# Routing Security Published articles for Routing Security. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia DevFeed: [CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Anastasiya Pak Published: 2026-09-17T17:29:36Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Routing Security](), [networking](), [Networks]() Tags: [2026](), [adoption](), [aspa](), [atlas](), [central](), [connectivity](), [country](), [events](), [internet](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [progress](), [region](), [report](), [research](), [ripe](), [ris](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [traffic]() ### AI overview This report examines changes in Central Asia's Internet connectivity since CAPIF 1. It describes more direct regional routes, expanding IXPs, stronger routing security and new links toward Pakistan, China, Azerbaijan and Europe, while noting persistently low IPv6 adoption and continued, though reduced, reliance on routes through Russia. ### Source excerpt Central Asia's Internet looks very different than it did back at CAPIF 1. We trace the rise of direct regional routes, stronger routing security and new connectivity options - along with the gaps that remain. ## Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026 DevFeed: [Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-14T09:00:47Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [airtel](), [apnic-62](), [as9498](), [india](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [routing-security](), [rov](), [rpki]() ### AI overview Airtel has told customers it plans to begin rolling out RPKI Route Origin Validation on 22 September 2026. The article examines 726 RPKI-invalid routes in Airtel's table, including 108 IPv4 and 618 IPv6 routes, and discusses their visibility outside India. ### Source excerpt Just back from Mumbai after APNIC 62 and Equinix's India Peering Forum. On excellent news: Airtel has started sending emails to its customers about RPKI RoV (Route Origin Validation). As per the mail, Airtel will start RPKI RoV soon and has mentioned 22 Sep 2026 as the timeline when they will start rolling out RoV. This is excellent news on the routing security front, and kudos to Airtel (AS9498) for taking the lead here among other large Indian backbones. This brings up the important question of how many routes exist in their table which are RPKI RoV invalids as of today? Looking at their announcements, I see the following: RPKI Valids: 33,735 RPKI Unknown: 4632 RPKI invalids: 726 This is for their table, including downstream routes. One can view the complete list of those 726 invalids, including prefix and AS_PATH here. One interesting thing here is that out of 726, 140 are from Airtel fixedline AS24560 and 122 are from Airtel Mobility. In terms of address family, there are 108 invalids from IPv4 and 618 from IPv6. How many of these invalids are single-homed vs multi-homed? This is important to check, as often the argument against RoV given by various operators in past was that they were losing traffic to their competitors. When I checked, I do not see any of these prefixes visible outside of India behind a transit-free / tier 1 network without AS9498 in the path. It could be because Tata Comm AS6453 drops RPKI invalid already & most of these are not dual-homed via Jio AS64049. So unless a less specific RPKI valid announcement is there, these are anyway largely blackholed for now by networks & IXPs doing RoV outside of India. Let's hope other Indian backbones also start doing RPKI RoV soon. Happy routing! 😀 ## APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India DevFeed: [APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dan Fidler Published: 2026-09-09T09:01:06Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [Routing Security](), [Security](), [Internet](), [Resilience](), [networking]() Tags: [apnic-62](), [collaboration](), [development](), [india](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [knowledge-sharing](), [nixi](), [partnership](), [resilience](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [skills](), [support]() ### AI overview APNIC and NIXI have signed an MoU to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India. The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment, pilot an RPKI repository mirror, promote routing security practices, and support technical training and knowledge sharing. ### Source excerpt The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment including piloting an RPKI Repository Mirror to support a more secure and resilient Internet ecosystem. ## The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace DevFeed: [The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthias Wichtlhuber Published: 2026-09-01T12:20:33Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Databases](), [Internet]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [competition](), [data](), [database](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [overview](), [research](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [series]() ### AI overview This article analyzes which parts of the Internet Route Registry landscape can safely be replaced by RPKI using traffic and route-server data from AMS-IX and DE-CIX. It concludes that third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain important for BGP filter generation. ### Source excerpt In the third part of our IRR landscape series, we use traffic measurements from AMS-IX and DE-CIX to assess which parts of the IRR landscape can safely be replaced with RPKI. Third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain essential for BGP filter generation. ## South Asia SRF highlights Member priorities on IPv6, routing security, and training DevFeed: [South Asia SRF highlights Member priorities on IPv6, routing security, and training]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dale Roberts Published: 2026-08-25T06:04:35Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [SANOG](), [Availability]() Tags: [aspa](), [community](), [deployment](), [development](), [event](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [network](), [networks](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [sanog](), [south-asia](), [subregional-forum](), [training]() ### AI overview The South Asia APNIC Sub-Regional Forum, held alongside SANOG 44 in Kathmandu, brought together more than 100 Members and regional Internet stakeholders. Discussions emphasized IPv6 deployment, routing security using RPKI, ROV, and ASPA, Internet resource and registry management, policy participation, automation, IPv4 availability, and practical technical training. ### Source excerpt More than 100 APNIC Members attended the South Asia APNIC Sub-Regional Forum alongside SANOG 44 in Kathmandu. Member feedback gathered during the event will help inform APNIC's future priorities across the region. ## BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234 DevFeed: [BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Mingwei Zhang Published: 2026-08-18T15:21:32Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Cloudflare Blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Networks](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Cloudflare](), [Monitoring]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [cloudflare](), [internet](), [monitoring](), [network](), [networks](), [research](), [router](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article examines the adoption of RFC 9234, which uses BGP Roles and the Only to Customer (OTC) attribute to help routers prevent and detect route leaks. Cloudflare measured deployment through its global peering presence and found that two large Tier-1 networks were stripping OTC attributes from forwarded routes. ### Source excerpt RFC 9234 lets routers reject route leaks on their own, using BGP Roles and the Only to Customer attribute. We measured who has deployed it, and found two Tier 1 networks unexpectedly stripping OTC. ## Packets Down Range #42:Verizon, H5 tour, China ROAs DevFeed: [Packets Down Range #42:Verizon, H5 tour, China ROAs]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-08-14T16:12:36Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [datacenter](), [networking](), [Routing Security](), [.env]() Tags: [bead](), [bgp](), [broadband](), [china](), [data-center](), [fiber](), [internet2](), [isp](), [news](), [packets-down-newsletter](), [packets-down-range](), [peering](), [roa](), [routing-security](), [terminal](), [verizon]() ### AI overview This English news roundup covers interconnection and data center topics, including H5's 325 Hudson, the value of peering beyond transit-cost savings, OpenAI's reported plan, routing visibility for Internet2 traffic, broadband developments in Texas and Indiana, Verizon fiber expansion, China's use of ROAS, and related tools and sites. ### Source excerpt Rain Rain Rain. Indiana has been rained on this week. Things are flooded but the Internet still works! So fire up your terminal, and let's head down range. Patreon Subscribers can view additional news here. It's only $3 a month. It's like buying me a Red Bull once a month. Interconnection & Data Center News-Inside ... Read more The post Packets Down Range #42:Verizon, H5 tour, China ROAs appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating DevFeed: [Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Antonio Prado Published: 2026-07-21T12:33:47Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [article](), [attacks](), [bgp](), [internet-attacks](), [operational](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview The article argues that RPKI and cryptographic origin validation do not cover every BGP attack. It describes a malformed Prefix-SID incident that caused widespread updates and session resets, then presents a taxonomy of four macro-categories and eight micro-categories for routing attacks and their operational defences. ### Source excerpt RPKI has made real progress against prefix hijacking. But when you map every known class of BGP attack against the defences that exist, four of them turn out to sit entirely outside cryptographic validation: handled with local filters, static thresholds and reactive response. ## MANRS for Enterprise Customers DevFeed: [MANRS for Enterprise Customers]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-03-17T07:13:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [Routing Security](), [networking](), [Security]() Tags: [blog-post](), [connectivity](), [internet](), [networking](), [routing-security](), [security](), [white-paper]() ### AI overview The article argues that enterprises should use their purchasing power to encourage Internet service providers to adopt MANRS routing-security practices. It highlights limited MANRS participation among providers serving Croatia and Slovenia and points readers to a MANRS white paper about Internet routing as an overlooked enterprise supply-chain dependency. ### Source excerpt In October 2023, I was talking about Internet routing security at the DEEP conference in Zadar, Croatia. After explaining the (obvious) challenges and the initiatives aimed at making Internet routing more secure (MANRS), I made my usual recommendation: vote with your wallet. However, if you're a company in Croatia (or Slovenia, or a number of other countries), you're stuck. While ISPs in Croatia might be doing a great job, none of them is a MANRS participant1, so we don't know how good they are. The situation is not much better in Slovenia; the only ISPs claiming to serve Slovenia are Anexia (a cloud provider) and Go6 Institute, the small network operated by my good friend (and True Believer in IPv6 and MANRS) Jan Žorž. Moving further north, there are decent choices in Austria, and tons of options in Germany or Switzerland. I must be living in a truly thrifty part of Europe. Read more ... ## SwiNOG 40: When a Routing Control Functions Is Too Fresh DevFeed: [SwiNOG 40: When a Routing Control Functions Is Too Fresh]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-09-17T05:33:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [Integration testing](), [bug](), [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Network]() Tags: [bgp](), [bug](), [integration](), [integration-testing](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [video]() ### AI overview The article highlights a bug encountered during integration testing of network devices: applying a newly defined Routing Control Function to BGP routing updates in the same Arista EOS configuration session can produce unexpected behavior. The related SwiNOG 40 video presentation notes that the bug has since been fixed. ### Source excerpt During integration testing, I find unexpected quirks in network devices way too often. However, that's infinitely better than experiencing them in production (even after thoroughly testing stuff) while discovering that your peers don't care about routing security, RPKI, and similar useless stuff. For example, what happens if you define a new Routing Control Function (RFC) on Arista EOS and apply it to BGP routing updates in the same configuration session? You'll find out in the Sorry We Messed Up (video) presentation Stefan Funke had at SwiNOG 40 (note: the bug has been fixed in the meantime). ## Video: Internet Routing Security (DEEP 2023) DevFeed: [Video: Internet Routing Security (DEEP 2023)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-12-12T13:59:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [Routing Security](), [Internet]() Tags: [bgp](), [internet](), [routing-security](), [security](), [talk](), [video](), [youtube]() ### AI overview A talk on Internet Routing Security from the DEEP conference is now available on YouTube. The video is a shorter version of an Internet Routing Security webinar. ### Source excerpt My Internet Routing Security talk from last year's DEEP conference (a shorter version of the Internet Routing Security webinar) is now available on YouTube. Hope you'll find it useful ;) Watch the video