# RPKI Published articles for RPKI. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia DevFeed: [CAPIF 5: Regional Interconnectivity in Central Asia]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Anastasiya Pak Published: 2026-09-17T17:29:36Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [Internet](), [Routing Security](), [networking](), [Networks]() Tags: [2026](), [adoption](), [aspa](), [atlas](), [central](), [connectivity](), [country](), [events](), [internet](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [progress](), [region](), [report](), [research](), [ripe](), [ris](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [traffic]() ### AI overview This report examines changes in Central Asia's Internet connectivity since CAPIF 1. It describes more direct regional routes, expanding IXPs, stronger routing security and new links toward Pakistan, China, Azerbaijan and Europe, while noting persistently low IPv6 adoption and continued, though reduced, reliance on routes through Russia. ### Source excerpt Central Asia's Internet looks very different than it did back at CAPIF 1. We trace the rise of direct regional routes, stronger routing security and new connectivity options - along with the gaps that remain. ## Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026 DevFeed: [Airtel plans to begin RPKI Route Origin Validation rollout on 22 September 2026]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-14T09:00:47Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [airtel](), [apnic-62](), [as9498](), [india](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [routing-security](), [rov](), [rpki]() ### AI overview Airtel has told customers it plans to begin rolling out RPKI Route Origin Validation on 22 September 2026. The article examines 726 RPKI-invalid routes in Airtel's table, including 108 IPv4 and 618 IPv6 routes, and discusses their visibility outside India. ### Source excerpt Just back from Mumbai after APNIC 62 and Equinix's India Peering Forum. On excellent news: Airtel has started sending emails to its customers about RPKI RoV (Route Origin Validation). As per the mail, Airtel will start RPKI RoV soon and has mentioned 22 Sep 2026 as the timeline when they will start rolling out RoV. This is excellent news on the routing security front, and kudos to Airtel (AS9498) for taking the lead here among other large Indian backbones. This brings up the important question of how many routes exist in their table which are RPKI RoV invalids as of today? Looking at their announcements, I see the following: RPKI Valids: 33,735 RPKI Unknown: 4632 RPKI invalids: 726 This is for their table, including downstream routes. One can view the complete list of those 726 invalids, including prefix and AS_PATH here. One interesting thing here is that out of 726, 140 are from Airtel fixedline AS24560 and 122 are from Airtel Mobility. In terms of address family, there are 108 invalids from IPv4 and 618 from IPv6. How many of these invalids are single-homed vs multi-homed? This is important to check, as often the argument against RoV given by various operators in past was that they were losing traffic to their competitors. When I checked, I do not see any of these prefixes visible outside of India behind a transit-free / tier 1 network without AS9498 in the path. It could be because Tata Comm AS6453 drops RPKI invalid already & most of these are not dual-homed via Jio AS64049. So unless a less specific RPKI valid announcement is there, these are anyway largely blackholed for now by networks & IXPs doing RoV outside of India. Let's hope other Indian backbones also start doing RPKI RoV soon. Happy routing! 😀 ## Worth Reading 091126 DevFeed: [Worth Reading 091126]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-09-11T15:39:48Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](), [data](), [Internet](), [Programming](), [Software](), [systems]() Tags: [ai](), [articles](), [data](), [errors](), [internet](), [junior](), [learning](), [programming](), [rpki](), [software](), [systems](), [worth-reading]() ### AI overview A reading roundup connecting the AI bubble, Internet Route Registry and RPKI safety, silent data corruptions, and the effects of AI-assisted programming on junior developers and software engineering. ### Source excerpt Recognizing that AI is a bubble requires one to apply the right test to the right companies and that requires one to understand the fundamental nature of the bubble in question. Based on the insights from those articles, we now shift attention to which parts of the Internet Route Registry (IRR) landscape can - or cannot - be replaced safely with information from the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system. While many faults manifest as crashes or exceptions, others are far more subtle to identify. Silent data corruptions (SDCs), also known as silent data errors or silent errors, are violations of data integrity that occur without immediate, observable, and explicit indications. Aligning intended learning outcomes, assessments, and teaching practices with the realities of AI-assisted programming. AI is transforming the role of the junior developer. But as routine tasks become increasingly automated, how will the next generation of software engineers master the craft of maintaining complex systems? ## APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India DevFeed: [APNIC and NIXI partner to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dan Fidler Published: 2026-09-09T09:01:06Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [Routing Security](), [Security](), [Internet](), [Resilience](), [networking]() Tags: [apnic-62](), [collaboration](), [development](), [india](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [knowledge-sharing](), [nixi](), [partnership](), [resilience](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [skills](), [support]() ### AI overview APNIC and NIXI have signed an MoU to strengthen routing security and technical capacity in India. The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment, pilot an RPKI repository mirror, promote routing security practices, and support technical training and knowledge sharing. ### Source excerpt The partnership will expand IPv6 and RPKI deployment including piloting an RPKI Repository Mirror to support a more secure and resilient Internet ecosystem. ## The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace DevFeed: [The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthias Wichtlhuber Published: 2026-09-01T12:20:33Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Databases](), [Internet]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [competition](), [data](), [database](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [overview](), [research](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [series]() ### AI overview This article analyzes which parts of the Internet Route Registry landscape can safely be replaced by RPKI using traffic and route-server data from AMS-IX and DE-CIX. It concludes that third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain important for BGP filter generation. ### Source excerpt In the third part of our IRR landscape series, we use traffic measurements from AMS-IX and DE-CIX to assess which parts of the IRR landscape can safely be replaced with RPKI. Third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain essential for BGP filter generation. ## South Asia SRF highlights Member priorities on IPv6, routing security, and training DevFeed: [South Asia SRF highlights Member priorities on IPv6, routing security, and training]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dale Roberts Published: 2026-08-25T06:04:35Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [APNIC Blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [SANOG](), [Availability]() Tags: [aspa](), [community](), [deployment](), [development](), [event](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [ipv4](), [ipv6](), [network](), [networks](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [sanog](), [south-asia](), [subregional-forum](), [training]() ### AI overview The South Asia APNIC Sub-Regional Forum, held alongside SANOG 44 in Kathmandu, brought together more than 100 Members and regional Internet stakeholders. Discussions emphasized IPv6 deployment, routing security using RPKI, ROV, and ASPA, Internet resource and registry management, policy participation, automation, IPv4 availability, and practical technical training. ### Source excerpt More than 100 APNIC Members attended the South Asia APNIC Sub-Regional Forum alongside SANOG 44 in Kathmandu. Member feedback gathered during the event will help inform APNIC's future priorities across the region. ## BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234 DevFeed: [BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Mingwei Zhang Published: 2026-08-18T15:21:32Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Cloudflare Blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Networks](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Cloudflare](), [Monitoring]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [cloudflare](), [internet](), [monitoring](), [network](), [networks](), [research](), [router](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article examines the adoption of RFC 9234, which uses BGP Roles and the Only to Customer (OTC) attribute to help routers prevent and detect route leaks. Cloudflare measured deployment through its global peering presence and found that two large Tier-1 networks were stripping OTC attributes from forwarded routes. ### Source excerpt RFC 9234 lets routers reject route leaks on their own, using BGP Roles and the Only to Customer attribute. We measured who has deployed it, and found two Tier 1 networks unexpectedly stripping OTC. ## The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker DevFeed: [The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-31T12:17:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [App](), [Cisco](), [MikroTik]() Tags: [application](), [bgp](), [irr](), [j2-networks](), [j2-updates](), [network-engineering-resources](), [network-tools](), [network-troubleshooting](), [prefix-advertisement](), [ripe-ris](), [roa](), [routing](), [routing-policy](), [rpki](), [visibility]() ### AI overview This article describes the J2SW Prefix Advertisement Checker, an application that evaluates an exact IPv4 or IPv6 prefix using live BGP data. It reports observed origin ASNs from RIPE RIS collectors, collector visibility, RPKI/ROA status, and matching IRR route objects, with an optional expected origin ASN for comparison. ### Source excerpt A prefix can appear in the global BGP table and still have a routing problem. The route may originate from the wrong ASN. Its ROA may also authorize a shorter prefix but reject the advertised prefix length. Checking each part normally means pulling data from several routing tools. The J2SW Prefix Advertisement Checker, my 3rd ... Read more The post The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating DevFeed: [Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Antonio Prado Published: 2026-07-21T12:33:47Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [article](), [attacks](), [bgp](), [internet-attacks](), [operational](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview The article argues that RPKI and cryptographic origin validation do not cover every BGP attack. It describes a malformed Prefix-SID incident that caused widespread updates and session resets, then presents a taxonomy of four macro-categories and eight micro-categories for routing attacks and their operational defences. ### Source excerpt RPKI has made real progress against prefix hijacking. But when you map every known class of BGP attack against the defences that exist, four of them turn out to sit entirely outside cryptographic validation: handled with local filters, static thresholds and reactive response. ## Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers? DevFeed: [Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ties Dirksen Published: 2026-07-20T07:57:23Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Server]() Tags: [bgp](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [internet-infrastructure](), [publication](), [research](), [routing](), [rpki](), [servers]() ### AI overview This article investigates the independently operated RPKI publication servers that supplement the Regional Internet Registries and help secure BGP routing. It explains how RPKI and Route Origin Authorisations reduce the risk of accidental or malicious prefix hijacks. ### Source excerpt Who runs the hidden infrastructure behind secure Internet routing? An internship report from SIDN Labs looks beyond the RIRs at the independently operated RPKI publication servers helping to secure BGP. ## This site now runs on Astro, not WordPress DevFeed: [This site now runs on Astro, not WordPress]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Bastiaan Brink Published: 2026-07-19T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [AS215248 - Notes]() Topics: [Astro](), [WordPress](), [data](), [Web Development](), [Cloudflare](), [Git]() Tags: [astro](), [cloudflare](), [dns](), [git](), [meta](), [network](), [rpki](), [static](), [static-site](), [tooling](), [website](), [wordpress]() ### AI overview The author explains why as215248.net was rebuilt from WordPress as a static Astro site. The site now generates static HTML without a database, PHP, or admin panel, while scripts fetch live network data from services including Globalping, PeeringDB, RIPEstat, RDAP, the NTP Pool, and Tor Metrics. A Git-based process rebuilds and republishes the site daily behind a Cloudflare Tunnel. ### Source excerpt Why I rebuilt as215248.net as a static site, and what it does now -- a live Looking Glass, auto-synced PeeringDB data, and a world map of presence. ## Many Sovereignties, One Internet DevFeed: [Many Sovereignties, One Internet]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Hisham Ibrahim Published: 2026-07-15T07:09:49Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [digital sovereignty](), [interoperability](), [Resilience](), [Internet]() Tags: [bgp](), [digital-sovereignty](), [governance](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [interoperability](), [ipv6](), [policy](), [resilience](), [rpki](), [sovereignty-and-the-commons](), [standards]() ### AI overview The article proposes a "commons test" for evaluating digital sovereignty policies. It distinguishes strategies that expand choice, preserve interoperability, strengthen resilience and support participation from those that create dependencies and chokepoints. It argues that the Internet's technical coordination core should remain globally interoperable and should not be repurposed for broader national policy or political control. ### Source excerpt Digital sovereignty is not simply good or bad. The commons test offers a practical framework for assessing whether different strategies expand choice, preserve interoperability, strengthen resilience and support meaningful participation, or create new dependencies and chokepoints. ## Sentinelle, un outil pour analyser le routage de votre rĂ©seau DevFeed: [Sentinelle, un outil pour analyser le routage de votre rĂ©seau]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: fr Sources: [Blog de StĂ©phane Bortzmeyer]() Topics: [BGP](), [configuration]() Tags: [article](), [bgp](), [blog](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article reviews Sentinelle, a tool that analyzes an autonomous system's BGP routing configuration and security, including RPKI protection. It demonstrates the tool with several AS examples and briefly describes features available in its free and paid offerings. ### Source excerpt Vous gĂ©rez un AS ou, tout simplement, vous ĂȘtes curieux du routage d'un rĂ©seau que vous utilisez ? Il existe plusieurs outils d'analyse de la configuration et de la sĂ©curitĂ© du routage, aujourd'hui, voyons un des plus rĂ©cents, Sentinelle (https://sentinelle-routage.fr/). ## Telegram prefixes hijack by Rcom AS18101 DevFeed: [Telegram prefixes hijack by Rcom AS18101]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-06-16T19:44:03Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)]() Tags: [airtel](), [as15412](), [as18101](), [as4755](), [bgp](), [india](), [outage](), [rcom](), [ripe-ris](), [routers](), [routing](), [rpki](), [telegram](), [traffic]() ### AI overview The article examines Rcom AS18101's apparent BGP hijacking of Telegram prefixes during Telegram's blocking in India. It confirms that Rcom originated at least one Telegram prefix and argues that the incident was more likely an accidental configuration error than intentional sabotage, while noting that the impact varied by upstream connectivity. ### Source excerpt The last few hours were quite noisy with a lot of discussion around Telegram block and Rcom's hijack of Telegram prefixes. For those who may not know, Telegram has been blocked in India till 22 June 2026 (news here). The justification has been to avoid paper leak over the telegram. Anyways, I am not going into whether the block is good or bad as it can be part of an endless discussion depending on how one views it. Maybe some separate time but let's look at the BGP routing side of things. ISPs went for blocking it in all possible ways - from the usual DNS layer to block resolution of Telegram to also blackhole its prefixes. Telegram is a special case as they have their own ASN, IP prefixes etc making it easy to block them at the routing layer directly. I saw this on Airtel, where traffic seems to be dropping at their routers. mtr -wby0 -4 web.telegram.org Start: 2026-06-17T01:20:46+0530 HOST: desktop Loss% Snt Last Avg Best Wrst StDev 1. AS??? _gateway (172.16.0.1) 0.0% 10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 2. AS??? 10.240.9.204 0.0% 10 4.6 7.4 4.2 25.7 6.5 3. AS??? 172.31.0.154 0.0% 10 8.1 13.5 6.4 26.4 6.2 4. AS9498 169.168.18.125.dhcp.anaronline.net (125.18.168.169) 0.0% 10 5.2 6.8 4.9 13.6 2.6 5. AS??? ??? 100.0 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 At 11:58 PM - Telegram CEO Pavel Durov tweeted and accused Reliance (technically Rcom and not Jio) for outage of Telegram outside of India by BGP hijacking. Indian telecom Reliance is sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users OUTSIDE India (including the UAE) via a rogue method called BGP hijacking. The sabotage seems intentional, as Reliance has ignored multiple reports. This may be part of a competitive war, as... -- Pavel Durov (@durov) June 16, 2026 Technically it's true that Rcom AS18101 has hijacked Telegram's prefixes. Take e.g 91.105.192.0/23 - AS18101 started originating this prefix at 16:14:19 GMT / 21:44:19 IST on 16 June as visible from many RIPE RIS collectors including RIPE RIS RRC01 in London. It's bad and they should not ha ## Reaching 90+ internet exchanges as a one-person network DevFeed: [Reaching 90+ internet exchanges as a one-person network]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Bastiaan Brink Published: 2026-05-24T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [AS215248 - Notes]() Topics: [Internet](), [Network](), [Hardware]() Tags: [bgp](), [hardware](), [hobby](), [internet](), [ipv6](), [irr](), [network](), [operator](), [peering](), [personal](), [remote-peering](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article explains how the one-person network AS215248 participates in more than 90 internet exchanges across two dozen countries using hardware in Amsterdam and remote peering. It describes an open peering policy, IPv6 support, and route validation with RPKI and IRR. ### Source excerpt A hobby AS doesn't need a rack in every city. A little hardware in Amsterdam plus remote peering goes a surprisingly long way. ## Hedge 306: RPKI Transport DevFeed: [Hedge 306: RPKI Transport]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-05-22T15:33:40Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [BGP](), [Security](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Internet](), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)]() Tags: [audio](), [bgp](), [hedge](), [ietf](), [internet](), [protocol](), [rpki](), [security]() ### AI overview This podcast discusses ERIK, a protocol developed to synchronize RPKI records used to provide security information for BGP across the Internet. Job Snijders joins Tom and Russ to explain the protocol and its requirements. ### Source excerpt Synchronizing information across the Internet, at an initial glance, looks like a fairly simple problem to solve. Just copy a file to a host and create a magic protocol, right? Not really. Each kind of data has a fairly unique set of requirements--and RPKI data, used to provide security information for BGP, is no different. Job Snijders joins Tom and Russ to talk about ERIK, a protocol developed to synchronize RPKI records. ## How Internet Exchange Route Servers Simplify BGP Peering and Improve Route Security DevFeed: [How Internet Exchange Route Servers Simplify BGP Peering and Improve Route Security]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2026-03-12T11:32:39Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Network](), [Security]() Tags: [bgp](), [internet-exchange](), [network](), [routing](), [rov](), [rpki](), [security]() ### AI overview This article explains how internet exchange route servers simplify BGP peering by distributing routes among exchange members over a shared LAN. It also discusses their route-security practices, including IRR filtering, RPKI route-origin validation, Peerlock, next-hop checking, and AS_PATH validation. ### Source excerpt How far can you go with IX Route Servers only? On paper internet exchanges (IX) are very simple in their implementation, simply put together a bunch of routers on a shared layer 2 ethernet switch ## SwiNOG 40: When a Routing Control Functions Is Too Fresh DevFeed: [SwiNOG 40: When a Routing Control Functions Is Too Fresh]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-09-17T05:33:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [Integration testing](), [bug](), [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Network]() Tags: [bgp](), [bug](), [integration](), [integration-testing](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [video]() ### AI overview The article highlights a bug encountered during integration testing of network devices: applying a newly defined Routing Control Function to BGP routing updates in the same Arista EOS configuration session can produce unexpected behavior. The related SwiNOG 40 video presentation notes that the bug has since been fixed. ### Source excerpt During integration testing, I find unexpected quirks in network devices way too often. However, that's infinitely better than experiencing them in production (even after thoroughly testing stuff) while discovering that your peers don't care about routing security, RPKI, and similar useless stuff. For example, what happens if you define a new Routing Control Function (RFC) on Arista EOS and apply it to BGP routing updates in the same configuration session? You'll find out in the Sorry We Messed Up (video) presentation Stefan Funke had at SwiNOG 40 (note: the bug has been fixed in the meantime). ## How Invalid RPKI ROAs Disrupted Orange Spain's Internet Connectivity DevFeed: [How Invalid RPKI ROAs Disrupted Orange Spain's Internet Connectivity]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2024-03-21T16:31:30Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security](), [BGP](), [incident]() Tags: [bgp](), [connectivity](), [incident](), [outage](), [routing-security](), [rov](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview This case study examines how a malicious actor used credentials exposed on the public internet to create invalid RPKI ROAs for Orange Spain. The resulting route-origin validation effects made many websites unreachable for an estimated 9 million-plus customers for three to four hours, and the article analyzes network visibility during the incident. ### Source excerpt Signed but not secure At the start of the year a very interesting (and some would say inevitable) event happened involving internet routing security, the first case study of a large-scale victim o ## Applying BGP Policy Templates DevFeed: [Applying BGP Policy Templates]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-02-20T06:25:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Cisco]() Tags: [bgp](), [cisco](), [policy](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article discusses when to apply BGP route maps through peer, session, or policy templates versus directly to individual neighbors. It recommends shared templates for common parameters and neighbor-specific configuration for route manipulation, with different considerations for IBGP and EBGP. ### Source excerpt I got this question after publishing the BGP Session Templates lab exercise: Would you apply BGP route maps with a peer/policy template or directly to a BGP neighbor? Of course, it depends; however, I believe in using a template for neighbors with the same general parameters and being more specific per neighbor when it comes to route manipulation. As my reader already pointed out, the correct answer is It Depends, now let's dig into the details ;) Read more ... ## The year of RPKI on the control plane DevFeed: [The year of RPKI on the control plane]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk Published: 2019-09-09T12:38:20Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [benjojo blog]() Topics: [control-plane](), [networking](), [BGP](), [Networks]() Tags: [bgp](), [control-plane](), [networks](), [routing](), [rpki]() ### AI overview A textual version of a 2019 NLNOG talk examines RPKI adoption and route validation on the control plane. It discusses traffic analysis of RPKI-invalid prefixes, BGP hijacks, and RPKI's limitation in validating every AS path participant. ### Source excerpt The year of RPKI on the control plane This post is a textual version of the talk I gave at NLNOG 2019, You can watch the recording of the talk on youtube below if that's your preferred medium: