [research](), [ripe](), [ris](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [traffic]() ### AI overview This report examines changes in Central Asia's Internet connectivity since CAPIF 1. It describes more direct regional routes, expanding IXPs, stronger routing security and new links toward Pakistan, China, Azerbaijan and Europe, while noting persistently low IPv6 adoption and continued, though reduced, reliance on routes through Russia. ### Source excerpt Central Asia's Internet looks very different than it did back at CAPIF 1. We trace the rise of direct regional routes, stronger routing security and new connectivity options - along with the gaps that remain. ## The /3 Body Problem DevFeed: [The /3 Body Problem]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Remco van Mook Published: 2026-09-10T09:22:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [networking](), [Internet](), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)]() Tags: [article](), [ietf](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [networking](), [policy](), [space]() ### AI overview The article examines how IPv6 addressing and policy mechanisms may need to evolve for space networking. It argues that terrestrial assumptions break down beyond low Earth orbit and calls for addressing policy questions now, including through the proposed EXPANSE working group. ### Source excerpt A large chunk of IPv6 is heading for space, and every policy question about it is currently going to be deferred to the RIR communities. This article outlines what those questions look like, and argues why now is the time to start asking them. ## The Internet's New Edge Builders DevFeed: [The Internet's New Edge Builders]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Arman Obosyan Published: 2026-09-08T06:55:03Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Cloud](), [Networks](), [Network](), [amazon](), [Google](), [Meta](), [Microsoft]() Tags: [amazon](), [architecture](), [article](), [atlas](), [cdn](), [cloud](), [google](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [internet-infrastructure](), [measurements](), [meta](), [microsoft](), [network](), [networks](), [peering](), [research](), [systems]() ### AI overview The article examines how content and cloud platforms are moving from operating private backbones toward controlling delivery infrastructure closer to users. It discusses the changing role of traditional CDNs, public measurements of international bandwidth, private interconnection and caches within access networks, and what Google and Meta deployments reveal about network operators. ### Source excerpt After building private backbones, content and cloud platforms are now moving closer to users. In doing so, they are taking on delivery roles once associated mainly with independent CDNs. ## Closing the IPv6 First-Packet Gap with GRAND DevFeed: [Closing the IPv6 First-Packet Gap with GRAND]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Seyed Pouria Mousavizadeh Tehrani Published: 2026-09-04T13:32:29Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Network](), [Internet](), [reactive](), [Latency]() Tags: [competition](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [latency](), [network](), [open-source](), [reactive]() ### AI overview The article explains an IPv6 Neighbour Discovery asymmetry: a host can reach its router immediately after configuring an address, while the router may not yet know how to reach the host. This can delay or drop the first return packets. GRAND addresses the gap by having the host proactively advertise its address, and the article describes an implementation of this mechanism in FreeBSD. ### Source excerpt There is a subtle asymmetry in IPv6 Neighbour Discovery: a host knows how to reach its router before the router necessarily knows how to reach the host. GRAND fixes that asymmetry by making the host proactively advertise its address, and I implemented that mechanism in FreeBSD. ## When Traceroutes Lie: How TTL Jumps Can Give Us a False Impression of the Internet's Topology DevFeed: [When Traceroutes Lie: How TTL Jumps Can Give Us a False Impression of the Internet's Topology]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Sebastian Kappes Published: 2026-09-03T12:03:26Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Networks](), [debugging]() Tags: [atlas](), [competition](), [debugging](), [internet](), [measurements](), [networks](), [research](), [router]() ### AI overview This article explains how routers that rewrite or fail to decrement TTL values can cause traceroute to omit entire networks and create a false impression of Internet topology. It describes the normal traceroute mechanism and measurements using RIPE Atlas probes to investigate the behavior. ### Source excerpt Traceroute is a powerful tool for uncovering how packets travel across the Internet. However, as we recently discovered, some routers tamper with the TTL values in traceroute's probing packets, giving you a false view of how networks are actually interconnected. ## Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice in Internet Operations DevFeed: [Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice in Internet Operations]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Jelena Cosic Published: 2026-09-02T08:29:12Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Network](), [data]() Tags: [collaboration](), [community](), [data](), [data-protection](), [events](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [network](), [privacy](), [research](), [security]() ### AI overview The article examines how Internet researchers and network operators can build more deliberate, lasting collaboration beyond chance encounters at RIPE Meetings. ### Source excerpt Internet research can benefit from operational insight, and network operators from research expertise. Building on what we learned at RIPE 92, we look at practical ways to make those connections easier and turn promising conversations into lasting collaboration. ## The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace DevFeed: [The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthias Wichtlhuber Published: 2026-09-01T12:20:33Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Databases](), [Internet]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [competition](), [data](), [database](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [overview](), [research](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [series]() ### AI overview This article analyzes which parts of the Internet Route Registry landscape can safely be replaced by RPKI using traffic and route-server data from AMS-IX and DE-CIX. It concludes that third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain important for BGP filter generation. ### Source excerpt In the third part of our IRR landscape series, we use traffic measurements from AMS-IX and DE-CIX to assess which parts of the IRR landscape can safely be replaced with RPKI. Third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain essential for BGP filter generation. ## DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure: Beyond Definitions and Blocklists DevFeed: [DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure: Beyond Definitions and Blocklists]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Andrew Campling Published: 2026-08-24T11:30:19Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [analysis](), [article](), [competition](), [dns](), [governance](), [malware](), [research](), [security]() ### AI overview The article examines evidence that malicious actors may control a substantial share of new generic top-level domain registrations. It discusses estimates that at least 10% of domains registered in 2025 appeared on security blocklists, while the share associated with malicious actors may be closer to 20%. It also evaluates how definitions of DNS Abuse, evidentiary standards, and analytical methods affect these estimates, emphasizing that ICANN's contractual definition is limited to botnets, malware, pharming, phishing, and qualifying spam. ### Source excerpt Evidence suggests that criminals may control a substantial share of new gTLD registrations. Although the precise scale remains contested, the article asks whether current DNS Abuse measures adequately address wider misuse of domain names. ## Deploying IPv6-first EKS on AWS: What Still Doesn't Work, and What It Saves DevFeed: [Deploying IPv6-first EKS on AWS: What Still Doesn't Work, and What It Saves]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Spiro Stathakis Published: 2026-08-14T08:57:28Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service](), [Amazon Web Services](), [VPC](), [networking](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [Kubernetes]() Tags: [2026](), [amazon](), [amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service](), [aws](), [cni](), [competition](), [cost](), [ip](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [kubernetes](), [nat](), [networking](), [networks](), [vpc]() ### AI overview A field report on deploying an IPv6-first Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service platform on AWS. It explains how IPv6 pods, VPC networking, and an egress-only Internet gateway reduce dependence on NAT gateways and public IPv4 addresses, while legacy IPv4-only dependencies such as databases, payment APIs, and container registries still impose compatibility requirements and costs. ### Source excerpt In this field report on IPv6-first Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS), the isp6 team shares which dependencies still drag IPv4 back in, what they learnt from /28s, and why the saving is large but not automatic. ## Multiple LIR Accounts: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead DevFeed: [Multiple LIR Accounts: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Marco Schmidt Published: 2026-08-12T12:47:22Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Networks](), [.NET 11]() Tags: [administration](), [article](), [complexity](), [ip](), [ipv4](), [networks](), [operational](), [policy]() ### AI overview The article examines how allowing RIPE NCC members to operate multiple Local Internet Registry (LIR) accounts evolved from a solution for limited organizational situations into a source of disproportionate operational complexity. It reviews the effects of IPv4 exhaustion, the last /8 policy, and the IPv4 transfer market, then explains the Internet Registry System and the rationale for simplifying the current model. ### Source excerpt Why a feature introduced for a handful of members became one of the RIPE NCC's most complex operational challenges. ## Two Providers, a Stubborn Plateau and a Very Long Tail: Email in the Tranco Top-1M DevFeed: [Two Providers, a Stubborn Plateau and a Very Long Tail: Email in the Tranco Top-1M]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Artem Berezin Published: 2026-07-30T11:49:26Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Time Series](), [microsoft 365](), [Resilience](), [Google](), [Microsoft](), [migration](), [Server](), [Internet](), [data](), [Software as a service](), [proofpoint]() Tags: [2026](), [authentication](), [competition](), [data](), [dns](), [google](), [measurements](), [microsoft](), [microsoft-365](), [migration](), [popular](), [resilience](), [saas](), [server](), [time-series]() ### AI overview A decade of DNS measurements across the Tranco top 1 million domains shows that email infrastructure is consolidating around Google Workspace and Microsoft 365. Self-hosted mail servers declined from 44.6% in 2016 to 22.4% in July 2026, while the two leading providers together handled 38.6% of measured domains. DMARC enforcement has plateaued, and a large long tail of infrastructure remains difficult to classify. The article frames this concentration as a resilience concern because outages, filtering changes, or policy decisions could affect a substantial part of the email ecosystem. ### Source excerpt Ten years of DNS measurements reveal three trends across the Internet's most popular domains: email continues to consolidate around two providers, DMARC enforcement has hit a plateau, and a surprisingly large long tail of infrastructure defies easy classification. ## What's ARP Got to Do with It? DevFeed: [What's ARP Got to Do with It?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Remco van Mook Published: 2026-07-23T06:35:41Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Network](), [Networks](), [FIRST]() Tags: [arp](), [article](), [enterprise](), [ietf](), [internet](), [internet-infrastructure](), [ipv4](), [network](), [networks]() ### AI overview The article examines why ARP still matters by distinguishing durable demand for IPv4 reachability from the local-network architecture traditionally used to provide it. It argues that many access and hosting segments isolate subscribers or tenants and use the local IPv4 subnet mainly as a mechanism for reaching the gateway, rather than for lateral communication. ### Source excerpt It's only ARP. It works. So how much can it really matter? The answer lies beyond ARP itself, in the IPv4 layer cake that grew around it over four decades. The IPv4 internet is not going away in bounded time, and nobody should pretend otherwise. ## Inside a Shutdown: BGP Evidence from an Operator Who Was There DevFeed: [Inside a Shutdown: BGP Evidence from an Operator Who Was There]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Md.Kamruzzaman Khan Published: 2026-07-22T11:29:16Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Cloudflare](), [Internet]() Tags: [api](), [article](), [bgp](), [cloudflare](), [competition](), [internet](), [network](), [outage](), [outages](), [radar](), [research](), [ris](), [routing]() ### AI overview This article examines Bangladesh's July 2024 internet shutdown through public BGP routing data and firsthand observations from one affected network. It compares operator experiences with measurements from RIPE RIS, Cloudflare Radar, IODA, and OONI, while explaining what the data can and cannot establish about the event. ### Source excerpt When Bangladesh vanished from the global routing table in July 2024, public routing data captured the event as it unfolded. Drawing on first-hand observations from inside one affected network, this article explores what that data can and cannot tell us. ## Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating DevFeed: [Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Antonio Prado Published: 2026-07-21T12:33:47Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [article](), [attacks](), [bgp](), [internet-attacks](), [operational](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview The article argues that RPKI and cryptographic origin validation do not cover every BGP attack. It describes a malformed Prefix-SID incident that caused widespread updates and session resets, then presents a taxonomy of four macro-categories and eight micro-categories for routing attacks and their operational defences. ### Source excerpt RPKI has made real progress against prefix hijacking. But when you map every known class of BGP attack against the defences that exist, four of them turn out to sit entirely outside cryptographic validation: handled with local filters, static thresholds and reactive response. ## Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers? DevFeed: [Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ties Dirksen Published: 2026-07-20T07:57:23Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Server]() Tags: [bgp](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [internet-infrastructure](), [publication](), [research](), [routing](), [rpki](), [servers]() ### AI overview This article investigates the independently operated RPKI publication servers that supplement the Regional Internet Registries and help secure BGP routing. It explains how RPKI and Route Origin Authorisations reduce the risk of accidental or malicious prefix hijacks. ### Source excerpt Who runs the hidden infrastructure behind secure Internet routing? An internship report from SIDN Labs looks beyond the RIRs at the independently operated RPKI publication servers helping to secure BGP. ## Many Sovereignties, One Internet DevFeed: [Many Sovereignties, One Internet]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Hisham Ibrahim Published: 2026-07-15T07:09:49Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [digital sovereignty](), [interoperability](), [Resilience](), [Internet]() Tags: [bgp](), [digital-sovereignty](), [governance](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [interoperability](), [ipv6](), [policy](), [resilience](), [rpki](), [sovereignty-and-the-commons](), [standards]() ### AI overview The article proposes a "commons test" for evaluating digital sovereignty policies. It distinguishes strategies that expand choice, preserve interoperability, strengthen resilience and support participation from those that create dependencies and chokepoints. It argues that the Internet's technical coordination core should remain globally interoperable and should not be repurposed for broader national policy or political control. ### Source excerpt Digital sovereignty is not simply good or bad. The commons test offers a practical framework for assessing whether different strategies expand choice, preserve interoperability, strengthen resilience and support meaningful participation, or create new dependencies and chokepoints.