# private key

Published articles for private key.

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## CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-61798-netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-boringssl-hpke-private-key-bytes-exposed-through-tostring-and-exception-messages-144620.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61798>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-19T22:18:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Netty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/netty.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [array](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/array.md>), [codec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codec.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-61798](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-61798.md>), [exception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exception.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [hpke](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hpke.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/log.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [messages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/messages.md>), [netty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty.md>), [netty-incubator-codec-ohttp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [tostring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tostring.md>)

### AI overview

Before netty-incubator-codec-ohttp 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSL HPKE private-key bytes could be exposed through two paths: key-pair and private-key parameter toString() output, and exception messages containing rejected privateKeyBytes. Applications that log these objects or initialization exceptions may persist complete private keys in logs or telemetry. Readers of those records could recover a key and potentially compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity while it remains usable. The issue is fixed in 0.0.23.Final.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-61798 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 10:18 p.m. | 2 hours, 54 minutes ago Description :netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. Severity: 8.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-133185-elazarl-goproxy-before-1-9-4-predictable-mitm-leaf-certificate-private-keys-143736.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133185>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-19T14:27:46Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-133185](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-133185.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [elazarl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elazarl.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [goproxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy.md>), [goproxy-project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy-project.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [mitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitm.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Goproxy versions before 1.9.4 have a weak key generation flaw in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey: misuse of hash.Sum causes RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys to be derived from public data. An attacker who has the proxy CA certificate and has observed a leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate it to clients that trust the proxy CA.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-133185 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 2:27 p.m. | 55 minutes ago Description :Goproxy before 1.9.4 contains a weak key generation vulnerability in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey that derives RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys from public data due to misuse of hash.Sum. Attackers with the CA certificate and one observed leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate the host to clients trusting the proxy CA. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Google Drafts Stricter Key-Management Rules for Web Certificates, Requiring Audits for All Subordinate CA Key Generation

DevFeed: [Google Drafts Stricter Key-Management Rules for Web Certificates, Requiring Audits for All Subordinate CA Key Generation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/google-drafts-stricter-key-management-rules-for-web-certificates-requiring-audits-for-all-subordinate-ca-key-generation-134010.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://joho-todai.com/en/google-web-certificate-key-management-stricter-rules/>)

Author: Toru Misaki

Published: 2026-11-14T01:54:44Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Joho no Todai](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/joho-no-todai.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/audit.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [backup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backup.md>), [backups](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backups.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [forms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forms.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>), [required](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/required.md>), [revision](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/revision.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [website](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/website.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed CA/Browser Forum revision would tighten how browser-trusted certificate authorities generate, protect, track, and transfer private keys. Outside validated cryptographic modules, keys could be protected only by encryption with a key-encryption key kept inside the module or by secret sharing; all covered CA key generation would require documented procedures and an auditor's presence or a full video recording. Records would link the generated public key to later certificates through hash comparisons and quality checks, addressing the eMudhra incident in which a different key went undetected for about 18 months. If transfer between devices cannot meet the rules, the CA must generate a new key at the destination. Phase one is scheduled for March 15, 2027, and phase two for September 15, 2027, subject to adoption; missing evidence of compliant protection could require subordinate certificate revocation. Published Japanese CA policies vary, but they cannot establish actual compliance effort because internal controls may differ.

### Source excerpt

A proposed revision to the common standards governing issuers of browser-trusted website certificates would uniformly require approved forms of private-key protection, audited key generation, transfer procedures, and key inventories. A CA that cannot demonstrate the existence and protection of its keys could be required to revoke certificates.

## CVE-2026-95613 - Zenitel Connect pREST API adopts arbitrary PostgreSQL role from unvalidated JWT sub claim

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-95613 - Zenitel Connect pREST API adopts arbitrary PostgreSQL role from unvalidated JWT sub claim](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-95613-zenitel-connect-prest-api-adopts-arbitrary-postgresql-role-from-unvalidated-jwt-sub-claim-132487.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95613>)

Author: CVEFEED.io

Published: 2026-11-13T16:19:38Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [PostgreSQL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postgresql.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [containers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/containers.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-95613](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-95613.md>), [data-volume](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-volume.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [filesystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/filesystem.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [password](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/password.md>), [postgres](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgres.md>), [postgresql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgresql.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [rest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest.md>), [rest-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest-api.md>)

### AI overview

In Zenitel Connect firmware before 1.11.0, the pREST API sets the PostgreSQL session role from an unvalidated JWT `sub` claim while connected as the `postgres` superuser. The API signs and verifies tokens using a platform CA private key stored on a data volume shared between containers. A local attacker who can read that key can forge a JWT with `sub=postgres` and use the API to perform database operations as the superuser, including reading the master encryption key and password hashes. The excerpt reports no affected products in its product table, so it does not identify specific product versions beyond the firmware range in the description.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-95613 Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 4:19 p.m. | 1 hour ago Description :The pREST database REST API in Zenitel Connect firmware before 1.11.0 signs and verifies JWTs with the platform CA private key, which is stored on a data volume shared between containers, and sets the PostgreSQL session role from the unvalidated sub claim of each request while connected to the database as the "postgres" superuser, which allows local attackers who can read the platform CA private key from the container filesystem to execute database operations as the PostgreSQL superuser, including reading the master encryption key and password hashes, via a forged JWT with sub=postgres sent to the pREST API. Severity: 8.6 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## eMudhra revokes 8 more CAs it previously declared unaffected by key compromise

DevFeed: [eMudhra revokes 8 more CAs it previously declared unaffected by key compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-revokes-8-more-cas-it-previously-declared-unaffected-by-key-compromise-130552.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.adafruit.com/2026/11/12/emudhra-revokes-8-more-cas-it-previously-declared-unaffected-by-key-compromise/>)

Author: Anne Barela

Published: 2026-11-12T16:20:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Adafruit Industries](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/adafruit-industries-makers-hackers-artists-designers-and-engineers.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Python](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/python.md>)

Tags: [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [certificate-authorities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authorities.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [hsm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hsm.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

eMudhra revoked eight additional intermediate CAs that it had previously said were unaffected by its October key compromise. The issue traces to an April 30, 2025 key ceremony: a Python script used to transfer keys between Utimaco and Crypto4A HSMs read private keys into the ceremony computer's memory. Unlike eight ECDSA keys previously affected by a bug that truncated their values, the eight RSA keys were not shortened; eMudhra says it cannot demonstrate they were handled under its own rules. Six were for TLS and two for code signing, covering 195 certificates. The excerpt says eMudhra is leaving the publicly trusted TLS business.

### Source excerpt

The Hacker News reports that eMudhra has revoked 8 more intermediate certificate authorities, the same ones it had called unaffected by its October key compromise. An intermediate CA has its own private key, used to sign the certificates the company issues. Both problems trace back to a key ceremony on April 30, 2025, where 16 [...]

## eMudhra revokes 8 more CA certificates after private key mishap

DevFeed: [eMudhra revokes 8 more CA certificates after private key mishap](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-revokes-8-more-ca-certificates-after-private-key-mishap-129652.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emudhra-revokes-8-more-ca-certificates-after-private-key-mishap/>)

Author: Lawrence Abrams

Published: 2026-11-11T21:27:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>)

Tags: [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificate-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-management.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [early-warning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/early-warning.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [handling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handling.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [investigation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/investigation.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [process](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/process.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-incident.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

eMudhra revoked eight more intermediate CA certificates on November 7, bringing the total affected to 16. Its investigation traced both groups to a custom Python script used in April 2025 to move keys between HSM vendors: a bug reduced eight ECDSA keys to one byte, while eight RSA keys were handled in host memory, contrary to the company's certificate security policy. The RSA keys were not reported weakened, but eMudhra said it could not demonstrate compliant handling and revoked their certificates; affected customer certificates were replaced or migrated. An earlier mismatch in CRL signing in June 2025 was an uninvestigated warning, and the company also found it had not verified key strength or matched generated keys against those created in the HSM. Browser and OS vendors blocked the compromised certificates. eMudhra plans to exit publicly trusted TLS certificates, stop issuing under its G1 hierarchy by November 16, and obtain a KPMG review; it reported no evidence of malicious use.

### Source excerpt

Certificate authority eMudhra has revoked eight additional intermediate CA certificates after an investigation into its recent certificate security incident found improper handling of private keys during the certificate-generation process. [...]

## Binance Lost $6.3 Billion to Its Own Signing Machine

DevFeed: [Binance Lost $6.3 Billion to Its Own Signing Machine](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/binance-lost-6-3-billion-to-its-own-signing-machine-110089.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/binance-lost-$63-billion-to-its-own-signing-machine?source=rss>)

Author: Sidra Zafar

Published: 2026-10-31T16:32:20Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Binance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/binance.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [software supply-chain attack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-supply-chain-attack.md>)

Tags: [binance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance.md>), [binance-hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hack.md>), [binance-hack-6-3-billion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hack-6-3-billion.md>), [binance-hot-wallet-signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hot-wallet-signing.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-security.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [eip7702-phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip7702-phishing.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [laptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptop.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>)

### AI overview

The article reports that an attacker moved about $6.36 billion from Binance wallets across ten blockchains while Binance said it found no evidence of a private-key leak. It attributes the loss to compromised access to internal signing infrastructure: on Ethereum, one of 50 pre-signed EIP-7702 authorizations delegated a hot wallet to a sweeper contract, and the delegation continued sweeping later deposits. The article stresses that valid signatures can be produced while keys remain inside an HSM or MPC system if an attacker controls the requests or bypasses policy checks. Issuers froze about $3 billion in assets, while the attacker converted other funds; no perpetrator had been officially identified as of 31 October, and Binance's root-cause findings were pending. Proposed controls include isolated developer devices and access, independent approval of large withdrawals, alerts or human review for EIP-7702 authorizations, and separate signing paths and outflow limits by chain and wallet.

### Source excerpt

Binance lost $6.3B with no private key leaked. How a DevOps laptop and EIP-7702 turned the exchange's own signer against it.

## Binance hit by $6.3 billion theft in what could be the biggest crypto heist on record

DevFeed: [Binance hit by $6.3 billion theft in what could be the biggest crypto heist on record](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/binance-hit-by-6-3-billion-theft-in-what-could-be-the-biggest-crypto-heist-on-record-107478.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/30/binance-crypto-hack/>)

Author: Sinisa Markovic

Published: 2026-10-30T08:26:13Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [arbitrum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arbitrum.md>), [binance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance.md>), [chainalysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chainalysis.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [crypto-heist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-heist.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cyberattack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattack.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [devops-engineer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops-engineer.md>), [don-t-miss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t-miss.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hack.md>), [hot-stuff](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hot-stuff.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [investigation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/investigation.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [north-korea](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/north-korea.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-incident.md>), [security-update](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-update.md>), [service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service.md>), [theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/theft.md>), [transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transactions.md>), [update](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/update.md>), [wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wallet.md>)

### AI overview

Binance said about $6.3 billion in cryptocurrency was stolen and that it would cover losses, while deposits resumed and withdrawals remained paused for a security revamp expected to take up to 48 hours. Its initial investigation pointed to a possibly compromised DevOps laptop and service container; Binance reported no evidence of leaked wallet private keys and promised a post-mortem and updated Proof of Reserves after remediation. Stablecoin issuers and other partners froze about $2.7 billion by early October 30, with Binance also revoking affected address authorization and involving law enforcement. TRM Labs and Chainalysis attributed the attack with high confidence to North Korea-linked TraderTraitor. TRM said valid signatures across chains within roughly half an hour suggest hot-wallet signing infrastructure was compromised, while noting that phishing could explain Ethereum activity but not the other chains. The article says hackers still held more than $2.4 billion in ETH and BTC.

### Source excerpt

About $6.3 billion in cryptocurrency was stolen from Binance in what might be the biggest crypto hack in history. "Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions," the exchange said in a security update published early on October 30. The company found no evidence of a wallet private key leak and plans ... More -> The post Binance hit by $6.3 billion theft in what could be the biggest crypto heist on record appeared first on Help Net Security.

## GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis

DevFeed: [GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gks-fully-homomorphic-encryption-security-analysis-103375.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37061>)

Author: John Graham, Soundes Marzougui, Milo\\v{s} Pavlovi\\'c, Vladimir Shpilrain

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [math-ra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/math-ra.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The abstract says GKS supports computation on encrypted data without bootstrapping or de-linearization, offers bit-exact decryption and native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth. The supplied text does not provide the analysis or its security findings, so those cannot be summarized here.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.37061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: All traditional encryption schemes share a fundamental operational vulnerability: encrypted data must be decrypted before it can be used. Fully homomorphic encryption eliminates this vulnerability by enabling computation directly on encrypted data, but existing FHE schemes impose substantial practical constraints that limit deployment. This paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key FHE scheme. GKS requires no bootstrapping or de-linearization, produces bit-exact decryption, supports native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth.

## Compromised TLS Certificates

DevFeed: [Compromised TLS Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-tls-certificates-97564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/10/compromised-tls-certificates.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-10-23T11:04:22Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [elliptic-curve-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curve-cryptography.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [encrypted-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted-traffic.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

### AI overview

Eight TLS certificates issued by India's eMudhra had private keys with only 3 to 8 bits of entropy, far below the roughly 384 bits cited for a typical NIST P-384 key. The excerpt says the immediate concern may be VPN users, particularly where governments could intercept traffic. Exploitation still requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack to intercept and relay TLS traffic; local-network control makes that easier, while some attacks may demand well-resourced actors. Transparency logs help reveal unauthorized certificates, but require active monitoring and work only after issuance. The excerpt says end users may need to wait for assurances that updates are in place before using some non-browser TLS communications.

### Source excerpt

The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys: The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that's challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237...

## OpenCode hack exposes API keys amid AI distillation attacks

DevFeed: [OpenCode hack exposes API keys amid AI distillation attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/opencode-hack-exposes-api-keys-amid-ai-distillation-attacks-90455.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/opencode-hack-exposes-api-keys-amid-ai-distillation-attacks/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-10-19T17:27:15Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [API keys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-keys.md>), [token jacking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/token-jacking.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding.md>), [ai-cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-cybersecurity.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [charges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charges.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [initial-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/initial-access.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [opencode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opencode.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-breach.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

OpenCode reported that a breach exposed API keys some users had stored for external AI providers. The incident affected 1.4% of OpenCode Console users and led to reports of unauthorized charges and suspended Google Cloud projects. The article says attackers used AI agents in a large-scale distillation attack, while OpenCode worked with Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic to address the incident.

### Source excerpt

The open-source AI coding project OpenCode has notified a small number of users that API keys they used with external providers were exposed in a security breach. [...]

## How to Achieve True SSH in Runpod

DevFeed: [How to Achieve True SSH in Runpod](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-achieve-true-ssh-in-runpod-84643.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.runpod.io/blog/how-to-achieve-true-ssh-in-runpod>)

Author: Zhen Lu

Published: 2026-10-10T23:20:15Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Runpod Blog.](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/runpod-blog.md>)

Topics: [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [OpenSSH](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssh.md>), [engineering-culture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/engineering-culture.md>)

Tags: [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tutorial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tutorial.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how to configure a true SSH daemon in a Runpod pod, enabling SCP and IDE connections. It describes selecting and deploying a pod, configuring a template, and using the connection command. Runpod says the setup is automated in its custom TensorFlow, PyTorch, and Runpod stack images.

### Source excerpt

This tutorial guides users through setting up a true SSH daemon on Runpod, enabling functionalities like SCP and IDE connections. It covers selecting a.

## \[Podcast\] The October 2026 root KSK roll

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] The October 2026 root KSK roll](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-the-october-2026-root-ksk-roll-63018.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/01/podcast-the-october-2026-root-ksk-roll/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-09-30T22:44:12Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [TTL in DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ttl-in-dns.md>)

Tags: [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [ksk-roll](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk-roll.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

In this PING episode, Verisign researcher Duane Wessels discusses the second DNS root Key Signing Key rollover. The third key pair is scheduled to begin signing the root zone on 11 October 2026, after delays in 2020 and 2023. The episode also covers research into resolver behavior during the rollover and the RFC 8145 signaling mechanism.

### Source excerpt

In this episode of PING, Verisign's Duane Wessels discusses the transition to the third DNS root KSK key pair, which is scheduled to begin signing the root zone on 11 October 2026.

## Who Holds the Authority When AI Agents Pay for Their Own GPU Compute?

DevFeed: [Who Holds the Authority When AI Agents Pay for Their Own GPU Compute?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/who-holds-the-authority-when-ai-agents-pay-for-their-own-gpu-compute-61841.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/who-holds-the-authority-when-ai-agents-pay-for-their-own-gpu-compute?source=rss>)

Author: Kenneth Onyebuchi

Published: 2026-09-29T15:35:11Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [agentic commerce fraud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-commerce-fraud.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [AI agents in autonomous vehicles](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agents-in-autonomous-vehicles.md>)

Tags: [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-compute.md>), [ai-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-infrastructure.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compute.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [copy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/copy.md>), [decentralize-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralize-ai.md>), [decentralize-ai-hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralize-ai-hackathon.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [developer-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer-tools.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-compute.md>), [gpu-marketplace](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-marketplace.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [payment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payment.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>)

### AI overview

The article examines the security risks of AI agents paying for GPU compute through decentralized networks. It argues that a wallet key can authorize irreversible transactions, and points to Solana's delegation primitive as a possible way to limit that authority.

### Source excerpt

AI agents are starting to pay for their own GPU compute. Here's how Solana's existing delegation primitive could make that safe.

## New Attack Against RSA

DevFeed: [New Attack Against RSA](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/new-attack-against-rsa-61068.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/09/new-attack-against-rsa.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-09-28T11:02:58Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [academic-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/academic-papers.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [factoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/factoring.md>), [forgery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forgery.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [speed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

### AI overview

The post distinguishes an RSA signature-forgery attack from private-key recovery: the technique is based on 2007 research, and the newer development is its implementation. It applies only to unformatted, unpadded signatures, and forging a 1024-bit RSA message reportedly required 1,380 CPU core-years over more than five months.

### Source excerpt

ArsTechnica is reporting on a "new" attack against RSA, one that bypasses factoring. First, this attack isn't new. The original research is from 2007. What is new is the implementation. Second, it is a forgery attack. It allows an attacker to forge digital signatures. It does not recover the private key from the public key. Third, the attack only works against pure signatures. That is, signatures without any formatting or padding. This is not generally how we use RSA in practice. Fourth, speed is all relative. This is not a polynomial-time algorithm; it's a subexponential-time algorithm. But it is somewhat faster than factoring. The authors were able to forge messages for 1024-bit RSA with 1380 CPU core-years (over five real-world months)...

## AmericanFortress Publishes a Zero-Knowledge Proof That Stops Bridges Paying the Wrong Wallet

DevFeed: [AmericanFortress Publishes a Zero-Knowledge Proof That Stops Bridges Paying the Wrong Wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/americanfortress-publishes-a-zero-knowledge-proof-that-stops-bridges-paying-the-wrong-wallet-59345.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/americanfortress-publishes-a-zero-knowledge-proof-that-stops-bridges-paying-the-wrong-wallet?source=rss>)

Author: Ishan Pandey

Published: 2026-09-24T15:15:49Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bitcoin.md>), [Solana](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solana.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ed25519.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [americanfortress](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/americanfortress.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [software-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-engineering.md>), [solana](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solana.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>), [zero-knowledge-proof](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge-proof.md>), [zkposp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zkposp.md>)

### AI overview

AmericanFortress is publishing research on a zero-knowledge proof that lets bridges verify whether Bitcoin and Solana wallets share one hidden secret without revealing the secret or publicly linking the wallets. The approach is intended to prevent substituted payout addresses.

### Source excerpt

AmericanFortress's Provenance Proofs paper lets a bridge verify two wallets on Bitcoin and Solana share one hidden secret, blocking substituted payout addresses

## GitHub App keys can still enable takeovers long after they are forgotten

DevFeed: [GitHub App keys can still enable takeovers long after they are forgotten](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/github-app-keys-can-still-enable-takeovers-long-after-they-are-forgotten-58527.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4225630/github-app-keys-can-still-enable-takeovers-long-after-they-are-forgotten.html>)

Author: Shweta Sharma

Published: 2026-09-23T15:10:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [GitGuardian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitguardian.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [Repository](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/repository.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [Self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted.md>)

Tags: [code-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security.md>), [code-security-identity-and-access-management-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security-identity-and-access-management-security.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [secret-scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-scanning.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>)

### AI overview

The article reports that leaked GitHub App private keys can remain valid for years and may enable unauthorized access to repositories, workflows, self-hosted runners, and organization administration. It describes findings from GitGuardian and explains how attackers could use valid keys to inject malicious code or compromise production environments.

### Source excerpt

GitHub allows organizations to install GitHub Apps that automate and extend certain functionality on the platform and have access to selected repositories and permissions. But the private keys these applications use to authenticate themselves can remain valid for years unless manually revoked. If leaked, those keys can potentially give attackers administrative control over an organization's GitHub account, says GitGuardian, which found 474 still-valid GitHub App private keys among 4802 publicly exposed ones it has collected since 2019. In testing the keys for validity, it was also able to determine what access rights they provided, finding that "72% of the compromised Apps could read private repository content, and 207 could write to it, turning one leaked key into an organization takeover," GitGuardian researcher Gaetan Ferry said in a blog post. Among the GitHub Apps affected by the leaked keys was "Access Tokens for GitHub Actions," an application used to manage access for GitHub Actions workflows. Its private key was exposed in January 2024 after being accidentally committed to a repository, potentially affecting 300 organizations where the app was installed, including Civica and Sierra Nevada Corp. BuildBuddy, Crusher.dev, and a private application associated with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were among the other GitHub Apps for which GitGuardian found exposed keys. Agnidipta Sarkar, chief evangelist at security software vendor ColorTokens, said the initial abuse is "trivially straightforward" and an attacker can achieve that with a valid private key and the corresponding App ID. For maximum impact, he said, attackers could chain the abuse by "injecting malicious code into the repository and when the code is built or deployed, it can compromise downstream users or production environments." An attacker might also be able to modify CI/CD runner configurations to execute arbitrary code on the organization's internal network infrastructure, Sar

## How to Give an AI Agent a Wallet Without a Private Key

DevFeed: [How to Give an AI Agent a Wallet Without a Private Key](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-give-an-ai-agent-a-wallet-without-a-private-key-58715.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/how-to-give-an-ai-agent-a-wallet-without-a-private-key?source=rss>)

Author: Jon Stojan Journalist

Published: 2026-09-23T08:00:11Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agent-private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-private-key.md>), [ai-agent-session-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-session-keys.md>), [ai-agent-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-wallet-security.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [autonomous-ai-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-ai-wallet-security.md>), [crypto-wallets-for-ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-wallets-for-ai-agents.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [namera-agent-wallets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/namera-agent-wallets.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [scoped-authorization-ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scoped-authorization-ai-agents.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains why giving AI agents unrestricted private keys creates security and reliability risks, including excessive spending, repeated payments, leaked credentials, and malicious instructions in tool responses. It presents scoped authorization using smart accounts and revocable session keys as an alternative.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to give AI agents controlled wallet access without private keys using smart accounts, scoped session keys, transaction limits, & revocable permissions

## Experimental support for Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) in ASP.NET Core: Exploring the .NET 11 preview - Part 8

DevFeed: [Experimental support for Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) in ASP.NET Core: Exploring the .NET 11 preview - Part 8](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/experimental-support-for-device-bound-session-credentials-dbsc-in-asp-net-core-exploring-the-net-11-preview-part-8-57969.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://andrewlock.net/exploring-the-dotnet-11-preview-8-experimental-support-for-device-bound-session-credentials-in-aspnetcore/>)

Author: Andrew Lock

Published: 2026-09-22T10:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Andrew Lock | .NET Escapades](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/andrew-lock-net-escapades.md>)

Topics: [ASP.NET Core](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/asp-net-core.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [.NET](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/net.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/browser.md>), [Cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cookies.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [HTTP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/http.md>), [Server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/server.md>)

Tags: [asp-net-core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asp-net-core.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [c-sharp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c-sharp.md>), [cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cookies.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [net](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net.md>), [net-11](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-11.md>), [net-11-c-sharp-asp-net-core-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-11-c-sharp-asp-net-core-security.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explores experimental Device Bound Session Credentials support in .NET 11 through the Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.DeviceBoundSessions package. It explains how to use DBSC with an ASP.NET Core Identity application and describes its request flow and implementation details.

### Source excerpt

In this post I look at the new experimental support for DBSC provided by the Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.DeviceBoundSessions package

## How AI Is Reshaping Crypto Security, with Michael Coates

DevFeed: [How AI Is Reshaping Crypto Security, with Michael Coates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-ai-is-reshaping-crypto-security-with-michael-coates-55391.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://solana.com/news/bits-to-bricks-crypto-security-michael-coates>)

Author: Solana Foundation

Published: 2026-09-19T10:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Solana News Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/solana-news-feed.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [Bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bitcoin.md>), [Hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardware.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Randomizer](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/randomizer.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Software Testing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-testing.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bug.md>), [Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-technology.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [crypto-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-news.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cyber-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-security.md>), [defi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defi.md>), [ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecosystem.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploit.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [nfts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nfts.md>), [podcasts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcasts.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [solana](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solana.md>), [solana-ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solana-ecosystem.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>), [testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/testing.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>)

### AI overview

A Coldcard hardware-wallet exploit exposed a weakness in seed-phrase generation after a code change replaced a hardware random-number generator with an insecure software pseudo-random source. Michael Coates discusses audit limitations, layered testing, self-custody risks, and how AI may accelerate both security auditing and attacks.

### Source excerpt

A ~$116 million Coldcard exploit shows why crypto security must eliminate single points of failure and automate defenses for AI-speed threats.

## Understanding Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC)

DevFeed: [Understanding Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/understanding-device-bound-session-credentials-dbsc-51489.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://andrewlock.net/understanding-device-bound-session-credentials/>)

Author: Andrew Lock

Published: 2026-09-15T10:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Andrew Lock | .NET Escapades](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/andrew-lock-net-escapades.md>)

Topics: [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [Cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cookies.md>), [Web app](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/webapp.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/browser.md>), [Server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/server.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cookies.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [web-applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-applications.md>)

### AI overview

An introduction to Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC), a protocol designed to reduce session hijacking by binding authentication cookies to the device where they were issued. The post explains the security problem, the browser and server verification flow, and DBSC's progressive-enhancement approach.

### Source excerpt

In this post I provide an introduction to Device Bound Session Credentials, I look at how DBSC protects against session hijacking, and how the protocol works

## AD Rights Management Service (Part 2): Extraction, Offline Decryption, and the Unrotatable Key

DevFeed: [AD Rights Management Service (Part 2): Extraction, Offline Decryption, and the Unrotatable Key](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ad-rights-management-service-part-2-extraction-offline-decryption-and-the-unrotatable-key-54181.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/ad-rms-slc-encryption-key>)

Author: Andrew Schwartz

Published: 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Huntress Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/huntress-blog.md>)

Topics: [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [active directory](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/active-directory.md>), [Server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/server.md>)

Tags: [active-directory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/active-directory.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [dcsync](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dcsync.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [refactoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/refactoring.md>), [sql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sql.md>)

### AI overview

This article describes a server-side attack against Active Directory Rights Management Service that extracts the Server Licensor Certificate private key. The key can decrypt every document protected by the deployment offline and remains effective after the deployment is rebuilt.

### Source excerpt

An AD RMS Service Group account exports the AD RMS Server Licensor Certificate private key. That 1172-byte key decrypts every document the deployment ever protected, offline, and keeps doing so after the deployment is rebuilt.

## AD Rights Management Service (Part 1): Architecture, Deprecation, and Reconnaissance

DevFeed: [AD Rights Management Service (Part 1): Architecture, Deprecation, and Reconnaissance](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ad-rights-management-service-part-1-architecture-deprecation-and-reconnaissance-54180.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/ad-rms-architecture-and-recon>)

Author: Andrew Schwartz

Published: 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Huntress Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/huntress-blog.md>)

Topics: [active directory](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/active-directory.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [OSINT](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/osint.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [enterprise deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-deployment.md>)

Tags: [active-directory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/active-directory.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [trace](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trace.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>), [windows-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows-server.md>)

### AI overview

This first part investigates Active Directory Rights Management Services (AD RMS), mapping its trust model, license flow, SOAP surface, deployment discovery, and protected-file fingerprinting. It explains how the system's certificate and private-key architecture can enable offline decryption and why its long-lived, non-rotatable key matters for security assessments.

### Source excerpt

Active Directory Rights Management Services still ships in Windows Server 2025, years after Microsoft began steering customers to the cloud, and it remains fully supported on-premises. Part 1 maps the AD RMS trust model (the Server Licensor Certificate, the license flow, the SOAP surface) and shows how to discover an RMS deployment, fingerprint an AD RMS-protected file, and trace the path to that certificate's private key.

## Rotating Expiring X.509 Certificates in Percona Server for MongoDB with Minimal Service Interruption

DevFeed: [Rotating Expiring X.509 Certificates in Percona Server for MongoDB with Minimal Service Interruption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rotating-expiring-x-509-certificates-in-percona-server-for-mongodb-with-minimal-service-interruption-14114.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.percona.com/blog/rotating-expiring-x-509-certificates-in-percona-server-for-mongodb-with-minimal-service-interruption/>)

Author: Ivan Groenewold

Published: 2026-08-31T11:48:11Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Percona](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/blog-percona.md>)

Topics: [MongoDB](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/mongodb.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/configuration.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [insight-for-dbas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/insight-for-dbas.md>), [mongodb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mongodb.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rotation.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [x509](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x509.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how to renew same-CA X.509 certificates in Percona Server for MongoDB with minimal service interruption. It covers reloading TLS material with rotateCertificates, certificate and private-key configuration, limitations, validation, and cases where hot reload should not be used.

### Source excerpt

Expired TLS certificates can prevent new client connections and, when X.509 is used for Percona Server for MongoDB internal authentication, also prevent members of a replica set or sharded cluster from authenticating to one another. In this post we will discuss performing a same-CA renewal: replacement certificates for server, member, and client leaf are issued ... Continued The post Rotating Expiring X.509 Certificates in Percona Server for MongoDB with Minimal Service Interruption appeared first on Percona.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTA4LTMxVDExOjQ4OjExKzAwOjAwIiwgImJlMWRhZTI4LTIzNWMtNGJkNC1iN2RiLWE5MjFiNTMxZmU0ZCJd>)