# handshake

Published articles for handshake.

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## CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-125275-a-device-certificate-whose-ca-isn-t-registered-can-keep-a-tls-handshake-running-forever-136468.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125275>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-17T03:17:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-125275](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-125275.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [erlang](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang.md>), [erlang-otp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang-otp.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [nerves-hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub.md>), [nerves-hub-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub-web.md>), [nerveshub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerveshub.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

In NervesHub versions 1.0.0 through before 2.5.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause denial of service by presenting a TLS client certificate whose chain reaches a root trusted by the device endpoint but contains no CA registered in NervesHub. The verification callback returns :unknown_ca; Erlang/OTP ssl treats this as a missing trust anchor, retries the same root indefinitely, and the handshake process repeatedly queries the database even after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. Public CA roots are trusted by default unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is configured, so a client-auth-capable certificate from a public CA can trigger the issue. A chain ending at a root outside the trust store is rejected once.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-125275 Published : Nov. 17, 2026, 3:17 a.m. | 1 hour, 3 minutes ago Description :Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. Severity: 8.2 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Security Advisory CVE-2026-114369: Resource exhaustion (denial of service) vulnerability in the WebSocket handshake handling of QWebSocket and QWebSocketServer impacts Qt Framework

DevFeed: [Security Advisory CVE-2026-114369: Resource exhaustion (denial of service) vulnerability in the WebSocket handshake handling of QWebSocket and QWebSocketServer impacts Qt Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/security-advisory-cve-2026-114369-resource-exhaustion-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-the-websocket-handshake-handling-of-qwebsocket-and-qwebsocketserver-impacts-qt-fr-130543.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qt.io/blog/security-advisory-cve-2026-114369>)

Author: Joni Poikelin

Published: 2026-11-12T08:41:01Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qt](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qt-blog.md>)

Topics: [Qt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/qt.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [availability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/availability.md>), [classes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classes.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [handling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handling.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/id.md>), [module](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/module.md>), [qt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/qt.md>), [qt-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/qt-framework.md>), [resource](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resource.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [websocket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/websocket.md>), [websockets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/websockets.md>)

### AI overview

CVE-2026-114369 is a resource-exhaustion vulnerability in WebSocket handshake handling that can let a remote peer drive excessive CPU use and denial of service in applications using Qt WebSockets. QWebSocketServer is affected from Qt 5.15.0 onward; QWebSocket is affected from Qt 6.3.0 onward. The excerpt lists affected ranges through Qt 6.8.9 and from Qt 6.9.0 to Qt 6.12.0, and says status before Qt 5.15.0 is unknown.

### Source excerpt

Resource exhaustion vulnerability in the Qt Framework QWebSocket and QWebSocketServer classes of the Qt WebSockets module has been discovered and has been assigned the CVE id CVE-2026-114369.

## CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-82509-v-programming-language-net-http-tls-certificate-validation-bypass-126435.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82509>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-10T14:17:36Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [V](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/v.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [backends](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backends.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-82509](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-82509.md>), [fetch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fetch.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [handshakes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshakes.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [http-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-post.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interception.md>), [library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/library.md>), [mbedtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mbedtls.md>), [net-http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-http.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssl.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

V's `net.http` library through version 0.5.2, before commit 4077484, reportedly allows on-path attackers to intercept or modify HTTPS traffic because `SSLConnectConfig.validate` and `FetchConfig.validate` default to false. In both mbedtls and OpenSSL backends, TLS handshakes can complete without certificate verification; the description says this affects `http.get`, `http.post`, and `http.fetch`, including when presented with expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificates. It says to explicitly configure `validate: true` to require validation. The source's affected-products table lists none.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-82509 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 2:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 13 minutes ago Description :V programming language standard library net.http through version 0.5.2 prior to commit 4077484 contains a TLS certificate validation bypass vulnerability that allows on-path attackers to intercept HTTPS traffic by exploiting the default false value of SSLConnectConfig.validate and FetchConfig.validate, which completes TLS handshakes without verifying certificates in both the mbedtls and OpenSSL backends. Attackers can present an expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificate to successfully complete the handshake via http.get, http.post, or http.fetch, enabling interception or modification of HTTPS traffic unless validate: true is explicitly configured. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## GC-MoE: Overlapping Expert-Parallel Token Dispatch with FP8/FP4 Grouped GEMM via CUDA Green Contexts

DevFeed: [GC-MoE: Overlapping Expert-Parallel Token Dispatch with FP8/FP4 Grouped GEMM via CUDA Green Contexts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gc-moe-overlapping-expert-parallel-token-dispatch-with-fp8-fp4-grouped-gemm-via-cuda-green-contexts-116485.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04222>)

Author: Yong Li, Kan Liu, Tao Lan

Published: 2026-11-04T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Mixture of Experts (MoE)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/mixture-of-experts-moe.md>), [CUDA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cuda.md>), [CUDA Graphs](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cuda-graphs.md>), [quantization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantization.md>), [synchronization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/synchronization.md>)

Tags: [blackwell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blackwell.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-ar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ar.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [cs-pf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-pf.md>), [cuda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cuda.md>), [decode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decode.md>), [decoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decoding.md>), [deepseek](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deepseek.md>), [deepseek-v4-1-flash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deepseek-v4-1-flash.md>), [dispatch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dispatch.md>), [expert-parallelism](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/expert-parallelism.md>), [fp4](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fp4.md>), [fp8](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fp8.md>), [glm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/glm.md>), [glm-5-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/glm-5-2.md>), [gpus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpus.md>), [graph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graph.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [hopper](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hopper.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [mixture-of-experts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mixture-of-experts.md>), [mixture-of-experts-moe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mixture-of-experts-moe.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>)

### AI overview

GC-MoE overlaps expert-parallel token dispatch and grouped GEMM by using CUDA Green Contexts to assign communication and compute to separate GPU partitions, each with its own kernel resources and synchronization. A concurrent CUDA Graph launch, token-ring handshake, and double-buffered receive counters enable early computation and avoid a trailing cross-rank barrier between replays. For computation, it uses operand-swapped block-scaled MMA on Blackwell and register-A WGMMA with in-register FP4 decoding on Hopper; fused SwiGLU, requantization, and optional shared experts are supported. In the reported tests, it beat Mega MoE at all 54 matched-accuracy points: average decode speedups were 1.188x on 8 H20 GPUs for DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash, and 1.106x on 8 B300 GPUs for GLM-5.2 and DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash (1.123x with fused shared experts). Dispatch used 20 of 148 B300 SMs.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.04222v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Under expert parallelism, mixture-of-experts (MoE) layers pay all-to-all token dispatch, grouped GEMMs, and a combine step in every layer. In decode each rank holds only 1-256 tokens: dispatch latency and weight traffic dominate while tensor-core utilization is inherently low. In fused operators such as DeepGEMM's Mega MoE, dispatch and computation overlap only by sharing every SM: dispatch warps compete with TMA/MMA and epilogue warps for registers, shared memory, and issue slots; every phase shares one CTA resource budget, synchronization spans the whole SM array, and every replay ends with a workspace-clean pass and a cross-rank barrier. We present GC-MoE, an open-source FP8/FP4 MoE inference operator for NVIDIA Hopper and Blackwell GPUs that uses CUDA Green Contexts to split the device into a small communication partition and a large compute partition. Each role gets its own kernel, resource budget, and synchronization domain, so dispatch and GEMM tune independently. A three-node CUDA Graph (four on Hopper with fused shared experts) launches the dispatch and grouped-GEMM kernels as concurrent roots; a token-ring handshake starts computation on the first filled ring blocks, and double-buffered receive counters remove the trailing cross-rank barrier between replays. The compute partition runs operand-swapped tcgen05 block-scaled MMA on Blackwell and register-A WGMMA with in-register FP4 decoding on Hopper, with fused SwiGLU, requantization, and optional shared experts. On 8 H20 GPUs GC-MoE accelerates DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash decode by 1.188x on average on both the routed and shared-expert suites (peaks 1.296x and 1.353x); on 8 B300 GPUs it accelerates GLM-5.2 and DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash by 1.106x (1.123x with fused shared experts, peak 1.209x), beating Mega MoE at all 54 measured points at matched accuracy. GC-MoE reserves only 20 of 148 SMs on B300 for dispatch.

## TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices

DevFeed: [TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tls-flaws-found-in-goahead-web-server-used-in-hundreds-of-millions-of-devices-104428.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/tls-flaws-found-in-goahead-web-server-used-in-hundreds-of-millions-of-devices/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-10-28T13:10:34Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>), [Security research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-research.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [bugs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bugs.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [crl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crl.md>), [data-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-protection.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [eavesdropping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eavesdropping.md>), [firewall](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firewall.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [goahead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goahead.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [web-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-server.md>)

### AI overview

FoxIO disclosed three GoAhead TLS flaws, each limited to particular versions, TLS libraries, and configurations. In GoAhead 3.4.5-6.1.0 using OpenSSL with mTLS and a CRL, the server reads the revocation list but does not check it, so revoked client certificates can still be accepted. In Mbed TLS builds from 4.0.2-6.1.0, a coding error weakens some TLS 1.2 connections, allowing recorded sessions to be decrypted offline if clients accept the flawed parameters. LibreSSL builds through 6.1.0 can bypass a certificate-chain length cap when client certificates from any issuer are accepted and the cap is the only safeguard. GoAhead 6.1.1 fixes the OpenSSL and Mbed TLS issues; other stated mitigations include disabling finite-field DHE or switching TLS backends, and enabling issuer verification with a trusted CA bundle for the LibreSSL issue. Device exposure depends on firmware configuration, and an upstream fix does not guarantee manufacturers have patched their products.

### Source excerpt

FoxIO disclosed three GoAhead TLS bugs that can let revoked certificates through or expose some encrypted sessions to eavesdroppers. The post TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## HqcLethe: Streaming HQC Encapsulation for Tiny Stateless Servers

DevFeed: [HqcLethe: Streaming HQC Encapsulation for Tiny Stateless Servers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hqclethe-streaming-hqc-encapsulation-for-tiny-stateless-servers-103368.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36808>)

Author: Wind Wong, Klaus v. Gleissenthall

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [stateless](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/stateless.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [hedge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hedge.md>), [independent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/independent.md>), [lattice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lattice.md>), [masks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/masks.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [nist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nist.md>), [packet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packet.md>), [packets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packets.md>), [pi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pi.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [puzzles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/puzzles.md>), [raspberry-pi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/raspberry-pi.md>), [servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/servers.md>), [stateless](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stateless.md>), [streaming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/streaming.md>)

### AI overview

HqcLethe streams an HQC encapsulation in packet-sized pieces, enabling a stateless post-quantum key exchange without buffering multi-packet handshakes. It uses the Chinese remainder theorem to split cyclic polynomial multiplication into per-packet remainders and masks them so they reveal no more than an ordinary HQC ciphertext; the authors report proving this in Rocq with SSProve and verifying session secrecy, server authentication, and forward secrecy in ProVerif. Client puzzles bound CPU exhaustion, while each worker used a fixed 1.2-1.6 MiB on a Raspberry Pi 3B+. At category 5, the abstract reports 27 times fewer bytes and 9 times less server CPU than McTiny.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.36808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Stateless post-quantum authenticated key exchanges such as post-quantum WireGuard hedge against unexpected cryptanalytic advances by combining a lattice KEM with code-based Classic McEliece. However, recent attacks have led Germany's BSI to advise against McEliece, which leaves these protocols with lattices alone. HQC, the code-based KEM that NIST selected, could restore diversity, but its keys do not fit in a single packet, so a server would have to buffer multi-packet handshakes. This would leave an attack surface for memory exhaustion, which is what WireGuard's stateless handshake was designed to avoid in the first place. McTiny demonstrated that stateless key encapsulation for Classic McEliece is possible by streaming key blocks one-at-a-time. However, HQC's encapsulation does not split as easily into individual packets, as cyclic polynomial multiplication, unlike matrix-vector multiplication, is inherently non-local. We present HqcLethe, a stateless key exchange that streams an HQC encapsulation in packet-sized pieces. It uses the Chinese remainder theorem to split the polynomial multiplication into independent remainders, one per packet, and masks them so that they reveal no more than an ordinary HQC ciphertext, which we prove in Rocq with SSProve; we also verify session secrecy, server authentication and forward secrecy in ProVerif. Client puzzles bound CPU exhaustion, and HqcLethe removes memory exhaustion: on a Raspberry Pi 3B+, each worker runs in a fixed 1.2-1.6 MiB. At category 5 it sends 27x fewer bytes and uses 9.0x less server CPU than McTiny, the earlier stateless code-based design.

## GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption

DevFeed: [GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/goahead-tls-flaws-allow-revoked-client-certificates-and-enable-session-decryption-102449.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/goahead-tls-flaws-allow-revoked-client.html>)

Author: The Hacker News

Published: 2026-10-27T13:59:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Security research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-research.md>), [NVD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nvd.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [ecdhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdhe.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [exploited](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploited.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [iot-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot-security.md>), [login](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/login.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [web-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-security.md>), [web-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-server.md>)

### AI overview

GoAhead 6.1.1 fixes three TLS flaws, but exposure depends on how device makers compiled and configured the server. On OpenSSL builds with mutual TLS and a configured revocation list, revocation checking was never enabled, allowing a trusted client certificate listed as revoked to authenticate; Mbed TLS builds are unaffected by this flaw. A separate Mbed TLS issue can expose recorded session traffic only when a client accepts the undersized key exchange; mainstream clients reject it, and TLS 1.3, ECDHE, and Mbed TLS 4.x are unaffected. Certain older LibreSSL builds can accept overlong client certificate chains when issuer checking is off. Device makers must rebuild and ship firmware with 6.1.1, and it is unknown whether any have done so. The article reports no known attacks as of October 27, 2026, while noting that this does not rule out exploitation. It also says the release fixes a login bypass affecting some HTTP Basic or form-login builds; after upgrading, EmbedThis recommends ending active sessions, restarting the server, and changing passwords stored in Blowfish format.

### Source excerpt

GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption The GoAhead embedded web server loaded a certificate revocation list into its default TLS backend but never turned revocation checking on, so a revoked client certificate could still pass login on aff ... Read more Published Date: Oct 27, 2026 (4 hours, 56 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article.

## Embedding Large PQC KEMs in IKEv2

DevFeed: [Embedding Large PQC KEMs in IKEv2](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/embedding-large-pqc-kems-in-ikev2-100289.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32356>)

Author: Daniel Herzinger, Marco Thomas, Tobias Handirk, Stefan-Lukas Gazdag, Daniel Loebenberger, Marian Margraf

Published: 2026-10-26T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [QUIC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quic.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>)

Tags: [compatibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compatibility.md>), [computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [error-correcting-codes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error-correcting-codes.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [handshakes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshakes.md>), [ietf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ietf.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [measurements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurements.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [quic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quic.md>), [size](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/size.md>), [specification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/specification.md>), [transport](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transport.md>)

### AI overview

The study compares eight ways to carry large post-quantum KEM keys in IKEv2, implemented on one open-source codebase and tested in 126,500 handshakes across 1,296 configurations. No approach fully offsets the key-size impact. Under challenging conditions, none handles Classic McEliece acceptably: approaches either congest the link or average nearly two minutes per handshake. For ML-KEM and FrodoKEM, the authors identify two paths: standardized IKEv2 extensions, which preserve compatibility but require larger implementation changes and further optimization, or delegating transport to QUIC. The latter can avoid those drawbacks through a composite key exchange; QUIKE-composite had the best overall performance. These findings reflect the tested bandwidth, latency, loss, and KEM configurations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.32356v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms carry public keys far larger than the established VPN handshake protocol IKEv2 was designed for. At the same time, its initial exchange comprising the public keys cannot be fragmented. In response, the IETF discusses a range of protocol adjustments, yet these proposals have never been compared in terms of their performance and stability under identical conditions. We systematically screened the IETF document corpus for such proposals, added three of our own (one using forward error correction and two using IKEv2 with QUIC, namely QUIKE and QUIKE with a composite key exchange), identified two specification gaps in existing acknowledgment drafts, and implemented all eight on the same open-source codebase. Measurements across different bandwidths, latencies, and packet loss rates, and with ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece, total 126 500 handshakes in 1296 different configurations and show that no mechanism fully compensates for the effect of the key size on performance. For Classic McEliece, no approach handles challenging conditions acceptably. The approaches either congest the link or take up to nearly two minutes per handshake on average. For ML-KEM and FrodoKEM, there are two ways forward: building on already standardized extensions or delegating the transport. The former requires the larger implementation change and needs further optimization, such as acknowledgment mechanisms or error-correcting codes, but grants continuity and compatibility. The latter can use a composite key exchange to avoid these drawbacks and achieve a faster, more resilient handshake and leaner implementation, with QUIKE-composite offering the best overall performance.

## GLP Networking API Specification

DevFeed: [GLP Networking API Specification](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/glp-networking-api-specification-100170.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32583>)

Author: Dan Bachar, Ehud Shapiro

Published: 2026-10-26T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Bluetooth LE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bluetooth-le.md>), [NAT and SNAT](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nat-and-snat.md>), [Zero Trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zero-trust.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apple](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apple.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [asynchronous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asynchronous.md>), [atomic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atomic.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [bluetooth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bluetooth.md>), [bluetooth-low-energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bluetooth-low-energy.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [cs-pl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-pl.md>), [delivered](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delivered.md>), [delivery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delivery.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [graph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graph.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [specification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/specification.md>)

### AI overview

The specification defines the networking layer madGLP needs for agents on smartphones to communicate over Bluetooth LE, local networks, and the Internet across NAT. It provides only services GLP cannot supply: networking, location, application attestation, and cryptographic primitives. PAN and LAN use rotating, key-derived recognition tokens; GLP sets whether an agent responds to unrecognized contacts. For WAN, a static-address rendezvous server coordinates hole punching without relaying payload or joining a social graph. Across all underlays, peers establish mutually authenticated Noise sessions using Ed25519 keys and attest, bound to the handshake, that they run an application published under its developer's key; verification uses Apple's and Google's roots without contacting a third party. A shared protocol over UDP datagrams and GATT writes provides the fair, unordered, atomic, authenticated delivery madGLP assumes.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.32583v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multiagent deterministic GLP (madGLP) runs Grassroots Logic Programs (GLP) as agents that communicate solely by asynchronous message passing, and assumes fair delivery: every message sent is eventually delivered. Each agent runs on a person's smartphone, named by the person's public key. A grassroots platform depends on no global resource but the network, so agents must reach one another over Bluetooth Low Energy, on a local network, and across the Internet from behind NAT, via rendezvous servers anyone can run. What madGLP requires of such a network, and what the network requires of the platform, has not been specified. We specify the networking layer beneath madGLP. Anything that can be done in GLP is done in GLP: the layer provides only what GLP cannot reach - the network stack, the location service, application attestation, and cryptographic primitives. Three transport underlays share one interface. Over PAN and LAN, an agent advertises a rotating recognition token derived from its key and time slot, so a peer who knows the key recognises it before contact and nobody else can track it; whether it answers unrecognised contacts is a per-underlay trust level set by GLP. Over WAN, a rendezvous server is a static-address host running the headless layer and a GLP rendezvous agent that coordinates hole punching, relays no payload, and belongs to no social graph. On every underlay, peers establish a mutually authenticated Noise session from Ed25519 keys, then attest, bound to the handshake hash, that each runs the application published under its developer's key, verified against Apple's and Google's roots with no third party contacted. One message protocol, over UDP datagrams and GATT writes, provides the fair, unordered, atomic and authenticated delivery madGLP assumes.

## CVE-2026-79977 - WireGuard peer endpoint learned from unauthenticated transport-data messages allows off-path tunnel hijack in Zephyr

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-79977 - WireGuard peer endpoint learned from unauthenticated transport-data messages allows off-path tunnel hijack in Zephyr](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-79977-wireguard-peer-endpoint-learned-from-unauthenticated-transport-data-messages-allows-off-path-tunnel-hijack-in-zephyr-98407.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79977>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-10-23T20:17:27Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [boot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boot.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptographic-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic-identity.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-79977](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-79977.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [handshakes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshakes.md>), [hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijack.md>), [index](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/index.md>), [interface](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interface.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [message](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/message.md>), [peer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/peer.md>), [transport](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transport.md>), [wireguard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wireguard.md>), [zephyr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zephyr.md>), [zephyrproject](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zephyrproject.md>)

### AI overview

In Zephyr's WireGuard service, an unauthenticated transport-data message with an unknown receiver index could overwrite a peer's endpoint with an attacker-chosen address when no valid handshake or current keypair exists. A reachable UDP listener makes this possible off-path with a single spoofed datagram; later handshakes and tunnel traffic are then redirected, potentially persistently disrupting the tunnel. Relaying redirected handshakes can expose ciphertext and traffic metadata, but WireGuard encryption still prevents content decryption or forgery. The described fix removes endpoint learning from this recovery path: it sends the handshake to an endpoint learned through authentication, falls back to the configured endpoint, or drops the message if neither is known. WireGuard support is experimental and disabled by default.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-79977 Published : Oct. 23, 2026, 8:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 29 minutes ago Description :The WireGuard VPN service in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c updated the peer endpoint from a message it could not authenticate. In handle_transport_data(), when the 32-bit receiver index of an incoming transport-data message matched no session, the code both scheduled a new handshake and copied the datagram's source address into peer->endpoint with memcpy(&peer->endpoint, peer_addr, sizeof(peer->endpoint)). Because the receiver index is unknown, there is no key with which such a message could be verified, so the address written into peer->endpoint is entirely attacker-supplied. Every other endpoint update in the implementation happens only after authentication -- after the Noise handshake in handle_handshake_init(), or after AEAD decryption plus the anti-replay check in wg_process_data_message(). The WireGuard listener is registered with net_udp_register() using no remote address or port filter and defaults to UDP port 51820 (CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PORT), and wg_ctrl_recv() resolves the peer by interface rather than by any cryptographic identity. Any host able to send a UDP datagram to that port can therefore reach the defect off-path, with no need to observe legitimate traffic: a 16-byte datagram carrying the transport-data type, zeroed reserved bytes and an arbitrary receiver index is sufficient. The vulnerable branch runs whenever the peer has neither a valid handshake nor a current keypair -- the state at boot and after a session expires. A single spoofed datagram redirects peer->endpoint to an address of the attacker's choosing, and all subsequent handshake initiations, keepalives and encrypted data packets are sent there. The legitimate peer never receives the initiations and so never re-authenticates, and nothing resets the endpoint afterwards, leaving the tunnel persistently unusable on devices whose peer does not initiate handshakes itself. The attacker can also relay t

## HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks

DevFeed: [HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hpq-ake-a-provably-secure-sign-less-hybrid-authenticated-key-exchange-protocol-for-bandwidth-constrained-iot-and-edge-networks-96558.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12024>)

Author: Khiem Pham-Tuan, Minh Quang Le, Khuong Nguyen-An

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-3.md>), [arm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arm.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [benchmarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarking.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-services.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [gateways](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateways.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>)

### AI overview

HPQ-AKE replaces transcript signatures with dual KEMs for RSA-enabled IoT gateways and edge/cloud services: ML-KEM-768 provides post-quantum session secrecy and forward secrecy, while RSA-OAEP provides implicit mutual authentication. Its security analysis claims AKE security, forward secrecy, and conditional KCI resistance under Module-LWE and RSA assumptions, with long-term-key-only exposure assumptions. In evaluation, modeled handshake transmission falls 56.4% versus a Hybrid TLS 1.3 Full handshake (5,668 versus 13,009 bytes), with 7.11 ms local computation on the measured x86 testbed. A simulation of a 50 kbps link with 600 ms RTT reports median latency of 1,914 ms, 31.4% below baseline. The reported performance is based on x86 measurements and modeling; ARM gateway and unaccelerated microcontroller performance remains unvalidated.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.12024v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Securing bandwidth-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) and edge networks during post-quantum migration creates an authentication trade-off: ML-KEM provides post-quantum key establishment, whereas post-quantum signatures increase certificate-chain size, verification cost, and handshake latency. We present HPQ-AKE, a sign-less hybrid authenticated key exchange for RSA-enabled IoT gateways and edge/cloud services that replaces transcript signatures with dual KEMs. HPQ-AKE combines ML-KEM-768 for post-quantum session secrecy and forward secrecy with RSA-OAEP for implicit mutual authentication, preserving existing RSA-enabled infrastructure during migration. We analyze HPQ-AKE in an extended Bellare-Rogaway model, separating classical authentication in the Random Oracle Model from session-key secrecy in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Under the Module-LWE and RSA assumptions, it establishes AKE security, forward secrecy, and conditional KCI resistance under the long-term-key-only exposure assumptions. Evaluation combines x86 micro-benchmarking, analytical latency modeling, and 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo simulation. HPQ-AKE reduces modeled handshake transmission from 13,009 to 5,668 Bytes, a 56.4% reduction relative to a Hybrid TLS 1.3 Full handshake, while requiring 7.11 ms of total local computation on the measured x86 testbed. Under a simulated 50 kbps satellite-like link with 600 ms RTT and stochastic jitter, median latency is 1,914 ms, 31.4% below the 2,791 ms baseline. At 20 ms RTT, modeled break-even thresholds are 0.31 Mbps against the pre-cached baseline and 4.08 Mbps against the full baseline; both decrease as RTT increases. These x86-based results motivate evaluation on gateway-class IoT and edge platforms; performance on ARM gateways and unaccelerated microcontrollers remains unvalidated.

## The Cost of Saying Hello: An Empirical Study of Handshake Overhead in AI Agent Communication Protocols

DevFeed: [The Cost of Saying Hello: An Empirical Study of Handshake Overhead in AI Agent Communication Protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-cost-of-saying-hello-an-empirical-study-of-handshake-overhead-in-ai-agent-communication-protocols-96899.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30151>)

Author: Pranav Varshney

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [agent to agent communication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agent-to-agent-communication.md>), [Multi Agent Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-agent-systems.md>), [A2A protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/a2a-protocol.md>), [LLM observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-observability.md>)

Tags: [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [a2a](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/a2a.md>), [acp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acp.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-communication.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>)

### AI overview

The benchmark finds that handshake round trips dominate startup latency across the tested agent protocols. At an emulated 50 ms RTT, legacy MCP takes three round trips and 230 ms, while A2A takes one and 61 ms. Metadata adds a separate context cost when an LLM reads counterpart capabilities: 24-107 tokens per capability, or 11% of a 200k-token context window for 200 capabilities. MCP's 2026 discover revision reduces the handshake to two round trips, and era pinning eliminates it on warm reconnects. The study used official SDKs and tested cold starts, warm repeats, capability mismatches, and degraded metadata; these results describe the reported benchmark conditions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.30151v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Every interaction between AI agents begins with a handshake: the initiating agent must locate its counterpart, learn what it can do, and establish a session before the first useful message can be sent. Surveys of agent communication protocols name handshake overhead as an efficiency criterion, yet none report measurements. This paper presents the first empirical, phase-decomposed benchmark of the handshake in three major agent protocols: MCP (in both its 2025 initialize and 2026 discover eras), A2A, and ACP. Using each protocol's official SDK, we instrument every request for round trips, per-phase latency, wire bytes, and token cost across cold-start, warm-repeat, capability-mismatch, and degraded-metadata scenarios (N=50 per cell, on loopback and under an emulated 50 ms RTT). Round-trip count dominates handshake cost. A legacy MCP handshake takes three round trips and 230 ms at 50 ms RTT; A2A needs one round trip and 61.0 ms. Round trips are not the whole bill: when an LLM reads the counterpart's metadata, handshake cost scales with the counterpart's capability inventory at 24-107 tokens per capability, so a 200-capability counterpart spends 11% of a 200k-token context window before the agent reads its own task. MCP's own 2026 revision cuts its handshake from three round trips to two and, with era pinning, to zero on warm reconnects, protocol evolution that corroborates the cost we measure. We release the full harness, raw data, and analysis at https://github.com/pvarshh/handshake-benchmark.

## Accelerating HQC for Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 on x86 IoT Gateways

DevFeed: [Accelerating HQC for Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 on x86 IoT Gateways](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/accelerating-hqc-for-post-quantum-tls-1-3-on-x86-iot-gateways-93772.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11107>)

Author: Jihoon Jang, Hyunju Park, Jebin Kim, Seokhie Hong, Suhri Kim

Published: 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [x86](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/x86.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>)

Tags: [avx2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/avx2.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decoding.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [integrate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrate.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [intel-core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel-core.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [ml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>), [x86](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x86.md>)

### AI overview

The work optimizes HQC on x86 using AVX2, AVX-512, and GFNI, then integrates the implementations into TLS 1.3. Changes include faster polynomial multiplication, Reed-Solomon and Reed-Muller decoding, SHA3-512, and fixed-weight sampling; HQC-5 also uses FAFFT multiplication with AVX-512 and GFNI. On an Intel Core i5-1135G7, AVX2 cuts decapsulation time by 11.1-21.5% versus prior AVX2 results. Across three parameter sets, AVX-512 improves key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation by 24.9-29.5%, 10.4-11.1%, and 20.6-26.1%, respectively, versus Cabral et al. In loopback TLS, HQC-5 handshake latency falls from 3.22 ms to 2.92 ms. On a 1 Mbit/s path with 50 ms added RTT, however, HQC-5 takes 243 ms versus 87 ms for ML-KEM-1024, with key and ciphertext sizes driving the remaining cost on constrained links.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.11107v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Post-quantum TLS at an IoT gateway must protect many device connections without large increases in handshake delay, CPU cost, or network traffic. HQC provides code-based diversity beyond ML-KEM, but its computation and ciphertext sizes can increase these costs. We optimize HQC for x86 processors with AVX2, AVX-512, and the Galois Field New Instructions (GFNI), and integrate the resulting implementations into TLS 1.3. We extend branch-free Toom-Cook/Karatsuba multiplication to AVX-512, accelerate Reed-Solomon decoding with GFNI, improve Reed-Muller decoding, accelerate SHA3-512 and fixed-weight sampling, and port Frobenius additive FFT (FAFFT) multiplication to AVX-512 + GFNI for HQC-5. On an Intel Core i5-1135G7 processor, our AVX2 implementation reduces decapsulation by 11.1-21.5% over the fastest prior AVX2 results. Our AVX-512 implementation reduces key generation by 24.9-29.5%, encapsulation by 10.4-11.1%, and decapsulation by 20.6-26.1% relative to Cabral et al. across the three HQC parameter sets. We evaluate the effects of these implementations on TLS 1.3 handshake latency and server and client CPU costs, as well as the effects of round-trip time (RTT) and bandwidth. In local loopback TLS measurements, our AVX-512 HQC-5 implementation reduces handshake latency from 3.22 ms to 2.92 ms compared with Cabral et al. On a constrained path with 1 Mbit/s bandwidth and an added RTT of 50 ms, the HQC-5 handshake takes 243 ms, compared with 87 ms for ML-KEM-1024. This indicates that HQC public-key and ciphertext sizes, rather than implementation speed, determine the remaining handshake cost on constrained links.

## Cloudflare Measures Origin TLS Preferences, Cutting Handshake Retries from 52% to 3.7%

DevFeed: [Cloudflare Measures Origin TLS Preferences, Cutting Handshake Retries from 52% to 3.7%](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloudflare-measures-origin-tls-preferences-cutting-handshake-retries-from-52-to-3-7-55522.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/09/cloudflare-automatic-key-exchang/>)

Author: Steef-Jan Wiggers

Published: 2026-09-20T08:15:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/handshake.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>)

Tags: [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cloudflare-automatic-key-exchang](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-automatic-key-exchang.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [x25519mlkem768](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x25519mlkem768.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare replaced a static X25519 choice in origin TLS handshakes with per-origin measurement. HelloRetryRequests fell from roughly 52% to 3.7%, reducing p90 handshake latency by more than 150 milliseconds. The system also identifies origins that support post-quantum key exchange, while accounting for compatibility problems caused by larger ClientHello messages.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare has replaced its static X25519 guess for origin TLS handshakes with per-origin measurement. HelloRetryRequests on scanned origins fell from roughly 52% to 3.7%, removing over 150 ms from p90 latency. Post-quantum connections completing in one round trip rose from 0% to 99.2%, though only 12.8% of origins support it. By Steef-Jan Wiggers

## What Is the x402 Protocol? HTTP 402 Payments for AI Agents

DevFeed: [What Is the x402 Protocol? HTTP 402 Payments for AI Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-is-the-x402-protocol-http-402-payments-for-ai-agents-10450.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://dodopayments.com/blogs/x402-protocol/>)

Author: Ayush Agarwal

Published: 2026-09-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Dodo Payments Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/dodo-payments-blog.md>)

Topics: [HTTP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/http.md>), [API Monetization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-monetization.md>), [A2A protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/a2a-protocol.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [a2a](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/a2a.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [card](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/card.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [headers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/headers.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [payment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payment.md>), [payments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payments.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [rails](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rails.md>), [required](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/required.md>), [what-is](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-is.md>), [works](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/works.md>), [x402](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x402.md>), [x402-protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x402-protocol.md>)

### AI overview

x402 lets a client pay for one resource request without an account or API key: the server returns HTTP 402 with payment requirements, the client signs a payment and retries with `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE`, and the server verifies and settles it before returning the resource. An optional facilitator handles `/verify` and `/settle`, sparing the seller chain infrastructure; servers can also handle those steps themselves. The protocol supports multiple payment options, but a transaction requires the client and facilitator to support the same scheme and network. Its `exact` scheme covers fixed amounts; other schemes remain under development. x402 suits machine-to-machine micropayments, but requires a funded wallet and token settlement and does not provide subscriptions, chargebacks, tax handling, invoicing, or fiat payouts. The article recommends pairing it with a separate billing rail when serving human subscribers.

### Source excerpt

A technical guide to the x402 protocol: how the HTTP 402 payment handshake works, the PAYMENT-REQUIRED and PAYMENT-SIGNATURE headers, facilitators, payment schemes, and where x402 fits next to card rails.

## How Handshake migrated a ten-year-old analytics estate to Omni in eight weeks

DevFeed: [How Handshake migrated a ten-year-old analytics estate to Omni in eight weeks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-handshake-migrated-a-ten-year-old-analytics-estate-to-omni-in-eight-weeks-82498.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://omni.co/blog/case-study-handshake>)

Published: 2026-08-19T16:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Omni Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/omni-blog.md>)

Topics: [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [semantic-layer](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/semantic-layer.md>), [Postman AI Engineer](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman-ai-engineer.md>), [metric-standardization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/metric-standardization.md>)

Tags: [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-context.md>), [analytics-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics-engineering.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [context-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context-engineering.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [docs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docs.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [semantic-layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semantic-layer.md>)

### AI overview

Handshake moved its decade-old analytics estate to Omni in eight weeks, roughly 40% faster than the original estimate. One analytics engineer used Claude Code, APIs, and automated validation to migrate data models, dashboards, and schedules, while preserving a governed semantic layer for internal and embedded analytics.

### Source excerpt

One analytics engineer used Claude Code and Omni's API to move Handshake from their previous BI tool to Omni in eight weeks, while cutting the scoped timeline by roughly 40%.

## Journey of an Ad Request: The Hidden Engineering

DevFeed: [Journey of an Ad Request: The Hidden Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/journey-of-an-ad-request-the-hidden-engineering-77967.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.hotstar.com/journey-of-an-ad-request-the-hidden-engineering-e7b7f9921e46?source=rss----dbc3fcbc7f07---4>)

Author: Ayush Kumar

Published: 2026-07-20T10:22:24Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [JioHotstar](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/jiohotstar.md>)

Topics: [streaming data analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/streaming-data-analytics.md>), [Electrical engineering and computer science (EECS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science-eecs.md>)

Tags: [ads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ads.md>), [adtech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adtech.md>), [advertising](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advertising.md>), [auction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auction.md>), [bidding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bidding.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complexity.md>), [content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content.md>), [cpc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpc.md>), [cue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cue.md>), [demand](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/demand.md>), [display](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/display.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [event](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event.md>), [formats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formats.md>), [frontend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/frontend.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [live](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/live.md>), [movie](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/movie.md>)

### AI overview

JioHotstar describes ad selection as a sub-100-millisecond process that filters candidates by user, device, content, location and advertiser constraints, checks frequency caps, paces delivery with PID or SHALE algorithms, then fills an ad pod through priority tiers. Direct deals return a VAST response immediately; programmatic ads depend on third-party SSP auctions and their uncertain fill rates. The article contrasts SSAI, which stitches ads into streams and may personalize by cohort, with CSAI, which uses advance cue markers, and SGAI, where the server guides player-side insertion for one-to-one personalization without advance markers. Tracking pipelines record delivery events, while click-through and view-through attribution credit conversions after clicks or ad exposure, respectively.

### Source excerpt

Advertising is a key source of revenue in most businesses. It certainly forms a key pillar for JioHotstar. There is so much technology hidden under the surface. In this blog, we will cover some of the complexity that gets unlocked when we render an ad on our content. Every 30-second ad break is a high-stakes performance involving millions of calculations, real-time bidding, and surgical precision. When you open JioHotstar to watch a live sports event or simply a movie, you see a Fence* ad (static display) or a Preroll* or a Midroll* Ad (video). What you don't see is the "Ad Decision" engine firing at millisecond speeds to decide: Why this ad? Why now? And why you? Speak Like an Adtech Pro Getting your foot inside the door, we need to understand some jargon! CPM (Cost Per Mille): The cost an advertiser pays for every 1,000 impressions. CPC -- Cost per Click SSAI (Server-Side Ad Insertion): Ads are "stitched" into the video stream on the server. At JioHotstar scale, this often happens at a Cohort level where we are grouping similar users to a balanced personalization of Ads. CSAI (Client Side Ad Insertion): The frontend client app(player) interrupts the video stream based on cue markers to show an ad. These cue markers are known well in advance when the user plays any content. SGAI (Server-Guided Ad Insertion): The server "guides" the player on what to do, but the player performs the final insertion. This allows for 1:1 personalization at a live event scale where we do not have the cue markers in advance. Programmatic vs. Direct: Direct is a handshake deal (e.g., "I want 1M views on an Ad"). Programmatic is an automated auction where we ask a 3rd-party SSP (Supply Side Platform) for an ad in real-time. Some common Ad Formats on JioHotstar Preroll Ad: The video ad you see before the actual content video starts. Midroll Ad: The video ad you see while in between the content. Fence Ad: The static display ad you see below the player on the app. The Demand Puzzle Imagine you

## Nginx tuning tips: HTTPS/TLS - Turbocharge TTFB/Latency

DevFeed: [Nginx tuning tips: HTTPS/TLS - Turbocharge TTFB/Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/nginx-tuning-tips-https-tls-turbocharge-ttfb-latency-20880.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://linuxblog.io/nginx-tuning-tips-tls-ssl-https-ttfb-latency/>)

Author: Hayden James

Published: 2026-06-10T12:06:18Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Hayden James](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hayden-james.md>)

Topics: [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/request.md>), [reuse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reuse.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [sysadmins](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sysadmins.md>), [tips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tips.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt says Nginx TLS tuning can reduce handshake overhead and improve connection reuse, shaving milliseconds from HTTPS requests, but it will not fix a slow application: backend work often dominates TTFB. The guide focuses on TLS, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 settings intended to reduce latency while retaining modern security. It recommends TLS 1.2 or 1.3 and says SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 should be disabled; the excerpt does not include the specific Nginx configuration steps.

### Source excerpt

Nginx TLS tuning won't fix a slow application, but it does cut handshake overhead and improve connection reuse, which shaves milliseconds off every HTTPS request. Continue reading...

## Block DDoS attacks with JA4 fingerprints

DevFeed: [Block DDoS attacks with JA4 fingerprints](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/block-ddos-attacks-with-ja4-fingerprints-83196.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://ngrok.com/blog/block-ddos-ja4-fingerprints>)

Author: Allison Carlisle

Published: 2025-05-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [\[ngrok news\]](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ngrok-news.md>)

Topics: [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [ddos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ddos.md>), [fingerprint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fingerprint.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [headers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/headers.md>), [ngrok](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ngrok.md>), [product-updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product-updates.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [traffic-policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-policy.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains how JA4 TLS client fingerprints can help protect applications and APIs. It describes using ngrok Traffic Policy to identify traffic patterns, then block fingerprints, rate limit traffic, or allow-list known clients. JA4 can add a layer of protection against unwanted traffic, but it does not identify a specific user or replace authentication.

### Source excerpt

Tired of spoofed headers? Use JA4 to fingerprint clients by their TLS handshake, then rate limit, block, or allow-list them with ngrok Traffic Policy.

## Making Chrome QUICer

DevFeed: [Making Chrome QUICer](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/making-chrome-quicer-4191.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.chromium.org/2024/12/making-chrome-quicer.html>)

Author: Chromium Blog (noreply@blogger.com)

Published: 2024-12-17T18:09:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Chromium Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/chromium-blog.md>)

Topics: [QUIC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quic.md>), [Web app](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/webapp.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [connection-pooling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connection-pooling.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [google-search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google-search.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [http-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-2.md>), [http-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-3.md>), [ietf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ietf.md>), [ip](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ip.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [lookup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lookup.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [metrics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/metrics.md>), [none](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/none.md>), [october](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/october.md>), [optimizing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optimizing.md>), [packets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packets.md>)

### AI overview

Chrome enabled HTTP/3's ORIGIN frame and Server's Preferred Address by default in M131 to improve connection reuse and reduce round-trip time. ORIGIN lets a server specify which domains may share a connection, avoiding extra DNS checks and new connections when IP addresses mismatch; Chrome metrics suggest nearly 20% of HTTP/3 connections would otherwise be unnecessary because of such mismatches. New connections can add DNS, handshake, cryptographic, CPU and memory costs, and 0-RTT may fail or be unavailable for non-safe requests. Server's Preferred Address lets the server, after handshake confirmation, suggest a different IP for the client to migrate to, potentially bypassing a load balancer or a longer Anycast route. Chrome tests reported migration success above 99% and average RTT reductions of 40-80%. The excerpt says Google's Media CDN was the only service widely advertising an alternative address so far.

### Source excerpt

In October 2020, Chrome enabled HTTP/3 by default. HTTP/3 (RFC 9114) runs over IETF QUIC (RFC9000). Default-enabling HTTP/3 in Chrome resulted in improved performance compared not only HTTP/1 and HTTP/2, but also Google QUIC. Benefits included reduced Google search latency and fewer rebuffers for YouTube. The journey to optimizing performance did not end when HTTP/3 was default enabled. Recent advancements include the implementation of the HTTP/3 ORIGIN frame (RFC 9412) and Server's Preferred Address (RFC 9000 Section 9.6). The former enhances connection coalescing, while the latter reduces a connection's round trip time (RTT). Both features have been enabled by default in M131, which was released to Stable on 11/19. ORIGIN Frame When a connection is established for a specific hostname, the server's certificate typically contains numerous other hostnames for which the server is authoritative. However, a client cannot immediately send requests for those other hostnames on that connection without first performing a DNS lookup for the other hostname and verifying that the IP address of the connection matches the resolved address. This additional DNS resolution introduces latency and significantly reduces the likelihood of connection pooling due to potential IP mismatches. The metrics from Chrome indicate that nearly 20% of HTTP/3 connections would be unnecessary if not for this IP mismatch. Creating a new connection, even with QUIC 0-RTT, is expensive in terms of latency, memory, and CPU usage. This is because: DNS resolution adds latency unless cached locally in Chrome's DNS cache. Both client and server must send multiple packets to complete a QUIC handshake. TLS necessitates CPU-intensive asymmetric cryptography on both ends. The congestion controller begins in its default state, potentially leading to under or over-sending. 0-RTT might fail. Non-safe requests aren't sent via 0-RTT. More connections consume more memory. Additionally, features like HTTP priorities (R

## mTLS (Mutual TLS): How It Works, with Diagram

DevFeed: [mTLS (Mutual TLS): How It Works, with Diagram](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mtls-mutual-tls-how-it-works-with-diagram-83356.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://ngrok.com/blog/what-is-mtls>)

Author: Team ngrok

Published: 2024-06-06T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [\[ngrok news\]](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ngrok-news.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [zero trust network access](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zero-trust-network-access.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [AWS Certificate Manager](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-certificate-manager.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [mutual-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mutual-tls.md>), [ngrok](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ngrok.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [traffic-policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-policy.md>)

### AI overview

mTLS extends TLS by requiring both sides of a connection to authenticate with certificates. This guide explains the handshake, certificate issuance and lifecycle management, use cases such as service-to-service communication, and configuring mTLS on an ngrok endpoint. It also discusses trade-offs including operational complexity and handshake latency.

### Source excerpt

What is mTLS and how does mutual TLS work? A clear guide to the mutual TLS handshake, with a step-by-step diagram, real use cases, and setup with ngrok.

## Understanding TCP The Three Way Handshake - Make completely with AI

DevFeed: [Understanding TCP The Three Way Handshake - Make completely with AI](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/understanding-tcp-the-three-way-handshake-make-completely-with-ai-66362.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zk5cwVAy9nI>)

Published: 2024-01-19T12:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Automate Your Network](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/automate-your-network.md>)

Topics: [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [camera-phone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/camera-phone.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [sharing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sharing.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [upload](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/upload.md>), [video](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/video.md>), [video-phone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/video-phone.md>)

### AI overview

A video about the TCP three-way handshake. Its description says it was made with InVideo AI from a single prompt.

### Source excerpt

John Capobianco - Video publication

## Routing egress traffic to wildcard destinations

DevFeed: [Routing egress traffic to wildcard destinations](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/routing-egress-traffic-to-wildcard-destinations-48763.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://istio.io/latest/blog/2023/egress-sni/>)

Author: Gergő Huszty (IBM)

Published: 2023-12-01T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Istio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/istio-blog.md>)

Topics: [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/istio.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proxy.md>), [HTTP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/http.md>)

Tags: [egress](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/egress.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/istio.md>), [mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mesh.md>), [microservices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microservices.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [traffic-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-management.md>), [wildcard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wildcard.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains how to route egress traffic from Istio service meshes to wildcard external destinations. It describes a migration approach using Istio-independent components and Envoy features, avoiding a separate Nginx SNI proxy after changes in Istio 1.20.

### Source excerpt

If you are using Istio to handle application-originated traffic to destinations outside of the mesh, you're probably familiar with the concept of egress gateways. Egress gateways can be used to monitor and forward traffic from mesh-internal applications to locations outside of the mesh. This is a useful feature if your system is operating in a restricted environment and you want to control what can be reached on the public internet from your mesh. The use-case of configuring an egress gateway to handle arbitrary wildcard domains had been included in the official Istio docs up until version 1.13, but was subsequently removed because the documented solution was not officially supported or recommended and was subject to breakage in future versions of Istio. Nevertheless, the old solution was still usable with Istio versions before 1.20. Istio 1.20, however, dropped some Envoy functionality that was required for the approach to work. This post attempts to describe how we resolved the issue and filled the gap with a similar approach using Istio version-independent components and Envoy features, but without the need for a separate Nginx SNI proxy. Our approach allows users of the old solution to seamlessly migrate configurations before their systems face the breaking changes in Istio 1.20. Problem to solve The currently documented egress gateway use-cases rely on the fact that the target of the traffic (the hostname) is statically configured in a VirtualService, telling Envoy in the egress gateway pod where to TCP proxy the matching outbound connections. You can use multiple, and even wildcard, DNS names to match the routing criteria, but you are not able to route the traffic to the exact location specified in the application request. For example you can match traffic for targets *.wikipedia.org, but you then need to forward the traffic to a single final target, e.g., en.wikipedia.org. If there is another service, e.g., anyservice.wikipedia.org, that is not hosted by the

## CryptoMB - TLS handshake acceleration for Istio

DevFeed: [CryptoMB - TLS handshake acceleration for Istio](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cryptomb-tls-handshake-acceleration-for-istio-48747.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://istio.io/latest/blog/2022/cryptomb-privatekeyprovider/>)

Author: Ravi kumar Veeramally (Intel), Ismo Puustinen (Intel), Sakari Poussa (Intel)

Published: 2022-06-15T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Istio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/istio-blog.md>)

Topics: [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/istio.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/handshake.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cpu.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [ECDSA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ecdsa.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/intel.md>), [Server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/server.md>), [Pingora](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pingora.md>), [ChaCha](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/chacha-cipher.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cryptomb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptomb.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [gateways](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateways.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [intel-xeon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel-xeon.md>), [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/istio.md>), [mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mesh.md>), [microservices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microservices.md>), [offloading](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/offloading.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [sidecar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sidecar.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains how CryptoMB accelerates TLS handshakes in Istio gateways and sidecar proxies. It describes Envoy's private key provider, Intel IPP multi-buffer cryptography, and AVX-512 processing for RSA and ECDSA operations.

### Source excerpt

Cryptographic operations are among the most compute-intensive and critical operations when it comes to secured connections. Istio uses Envoy as the "gateways/sidecar" to handle secure connections and intercept the traffic. Depending upon use cases, when an ingress gateway must handle a large number of incoming TLS and secured service-to-service connections through sidecar proxies, the load on Envoy increases. The potential performance depends on many factors, such as size of the cpuset on which Envoy is running, incoming traffic patterns, and key size. These factors can impact Envoy serving many new incoming TLS requests. To achieve performance improvements and accelerated handshakes, a new feature was introduced in Envoy 1.20 and Istio 1.14. It can be achieved with 3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable processors, the Intel® Integrated Performance Primitives (Intel® IPP) crypto library, CryptoMB Private Key Provider Method support in Envoy, and Private Key Provider configuration in Istio using ProxyConfig. CryptoMB The Intel IPP crypto library supports multi-buffer crypto operations. Briefly, multi-buffer cryptography is implemented with Intel® Advanced Vector Extensions 512 (Intel® AVX-512) instructions using a SIMD (single instruction, multiple data) mechanism. Up to eight RSA or ECDSA operations are gathered into a buffer and processed at the same time, providing potentially improved performance. Intel AVX-512 instructions are available on recently launched 3rd generation Intel Xeon Scalable processor server processors (Ice Lake server). The idea of Envoy's CryptoMB private key provider is that incoming TLS handshakes' RSA operations are accelerated using Intel AVX-512 multi-buffer instructions. Accelerate Envoy with Intel AVX-512 instructions Envoy uses BoringSSL as the default TLS library. BoringSSL supports setting private key methods for offloading asynchronous private key operations, and Envoy implements a private key provider framework to allow creation of Envoy e

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