# RoV Published articles for RoV. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026 DevFeed: [Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-14T09:00:47Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [airtel](), [apnic-62](), [as9498](), [india](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [routing-security](), [rov](), [rpki]() ### AI overview Airtel has told customers it plans to begin rolling out RPKI Route Origin Validation on 22 September 2026. The article examines 726 RPKI-invalid routes in Airtel's table, including 108 IPv4 and 618 IPv6 routes, and discusses their visibility outside India. ### Source excerpt Just back from Mumbai after APNIC 62 and Equinix's India Peering Forum. On excellent news: Airtel has started sending emails to its customers about RPKI RoV (Route Origin Validation). As per the mail, Airtel will start RPKI RoV soon and has mentioned 22 Sep 2026 as the timeline when they will start rolling out RoV. This is excellent news on the routing security front, and kudos to Airtel (AS9498) for taking the lead here among other large Indian backbones. This brings up the important question of how many routes exist in their table which are RPKI RoV invalids as of today? Looking at their announcements, I see the following: RPKI Valids: 33,735 RPKI Unknown: 4632 RPKI invalids: 726 This is for their table, including downstream routes. One can view the complete list of those 726 invalids, including prefix and AS_PATH here. One interesting thing here is that out of 726, 140 are from Airtel fixedline AS24560 and 122 are from Airtel Mobility. In terms of address family, there are 108 invalids from IPv4 and 618 from IPv6. How many of these invalids are single-homed vs multi-homed? This is important to check, as often the argument against RoV given by various operators in past was that they were losing traffic to their competitors. When I checked, I do not see any of these prefixes visible outside of India behind a transit-free / tier 1 network without AS9498 in the path. It could be because Tata Comm AS6453 drops RPKI invalid already & most of these are not dual-homed via Jio AS64049. So unless a less specific RPKI valid announcement is there, these are anyway largely blackholed for now by networks & IXPs doing RoV outside of India. Let's hope other Indian backbones also start doing RPKI RoV soon. Happy routing! 😀 ## How Internet Exchange Route Servers Simplify BGP Peering and Improve Route Security DevFeed: [How Internet Exchange Route Servers Simplify BGP Peering and Improve Route Security]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2026-03-12T11:32:39Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Network](), [Security]() Tags: [bgp](), [internet-exchange](), [network](), [routing](), [rov](), [rpki](), [security]() ### AI overview This article explains how internet exchange route servers simplify BGP peering by distributing routes among exchange members over a shared LAN. It also discusses their route-security practices, including IRR filtering, RPKI route-origin validation, Peerlock, next-hop checking, and AS_PATH validation. ### Source excerpt How far can you go with IX Route Servers only? On paper internet exchanges (IX) are very simple in their implementation, simply put together a bunch of routers on a shared layer 2 ethernet switch ## How Invalid RPKI ROAs Disrupted Orange Spain's Internet Connectivity DevFeed: [How Invalid RPKI ROAs Disrupted Orange Spain's Internet Connectivity]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2024-03-21T16:31:30Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security](), [BGP](), [incident]() Tags: [bgp](), [connectivity](), [incident](), [outage](), [routing-security](), [rov](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview This case study examines how a malicious actor used credentials exposed on the public internet to create invalid RPKI ROAs for Orange Spain. The resulting route-origin validation effects made many websites unreachable for an estimated 9 million-plus customers for three to four hours, and the article analyzes network visibility during the incident. ### Source excerpt Signed but not secure At the start of the year a very interesting (and some would say inevitable) event happened involving internet routing security, the first case study of a large-scale victim o ## The state of RPKI: Q4 2018 DevFeed: [The state of RPKI: Q4 2018]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2018-12-20T21:57:37Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Networks](), [Internet]() Tags: [arin](), [network](), [networking](), [networks](), [rir](), [route](), [rov](), [rpki](), [signing]() ### AI overview An update on RPKI deployment in Q4 2018 examines legal restrictions affecting validation of ARIN routes and the gap between signing route origins and validating imported routes. It reports that 116 ASNs were fully RPKI protected, up from 85 in the previous update, while networks performing route-origin validation had doubled since September. ### Source excerpt The state of RPKI: Q4 2018 In the fall I did a blog post and talk on RPKI about how the current methods of measuring RPKI deployment are broken because they do not take