# P2P Published articles for P2P. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Connect an ESP device and iPhone directly using Wi-Fi Aware DevFeed: [Connect an ESP device and iPhone directly using Wi-Fi Aware]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: John Lee Published: 2026-08-25T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Blog on Developer Portal]() Topics: [Wi-Fi](), [iOS](), [iphone](), [cross-platform](), [P2P](), [Internet of things](), [networking]() Tags: [android](), [app](), [blog](), [cross-platform](), [esp-idf](), [esp-idf-component](), [how-to](), [ios](), [iot](), [iphone](), [ipv6](), [p2p](), [pairing](), [practitioner](), [security](), [wi-fi](), [wi-fi-aware]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how to connect an ESP device directly to an iPhone using Wi-Fi Aware. It describes service discovery, mandatory six-digit PIN pairing, and an encrypted IPv6 data link without an access point, DHCP server, or internet connection. On supported devices running iOS 26 or iPadOS 26, the connection can operate concurrently with normal Wi-Fi connectivity. ### Source excerpt iOS 26 brings Wi-Fi Aware™ support on iPhone 12 and later, enabling compatible devices to securely discover, pair, and communicate directly. This requires no Access Point and does not affect iPhone's network connectivity over Wi-Fi. This article walks through the steps to set up an ESP device and an iPhone so they can pair and connect using Wi-Fi Aware. ## I Rebuilt a Minimal BitTorrent Client in Go to Understand Peer-to-Peer Choking Algorithms DevFeed: [I Rebuilt a Minimal BitTorrent Client in Go to Understand Peer-to-Peer Choking Algorithms]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: hello@ankit-rana.com Published: 2026-08-02T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Ankit Rana | Mechanical Sympathy]() Topics: [Algorithms](), [P2P](), [Go Language](), [Programming](), [Network]() Tags: [algorithms](), [bittorrent](), [distributed-systems](), [go](), [golang](), [network](), [networking](), [p2p](), [peer-to-peer](), [protocol](), [system-design]() ### AI overview A hands-on explanation of BitTorrent choking algorithms through rebuilding a minimal client in Go. The article describes choking as a decentralized bandwidth-allocation mechanism, explains the choked and interested states, and shows how upload capacity affects peer prioritization. ### Source excerpt The BitTorrent spec explains choking in two paragraphs; implementing it in Go and watching every peer choke you within 60 seconds is what makes it stick. Choking is a bandwidth allocator running independently on every node, not a courtesy flag. Upload is the scarce resource on an asymmetric link, and each connection carries just two booleans, choked and interested, whose four combinations drive the entire fairness policy of the swarm. ## Backdoors in VStarcam cameras DevFeed: [Backdoors in VStarcam cameras]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Wladimir Palant Published: 2026-01-07T13:01:48Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Almost Secure]() Topics: [Security](), [backdoor](), [passwords](), [P2P](), [Protocol (disambiguation)]() Tags: [backdoor](), [cameras](), [p2p](), [passwords](), [protocol](), [security]() ### AI overview An investigation of VStarcam cameras finds that firmware mechanisms systematically undermine administrator-password protection by leaking passwords and exposing cameras through internet-connected P2P functionality. The article also examines insecure firmware updates delivered over plain HTTP and recommends restricting internet access with a network firewall or using custom firmware. ### Source excerpt VStarcam is an important brand of cameras based on the PPPP protocol. Unlike the LookCam cameras I looked into earlier, these are often being positioned as security cameras. And they in fact do a few things better like... well, like having a mostly working authentication mechanism. In order to access the camera one has to know its administrator password. So much for the theory. When I looked into the firmware of the cameras I discovered a surprising development: over the past years this protection has been systematically undermined. Various mechanisms have been added that leak the access password, and in several cases these cannot be explained as accidents. The overall tendency is clear: for some reason VStarcam really wants to have access to their customer's passwords. A reminder: "P2P" functionality based on the PPPP protocol means that these cameras will always communicate with and be accessible from the internet, even when located on a home network behind NAT. Short of installing a custom firmware this can only addressed by configuring the network firewall to deny internet access. Contents How to recognize affected cameras Downloading the firmware Caveats of this survey VStarcam's authentication approach Endpoint protection Unauthenticated log access Explicit password leaking via logs Log uploading Password-leaking backdoor Establishing a timeline The impact Coordinated disclosure attempt Recommendations How to recognize affected cameras Not every VStarcam camera has "VStarcam" printed on the side. I have seen reports of VStarcam cameras being sold under the brand names Besder, MVPower, AOMG, OUSKI, and there are probably more. Most cameras should be recognizable by the app used to manage them. Any camera managed by one of these apps should be a VStarcam camera: Eye4, EyeCloud, FEC Smart Home, HOTKam, O-KAM Pro, PnPCam, VeePai, VeeRecon, Veesky, VKAM, VsCam, VStarcam Ultra. Downloading the firmware VStarcam cameras have a mechanism to deliver firmware updates (Loo ## Shipyard 2025: IPFS Year in Review DevFeed: [Shipyard 2025: IPFS Year in Review]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: lidel; Shipyard Published: 2025-12-19T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [IPFS]() Topics: [IPFS](), [Self-hosted](), [releases](), [browser](), [HTTP]() Tags: [2025](), [boxo](), [browser](), [decentralized](), [dht](), [distributed](), [dweb](), [ecosystem](), [helia](), [http](), [ipfs](), [kubo](), [libp2p](), [p2p](), [peer-to-peer](), [rainbow](), [releases](), [review](), [self-hosted](), [storage](), [web](), [web3](), [year-in-review]() ### AI overview A review of IPFS developments in 2025, highlighting seven Kubo releases and related ecosystem updates. It focuses on DHT Provide Sweep, AutoTLS, HTTP retrieval, and Helia-based browser retrieval as improvements for self-hosted nodes and trustless access. ### Source excerpt Seven Kubo releases made self-hosted IPFS practical. Highlights: DHT Provide Sweep, AutoTLS, HTTP retrieval, and Helia for trustless browser retrieval. ## Shipping an L1 zkEVM #2: The Security Foundations DevFeed: [Shipping an L1 zkEVM #2: The Security Foundations]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: George Kadianakis Published: 2025-12-18T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Security](), [Cryptography](), [Provable security](), [Ethereum](), [P2P](), [Tool]() Tags: [cryptography](), [ethereum](), [p2p](), [provable-security](), [research](), [research-development](), [security](), [tool]() ### AI overview The Ethereum Foundation outlines security foundations for building a mainnet-grade L1 zkEVM after major improvements in real-time proving. It argues for provable security at a 128-bit target, describes the tension between security and proof size, and introduces soundcalc for consistent zkVM security assessments. ### Source excerpt Thanks to Arantxa Zapico, Benedikt Wagner, and Dmitry Khovratovich from the EF cryptography team for their contributions, and to Ladislaus, Kev, Alex, and Marius for the careful review and feedback. The zkEVM ecosystem has been sprinting for a year. And it worked! We crossed the finish line for real-time... ## Provide Sweep: Solving the DHT Bottleneck for Self-Hosting IPFS at Scale DevFeed: [Provide Sweep: Solving the DHT Bottleneck for Self-Hosting IPFS at Scale]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: guillaumemichel; Shipyard Published: 2025-11-26T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [IPFS]() Topics: [IPFS](), [Scalability](), [Self-hosted](), [networking](), [Raspberry Pi]() Tags: [boxo](), [decentralized](), [dht](), [distributed](), [dweb](), [ecosystem](), [helia](), [ipfs](), [kubo](), [libp2p](), [p2p](), [peer-to-peer](), [performance](), [rainbow](), [raspberry-pi](), [routing](), [scale](), [self-hosting](), [storage](), [web](), [web3]() ### AI overview This article explains how Kubo v0.39's Provide Sweep becomes the default provider system for IPFS. By batching CIDs associated with the same DHT servers and systematically sweeping keyspace regions, it reports a 97% reduction in DHT lookups for a node providing 100,000 CIDs, alongside smart resume capabilities and memory optimizations. ### Source excerpt Provide Sweep: Solving the DHT Bottleneck for Self-Hosting IPFS at Scale ## An overview of the PPPP protocol for IoT cameras DevFeed: [An overview of the PPPP protocol for IoT cameras]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Wladimir Palant Published: 2025-11-05T15:11:36Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Almost Secure]() Topics: [Internet of things](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [P2P](), [Reverse Engineering](), [Security]() Tags: [cameras](), [firmware](), [iot](), [network](), [p2p](), [protocol](), [reverse-engineering](), [security-research](), [servers](), [tcp]() ### AI overview An overview of the PPPP protocol used primarily by network-connected IoT cameras. The article explains that PPPP relies on central servers while allowing bulk data transfer through direct client-to-device connections, and describes device identifiers, connection establishment, fallback mechanisms, redundant servers, and related protocol research. ### Source excerpt My previous article on IoT "P2P" cameras couldn't go into much detail on the PPPP protocol. However, there is already lots of security research on and around that protocol, and I have a feeling that there is way more to come. There are pieces of information on the protocol scattered throughout the web, yet every one approaching from a very specific narrow angle. This is my attempt at creating an overview so that other people don't need to start from scratch. While the protocol can in principle be used by any kind of device, it is mostly being used for network-connected cameras. It isn't really peer-to-peer as advertised but rather relies on central servers, yet the protocol allows to transfer the bulk of data via a direct connection between the client and the device. It's hard to tell how many users there are but there are lots of apps, I'm sure that I haven't found all of them. There are other protocols with similar approaches being used for the same goal. One is used by ThroughTek's Kalay Platform which has the interesting string "Charlie is the designer of P2P!!" in its codebase (32 bytes long, seems to be used as "encryption" key for some non-critical functionality). I recognize both the name and the "handwriting," it looks like PPPP protocol designer found a new home here. Yet PPPP seems to be still more popular than the competition, thanks to it being the protocol of choice for cheap low-end cameras. Disclaimer: Most of the information below has been acquired by analyzing public information as well as reverse engineering applications and firmware, not by observing live systems. Consequently, there can be misinterpretations. Contents The general design The network ports The device IDs The protocol variants CS2 Network Yi Technology iLnk HLP2P "Encryption" "Secret" messages Applications Changelog The general design The protocol's goal is to serve as a drop-in replacement for TCP. Rather than establish a connection to a known IP address (or a name to be resolved ## A look at a P2P camera (LookCam app) DevFeed: [A look at a P2P camera (LookCam app)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Wladimir Palant Published: 2025-09-08T13:00:50Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Almost Secure]() Topics: [Security](), [Vulnerabilities](), [webcam](), [Encryption](), [P2P](), [Cloud]() Tags: [camera](), [cloud](), [encryption](), [internet](), [p2p](), [security]() ### AI overview A security analysis of internet-connected cameras managed through the LookCam app reports weak access controls, largely unencrypted PPPP communication, exposed cloud uploads, firmware security flaws, and no firmware update mechanism. The findings are presented as applying to LookCam-managed cameras and several related apps, but not LookCamPro devices. ### Source excerpt I've got my hands on an internet-connected camera and decided to take a closer look, having already read about security issues with similar cameras. What I found far exceeded my expectations: fake access controls, bogus protocol encryption, completely unprotected cloud uploads and firmware riddled with security flaws. One could even say that these cameras are Murphy's Law turned solid: everything that could be done wrong has been done wrong here. While there is considerable prior research on these and similar cameras that outlines some of the flaws, I felt that the combination of severe flaws is reason enough to publish an article of my own. My findings should apply to any camera that can be managed via the LookCam app. This includes cameras meant to be used with less popular apps of the same developer: tcam, CloudWayCam, VDP, AIBoxcam, IP System. Note that the LookCamPro app, while visually very similar, is technically quite different. It also uses the PPPP protocol for low-level communication but otherwise doesn't seem to be related, and the corresponding devices are unlikely to suffer from the same flaws. There seems to be little chance that things will improve with these cameras. I have no way of contacting either the hardware vendors or the developers behind the LookCam app. In fact, it looks like masking their identity was done on purpose here. But even if I could contact them, the cameras lack an update mechanism for their firmware. So fixing the devices already sold is impossible. I have no way of knowing how many of these cameras exist. The LookCam app is currently listed with almost 1.5 million downloads on Google Play however. An iPhone and a Windows version of the app are also available but no public statistics exist here. Contents The highlights The hardware The LookCam app The PPPP protocol The basics The "encryption" The threat model The firmware The cloud How safe are device IDs? Recommendations Further reading The highlights The camera cannot be eas ## Turso crosses the mark of 128 contributors DevFeed: [Turso crosses the mark of 128 contributors]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Glauber Costa Published: 2025-07-24T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Turso Blog]() Topics: [Turso](), [Rust](), [SQLite](), [Open Source](), [Database](), [systems]() Tags: [code](), [database](), [engineering-culture](), [open-source](), [p2p](), [rust](), [software](), [sqlite](), [turso]() ### AI overview Turso has reached 128 contributors to its open-source, fully compatible SQLite rewrite in Rust. The article introduces bit-aloo, the 128th contributor, and describes their background, interest in SQLite internals, and positive experience with Turso's engineering culture and contribution process. ### Source excerpt Turso just crossed 128 contributors on its open SQLite rewrite in Rust. Meet bit-aloo, our 128th contributor, on contributing to database internals. ## Start netlab Tools without Changing Topology File DevFeed: [Start netlab Tools without Changing Topology File]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-06-30T07:14:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [IS-IS](), [Network](), [Cisco](), [Tool](), [P2P]() Tags: [cisco](), [ietf](), [is-is](), [netlab](), [network](), [p2p](), [tools]() ### AI overview This article explains how to enable the Edgeshark tool in netlab without modifying individual lab topology files. It uses an environment-variable default and a reproduced IS-IS integration test to investigate interoperability with older IOSv images. The investigation finds that FRRouting and Arista EOS accept Cisco routers sending pre-standard P2P IS-IS hello messages with missing sub-TLVs. ### Source excerpt Dan Partelly figured out that we have to configure the standard (IETF) 3-way IS-IS handshake on old IOSv images. On the other hand, all IS-IS integration tests pass for IOSv and IOSvL2. I wondered what was going on. Fortunately, a few months ago, I spent some time installing the client-side Edgeshark components on my laptop. All I needed to do was enable the edgeshark tool in my lab topology and restart the lab. Read more ... ## Lightweight MQTT Broker for ESP32: Mosquitto ported to ESP-IDF DevFeed: [Lightweight MQTT Broker for ESP32: Mosquitto ported to ESP-IDF]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: John Lee Published: 2025-05-28T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Blog on Developer Portal]() Topics: [ESP32](), [MQTT](), [ESP-IDF](), [Internet of things](), [Testing](), [Home Assistant](), [P2P](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)]() Tags: [blog](), [broker](), [edge-computing](), [esp](), [esp-idf](), [esp32](), [home-assistant](), [iot](), [mqtt](), [p2p](), [security](), [testing](), [tls]() ### AI overview This article introduces a lightweight port of the Eclipse Mosquitto MQTT broker to ESP-IDF for ESP32 devices. It describes support for TLS and TCP transports and outlines uses including private local IoT networks, on-device MQTT testing, and bridged brokers over peer-to-peer connections. ### Source excerpt Mosquitto - the industry-standard MQTT broker - has been ported to ESP-IDF. Its lightweight version retains Mosquitto's core functionality and security features to run on resource-constrained IoT devices. This MQTT broker is ideal for edge computing, testing, and standalone IoT deployments. In this article, we will do an overview and show you how to get started. ## 🌳 IPFS Newsletter 205: HTTP, P2P in browsers, Kubo speedup & more DevFeed: [🌳 IPFS Newsletter 205: HTTP, P2P in browsers, Kubo speedup & more]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-05-23T00:00:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [IPFS]() Topics: [IPFS](), [HTTP](), [P2P](), [browsers]() Tags: [browsers](), [http](), [ipfs](), [newsletter](), [object-object](), [p2p](), [updates]() ### AI overview The IPFS Newsletter returns with updates on HTTP support across the IPFS stack, peer-to-peer retrieval in browsers, Kubo, the Service Worker Gateway, and IPNI service improvements. ### Source excerpt The IPFS Newsletter is back, with many exciting updates to share: HTTP support across the IPFS stack, P2P in browsers, Kubo speedup, and more. ## Response: Peer-to-Peer Communication in IPv6 World DevFeed: [Response: Peer-to-Peer Communication in IPv6 World]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-04-15T05:23:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [P2P](), [Networks](), [Firewall](), [WebRTC]() Tags: [firewall](), [firewalls](), [ipv6](), [nat](), [p2p](), [webrtc]() ### AI overview This article presents Daryll Swer's response about peer-to-peer communication over IPv6. It argues that native IPv6 avoids shared-address NAT and related port-exhaustion issues, while stateful firewalls can still affect connectivity. The response reports successful STUN-based IPv6 peer connections in tested applications but notes that many CGNAT deployments remain problematic. ### Source excerpt Daryll Swer posted a very informative response to my NAT Traversal Mess blog post, focusing on: Punching holes through that firewall is equivalent to establishing NAT translations. It would be a shame to let that response wither as small print at the bottom of a blog post; here it is: Read more ... ## Introducing the 2025 Academic Grants Round DevFeed: [Introducing the 2025 Academic Grants Round]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Shyam Sridhar Published: 2025-01-21T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [Algorithms](), [Cryptography](), [Formal verification](), [networking](), [P2P](), [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [academic-research](), [algorithms](), [announce](), [cryptography](), [ethereum](), [formal-verification](), [funding](), [funding-coordination](), [networking](), [p2p](), [pdf](), [security]() ### AI overview The Ethereum Foundation's Ecosystem Funding Initiative has opened its 2025 Academic Grants Round, offering $2 million for open-access academic research related to Ethereum. Proposals are due by March 16, 2025. ### Source excerpt The EF's Ecosystem Funding Initiative team is proud to announce the launch of the 2025 Academic Grants Round, a pioneering initiative aimed at empowering and expanding the frontiers of Ethereum-related academic research. With a dedicated fund of $2 million, we are eager to build upon the success of the previous... ## Blockchain Concepts Explained Through Go Modules and Software Build Problems DevFeed: [Blockchain Concepts Explained Through Go Modules and Software Build Problems]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2022-12-12T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [William Kennedy]() Topics: [Blockchain](), [P2P](), [Database](), [Go Language]() Tags: [blockchain](), [build-blockchain-from-scratch](), [cryptographically-auditable](), [database](), [digital-wallet](), [ecdsa](), [engineering](), [ethereum](), [genesis-file](), [go](), [go-blockchain](), [golang-blockchain](), [p2p]() ### AI overview This video introduces blockchain concepts, including its append-only and transparent database model, cryptographic auditability, and peer-to-peer network structure without a central authority. It explains these ideas through reproducible, durable, and secure software builds and the Go module system. ### Source excerpt Introduction In this video, Bill will introduce the concepts of what a blockchain is, the benefits of a blockchain, and the network environment it operates in. Bill describes a blockchain as a single, append-only, transparent, publicly available and cryptographically auditable database. Blockchains operate using a peer to peer (p2p) network with no single node designated as the central authority. To better understand what all that means, Bill begins to work through a familiar problem of creating reproducible, durable, and secure builds that software teams face. It's a real problem the Go team eventually solved with the new module system. As Bill uncovers different problems that present themselves, he introduces different blockchain concepts that can help provide a solution. ## How to intercept, observe & mock WebRTC traffic DevFeed: [How to intercept, observe & mock WebRTC traffic]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: HTTP Toolkit; Tim Perry Published: 2022-10-13T10:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [HTTP Toolkit]() Topics: [WebRTC](), [Tooling](), [P2P](), [Security & Privacy]() Tags: [debugging](), [developer-tools](), [how-to](), [interception](), [javascript](), [p2p](), [security-privacy](), [webrtc]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains why WebRTC traffic is difficult to inspect and mock, covering its peer-to-peer encryption, negotiated networking, and limited debugging APIs. It introduces MockRTC and describes how controlling one peer can enable interception, observation, and transformation of WebRTC traffic. ### Source excerpt WebRTC allows two users on the web to communicate directly, sending real-time streams of video, audio & data peer-to-peer, from within a browser environment. It's exciting tech that's rapidly maturing, already forming the backbone of a huge range of video chat, screen sharing and live collaboration tools, but also as a key technology for decentralization of web apps - providing a P2P data transport layer used by everything from WebTorrent to IPFS to Yjs. Unfortunately though, it doesn't have the tooling ecosystem that developers used to networking with HTTP often expect. There's few supporting tools or libraries, inspecting raw traffic is hard or impossible, and mocking WebRTC traffic for automated testing is even harder. Even built-in low-level browser tools like chrome://webrtc-internals don't allow seeing messages sent on WebRTC data channels. It's hard to build modern secure web applications on top of protocols that you can't directly see or interact with. This doesn't just affect developers: it also seriously impacts security & privacy researchers and reverse engineers, each trying to investigate the traffic sent & received by the apps we all use. If you want to know what data a webapp you use is sending over WebRTC, right now it's very hard to find out. Intercepting WebRTC traffic to build these tools and libraries is difficult, because unlike protocols like HTTP that were designed to allow active proxying and user-configureable PKI (i.e. CA certificates) early on, WebRTC encrypts all traffic using peer-to-peer negotiated certificates for authentication without PKI, communicates in a wide variety of different negotiated ways at the network level to avoid NAT issues, and offers no convenient APIs to configure this for debugging. All of this provides some great features to the protocol as a user, but some serious challenges when building developer tools. As it turns out though, despite this, there are just enough places where we can hook into that it is possible ## Eth2 Phase 0 audit completed, pre-launch bounty program announced DevFeed: [Eth2 Phase 0 audit completed, pre-launch bounty program announced]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Danny Ryan Published: 2020-03-31T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [P2P](), [Development]() Tags: [announcements](), [attacks](), [audit](), [bounty](), [bugs](), [ethereum](), [p2p](), [research-development](), [update]() ### AI overview This Eth2 update reports the completion of Least Authority's comprehensive audit of the Phase 0 specifications, including patched DoS vectors and further investigation of identified concerns. It also announces a pre-launch bug bounty program with rewards of up to $10,000 and describes efforts to unify eth1 and eth2 communications. ### Source excerpt Have some fun announcements for y'all this week :) Other than the items below, client teams continue to move toward production. More on that next week! tl;dr Least Authority Phase 0 audit complete Phase 0 Pre-Launch Bounty Program 🐛 Unification of eth1+eth2 communications in the Eth R&D... ## Eth2 Update: Multi-Client Testnet, Block Explorers, and Networking Work DevFeed: [Eth2 Update: Multi-Client Testnet, Block Explorers, and Networking Work]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Danny Ryan Published: 2019-12-05T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Blockchain](), [developer tooling](), [P2P](), [Protocol (disambiguation)]() Tags: [blockchain](), [developer-tooling](), [monitor](), [networking](), [p2p](), [protocol](), [research-development](), [update]() ### AI overview This update reports that Parity's Shasper joined Prysmatic's Sapphire testnet, creating the first public eth2 multi-client testnet. It also covers the launch of two eth2 block explorers and the first public eth2 networking-specific call. ### Source excerpt Welcome to this week's eth2 quick update! tldr; Parity's Shasper joins Prysmatic's Sapphire testnet (the first public eth2 multi-client testnet)! Multiple eth2 block explorers launch -- Bitfly's beaconcha.in and Etherscan First eth2 networking call to tackle all the networkings -- Ben's notes and [Mamy's notes](https://gist.gi... ## EF-Supported Teams: Development Report DevFeed: [EF-Supported Teams: Development Report]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ethereum Foundation Published: 2019-06-21T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [Development](), [DevOps](), [Ansible](), [Terraform](), [Kubernetes](), [P2P](), [Testing](), [Monitoring](), [tracing](), [Data visualization]() Tags: [ansible](), [changelog](), [data-visualization](), [development](), [ethereum](), [kubernetes](), [monitoring](), [p2p](), [releases](), [report](), [research-development](), [terraform](), [testing](), [tracing]() ### AI overview An Ethereum Foundation development report reviews work by supported teams, including Aleth releases and peer-to-peer improvements, EVMC language bindings, Ethash updates, infrastructure managed with Ansible, Terraform, and Kubernetes, and Swarm deployment and testing tools. ### Source excerpt Friends, Over the last year, developers and researchers supported by Ethereum Foundation have kept their heads down and continued to produce at a staggering pace. Their focus has remained on their work, and together we're all building a more complete Ethereum. Today, our regular all-team update series is... ## Debian - Instalacja Bittorrent Sync (btsync) DevFeed: [Debian - Instalacja Bittorrent Sync (btsync)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Tom Published: 2013-07-16T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: pl Sources: [Tomasz Gągor]() Topics: [Debian](), [P2P]() Tags: [backup](), [debian](), [etc-init-d](), [linux](), [p2p]() ### AI overview A Polish tutorial explains how to install and run BitTorrent Sync (btsync) on Debian. It covers downloading the appropriate package and Debian scripts, placing the init script and configuration, creating or selecting a restricted user, and starting the service for peer-to-peer folder synchronization and photo backups. ### Source excerpt Bardzo spodobała mi się nowa aplikacja do zdalnej synchronizacji folderów z wykorzystaniem P2P. Ja wykorzystałem ją do automatycznych backupów archiwum zdjęć - zebrało mi się tego już prawie 130GB! Każde narzędzie, które chce np. je kompresować i raz na czas robić FULL backup jest skazane na porażkę - a fotek przybywa. Na początek pobieramy interesującą nas wersję: wget http://btsync.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/btsync_i386.tar.gz wget http://btsync.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/btsync_x64.tar.gz Oraz paczkę ze skryptami dla Debiana: wget http://www.yeasoft.com/downloads/various/btsync-linux-deploy.tar.gz Ja wyciągam z niej skrypt /etc/init.d/btsync i konfigurację /etc/*