# post-quantum cryptography Published articles for post-quantum cryptography. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Java 27 Delivers Post-Quantum Cryptography, Future Language Innovation, Helidon 27, JavaFX 27 DevFeed: [Java 27 Delivers Post-Quantum Cryptography, Future Language Innovation, Helidon 27, JavaFX 27]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Michael Redlich Published: 2026-09-16T10:00:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [InfoQ]() Topics: [Java](), [java-27](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Cryptography](), [Security](), [Programming](), [releases]() Tags: [application-security](), [architecture-design](), [cryptography](), [development](), [digital-signature](), [helidon](), [java](), [java-27](), [java27-released](), [javafx](), [jdk-27](), [jdk-28](), [lattice](), [module](), [news](), [oracle](), [portfolio](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [preview](), [project-valhalla](), [quantum-computing](), [release](), [security](), [structured-concurrency](), [vector]() ### AI overview Oracle released Java 27, the second non-LTS release since JDK 25. Its final feature set contains nine JEPs, including post-quantum hybrid key exchange for TLS 1.3, structured concurrency, compact object headers, JFR data redaction, the Vector API, and PEM encodings for cryptographic objects. Five features remain in preview or incubator stages. ### Source excerpt Oracle has released version 27 of the Java programming language and virtual machine. As the second non-LTS release since JDK 25, the final feature set includes nine JEPs, five of which are still progressing through the preview and incubator stages. This release focuses on strengthening security, future language innovation, and projects under the auspices of the Java Verified Portfolio. By Michael Redlich ## Java 27 adds improvements to garbage collection, headers, data security, and quantum key support DevFeed: [Java 27 adds improvements to garbage collection, headers, data security, and quantum key support]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Joab Jackson Published: 2026-09-16T04:50:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [www.theregister.com - Articles]() Topics: [java-27](), [Java](), [Security](), [data]() Tags: [devops](), [garbage-collection](), [improvements](), [java](), [java-27](), [jdk](), [jdk-27](), [openjdk](), [post-quantum-cryptography]() ### AI overview Java 27 introduces improvements to JDK garbage collection, header sizes, data security, and quantum key support, with the stated aim of reducing developer friction. ### Source excerpt Improvements in JDK garbage collection, header sizes, data security and quantum key support all should minimize developer friction ## Sites using PQC (September 2026) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (September 2026)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-01T14:49:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2026](), [cryptography](), [post](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [september-2026](), [sites](), [tls](), [top](), [using]() ### AI overview A periodic check examines which of the top 1 million domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ### Source excerpt One more periodic check of which of the top 1M domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Security for the Quantum Era: Implementing Post-Quantum Cryptography in Android DevFeed: [Security for the Quantum Era: Implementing Post-Quantum Cryptography in Android]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Edward Fernandez (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2026-03-25T13:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Google Online Security]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC)](), [Android](), [Security](), [Architecture & Design](), [Google]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [cryptography](), [google](), [none](), [os](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc](), [security](), [upgrade]() ### AI overview Google describes Android's plan to test post-quantum cryptography enhancements in the next Android 17 beta and make them generally available in the Android 17 production release. The upgrade integrates finalized NIST post-quantum cryptography standards into the operating system's architecture and chain of trust. ### Source excerpt Posted by Eric Lynch, Product Manager, Android and Dom Elliott, Group Product Manager, Google Play Modern digital security is at a turning point. We are on the threshold of using quantum computers to solve "impossible" problems in drug discovery, materials science, and energy--tasks that even the most powerful classical supercomputers cannot handle. However, the same unique ability to consider different options simultaneously also allows these machines to bypass our current digital locks. This puts the public-key cryptography we've relied on for decades at risk, potentially compromising everything from bank transfers to trade secrets. To secure our future, it is vital to adopt the new Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is urging before large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers become a reality. To stay ahead of the curve, the technology industry must undertake a proactive, multi-year migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We have been preparing for a post-quantum world since 2016, conducting pioneering experiments with post-quantum cryptography, rolling out post-quantum capabilities in our products, and sharing our expertise through threat models and technical papers. For Android, the objective extends beyond patching individual applications or transport protocols. The imperative is to ensure that the entire platform architecture is resilient for the decades to come. We are beginning tests of PQC enhancements starting in the next Android 17 beta, followed by general availability in the Android 17 production release. This deployment introduces a comprehensive architectural upgrade that is being rolled out across the operating system. By integrating the recently finalized NIST PQC standards deep into the platform, we're establishing a new, quantum-resistant chain of trust. This chain of trust secures the platform continuously--from the moment the OS powers on, to the execution of applications distri ## Sites using PQC (February 2026) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (February 2026)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-02-28T19:42:26Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)]() Tags: [2026](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [tls]() ### AI overview A periodic check examines which of the top 1 million domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange, using February 2026 data. ### Source excerpt Another periodic check of which of the top 1M domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Chrome develops Merkle Tree Certificates for quantum-resistant HTTPS DevFeed: [Chrome develops Merkle Tree Certificates for quantum-resistant HTTPS]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Google (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2026-02-27T17:01:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Google Online Security]() Topics: [Chrome](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Certificate Transparency](), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Scalability](), [Security](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [certificate-transparency](), [chrome](), [ietf](), [none](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [scalability](), [security](), [tls](), [web]() ### AI overview Chrome is developing Merkle Tree Certificates with partners through the IETF PLANTS working group to support quantum-resistant HTTPS while reducing the bandwidth and performance costs of larger post-quantum certificate chains. Chrome says it has no immediate plan to add traditional post-quantum X.509 certificates to the Chrome Root Store and is experimenting with MTCs using real internet traffic. ### Source excerpt Posted by Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team Today we're announcing a new program in Chrome to make HTTPS certificates secure against quantum computers. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) recently created a working group, PKI, Logs, And Tree Signatures ("PLANTS"), aiming to address the performance and bandwidth challenges that the increased size of quantum-resistant cryptography introduces into TLS connections requiring Certificate Transparency (CT). We recently shared our call to action to secure quantum computing and have written about challenges introduced by quantum-resistant cryptography and some of the steps we've taken to address them in earlier blog posts. To ensure the scalability and efficiency of the ecosystem, Chrome has no immediate plan to add traditional X.509 certificates containing post-quantum cryptography to the Chrome Root Store. Instead, Chrome, in collaboration with other partners, is developing an evolution of HTTPS certificates based on Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), currently in development in the PLANTS working group. MTCs replace the heavy, serialized chain of signatures found in traditional PKI with compact Merkle Tree proofs. In this model, a Certification Authority (CA) signs a single "Tree Head" representing potentially millions of certificates, and the "certificate" sent to the browser is merely a lightweight proof of inclusion in that tree. Why MTCs? MTCs enable the adoption of robust post-quantum algorithms without incurring the massive bandwidth penalty of classical X.509 certificate chains. They also decouple the security strength of the corresponding cryptographic algorithm from the size of the data transmitted to the user. By shrinking the authentication data in a TLS handshake to the absolute minimum, MTCs aim to keep the post-quantum web as fast and seamless as today's internet, maintaining high performance even as we adopt stronger security. Finally, with MTCs, transparency is a fundamental property of issuance: ## Use of PQC in SMTP STARTTLS DevFeed: [Use of PQC in SMTP STARTTLS]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-01-23T19:54:53Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [servers]() Tags: [cryptography](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [servers](), [smtp]() ### AI overview A quick summary of which SMTP servers among the Top 1M domains use post-quantum cryptography for STARTTLS. ### Source excerpt A quick summary of which SMTP servers amongst the Top1M domains uses post-quantum cryptography for STARTTLS. ## Preparing Java Systems for the European Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition DevFeed: [Preparing Java Systems for the European Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ixchel Ruiz Published: 2025-12-10T03:03:48Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Java Advent Calendar]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [Java](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Resilience](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention]() Tags: [2025](), [compliance](), [cryptography](), [cybersecurity](), [java](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [resilience]() ### AI overview This article explains how European legislation, strategic planning, and emerging standards are driving a transition toward crypto-agile and post-quantum-ready systems. It provides guidance for Java practitioners and discusses KEM/KDF APIs, PEM support, hybrid TLS efforts, and PQC-related proposals. ### Source excerpt -- Preparing for the Quantum Shift Table of Contents The EU's Post-Quantum Plan: Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 What will upcoming EU cybersecurity legislation require? And how can Java help you prepare? Why this is significant for architects? Java advisory note NIS2 -- Cryptography as Organizational Governance Engineering Implications Java advisory note DORA -- Operational Resilience [...] The post Breaking keys and building trust: The JAVA way! appeared first on JVM Advent. ## Sites using PQC (September 2025) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (September 2025)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-09-15T13:42:18Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Post-Quantum](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention]() Tags: [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [tls](), [updated]() ### AI overview An updated check examines which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ### Source excerpt An updated check of which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Post-Quantum Cryptography Proof of Concept Implementations DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography Proof of Concept Implementations]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-07-20T21:35:33Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [QUIC](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Server](), [client]() Tags: [client](), [cryptography](), [language](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [quic](), [server](), [tls]() ### AI overview The article presents a few QUIC post-quantum cryptography TLS server implementations intended to help verify client and language capabilities. ### Source excerpt A few quic PQC TLS server implekentations to help you verify client and language capabilities. ## Chainguard Containers Enabled with PQC Support DevFeed: [Chainguard Containers Enabled with PQC Support]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-06-03T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Chainguard: Unchained]() Topics: [chainguard containers](), [Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC)](), [Cryptography](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](), [ssh](), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)]() Tags: [chainguard-containers](), [compliance](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [fips](), [ietf](), [nist](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc](), [quantum](), [ssh](), [tls]() ### AI overview Chainguard Containers now support Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), including FIPS 203 ML-KEM and other algorithms used in TLS and SSH communications. The article explains the risks posed by quantum attacks and "harvest now, decrypt later" scenarios, and describes ongoing work toward FIPS-certified PQC implementations. ### Source excerpt Chainguard Containers support Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Learn more about what PQC is, and what Chainguard is doing to offer it today. ## Post-Quantum Cryptography on NetBSD DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography on NetBSD]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-05-03T01:29:06Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [cryptography](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc]() ### AI overview Instructions for setting up Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) on NetBSD with Open Quantum Safe and BoringSSL. ### Source excerpt Quick instructions to set up Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) on NetBSD using Open Quantum Safe and BoringSSL. ## Sites using PQC (March 2025) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (March 2025)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-24T06:57:11Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2025](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [sites](), [tls]() ### AI overview The article describes a check of the top 100,000 domains to identify which support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. The supplied evidence does not include the check's results. ### Source excerpt A quick look to check which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Post-Quantum Cryptography in February 2025 DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography in February 2025]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-02-19T16:12:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [implementation](), [Post-Quantum](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2025](), [cryptography](), [implementation](), [industry](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography]() ### AI overview An updated summary of how post-quantum cryptography implementation has advanced in the industry over the last year, as of February 2025. ### Source excerpt An updated summary of how the implementation of post-quantum cryptography has advanced in the industry in the last year. ## Cryptographic Right Answers: Post Quantum Edition DevFeed: [Cryptographic Right Answers: Post Quantum Edition]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-07-29T17:25:48Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Latacora]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Cryptography](), [recommendations]() Tags: [academic-research](), [cryptography](), [guide](), [post-quantum-cryptography]() ### AI overview This article updates cryptography recommendations for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. It explains that PQC involves more varied tradeoffs than classical cryptography and that some promising systems have failed, making recommendations harder to assess confidently. ### Source excerpt One of our favorite blog posts is our "crypto right answers" post. It's intended to be an easy-to-use guide to help engineers pick the best cryptography choices without needing to go too far down a rabbit hole. With post-quantum cryptography (PQC) recently transitioning from an academic research topic to a more practical cryptography concern we figured it's time for an update of our cryptography recommendations. One thing that makes recommending PQC challenging is that historically, we've been able to provide "better" answers for classical cryptography. Faster and bigger hashes, stronger password KDFs, easier-to-use primitives... These things all have the same fundamental "shape": you can take an existing design and drop in something else to make it better. MD5 and BLAKE3 are not comparable in strength, but you can just use BLAKE3 in place of MD5 and get something that's just far better with minimal API changes. ## Chrome enables Kyber post-quantum key exchange by default for TLS 1.3 and QUIC DevFeed: [Chrome enables Kyber post-quantum key exchange by default for TLS 1.3 and QUIC]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Chromium Blog (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2024-05-23T17:19:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Chromium Blog]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Chrome](), [chrome security](), [Google](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Security]() Tags: [chrome](), [chrome-security](), [google](), [none](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quic](), [security](), [tls]() ### AI overview Google announces that Chrome 124 enables the latest Kyber draft specification by default for TLS 1.3 and QUIC on desktop platforms. The rollout exposed existing TLS middlebox bugs, and Chrome provides a temporary enterprise opt-out policy while fixes are deployed. ### Source excerpt Google and many other organizations, such as NIST, IETF, and NSA, believe that migrating to post-quantum cryptography is important due to the large risk posed by a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC). In August, we posted about how Chrome Security is working to protect users from the risk of future quantum computers by leveraging a new form of hybrid post-quantum cryptographic key exchange, Kyber (ML-KEM)1. We're happy to announce that we have enabled the latest Kyber draft specification by default for TLS 1.3 and QUIC on all desktop Chrome platforms as of Chrome 124.2 This rollout revealed a number of previously-existing bugs in several TLS middlebox products. To assist with the deployment of fixes, Chrome is offering a temporary enterprise policy to opt-out. Launching opportunistic quantum-resistant key exchange is part of Google's broader strategy to prioritize deploying post-quantum cryptography in systems today that are at risk if an adversary has access to a quantum computer in the future. We believe that it's important to inform standards with real-world experience, by implementing drafts and iterating based on feedback from implementers and early adopters. This iterative approach was a key part of developing QUIC and TLS 1.3. It's part of why we're launching this draft version of Kyber, and it informs our future plans for post-quantum cryptography. Chrome's post-quantum strategy prioritizes quantum-resistant key exchange in HTTPS, and increased agility in certificates from the Web PKI. While PKI agility may appear somewhat unrelated, its absence has contributed to significant delays in past cryptographic transitions and will continue to do so until we find a viable solution in this space. A more agile Web PKI is required to enable a secure and reliable transition to post-quantum cryptography on the web. To understand this, let's take a look at HTTPS and the current state of post-quantum cryptography. In the context of HTTPS, cryptography is pr ## A High-Level Technical Overview of Fully Homomorphic Encryption DevFeed: [A High-Level Technical Overview of Fully Homomorphic Encryption]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-05-04T15:30:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Jeremy Kun]() Topics: [FHE](), [homomorphic encryption](), [Encryption](), [Cryptography](), [toolchain](), [Compiler](), [Post-quantum cryptography]() Tags: [compiler](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [fhe](), [google](), [homomorphic-encryption](), [linear-algebra](), [lwe](), [mathematics](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [programming](), [rlwe](), [technical]() ### AI overview A technical, high-level survey of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), explaining how programs can operate on encrypted data without decrypting it. The article discusses the field's current limitations, key techniques, and its relationship to the HEIR compiler toolchain. ### Source excerpt About two years ago, I switched teams at Google to focus on fully homomorphic encryption (abbreviated FHE, or sometimes HE). Since then I've got to work on a lot of interesting projects, learning along the way about post-quantum cryptography, compiler design, and the ins and outs of fully homomorphic encryption. If you've heard about FHE and you're a software person, you've probably heard two things: it lets you run programs directly on encrypted data without ever decrypting it; and it's still too slow to be useful for anything. ## Post-Quantum Cryptography in January 2024 DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography in January 2024]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-01-28T20:22:53Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum]() Tags: [cryptography](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum]() ### AI overview An article about post-quantum cryptography in January 2024. ### Source excerpt It's 2024 - Do you know where your post-quantum cryptography is?