# NIXI Published articles for NIXI. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Thanks for participating in APNIC 62 DevFeed: [Thanks for participating in APNIC 62]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Timothy Hildred Published: 2026-09-10T13:16:58Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [Internet](), [networking](), [NIXI]() Tags: [apnic-62](), [blog](), [community](), [conference](), [conferences](), [event](), [events](), [india](), [industry](), [internet](), [keynote](), [learn](), [linkedin](), [networking](), [nixi](), [september-2026](), [speakers](), [survey](), [transcripts](), [updates](), [videos](), [youtube]() ### AI overview APNIC 62 brought together 583 in-person and remote attendees from 54 economies in Mumbai from 4 to 10 September 2026. The article thanks participants, speakers, sponsors, and organizers, and points readers to the conference report, recordings, presentations, transcripts, and survey. ### Source excerpt Thank you to everyone who participated in person and remotely at APNIC 62, hosted by the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI) and co-hosted by ISPAI, from 4 to 10 September 2026 in Mumbai, India. ## APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India DevFeed: [APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dan Fidler Published: 2026-09-09T09:01:06Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [Routing Security](), [Security](), [Internet](), [Resilience](), [networking]() Tags: [apnic-62](), [collaboration](), [development](), [india](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [knowledge-sharing](), [nixi](), [partnership](), [resilience](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [skills](), [support]() ### AI overview APNIC and NIXI have signed an MoU to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India. The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment, pilot an RPKI repository mirror, promote routing security practices, and support technical training and knowledge sharing. ### Source excerpt The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment including piloting an RPKI Repository Mirror to support a more secure and resilient Internet ecosystem. ## Welcome to APNIC 62 DevFeed: [Welcome to APNIC 62]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Timothy Hildred Published: 2026-09-08T03:33:07Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [Internet](), [Networks](), [Cybersecurity](), [DNSSEC](), [threat detection](), [Threat Research](), [FIRST]() Tags: [apnic-62](), [community](), [conference](), [conferences](), [cybersecurity](), [dnssec](), [event](), [events](), [india](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [nixi](), [nro](), [policy-sig](), [tech-matters](), [threat-detection]() ### AI overview APNIC 62 in Mumbai previews technical, security, IPv6 deployment, DNSSEC, threat-detection, community, and policy sessions, alongside keynote talks, social events, newcomer activities, and NRO NC voting information. ### Source excerpt APNIC welcomes you to Mumbai, India for APNIC 62. Here is what you can look forward to over the coming days. ## Measuring IPv6 deployment on Indian Govt websites DevFeed: [Measuring IPv6 deployment on Indian Govt websites]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-06-04T20:19:53Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [Network](), [Internet](), [Website](), [Google](), [Cloudflare](), [amazon](), [Amazon Web Services]() Tags: [airtel](), [akamai](), [aws](), [cloudflare](), [dns](), [google](), [india](), [ipv6](), [jio](), [nixi](), [websites]() ### AI overview The article measures IPv6 support on Indian government websites using certificate transparency logs and checks for working IPv4 and IPv6 endpoints. Among 4,924 examined domains under gov.in and nic.in, 174, or about 3.5%, had working IPv6 web endpoints. ### Source excerpt India has done well on IPv6 deployment thanks to Jio taking the lead in 2016, along with Airtel & VI aggressively catching up. Many of us in the industry are very proud of the work done by these players, resulting in over 78% deployment of IPv6 when measured by APNIC / Google, etc. Jio and Airtel numbers are as high as 95% IPv6 preferred at this point in time. But that's one part of the Indian metrics. IPv6 deployment, DNSSEC usage or even Internet Exchange peering - one can find very different metrics depending on how one is measuring. Both APNIC & Google rely on Google's network and judge how (largely mobile) end users across India are connecting to their (IPv6-enabled) services, and this gives the "eyeballs" side of specs. One key element missing in the picture is IPv6 support on the Government of India websites. I am using "Govt. of India" loosely here. I mean the Central Govt, state governments, as well as UTs and any of their departments. I have always felt that deployment is very poor, as randomly looking across the critical government websites. The service either shows no DNS AAAA record or may have a AAAA record but does not respond to port 80/443, giving an idea of a broken deployment. Measuring deployment is hard since (as far as I know) there is no authoritative source of government domains. Likely NIXI or ERNET, etc. may hold them but then getting them may be a long process and may not work at all. Then I thought of certificate transparency logs. Most of the CAs would log TLS certificates issued in public logs. One can read these logs for *.gov.in and *.nic.in to get a list of all government. used domains under those well-known TLDs and the ones which took a TLS certificate. I did some extra checks, like verifying the A record, working website on IPv4, before looking for IPv6. That way I remove all non-existent/old/expired websites. Also, looked for and www. in some cases as TLS may be issued for both. In case of wildcard TLS certificates like *..gov.in