# permissions Published articles for permissions. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## From Prototype to Production: How to Safely Deploy Gemini Enterprise Agents DevFeed: [From Prototype to Production: How to Safely Deploy Gemini Enterprise Agents]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Geeta Kakrani Published: 2026-09-18T00:23:09Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Google Developer Experts - Medium]() Topics: [AI Agent](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Authorization](), [Google](), [deploy](), [Monitoring](), [Cloud]() Tags: [agents](), [ai](), [ai-agent](), [cloud](), [enterprise](), [google](), [google-gemini](), [monitoring](), [permissions](), [policy](), [security]() ### AI overview A practical guide to moving Gemini Enterprise AI agents from prototypes into governed production systems. It focuses on identity, permissions, policy enforcement, monitoring, auditing, and accountability for actions involving customer data. ### Source excerpt A practical look at building a governed, enterprise-ready AI agent with Google's Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform Every team building with AI agents eventually hits the same wall. The prototype works beautifully in a demo -- it answers questions, calls a few tools, feels almost magical. Then someone asks the obvious question: "Can this touch real customer data? Can it take real actions? What stops it from doing something we didn't intend?" That question is exactly why Google introduced the Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform at Cloud Next '26 -- a full rethink of how agents move from prototype to production, built around one idea: an agent should never have more access, more trust, or more autonomy than a human employee doing the same job. This piece walks through what that actually looks like, using a real, common use case: a customer-support agent. The Real Problem With "It Works in the Demo" Prototypes are optimized for one thing: showing that an agent can do a task. Production systems have to answer a harder set of questions: Does the agent only see data it's actually allowed to see? Can we prove, after the fact, exactly what the agent did and why? What happens when someone tries to manipulate it with a cleverly worded prompt? Who is accountable when an agent takes a sensitive action, like issuing a refund? None of these are solved by a better model. They're solved by infrastructure around the model -- identity, permissions, policy enforcement, and monitoring. That's precisely the gap the Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform was built to close. The Four Pillars: Build, Scale, Govern, Optimize Google organizes the platform around four pillars, but for anyone thinking about safety and compliance, one pillar matters most: Govern. It's built on three core components that work together. 1. Agent Identity -- Every Agent Gets Its Own ID In the old world, agents often ran with a shared service account, or worse, borrowed a human's credentials. Gemini Enterprise fixes this with Age ## Inside the Modern SOC: Defending the Cross-Environment Pivot DevFeed: [Inside the Modern SOC: Defending the Cross-Environment Pivot]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Sharon Maydar Published: 2026-09-17T22:00:33Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Unit 42]() Topics: [Security](), [Incident response](), [Monitoring](), [Cloud](), [Authorization](), [Network](), [sensitive data](), [Software as a Service (SaaS)](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Managed Services]() Tags: [ai](), [attack-surface](), [cloud](), [incident-response](), [inside-the-modern-soc](), [insights](), [monitoring](), [network](), [optimization](), [permissions](), [security](), [security-operations](), [security-tools](), [sensitive-data](), [soc](), [software-as-a-service-saas](), [unit-42-incident-response-report]() ### AI overview This article explains how attackers pivot across cloud, endpoint, network, identity, and SaaS environments, creating visibility gaps when security tools are disconnected. It recommends correlating signals across domains so analysts can reconstruct complete attack paths and continuously optimize monitoring, detections, and response workflows. ### Source excerpt Cross-environment attacks demand a new approach to security operations. Learn how Unit 42 Managed XSIAM helps SOC teams investigate complete attack paths. The post Inside the Modern SOC: Defending the Cross-Environment Pivot appeared first on Unit 42. ## The skills CLI now supports Notion hosted skills DevFeed: [The skills CLI now supports Notion hosted skills]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ben Sabic Published: 2026-09-17T18:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [Agent Skills](), [Notion](), [Command-line interface](), [API](), [personal access token](), [standard]() Tags: [agent](), [agent-skills](), [api](), [cli](), [commands](), [install](), [integration](), [notion](), [permissions](), [personal-access-token](), [skills](), [standard]() ### AI overview The skills CLI now supports Notion-hosted skills as an installation source. Teams can author, review, and update reusable agent skills in Notion, then install selected skill packs or individual skills through the CLI. Authentication uses a Notion personal access token and respects Notion page permissions. ### Source excerpt skills@1.7.0 adds Notion skills databases as an install source for agent skills . Notion skills are reusable agent skills written as Notion pages. Teams author, review, and update them in the workspace they already use, then install them into any agent the skills CLI supports. No Git repository required. To browse your Notion workspace's skills, run: The CLI lists the skill packs shared with you and installs every skill in the packs you select. To install a single skill, pass its Notion page URL: Both commands use the Notion CLI (ntn) to authenticate. To set it up: ntn login requires a Notion personal access token, so your workspace must allow them. Access follows Notion's page permissions. You only see skills shared with you, so controlling who can install a skill is the same as controlling who can view the page. This integration is built on Notion's new Agent Skills API, which exposes skills stored in Notion as standard Agent Skills folders. Because the format is standard, the same skills work in any agent that reads them. Get started by creating a Notion skill. Read more ## From guidance to action: Security fundamentals that materially reduce risk DevFeed: [From guidance to action: Security fundamentals that materially reduce risk]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ron Pessner Published: 2026-09-17T17:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Microsoft Security Blog]() Topics: [Cybersecurity](), [Exposure Management](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Vulnerabilities](), [Hacking](), [incident]() Tags: [agentic-security](), [ai](), [exposure-management](), [passwords](), [permissions](), [pypi](), [security](), [speed](), [sql]() ### AI overview Microsoft describes how AI is changing the cybersecurity threat landscape and argues that foundational controls remain essential. The article highlights excessive permissions, weak authentication, unpatched systems, exposed execution paths, and gaps between controls, along with guidance for governing agent identities and tools, isolating execution, restricting connectivity, monitoring behavior, and reducing exposure. ### Source excerpt AI has made fundamental changes to the operating environment for cybersecurity. Explore exposure management guidance on recommended controls and take action and stay ahead of cyberthreats. The post From guidance to action: Security fundamentals that materially reduce risk appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog. ## datasette 0.65.5 DevFeed: [datasette 0.65.5]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Simon Willison Published: 2026-09-16T23:51:08Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Simon Willison's Weblog]() Topics: [Security](), [Authorization]() Tags: [bypass](), [datasette](), [datasette-1-544](), [issue](), [permissions](), [release](), [security](), [security-636]() ### AI overview Datasette 0.65.5 is a security release fixing an issue in which a trailing newline in a requested table name could bypass table permissions and expose private rows. ### Source excerpt Release: datasette 0.65.5 Security fix for an issue where a trailing newline in a requested table name could bypass table permissions and expose private rows, reported by dpfkdlemtp in GHSA-h547-rmjf-5m2m. Tags: security, datasette ## Kubernetes v1.37: Hardening Container Storage with Bind Mount Options and EmptyDir Permissions DevFeed: [Kubernetes v1.37: Hardening Container Storage with Bind Mount Options and EmptyDir Permissions]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Nispriha Jagan; Neeraj Krishna Gopalakrishna Published: 2026-09-16T18:30:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Kubernetes Blog]() Topics: [Kubernetes](), [Security](), [mount](), [Filesystems](), [chmod](), [Unix]() Tags: [chmod](), [container](), [containers](), [filesystem](), [hardening](), [kubernetes](), [linux](), [mount](), [permissions](), [storage](), [volume](), [volumes]() ### AI overview Kubernetes v1.37 adds bind mount options and emptyDir permission modes to strengthen storage security. The article explains how noexec, nosuid, nodev, Unix permissions, and the sticky bit can help enforce security policies on writable volumes. ### Source excerpt Kubernetes v1.37 brings important storage security features: emptyDir permission modes and bind mount options. They help application programmers and security professionals implement rigorous security policies, for example, prohibiting deletion of files across containers or execution of arbitrary binaries from writable volumes, directly in Kubernetes without any complicated circumvention. Linux storage and permission fundamentals Before diving into the new Kubernetes features, let us briefly review the low-level Linux security mechanisms that make them possible. Bind mount flags When Linux mounts or remounts a directory, Virtual File System (VFS) flags control what actions are permitted on that filesystem: noexec: Do not permit direct execution of any binaries on the mounted filesystem. nosuid: Do not allow set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take effect. nodev: Do not interpret character or block special devices on the file system. Directory permissions and the sticky bit Standard Unix permissions regulate access across three scopes: Owner, Group, and Others (e.g., 0755 or 0777). Beyond standard read, write, and execute bits, Linux supports the sticky bit (as in mode 01777). When applied to a directory, the sticky bit ensures that a file inside that directory can only be deleted or renamed by the file's owner or root. This is essential for shared writable directories like /tmp. Motivation for the improvements Why does Kubernetes need bind mount options and emptyDir permissions? The primary goal of these features is to increase the security of Kubernetes workloads by allowing security-related bind mount options on volume mounts. By default, volumes are bind-mounted into containers by the container runtime and kubelet without noexec, nosuid, or nodev flags. This default can undermine security. For example, with noexec missing, a compromised process can use any writable volume (emptyDir, PersistentVolume, etc.) to download, chmod +x, and execute arbitra ## AWS reimagines the getting started experience DevFeed: [AWS reimagines the getting started experience]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Micah Walter Published: 2026-09-16T17:50:14Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [AWS News Blog]() Topics: [Amazon Web Services](), [AWS IAM](), [configuration](), [App]() Tags: [announcements](), [aws](), [aws-management-console](), [configuration](), [developers](), [free](), [getting-started](), [launch](), [news](), [permissions](), [project](), [team]() ### AI overview AWS announces a simplified getting-started experience with sensible defaults, managed project environments, simplified permissions, and $100 in Free Tier credits for most new customers. Customers can later activate advanced AWS features without migrating. ### Source excerpt AWS has reimagined the getting started experience with smart and sensible defaults to help developers get started fast so that they can focus on building. New customers can sign up and get started right away with $100 in Free Tier credits, managed project environments, and simplified team and resource permissions. If their workload evolves, customers can activate advanced features to access the full breadth and depth of AWS in one step, with no migration required. ## sem-ai 0.4.0: smaller responses, safer access, and pre-flight checks DevFeed: [sem-ai 0.4.0: smaller responses, safer access, and pre-flight checks]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Pete Miloravac Published: 2026-09-16T12:01:04Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Semaphore Engineering]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [Claude Code](), [Command-line interface](), [Authorization](), [API](), [configuration]() Tags: [ai-coding-agents](), [api](), [audio](), [claude-code](), [command-line](), [configuration](), [permissions](), [pipelines](), [product-news](), [release](), [video]() ### AI overview Semaphore's sem-ai 0.4.0 release adds more compact workflow and pipeline responses, context switching across organizations and credentials, and support for managing pre-flight checks. The update is aimed at reducing context usage and enabling more targeted permissions for AI coding agents. ### Source excerpt AI coding agents work best when they receive the right information without unnecessary noise. They also need clearly defined permissions and reliable safeguards for the changes they make. sem-ai 0.4.0 improves all three areas. The release introduces more compact pipeline responses, flexible context switching, and support for Semaphore pre-flight checks. Watch Nick demonstrate the new [...] The post sem-ai 0.4.0: smaller responses, safer access, and pre-flight checks appeared first on Semaphore. ## Building an AI-native data & insights operating system at Webflow DevFeed: [Building an AI-native data & insights operating system at Webflow]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ashwini Chaube Published: 2026-09-16T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Webflow Blog]() Topics: [data](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Platform Engineering](), [Data Science](), [decision-making](), [Authorization]() Tags: [agentic](), [ai](), [data](), [data-insights](), [inside-webflow](), [permissions](), [review](), [self-service](), [skills]() ### AI overview Webflow describes how its Data & Insights team built an AI-native operating system for trusted self-service analytics. The approach combines governed data, encoded business context, reusable skills and agents, permissions, architectural controls, review practices, and human judgment, while also changing how the team works through agent-first workflows, learning, and experimentation. ### Source excerpt How we built the governed foundations for trusted self-service analytics while transforming the way our own team works. ## MCP authorization: governing tool calls beyond OAuth DevFeed: [MCP authorization: governing tool calls beyond OAuth]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: WorkOS Published: 2026-09-15T15:04:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [WorkOS Blog]() Topics: [Model Context Protocol](), [Authorization](), [MCP OAuth](), [MCP Server](), [OAuth]() Tags: [authorization](), [mcp](), [mcp-server](), [oauth](), [permissions](), [policy](), [scope](), [scopes]() ### AI overview This guide explains why OAuth scopes alone cannot govern the content and destination of MCP tool calls. It presents server- or gateway-side policy enforcement before execution, including request-content inspection, approval handling, and testing for data leakage. ### Source excerpt Secure MCP tool calls beyond OAuth scopes. Learn where to enforce tool permissions, check request content, and test for data leakage with Airlock. ## How to Run Codex in an Ubuntu Virtual Machine on Proxmox DevFeed: [How to Run Codex in an Ubuntu Virtual Machine on Proxmox]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Travis Henderson Published: 2026-09-15T12:00:11Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Atomic Object]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [codex](), [Linux](), [Ubuntu](), [Proxmox](), [OpenSSH](), [Authorization]() Tags: [ai-agent](), [ai-for-developers](), [codex](), [coding-agents](), [development](), [linux](), [openssh](), [permissions](), [proxmox](), [sandbox](), [ubuntu]() ### AI overview This guide explains how to isolate Codex in a headless Ubuntu virtual machine running on Proxmox, using a separate Linux account and OpenSSH. The setup limits the files, dependencies, and network access available to the agent while keeping administrator tasks separate, but it does not eliminate risks from credentials, network access, or mistakes pushed to GitHub. ### Source excerpt The more useful coding agents become, the more access they tend to need. Installing dependencies, running commands, changing files, and generally more autonomy are part of the appeal. They're also the point where I start thinking about what else the coding agent can reach, especially while these tools are changing so quickly. My answer is [...] The post Your Coding Agent Should be in Jail. Here's Why and How. appeared first on Atomic Spin. ## How to secure AI coding agents with permissions, approval gates, hooks, and sandboxing DevFeed: [How to secure AI coding agents with permissions, approval gates, hooks, and sandboxing]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Jeff Morhous Published: 2026-09-08T10:07:38Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [The AI-Augmented Engineer]() Topics: [Claude Code](), [agentic-coding](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [AI-assisted coding](), [coding]() Tags: [agents](), [ai](), [ai-coding-agents](), [claude-code](), [coding-agents](), [how-to](), [least-privilege](), [permissions](), [sandboxing](), [security]() ### AI overview The article explains why coding-agent instructions such as CLAUDE.md are behavioral guidance rather than enforceable security boundaries. It discusses least privilege, Claude Code permissions, approval gates, hooks, and sandboxing as technical controls for limiting agent actions. ### Source excerpt Learn how to use the principle of least privilege, Claude Code permissions, approval gates, hooks, and sandboxing to keep your agentic coding secure ## From AI Code to Trusted Software: Harness Engineering in Practice DevFeed: [From AI Code to Trusted Software: Harness Engineering in Practice]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Travis Frisinger Published: 2026-09-04T21:55:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [8th Light](), [8th Light Insights]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [Software](), [trust](), [observability](), [Authorization]() Tags: [agent](), [ai](), [ai-and-emerging-tech](), [code](), [engineering](), [engineering-and-devops](), [observability](), [permissions](), [trust](), [verification]() ### AI overview The article presents harness engineering as a repository-centered discipline for making AI-generated software more trustworthy. It argues that prompts and written standards are insufficient, and that permissions, quality gates, evidence, and observability should enforce organizational standards and support verification. ### Source excerpt If the same reasoning path writes the system change and defines the proof of success, you may be setting yourself up for an avoidable failure in the future. Harness engineering is meant to act as an extension of your own organizational guardrails, which were always meant to reduce risk and improve quality. Travis Frisinger, Head of Agentic AI Your team is shipping more AI-written code every quarter. How do you know it is any good? Good means it meets your standards, and you have probably already tried handing your agents the standards: a context file, a style guide, the wiki pasted into the prompt. The agent reads them, agrees, and still breaks them, because instructions to a model are suggestions. What the repository permits is what actually happens. Your people absorb standards through review comments and hallway corrections, and the lessons stick. An agent apologizes and forgets by the next session. The only place its lessons can accumulate is the repository itself. That gap used to be an annoyance. With AI doing real engineering work, the quality gap is the whole game. Harness engineering is the discipline that closes it. It is the process of imbuing a repository with your standards so that the repository itself enforces them: permissions and boundaries that say what any actor may touch, quality gates that fail closed, evidence attached to every change, and observability that spans runs rather than moments. Models supply software delivery capacity. The harness supplies observable accountability: every change carries what was done, which rule allowed it, and what happened as a result, no matter which model, agent, or person did the work. Why now The industry started using the term harness engineering back in February, 2026. Since then, Thoughtworks, LangChain, and others have built serious thought leadership around the same shape. When several firms independently converge on the same word, it usually means they are trying to name the same problem. The real proble ## From Permissions to Sessions: Rethinking Location Access in Android 17 DevFeed: [From Permissions to Sessions: Rethinking Location Access in Android 17]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Nav Singh Published: 2026-09-03T18:18:32Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Stories by Nav Singh 🇨🇦 on Medium]() Topics: [Android](), [Jetpack Compose](), [Mobile](), [ui]() Tags: [android](), [android-development](), [android-permissions](), [android17](), [androiddev](), [branding](), [consent](), [how-to](), [implementation](), [jetpack](), [jetpack-compose](), [layout](), [permissions]() ### AI overview A tutorial on implementing Android 17's system-rendered Location Button in Jetpack Compose applications. It explains session-only precise location access, the USE_LOCATION_BUTTON permission, the required Jetpack library, fallback rendering, and UI customization. ### Source excerpt Image generated using Gemini In this article, we will learn how to implement the new 📍Location button introduced in Android 17 in Jetpack Compose-based Android applications. Android 17 adds a system-rendered 📍Location Button that we can drop into the layout via a Jetpack library, and tapping it gives the app precise location for that session only, gated by a new USE_LOCATION_BUTTON permission. What the feature is Android now exposes a system-owned, standard location button that we can embed in our UI instead of designing a custom control. When the user taps it, the system handles the permission flow, then grants the app precise location for the current session only, rather than long-lived access. How it changes permissions Instead of immediately requesting ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (and maybe ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION) at runtime, we declare the new USE_LOCATION_BUTTON permission to host the button. Developer benefits Less custom permission boilerplate: We lean on system UX and the Jetpack library for the hardest parts of location consent. [versions] locationbuttonCompose = "1.0.0-alpha01" [libraries] androidx-locationbutton-compose = { group = "androidx.core.locationbutton", name = "locationbutton-compose", version.ref = "locationbuttonCompose" } Higher trust and clarity for users: the control looks and behaves consistently across apps, and session-only precise access is easier to understand than broader access. Implementation As we all know, Android development is now Compose-first, so we will implement it using the LocationButton composable provided by th ## Fine-Grained Access Control Now Available for All Heroku Customers DevFeed: [Fine-Grained Access Control Now Available for All Heroku Customers]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Alberto Sigismondi Published: 2026-08-21T17:07:29Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Heroku]() Topics: [Heroku](), [Access Control](), [Security](), [IAM](), [Zero Trust](), [legacy]() Tags: [access-control](), [deploy](), [heroku](), [iam](), [identity-and-access-management](), [least-privilege](), [legacy](), [news](), [permissions](), [pipelines](), [security](), [security-compliance](), [zero-trust]() ### AI overview Heroku announces that Fine-Grained Access Control is available to all customers. The feature replaces fixed legacy roles with capability-based roles and app-specific permissions for roles such as view, deploy, operate, and manage. ### Source excerpt Fine-Grained Access Controls is now available to all Heroku customers. Heroku's legacy system gave you predefined roles like admin, member, or collaborator, each with a fixed bundle of permissions. It replaces that system with fine-grained roles like view, deploy, operate, and manage, with specific capability sets. Access control is managed at an app-specific layer, giving [...] The post Fine-Grained Access Control Now Available for All Heroku Customers appeared first on Heroku. ## Platform Engineering Must Adapt to AI-Driven Coding and Agentic Workloads DevFeed: [Platform Engineering Must Adapt to AI-Driven Coding and Agentic Workloads]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Pankaj Gupta Published: 2026-08-14T06:43:34Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Platform Engineering Blog]() Topics: [Platform Engineering](), [ai-coding](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Model Context Protocol](), [Security](), [GPU]() Tags: [agentic](), [agents](), [ai](), [ai-coding](), [model-context-protocol](), [permissions](), [platform-engineering](), [security](), [tooling]() ### AI overview The article argues that platform engineering must evolve as AI-generated code and agentic workloads change delivery, infrastructure, identity, permissions, and security requirements. It highlights parallel builds, automated policy checks, scalable review tooling, GPU and TPU allocation, MCP gateways, and guardrails as platform needs. ### Source excerpt Platform engineering has hit near-universal adoption, but five forces are pushing platforms past their limits. Here is each one and what your platform must do. ## How to Prevent RBAC Role Explosion with Nested Access Lists DevFeed: [How to Prevent RBAC Role Explosion with Nested Access Lists]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: info@goteleport.com (Paul Curtis) Published: 2026-08-13T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Teleport]() Topics: [Access Control](), [Authorization](), [Development]() Tags: [access-control](), [development](), [how-to](), [permissions](), [teams]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains RBAC role explosion, how repeated role changes create inflexible and duplicated roles, and how nested access lists can apply inherited permissions while keeping roles fixed. ### Source excerpt Learn how to use access lists to prevent RBAC role explosion. ## From a Large Allowlist to Three Denials: Permissions for a Coding Agent DevFeed: [From a Large Allowlist to Three Denials: Permissions for a Coding Agent]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Philipp Lehmann (philipp.lehmann@gruppe.ai) Published: 2026-08-11T07:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Philipp Lehmann]() Topics: [coding](), [Bash](), [Linux](), [Authorization](), [Kernel](), [mount](), [Network](), [Command-line interface]() Tags: [agent](), [agents](), [coding](), [command-line](), [curl](), [kernel](), [linux](), [mount](), [network](), [permissions](), [sandboxing](), [security](), [shell]() ### AI overview The article argues that command allowlists are a poor security boundary for coding agents because the required command set continually expands and command names do not constrain effects. It proposes enforcing limits at the kernel level with Linux namespaces, a read-only root filesystem, scoped writable mounts, and dropped capabilities, allowing a shell to run while restricting its blast radius. ### Source excerpt bwrap --unshare-net --cap-drop ALL instead of a command allowlist: sandboxing a coding agent's shell so rm -rf and curl cannot leave the workspace. ## Session revocations at scale DevFeed: [Session revocations at scale]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Llew Vallis Published: 2026-07-22T00:00:01Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Canva Engineering]() Topics: [sessions](), [Cookies](), [Authorization](), [Caching](), [MySQL](), [scaling](), [gateway](), [Redis](), [reliability]() Tags: [backend](), [caching](), [cookies](), [gateway](), [mysql](), [permissions](), [redis](), [reliability](), [scaling](), [security](), [sessions]() ### AI overview Canva describes how it manages session revocations for hundreds of millions of users. The system keeps revocations in memory for fast gateway checks, while MySQL handles refresh-time lookups; the article explains how loading the cache during deployments created database load and discusses evaluating Redis as a caching solution. ### Source excerpt How Canva keeps hundreds of millions of user sessions fast and secure ## Identity Security for AI DevFeed: [Identity Security for AI]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: info@goteleport.com (Ben Arent) Published: 2026-07-21T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Teleport]() Topics: [Security for AI](), [Security](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Authorization]() Tags: [agents](), [ai](), [ai-agents](), [github](), [identity](), [least-privilege](), [llms](), [permissions](), [secrets](), [security](), [security-for-ai]() ### AI overview The article examines identity-security challenges created by AI agents that can act continuously with delegated access. It connects traditional risks such as broad permissions, credential sprawl, insider threats, and long-lived secrets with emerging risks from agents, sub-agents, and LLM capabilities, and advocates delegated, ephemeral, least-privilege access. ### Source excerpt AI agents run 24/7 with the same infrastructure access as your engineers. See how Teleport secures AI with cryptographic identity, audit, and trusted runtimes. ## Sandbox Coding Agents with a Separate User Account DevFeed: [Sandbox Coding Agents with a Separate User Account]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Josh Sherman Published: 2026-07-12T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Josh Sherman]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [Claude Code](), [Command-line interface](), [Shell](), [trust]() Tags: [claude-code](), [coding-agents](), [local](), [permissions](), [sandboxing](), [shell](), [trust]() ### AI overview The author describes running Claude Code and other coding agents under a separate user account with mostly read-only access. They say this isolates agents from privileged local credentials, avoids shell-alias confusion, and makes more permissive operation feel safer while retaining local access through the separate account. ### Source excerpt I don't trust our new robot overlords at all. I also don't fully believe that agents are out there dropping production databases without some serious coercion to do so. And while I don't trust the robots, I trust myself only a trivial amount more, so my local access tends to be extremely thin. But not so thin that a rogue agent couldn't do a little damage. That all said, I am constantly calibrating my trust with agentic endeavors. In doing so, I've been moving agents out of my user space entirely. Having Claude Code and other harnesses living under a separate user account eliminates a lot of potential disasters due to the agent finding privileged local credentials that could do some damage. Sandboxing my agents has improved trust thanks to the isolation. It's also had an additional benefit of the robots not being thoroughly confused by some of my shell aliases. It's a clean slate, and I grant access, mostly read-only, accordingly. With my agents running primarily outside of my user space, I'm able to give them significantly more leash. Running in YOLO mode (--dangerously-skip-permissions) doesn't feel nearly as scary. I do use --remote-control, but I can still log in as the separate user account to cut the latency of the web interface when I'm actually at the keyboard. While things do feel much safer, I have watched the fucking clanker try to figure out if it has passwordless sudo access on numerous occasions. Maybe the robots do actually drop people's production databases. Seriously though, it's on them for letting the thing have access to begin with. ## AI agents gain distinct identities and permissions, but accountability remains the harder problem DevFeed: [AI agents gain distinct identities and permissions, but accountability remains the harder problem]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Brent Leekley Published: 2026-06-12T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [brent.leekley.me blog]() Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](), [Cisco](), [Duo](), [Authorization](), [trust]() Tags: [aeo](), [agent-identity](), [agentic-ai](), [agenticops](), [ai](), [ai-agents](), [answer-engine-optimization](), [cisco](), [cisco-cloud-control](), [cisco-live](), [cisco-live-2026](), [duo](), [duo-iam](), [identity](), [jeetu-patel](), [non-human-identity](), [permissions]() ### AI overview This commentary argues that AI agents are becoming operational actors with distinct identities, permissions, and lifecycles. It describes Cisco's approach of assigning agents identities, linking them to accountable humans, limiting permissions, and requiring human approval for proposed changes, while emphasizing that accountability and ongoing oversight remain unresolved challenges. ### Source excerpt Cisco Live 2026 made AI agents their own kind of identity, with permissions and an accountable human owner. Why issuing the identity is the easy 20 percent, what real accountability takes, and how the same agents quietly became the audience we now write for. ## How to Eliminate Shared Database Passwords: MySQL, PostgreSQL, and More DevFeed: [How to Eliminate Shared Database Passwords: MySQL, PostgreSQL, and More]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: info@goteleport.com (Dan Johns) Published: 2026-06-05T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Teleport]() Topics: [Databases](), [MySQL](), [PostgreSQL](), [certificates](), [passwords](), [Single sign-on (SSO)](), [audit](), [Authorization]() Tags: [apply](), [audit](), [certificates](), [credentials](), [cryptographic](), [database](), [how-to](), [mysql](), [passwords](), [permissions](), [policy](), [postgresql](), [sso]() ### AI overview A guide to replacing shared database passwords and standing privileges with short-lived certificates and identity-based access. It explains how Teleport supports MySQL, PostgreSQL, and other databases, including role-based permissions, hardware-key approval for writes, and query-level attribution in audit logs. ### Source excerpt Learn how to access MySQL, PostgreSQL, and other databases using short-lived certificates instead of shared passwords. ## What SPIFFE Answers for Workload Identity and What It Doesn't DevFeed: [What SPIFFE Answers for Workload Identity and What It Doesn't]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: info@goteleport.com (Rob Cobbins) Published: 2026-05-29T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Teleport]() Topics: [SPIFFE](), [Authorization](), [active directory](), [AWS IAM](), [passwd](), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](), [saml]() Tags: [active-directory](), [authorization](), [aws](), [identity](), [ldap](), [oidc](), [passwd](), [permissions](), [saml](), [spiffe]() ### AI overview This article examines what SPIFFE provides for workload identity and where it falls short. It argues that SPIFFE offers a sound way for machines to prove their identities without shared secrets, but does not define authorization and leaves workload registration largely to implementations. ### Source excerpt Learn about the workload identity questions SPIFFE can't answer and considerations for filling gaps in the spec. [Next page]()