# aes Published articles for aes. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Breaking ledgerctf's AES white-box challenge DevFeed: [Breaking ledgerctf's AES white-box challenge]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Axel "0vercl0k" Souchet Published: 2018-05-17T18:52:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Diary of a reverse-engineer]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Encryption](), [Reverse Engineering](), [obfuscation](), [C++]() Tags: [aes](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [ledgerctf](), [obfuscation](), [reverse-engineering](), [white-box](), [whitebox]() ### AI overview This article examines Ledger's ctf2 binary from its bug bounty puzzles, describing its AES white-box protection scheme and the author's reverse-engineering process for breaking it. The binary is presented as a C++ ELF64 executable with no apparent obfuscation, code encryption, or packing. ### Source excerpt Introduction About a month ago, my mate b0n0n was working on the ledgerctf puzzles and challenged me to have a look at the ctf2 binary. I eventually did and this blogpost discusses the protection scheme and how I broke it. Before diving in though, here is a bit of background ... ## DIY Portable Secrets Manager With a Raspberry Pi Zero and ARC DevFeed: [DIY Portable Secrets Manager With a Raspberry Pi Zero and ARC]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Simone Margaritelli Published: 2017-12-07T16:42:48Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [evilsocket]() Topics: [Raspberry Pi](), [passwords](), [Encryption](), [SQLite](), [API](), [Go](), [HTML5](), [JavaScript](), [Markdown](), [ui](), [Server]() Tags: [aes](), [api](), [arc](), [arcd](), [cybersecurity](), [database](), [encryption](), [go](), [golang](), [html5](), [javascript](), [markdown](), [notes](), [oss](), [password-manager](), [passwords](), [pi](), [portable-hacking](), [project-release](), [raspberry-pi](), [secrets](), [self-hosted](), [terminal]() ### AI overview This tutorial presents ARC, a self-hosted secrets manager designed to store encrypted passwords, notes, and files and synchronize access across devices without relying on cloud hosting or a paid server. It describes a Go REST API server using SQLite and an HTML5/JavaScript browser client, then begins configuring the system on a Raspberry Pi Zero. ### Source excerpt For the last few days I've been working on a new project which I developed for very specific needs and reasons: I need to store safely (encrypted) my passwords, sensitive files, notes, etc. I need to access them from anywhere, with every possible device ( desktop, mobile, terminal ). I need those objects to be syncronized accros all my devices. I don't want to use "the cloud". I don't want to pay for a server. I don't want to enable port forwarding and host it myself with DynDNS or alikes. So I wrote ARC. ## Spotlight on an unprotected AES128 white-box implementation DevFeed: [Spotlight on an unprotected AES128 white-box implementation]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Axel "0vercl0k" Souchet Published: 2015-02-09T06:59:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Diary of a reverse-engineer]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Encryption](), [C](), [Code](), [GitHub]() Tags: [aes](), [aes128](), [c](), [code](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [github](), [implementation](), [obfuscation](), [practical-cryptography](), [white-box]() ### AI overview This tutorial introduces white-box cryptography through an unprotected AES128 implementation. It explains the design goals and outlines transforming a plain C AES128 encryption function into a white-box implementation, with emphasis on how design weaknesses can allow key extraction. ### Source excerpt Introduction I think it all began when I've worked on the NSC2013 crackme made by @elvanderb, long story short you had an AES128 heavily obfuscated white-box implementation to break. The thing was you could actually solve the challenge in different ways: the first one was the easiest one: you didn't ... ## Hardware entropy: RDRAND DevFeed: [Hardware entropy: RDRAND]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Marek Published: 2013-03-24T23:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Marek Majkowski]() Topics: [Randomizer](), [Hardware](), [cpu](), [Security](), [intel](), [Linux Kernel]() Tags: [aes](), [ansi](), [bits](), [cryptographic](), [entropy](), [fips](), [generator](), [hardware](), [intel](), [kernel](), [linux-kernel](), [nist](), [security](), [time]() ### AI overview This article explains Intel's RDRAND instruction, which uses an on-processor entropy source and AES conditioning to produce hardware-generated random numbers. It also describes checking the carry flag because RDRAND may temporarily return no data when demand exceeds hardware supply. ### Source excerpt Hardware entropy: RDRAND This is the third blog post on machine instructions: This time I've noticed instruction. According to Wikipedia is: ... a random number generator that is compliant with security and cryptographic standards such as NIST SP800-90, FIPS 140-2, and ANSI X9.82. The generator uses an on-processor entropy source, which passes the randomly generated bits to an AES (in CBC-MAC mode) conditioner to distill the entropy into non-deterministic random numbers. Sounds good.