# LAN Published articles for LAN. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Breaking Fault Lines: Unifying TEE-Assisted BFT Consensus in Partially Trusted Worlds DevFeed: [Breaking Fault Lines: Unifying TEE-Assisted BFT Consensus in Partially Trusted Worlds]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Xiaoqing Wen, Tong Liu, Jianyu Niu, Jialin Li, Cong Wang, Yinqian Zhang, Chen Feng Published: 2026-11-05T05:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing]() Topics: [Distributed Systems & Parallel Computing](), [consensus algorithm](), [Confidential Computing](), [performance-engineering]() Tags: [bft-consensus](), [consensus](), [cs-dc](), [fault-tolerance](), [hardware](), [intel](), [lan](), [latency](), [performance](), [protocol](), [quorum](), [resilience](), [tee](), [throughput](), [trust](), [wan]() ### AI overview The paper derives a tight resilience bound for BFT deployments with arbitrary partial TEE coverage: f < max{n/3, m/2}, where n is total replicas and m are TEE-enabled replicas. It reports that TEEs improve fault tolerance only when they exceed two-thirds of the deployment. Its protocols combine TEE-only and mixed quorums and use a TEE-leader fast path based on hardware-enforced non-equivocation to reduce consensus and view-change latency. Raftel and its pipelined variant, chained-Raftel, are implemented on Intel SGX and evaluated in LAN and WAN settings. In WAN tests, Raftel reaches up to 625 TPS with latency below 670 ms, and exceeds HotStuff throughput by up to 308 TPS while approaching fully TEE-assisted protocols. These are abstract-level reported results; no evaluation details are provided here. ### Source excerpt arXiv:2609.09742v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: This paper revisits TEE-assisted BFT under a universal partial-TEE model, where an arbitrary subset of replicas execute inside TEEs while the remaining replicas operate without hardware trust guarantees. We show that heterogeneous trust changes the structure of quorum formation and fault tolerance. In particular, we derive a tight resilience bound f < max {n/3, m/2}, where n is the total number of replicas and m is the number of TEE-enabled replicas. The result reveals a sharp threshold phenomenon: TEEs improve fault tolerance only once they exceed two-thirds of the deployment. Guided by this characterization, we introduce two protocol principles: (1) a dual-quorum construction that safely combines TEE-only and mixed quorums, and (2) a TEE-leader fast path that leverages hardware-enforced non-equivocation to reduce both consensus and view-change latency. We realize these ideas in Raftel, which is, to our knowledge, the first HotStuff-style BFT protocol designed explicitly for arbitrary partial-TEE deployments, and in chained-Raftel, a pipelined variant that further accelerates mixed-trust execution. We implement both protocols atop Intel SGX and evaluate them in LAN and WAN environments. Our results show that Raftel achieves up to 625 TPS with sub-670 ms latency in WAN settings, outperforming HotStuff by up to 308 TPS in throughput while approaching the performance of fully TEE-assisted protocols. ## NaaS hasn't lived up to the hype. Is it still worth it? DevFeed: [NaaS hasn't lived up to the hype. Is it still worth it?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Maria Korolov Published: 2026-11-02T13:37:45Z Content type: comparison Language: en Sources: [Network World]() Topics: [Cloud Networking](), [Managed Services](), [network device monitoring](), [upgrade]() Tags: [2021](), [2025](), [2026](), [access-points](), [adoption](), [aging](), [cables](), [connectivity](), [coverage](), [deep](), [edition-us](), [end-of-life](), [enterprise](), [enterprise-networking](), [equipment](), [gartner](), [hardware](), [it](), [lan](), [language-en](), [latest](), [leadership](), [networking](), [storytype-feature]() ### AI overview NaaS adoption remains below Gartner's 2021 forecast: its 2026 networking hype cycle puts market penetration at 1%-5%. At Rivers School, Meter replaced a piecemeal LAN upgrade with a turnkey service: it surveyed, designed, installed, and now maintains Meter-owned equipment. The school reports better coverage, performance, security, visibility, and easier support, with included service calls and potential long-term savings. Outdoor coverage is limited because Meter bills by square footage. Gartner cautions that consumption pricing can be unpredictable, NaaS may cost more than capital-funded networks, and supplied hardware creates platform lock-in; a working network may not justify replacement. Analysts also cite campus hardware needs, reduced flexibility, unclear definitions, and risk of billing surprises. The excerpt distinguishes more-developed WAN offerings from full traditional WAN capabilities and notes that NaaS adoption and maturity figures vary by survey measure. ### Source excerpt In 2021, Gartner expected a promising future for Network as a Service (NaaS). At the time, adoption accounted for less than 1% of enterprises, and Gartner expected that number to rise to 15% by 2024. Instead, in Gartner's latest hype cycle for networking, NaaS is still at 1% to 5% market penetration. That's short of Gartner's earlier expectations. In fact, Gartner places NaaS deep in the "trough of disillusionment" in its 2026 Hype Cycle for Enterprise Networking. Making the case for NaaS NaaS has been working out for the Rivers School, which has a 55-acre campus in eastern Massachusetts that's home to a preparatory school and a music conservatory, totaling more than 1,700 students combined. John Adams, Rivers' director of technology and innovation, came on board in the summer of 2024, and upgrading the school's aging LAN was his top priority. At the time, the school had a network with 115 Wi-Fi access points, plus switches, routers, cables, and two ISPs providing connectivity. "Our entire switch inventory needed to be replaced, and about one-third of the access points were end-of-life as well," Adams says. "I made a pitch to our senior leadership that we needed to make an update," he says. After the board approved the request and allocated a budget, Adams went out to research options. The initial plan was to upgrade the equipment the school already had starting with the most out-of-date hardware first, improve coverage and performance, improve the security, and to try to do it all without adding headcount. There was one employee managing the network, with nobody else on the five-person technology team qualified to help, so, ideally, the new system would also allow someone to step in and take on some of the work if necessary. Instead of a piecemeal update to the existing setup, Rivers opted for NaaS, picking one of the two major vendors in the space, Meter. The final decision was made in late spring of 2025, and the new network was up and running by the time classes ## CVE-2026-61546 - AnkiMCP: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated local AnkiMCP HTTP tools DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61546 - AnkiMCP: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated local AnkiMCP HTTP tools]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com Published: 2026-10-28T22:17:15Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed]() Topics: [frontend security](), [Domain Name System (DNS)]() Tags: [2026](), [ai-assistants](), [browser](), [collection](), [cve-2026-61546](), [dns](), [fixed](), [http](), [lan](), [local](), [malicious](), [mcp](), [mcp-server](), [mcp-tool](), [note](), [published](), [secret](), [write]() ### AI overview Before version 0.21.0, AnkiMCP disables FastMCP's DNS-rebinding protection globally, including for its default HTTP listener at 127.0.0.1:3141, and the described MCP endpoints have no authentication or strict Host/Origin allowlists. If a victim visits a malicious page while Anki and the listener are running, browser requests can be rebound to loopback to initialize MCP, enumerate tools, read the collection, and create or update notes and decks. Reach requires neither LAN access nor a local process. Available actions depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools require opt-in. The reported harness exercised MCP dispatch using substituted Anki bridge responses and did not demonstrate destructive changes to a real collection. The issue is fixed in version 0.21.0. ### Source excerpt CVE ID :CVE-2026-61546 Published : Oct. 28, 2026, 10:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 12 minutes ago Description :AnkiMCP is an Anki addon that implements an MCP server, enabling AI assistants to interact with the Anki flashcard application. Prior to version 0.21.0, `anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py` globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection through `TransportSecuritySettings` with `enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False`, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener. The defaults in `anki_mcp_server/config.py` enable `http_enabled` on `127.0.0.1:3141`, with an empty `http_path` selecting the root endpoint. No bearer token, API key, session secret, strict `Host` allowlist or strict `Origin` allowlist is enforced before `initialize`, `tools/list` and `tools/call` reach MCP dispatch. A victim who visits a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to `initialize` MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates. The attacker needs neither LAN position nor a local process. Available operations depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools are hidden unless `enabled_destructive_tools` is opted into, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations. The reported harness confirms real MCP tool dispatch with substituted Anki bridge responses rather than demonstrating destructive changes to a real collection. Disabling protection for tunnels/proxies also disables it for the normal loopback configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.0. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more... ## Make a dedicated Wake-on-LAN server with Tailscale DevFeed: [Make a dedicated Wake-on-LAN server with Tailscale]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ameliepangolin Published: 2026-09-22T08:00:19Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [HackerNoon]() Topics: [tailscale](), [Network](), [Docker](), [Raspberry Pi](), [container](), [Command-line interface](), [Server]() Tags: [command-line](), [docker](), [ethernet](), [good-company](), [how-to](), [lan](), [local](), [mac-address](), [network](), [osi-model](), [raspberry-pi](), [raspberry-pi-wake-on-lan](), [remote-wake-on-lan-setup](), [server](), [servers](), [tailscale](), [tailscale-raspberry-pi](), [tailscale-wake-on-lan](), [tailscale-wol-remote-access](), [upsnap-tailscale](), [wake-on-lan-from-anywhere]() ### AI overview A tutorial on using Tailscale with Wake-on-LAN to remotely wake sleeping or powered-off devices. It describes using a Raspberry Pi, a web app, or a Docker container to send wake-up signals across networks. ### Source excerpt Learn how to combine Tailscale with Wake-on-LAN to wake sleeping PCs and servers remotely using a Raspberry Pi, UpSnap, or Docker. ## NTP, an atomic clock, and having a great time at the world's largest VCF DevFeed: [NTP, an atomic clock, and having a great time at the world's largest VCF]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: jeff@jeffgeerling.com (Jeff Geerling) Published: 2026-09-18T14:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Jeff Geerling]() Topics: [Homelab](), [Server](), [Network](), [macOS](), [Ubiquiti](), [Wi-Fi]() Tags: [clock](), [gnss](), [gps](), [homelab](), [lan](), [mac](), [mac-os](), [midwest](), [network](), [ntp](), [poe](), [retro](), [router](), [server](), [time](), [ubiquiti](), [vcf](), [wi-fi]() ### AI overview A personal report on exhibiting an NTP time-synchronization demonstration at VCF Midwest 21. The exhibit connected vintage Macs, an Xserve G5, a TrueTime Pi GNSS reference, and network equipment to illustrate Stratum 0 through Stratum 3 time services. ### Source excerpt I'm back from VCF Midwest 21, arguably the largest vintage computer festival on the planet. After being blown away last year, I decided to get a table of my own this year, to demonstrate NTP Time on a bunch of old Macs, representing every era up to the pinnacle of the PowerPC, an Xserve G5 (serving duty as a Stratum 2 ntpd server). Attending as an exhibitor is a lot different. In some ways better (I got to interact face-to-face with at least 200 people--after that I ran out of my 'time tokens'), and in some ways worse (I only got to see about 10% of the exhibits--if that). ## Analysis of PPPP "encryption" DevFeed: [Analysis of PPPP "encryption"]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Wladimir Palant Published: 2026-01-05T15:50:53Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Almost Secure]() Topics: [Encryption](), [Cryptography](), [Network](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Algorithms]() Tags: [analysis](), [ascii](), [cryptanalysis](), [encryption](), [lan](), [network](), [pull-request](), [theory]() ### AI overview This analysis examines weaknesses in PPPP "encryption." It explains that app keys are reduced to a four-byte effective key and that the scheme is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks. For LAN camera discovery when the app and traffic are unknown, the article describes sending all possible encrypted search packets, with at most 157,092 ciphertexts, and notes a pull request to update the device-detection script. ### Source excerpt My first article on the PPPP protocol already said everything there was to say about PPPP "encryption": Keys are static and usually trivial to extract from the app. No matter how long the original key, it is mapped to an effective key that's merely four bytes long. The "encryption" is extremely susceptible to known-plaintext attacks, usually allowing reconstruction of the effective key from a single encrypted packet. So this thing is completely broken, why look any further? There is at least one situation where you don't know the app being used so you cannot extract the key and you don't have any traffic to analyze either. It's when you are trying to scan your local network for potential hidden cameras. This script will currently only work for cameras using plaintext communication. Other cameras expect a properly encrypted "LAN search" packet and will ignore everything else. How can this be solved without listing all possible keys in the script? By sending all possible ciphertexts of course! TL;DR: What would be completely ridiculous with any reasonable protocol turned out to be quite possible with PPPP. There are at most 157,092 ways in which a "LAN search" packet can be encrypted. I've opened a pull request to have the PPPP device detection script adjusted. Note: Cryptanalysis isn't my topic, I am by no means an expert here. These issues are simply too obvious. Contents Mapping keys to effective keys Redundancies within the effective key ASCII to the rescue How large is n? How many ciphertexts is that? Understanding the response Mapping keys to effective keys The key which is specified as part of the app's "init string" is not being used for encryption directly. Nor is it being fed into any of the established key stretching algorithms. Instead, a key represented by the byte sequence b1,b2,...,bnb_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n is mapped to four bytes k1,k2,k3,k4k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4 that become the effective key. These bytes are calculated as follows (⌊x⌋\lfloor x \rfloor means r ## Arista EOS Spooky Action at a Distance DevFeed: [Arista EOS Spooky Action at a Distance]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-17T08:10:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [Integration testing](), [Ethernet](), [qemu](), [Linux](), [JSON]() Tags: [blog](), [blog-post](), [ethernet](), [integration-testing](), [ipv4](), [json](), [lan](), [linux](), [netlab](), [qemu](), [testing](), [tests](), [validation](), [virtualization]() ### AI overview This blog post investigates unexpected Arista EOS behavior found during netlab VRRP integration testing. In a minimal lab, shutting down one switch interface caused the other switch's Ethernet line protocol to go down and stopped responses from the VRRP backup. Packet capture indicated that the first switch sent a packet instructing the peer to emulate remote link loss. ### Source excerpt This blog post describes yet another bizarre behavior discovered during the netlab integration testing. It started innocently enough: I was working on the VRRP integration test and wanted to use Arista EOS as the second (probe) device in the VRRP cluster because it produces nice JSON-formatted results that are easy to use in validation tests. Everything looked great until I ran the test on all platforms on which netlab configures VRRP, and all of them passed apart from Arista EOS (that was before we figured out how Sturgeon's Law applies to VRRPv3) - a "That's funny" moment that was directly responsible for me wasting a few hours chasing white rabbits down this trail. Read more ... ## Lab: IS-IS Designated Router Election DevFeed: [Lab: IS-IS Designated Router Election]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-13T07:03:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [IS-IS]() Tags: [is-is](), [lan](), [netlab](), [ospf](), [router](), [standards]() ### AI overview This lab article explains that IS-IS uses a Designated Intermediate System (DIS) router to originate the pseudo-node for a LAN segment. Unlike OSPF, the DIS does not need a backup because it is not responsible for flooding. ### Source excerpt Like OSPF, IS-IS needs a router to originate the pseudo-node for a LAN segment. IS-IS standards call that router a Designated Intermediate System (DIS), and since it is not responsible for flooding, it does not need a backup. Want to know more? The Influence the Designated IS Election lab exercise provides the details (and some hands-on work). ## Capturing Traffic in Virtual Networking Labs DevFeed: [Capturing Traffic in Virtual Networking Labs]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-04T06:43:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [Network](), [Linux](), [qemu](), [virtual machines](), [container](), [Docker]() Tags: [capture](), [container](), [containers](), [docker](), [lan](), [linux](), [netlab](), [networking](), [qemu](), [virtual-machines](), [virtualization]() ### AI overview A tutorial on capturing traffic in virtual networking labs. It explains how to capture traffic from Linux bridges and QEMU-connected virtual machines, use netlab capture as a wrapper around virsh, brctl, and tcpdump, and approach traffic capture for containers attached to Docker networks or Linux bridges. ### Source excerpt When I announced the Stub Networks in Virtual Labs blog post on LinkedIn, I claimed it was the last chapter in the "links in virtual labs" saga. I was wrong; here comes the fourth part of the virtual links trilogy - capturing "on the wire" traffic in virtual networking labs. While network devices provide traffic capture capabilities (usually tcpdump in disguise generating a .pcap file), it's often better to capture the traffic outside of the device to see what the root cause of the problems you're experiencing might be. Read more ... ## Why VLAN 1 Should Not Be Tagged in a Trunk DevFeed: [Why VLAN 1 Should Not Be Tagged in a Trunk]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-02-11T07:05:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [Network](), [Ethernet](), [DHCP](), [Cisco]() Tags: [bridging](), [cisco](), [dhcp](), [ethernet](), [lan](), [netlab](), [network](), [security]() ### AI overview The article examines conflicting interpretations of VLAN 1 in trunks by Cumulus NVUE and Arista EOS. It recommends avoiding VLAN 1 in VLAN trunks and using it as the native VLAN when necessary, while explaining the historical and operational reasons behind this behavior. ### Source excerpt It all started with a netlab issue describing different interpretations of VLAN 1 in a trunk. While Cumulus NVUE (the way the netlab configuration template configures it) assumes that the VLAN 1 in a trunk is tagged, Arista EOS assumes it's the native VLAN. At that point, I should have said, "that's crazy, we shouldn't allow that" and enforce the "VLAN 1 has to be used as a native VLAN" rule. Alas, 20/20 hindsight never helped anyone. TL&DR: Do not use VLAN 1 in VLAN trunks; if you have to, use it as a native VLAN. Read more ... ## The Ethernet/802.1 Protocol Stack DevFeed: [The Ethernet/802.1 Protocol Stack]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-01-22T07:28:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [Ethernet](), [Protocol (disambiguation)]() Tags: [ethernet](), [gigabit-ethernet](), [lan](), [protocol](), [provisioning](), [reconciliation]() ### AI overview An explanation of the Ethernet and IEEE 802.1 protocol stack, including the MAC and LLC sublayers, physical-layer subdivisions, and the placement of discovery, link aggregation, spanning tree, VLAN, and provisioning protocols. ### Source excerpt The believers in the There Be Four Layers religion think everything below IP is just a blob of stuff dealing with physical things: People steeped in a slightly more nuanced view of the world in which IP is not the centerpiece of the universe might tell you that the blob of stuff we need is two things: Read more ... ## Attacking UNIX Systems via CUPS, Part I DevFeed: [Attacking UNIX Systems via CUPS, Part I]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Simone Margaritelli Published: 2024-09-26T14:51:30Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Evil Socket]() Topics: [Vulnerabilities](), [Security](), [Unix](), [Exploit](), [Linux](), [systems]() Tags: [bugs](), [cups](), [cups-browsed](), [cve](), [cve-2024-47076](), [cve-2024-47175](), [cve-2024-47176](), [cve-2024-47177](), [cybersecurity](), [disclosure](), [exploit](), [gnu-linux](), [hacking](), [ipp](), [lan](), [linux-security](), [mdns](), [no-authentication](), [port](), [print-services](), [printer](), [printers](), [printing](), [rce](), [responsible-disclosure](), [security](), [udp](), [unauthenticated-access](), [unix](), [vulnerability-research](), [zeroconf]() ### AI overview A security writeup describes multiple vulnerabilities in CUPS components affecting GNU/Linux and other UNIX systems. It reports that remote unauthenticated attackers may replace printer IPP URLs and trigger arbitrary command execution when a print job starts, with attacks possible over the public internet or via spoofed LAN advertisements. ### Source excerpt Hello friends, this is the first of two, possibly three (if and when I have time to finish the Windows research) writeups. We will start ## Using wemulate with netlab DevFeed: [Using wemulate with netlab]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-04-02T05:49:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace]() Topics: [Network](), [container](), [Linux](), [Docker]() Tags: [bash](), [container](), [containers](), [distributed](), [docker](), [ipv4](), [lan](), [linux](), [netlab](), [networking]() ### AI overview This tutorial shows how to use wemulate with netlab to build a container-based virtual WAN network. It explains how wemulate connects container interfaces with Linux bridges, how to configure static IPv4 prefixes, and how to add jitter before testing connectivity between hosts. ### Source excerpt An RSS hiccup brought an old blog post from Urs Baumann into my RSS reader. I'm always telling networking engineers that it's essential to set up realistic WAN environments when testing distributed software, and wemulate (a nice tc front-end) seemed like a perfect match. Even better, it runs in a container - an ideal component for a netlab-generated virtual WAN network. wemulate acts as a bump in the wire; it uses Linux bridges to connect two container interfaces. We'll use it to introduce jitter into an IP subnet: ┌──┐ ┌────────┐ ┌──┐ │h1├───┤wemulate├───┤h2│ └──┘ └────────┘ └──┘ ◄──────────────────────► 192.168.33.0/24 Read more ... ## How IX.BR Automates Quarantine LAN Testing DevFeed: [How IX.BR Automates Quarantine LAN Testing]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2024-02-01T11:27:29Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Benjojo]() Topics: [Network](), [Ethernet](), [Internet Traffic](), [DDoS](), [proxy](), [Software Testing]() Tags: [arp](), [bgp](), [ethernet](), [internet](), [internet-traffic](), [lan](), [proxy](), [tests]() ### AI overview The article describes IX.BR São Paulo's automated quarantine LAN testing portal for internet exchange participants. It explains why quarantine testing matters, including the risks of Ethernet loops, management frames, and Proxy ARP on a shared Layer 2 exchange LAN. ### Source excerpt Appreciation of automated IX Quarantine LAN testing Something that bgp.tools (my company) does a great deal is joining internet exchanges. ## Configuring VLANs, Firewall Rules, and WiFi Networks - UniFi Network Application DevFeed: [Configuring VLANs, Firewall Rules, and WiFi Networks - UniFi Network Application]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Techno Tim Published: 2023-03-04T15:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Techno Tim]() Topics: [Network](), [Firewall](), [Security](), [Ubiquiti]() Tags: [firewall](), [homelab](), [lan](), [network](), [security](), [unifi](), [wireless]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how to configure VLANs with the UniFi Network Application, including creating a network, setting up a wireless network that uses VLANs, and adding firewall rules. It also describes how VLANs can improve security, performance, management, and flexibility for home networks. ### Source excerpt What is a VLAN and How Do They Help? Today we're going to cover setting up VLANs using UniFi's network controller.We'll set up a VLAN, from start to finish, which includes creating a new network, configuring a wireless network that uses VLANs, and then we'll set up firewall rules to make sure we're keeping our network safe. If you think VLANs are only for the enterprise, you're wrong, I will s... ## How to Configure Wake on LAN Across Windows, macOS, and Linux DevFeed: [How to Configure Wake on LAN Across Windows, macOS, and Linux]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Techno Tim Published: 2023-02-19T15:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Techno Tim]() Topics: [Network](), [Linux](), [macOS](), [Windows](), [boot]() Tags: [guide](), [hardware](), [how-to](), [lan](), [linux](), [macos](), [network](), [networking](), [pikvm](), [utilities](), [windows]() ### AI overview A practical guide to configuring Wake on LAN across Windows, macOS, and Linux. It explains how WoL uses a magic packet to wake a machine and discusses the BIOS settings that may need to be enabled or disabled for different hardware and power states. ### Source excerpt What is Wake on LAN and why is it so hard? After releasing my video on the PiKVM I realized that there was so much confusion about Wake on LAN, and rightfully so, that I decided to put together this guide on how to configure Wake on LAN on any machine. Wake on LAN (WoL) is a networking standard that allows a computer to be turned on by sending a network packet. The client sends a special packe... ## Capture the Flag events and eSports DevFeed: [Capture the Flag events and eSports]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Jonathan Marcil Published: 2019-09-11T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Shostack & Friends Blog]() Topics: [Sports]() Tags: [competition](), [events](), [games](), [lan](), [sports](), [strategy](), [team]() ### AI overview The article compares Capture the Flag events with eSports and argues that CTFs are intrinsically an eSport with strong educational value. It describes eSports audiences, broadcasts, competition, professional gaming, and amateur LAN and online events. ### Source excerpt A breakdown of CTFs and eSports ## Networking for a Bare-Metal Kubernetes Cluster After AWS DevFeed: [Networking for a Bare-Metal Kubernetes Cluster After AWS]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ev@goteleport.com (Ev Kontsevoy) Published: 2019-05-14T15:39:34Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Teleport]() Topics: [Kubernetes](), [Network](), [Amazon Web Services](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [container](), [Software-defined networking]() Tags: [aws](), [bare-metal](), [hardware](), [ip](), [k8s](), [kubernetes](), [lan](), [networking](), [router](), [sdn]() ### AI overview This article explains how to design a simple, non-redundant network for a small bare-metal Kubernetes environment in a colocation facility after leaving AWS. It discusses network complexity, legacy limitations, SDN concepts, public subnet routing, and separate private LANs for management, security, and performance. ### Source excerpt This is part three of a three-part series on considerations that companies will want to address if they decide to build their own cloud environment.