# Communication/Data Movement

Published articles for Communication/Data Movement.

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## Formal Automotive Security Analysis Of CAN XL (Georgia Tech, QCRI, Purdue)

DevFeed: [Formal Automotive Security Analysis Of CAN XL (Georgia Tech, QCRI, Purdue)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/formal-automotive-security-analysis-of-can-xl-georgia-tech-qcri-purdue-64273.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://semiengineering.com/formal-analysis-uncovers-security-flaws-in-can-xl-georgia-tech-qcri-purdue/>)

Author: Technical Paper Link

Published: 2026-10-02T19:05:52Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Semiconductor Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/semiconductor-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Security research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-research.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [automotive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive.md>), [automotive-aerospace](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive-aerospace.md>), [automotive-electronics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive-electronics.md>), [automotive-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive-security.md>), [can-xl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can-xl.md>), [communication-data-movement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication-data-movement.md>), [controller-area-network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/controller-area-network.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [design-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design-verification.md>), [ecu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecu.md>), [electronic-control-units](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronic-control-units.md>), [formal-methods](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal-methods.md>), [formal-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal-verification.md>), [georgia-institute-of-technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/georgia-institute-of-technology.md>), [georgia-tech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/georgia-tech.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [in-vehicle-networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/in-vehicle-networks.md>), [mac-sub-layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac-sub-layer.md>), [paper](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/paper.md>), [purdue-university](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/purdue-university.md>), [qatar-computing-research-institute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/qatar-computing-research-institute.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [technical-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-papers.md>), [vehicle-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vehicle-security.md>)

### AI overview

Researchers from Georgia Tech, Qatar Computing Research Institute, and Purdue formally analyzed the CAN XL MAC sub-layer. They report that it retains known CAN CC MAC weaknesses and introduces seven new vulnerabilities, which they validated on commercial controllers and demonstrated through two multi-stage attacks on a vehicle-traffic testbed. The paper also proposes mitigations, including formal verification of standard revisions.

### Source excerpt

Researchers at Georgia Institute of Technology, Qatar Computing Research Institute, and Purdue University published a technical paper titled "A Formal Security Analysis of CAN XL." Abstract: "For decades, the Controller Area Network (CAN) has been the backbone of in-vehicle communication. As modern vehicles integrate cameras, LiDARs, and AI components, classic CAN (CAN CC) faces growing... " read more The post Formal Automotive Security Analysis Of CAN XL (Georgia Tech, QCRI, Purdue) appeared first on Semiconductor Engineering.