# secrets Published articles for secrets. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Running OpenBao on Kubernetes with a CloudNativePG PostgreSQL backend DevFeed: [Running OpenBao on Kubernetes with a CloudNativePG PostgreSQL backend]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Gabriele Bartolini (EnterpriseDB) and CNCF Ambassador, Rob Kenefeck (ControlPlane) Published: 2026-09-16T11:30:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Cloud Native Computing Foundation]() Topics: [CloudNativePG](), [Kubernetes](), [PostgreSQL](), [Open Source](), [vendor lock-in]() Tags: [blog](), [cloudnativepg](), [docker](), [hashicorp-vault](), [helm](), [infrastructure](), [kubernetes](), [linux-foundation](), [open-source](), [postgresql](), [secrets](), [vendor-lock-in]() ### AI overview A tutorial describes deploying OpenBao on Kubernetes with a three-instance CloudNativePG PostgreSQL cluster as its storage backend. It explains certificate-based authentication and a local Kind-based test environment. ### Source excerpt Managing infrastructure secrets on Kubernetes needs a backend that is self-healing and free of vendor lock-in, and that is exactly what OpenBao (the Linux Foundation's open-source fork of HashiCorp Vault) and CloudNativePG give you: an entirely... ## A Threat Hunter's Guide to Detecting Malicious Activity in GitHub Audit Logs DevFeed: [A Threat Hunter's Guide to Detecting Malicious Activity in GitHub Audit Logs]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Julie Agnes Sparks, Juvenal Araujo Published: 2026-09-16T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Datadog Security Labs]() Topics: [GitHub](), [Threat Hunting & Intel](), [Security](), [Logging](), [Authentication](), [personal access token]() Tags: [authentication](), [github](), [logging](), [oauth](), [personal-access-token](), [secrets](), [security](), [security-research]() ### AI overview This article examines threats targeting GitHub organizations, including compromised accounts, personal access tokens, OAuth tokens, leaked secrets, phishing, and malicious extensions or OAuth apps. It describes GitHub audit-log queries and behaviors that can help detect account compromise, reconnaissance, and source-code exfiltration. ### Source excerpt In this post, we walk through different threats to GitHub and how to detect them. ## How to Build an Endpoint Data Loss Prevention Strategy for Your Development Team DevFeed: [How to Build an Endpoint Data Loss Prevention Strategy for Your Development Team]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Alex Tray Published: 2026-09-15T21:03:09Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More]() Topics: [data loss prevention](), [Development](), [Access Control](), [data]() Tags: [access-control](), [cybersecurity](), [cybersecurityawareness](), [data-loss-prevention](), [data-protection](), [database](), [development](), [encryption](), [endpoint-security](), [hardcoded-credentials](), [it-security](), [net-conf](), [remote-access](), [secrets](), [sensitive-data](), [web-development]() ### AI overview A tutorial for development teams on building endpoint data loss prevention strategies. It covers auditing laptops for secrets and sensitive data, removing unnecessary copies, rotating exposed credentials, and establishing access controls. ### Source excerpt A developer's laptop holds more sensitive data than most people realize: API keys, database credentials, staging environment secrets, and sometimes entire copies of production data pulled down "just f ## \[Crypto\] Time-based one-time password (TOTP) for 2FA, part II: YubiKey DevFeed: [\[Crypto\] Time-based one-time password (TOTP) for 2FA, part II: YubiKey]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-13T22:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Dennis Yurichev]() Topics: [passwords](), [Command-line interface](), [Code](), [Linux](), [Android](), [USB]() Tags: [android](), [code](), [command-line](), [linux](), [password](), [secrets](), [usb]() ### AI overview The article examines using a YubiKey to store TOTP secrets for two-factor authentication. It explains that HMAC keys are intended to remain inside the device, but describes a Linux ykman weakness that could allow an attacker with temporary physical access to generate future TOTP keys and potentially log in during the relevant 30-second interval if the account password is also known. ### Source excerpt [Crypto] Time-based one-time password (TOTP) for 2FA, part II: YubiKey ## The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE DevFeed: [The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Eviatar Garzi Published: 2026-09-10T10:00:43Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Unit 42]() Topics: [Kubernetes]() Tags: [api](), [containers](), [cryptographic](), [identity](), [json](), [kubernetes](), [linux](), [malware](), [node](), [open-source](), [research](), [secrets](), [spiffe](), [spire](), [spoof](), [spoofing](), [threat-research](), [tool]() ### AI overview Research on a post-exploitation technique in which root access to a Kubernetes node can let an attacker spoof cgroup metadata used by SPIRE workload attestation, impersonate co-located workloads, and obtain SVIDs. ### Source excerpt Learn how root access on a compromised K8s node allows attackers to utilize SPIFFE/SPIRE metadata to spoof and harvest co-located workload identities. The post The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE appeared first on Unit 42. ## Is prevention essentially a solved problem? DevFeed: [Is prevention essentially a solved problem?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ezra Tanzer Published: 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [AI Development](), [Vulnerabilities](), [Architecture & Design](), [Code]() Tags: [agent](), [agentic](), [ai](), [application-security](), [awareness](), [blog](), [code](), [code-security](), [cost](), [developer](), [devops](), [devsecops](), [secrets](), [security](), [snyk-code](), [snyk-open-source](), [snyk-platform](), [vulnerabilities](), [vulnerability-insights]() ### AI overview The article argues that preventing vulnerabilities in agent-generated code is architecturally understood, but organizations must apply the appropriate controls throughout a changing development lifecycle. It says prompts can influence code but cannot reliably constrain agents, and that earlier security intervention reduces model-token cost, human attention, and the risk of an incorrect fix. ### Source excerpt Prevention in agent-generated code is architecturally solved--but choosing controls that protect security without slowing development remains the challenge. ## 6 Benefits of Sandbox Environments (and How Docker Sandboxes Delivers Them) DevFeed: [6 Benefits of Sandbox Environments (and How Docker Sandboxes Delivers Them)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Kevin Wittek Published: 2026-09-08T23:05:55Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Docker]() Topics: [Docker](), [Authorization]() Tags: [agentic-ai](), [ai-agents](), [ai-ml](), [autonomous](), [concepts](), [docker-ai-governance](), [docker-sandboxes](), [linux](), [policy](), [products](), [sandbox](), [secrets]() ### AI overview The article explains how Docker Sandboxes isolate untrusted code and autonomous AI agents from host machines and external systems. It highlights runtime policy controls, credential handling, disposability, and microVM-based isolation. ### Source excerpt Learn about the key benefits of sandbox environments with Docker including isolation, definable controls, secrets credential handling, and more. ## YOLO Mode: Agent Autonomy Without the Guardrails DevFeed: [YOLO Mode: Agent Autonomy Without the Guardrails]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Srini Sekaran Published: 2026-09-03T18:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Docker]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [Authorization](), [Command-line interface](), [cursor](), [GitHub Copilot CLI](), [Claude]() Tags: [agentic-ai](), [ai-agent](), [cli](), [concepts](), [cursor](), [docker-ai-governance](), [docker-sandboxes](), [products](), [sandbox](), [secrets](), [security]() ### AI overview The article defines YOLO mode as allowing AI coding agents to auto-approve actions without confirmation prompts. It argues that the key risk depends on the execution environment and recommends isolated, disposable sandboxes with scoped access and no real secrets. ### Source excerpt YOLO mode lets an AI agent run without asking permission. Learn what it is, why it's risky, and how to run it safely. ## One environment variable, and Claude Code is suddenly accountable DevFeed: [One environment variable, and Claude Code is suddenly accountable]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Hal Tyk's tutorial bot Published: 2026-09-02T10:38:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Tyk API Management]() Topics: [Claude Code](), [anthropic](), [API](), [configuration](), [Tutorial]() Tags: [ai-gateway](), [ai-studio](), [anthropic](), [api](), [api-management](), [api-platform-teams](), [article](), [claude-code](), [configuration](), [llm-governance](), [llm-observability](), [secrets](), [tutorial]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how to route Claude Code through Tyk AI Studio's Anthropic-compatible endpoint using one environment variable. It describes centralized provider configuration, monthly budgets, gateway enforcement, model allowlists, masked credentials, and secret references for controlled and attributable Anthropic usage. ### Source excerpt Hello. I'm Hal, Tyk's tutorial bot, and today I have been handed something slightly unusual: an article in which the thing being governed is very probably the thing you are using right now. Claude Code. Somebody on your team is running it. Possibly everybody is. It is excellent, it is fast, and from where your [...] The post One environment variable, and Claude Code is suddenly accountable appeared first on Tyk API Management. ## An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation DevFeed: [An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Renzon Cruz, Nicolas Bareil, Eric Semaan and Omar Jbari Published: 2026-09-02T10:00:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Unit 42]() Topics: [Security Attacks](), [Large Language Model](), [CI/CD]() Tags: [agentic](), [agentic-ai](), [ai](), [ai-agents](), [attacks](), [autonomous](), [breach](), [ci-cd](), [enterprise](), [frontier-ai](), [general](), [insights](), [llm](), [secrets](), [security](), [threat-research]() ### AI overview An investigation of a ransom attack in which a human attacker used AI agents and frontier models to automate intrusion, reconnaissance, credential theft, and CI/CD pipeline abuse against an enterprise network. ### Source excerpt Using autonomous AI agents, an attacker breached an enterprise network in a matter of hours. Understand how to address and defend against agentic attacks. The post An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation appeared first on Unit 42. ## Nobody Should Be Sharing Your OpenAI Key DevFeed: [Nobody Should Be Sharing Your OpenAI Key]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Hal Tyk's tutorial bot Published: 2026-09-02T08:35:50Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Tyk API Management]() Topics: [OpenAI](), [Large Language Model](), [Tutorial](), [API]() Tags: [ai](), [ai-gateway](), [ai-studio](), [anthropic](), [api](), [api-management](), [api-platform-teams](), [developer](), [gpt](), [large-language-model](), [llm](), [llm-governance](), [models](), [openai](), [secrets](), [tutorial]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how an organization can register OpenAI as a provider in Tyk, expose it through a portal and gateway, keep the provider key hidden from developers, optionally reference the key through Secrets, and restrict permitted models with a regular-expression pattern such as gpt-5.*. It also describes provider privacy levels, catalogs, budgets, and model access controls. ### Source excerpt Hello. I'm Hal, Tyk's tutorial bot, and I have been given the considerable privilege of explaining how a large language model gets from "we have an account with OpenAI" to "a developer is shipping with it, inside a budget, and has never seen the key". It is a shorter journey than you might expect. It [...] The post Nobody Should Be Sharing Your OpenAI Key appeared first on Tyk API Management. ## Workload identity trust policies govern CI/CD access to production cloud resources DevFeed: [Workload identity trust policies govern CI/CD access to production cloud resources]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: WorkOS Published: 2026-09-02T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [WorkOS Blog]() Topics: [OpenID connect (OIDC)](), [CI/CD](), [GitHub Actions](), [GitHub](), [Cloud](), [Amazon Web Services]() Tags: [aws](), [ci-cd](), [github](), [identity](), [oidc](), [policy](), [production](), [secrets](), [trust]() ### AI overview This article explains that workload identities used by service principals and CI/CD federation can evade human-focused access reviews. It argues that OIDC trust policies are the key boundary controlling which federated jobs can obtain short-lived cloud access tokens and reach production resources. ### Source excerpt Service principals and CI/CD federation skip the access reviews that catch humans. The OIDC trust policy string is what actually decides who reaches production. ## Provision a secure Amazon DocumentDB cluster with Terraform DevFeed: [Provision a secure Amazon DocumentDB cluster with Terraform]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Sourav Kundu Published: 2026-08-31T20:24:23Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [AWS Database Blog]() Topics: [Amazon DocumentDB](), [iac-security](), [Cryptography](), [passwords]() Tags: [advanced-300](), [amazon-cloudwatch](), [amazon-documentdb](), [amazon-vpc](), [authentication](), [encryption](), [infrastructure-as-code](), [monitoring](), [secrets](), [technical-how-to](), [terraform]() ### AI overview A walkthrough for provisioning a secure Amazon DocumentDB 8.0 cluster with Terraform. It applies infrastructure-as-code security controls including private VPC subnets, TLS, KMS encryption, secrets-managed passwords, security groups, and encrypted monitoring logs. ### Source excerpt Learn how to provision a secure Amazon DocumentDB cluster using Terraform. This post applies infrastructure-as-code best practices with encryption, AWS Secrets Manager authentication, network isolation, and encrypted monitoring. ## Need to know: How Webflow keeps secrets out of agent context DevFeed: [Need to know: How Webflow keeps secrets out of agent context]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Webflow Security Team Published: 2026-08-28T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Webflow Blog]() Topics: [AI Agent](), [ai-coding](), [Security](), [Command-line interface](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Open Source](), [Amazon Web Services]() Tags: [agent](), [ai](), [ai-agent](), [ai-coding](), [aws](), [cli](), [context-window](), [open-source](), [secrets](), [security]() ### AI overview Webflow describes how an AI coding agent exposed a live AWS session token during debugging and presents ctxcop, an open source CLI that removes secrets from agent context before they reach the model. The article argues for embedding security guardrails into AI coding workflows rather than banning the tools. ### Source excerpt An AI agent nearly leaked an AWS token during a debug session. Webflow built ctxcop, an open source CLI that strips secrets before the model sees them. ## ICYMI: July 2026 @AWS Security DevFeed: [ICYMI: July 2026 @AWS Security]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Rodolfo Brenes Published: 2026-08-26T19:32:55Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [AWS Security Blog]() Topics: [Application Security](), [AI-assisted coding](), [AWS IAM]() Tags: [ai-agent](), [ai-coding](), [ai-security](), [amazon-bedrock](), [announcements](), [aws](), [compliance](), [ddos](), [firewall](), [foundational-100](), [iam](), [secrets](), [security](), [security-blog](), [security-identity-compliance]() ### AI overview A July 2026 AWS Security roundup covering AI-agent security, data protection, supply-chain protection, firewall automation, DDoS mitigation, and compliance readiness. ### Source excerpt If you found time for a bit of vacation this summer, you might be in catch-up mode. Here's a list to help: all the expert blog posts, new service capabilities, code samples, and workshops, in case you missed it, from July 2026. AWS Security Blog post This month's AWS Security Blog posts covered AI agent [...] ## Introducing Run SDK: secure eval for your agents DevFeed: [Introducing Run SDK: secure eval for your agents]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Aayush Kapoor Published: 2026-08-25T04:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [AI Bots]() Tags: [agents](), [ai](), [authentication](), [javascript](), [node-js](), [sandbox](), [secrets](), [tools](), [typescript]() ### AI overview Vercel releases the Run SDK for executing untrusted JavaScript and TypeScript in an isolated QuickJS worker context. Applications expose selected host functions while keeping credentials and service clients outside the sandbox, and can pause execution for authentication or human approval before resuming work. ### Source excerpt Agents increasingly write TypeScript programs to coordinate tools and process their results. Once those programs touch real applications, some steps require authentication, while others need human approval. Executing that code with eval gives it the same access as the application around it, including its secrets and internal services, and leaves no durable way to pause at those boundaries. Today, we're releasing the Run SDK, a package for executing untrusted JavaScript and TypeScript without giving it direct access to your application or system. Applications expose narrow host functions and can interrupt execution for authentication or human-in-the-loop approval. The program resumes after a decision without repeating completed work. A small interface to the host The Run SDK evaluates JavaScript or type-stripped TypeScript in a fresh QuickJS context inside a worker thread, with no direct route to Node.js or the network. The application exposes selected operations through hostFunctions. These are regular functions that become callable globals inside the sandbox: Here, the generated program knows about store.listOrders(). The database client and its credentials remain in the application. Calls cross the sandbox boundary through serialization. A host function may return a promise, so existing service clients can sit behind this interface without being passed into the sandbox. You can try this in the playground. Code you run there can only reach the host functions on the page. Code mode in practice The Run SDK is the internal module powering code mode tool execution in the AI SDK. Giving an agent a program changes the unit of work. One model response can describe the calls and the logic connecting them: The two requests happen concurrently, and invoice filtering stays local to the program. Only the useful result returns to the application. This is a good fit for agents that work across several internal services. A research agent can combine search results before answerin ## Vercel Connect is now generally available DevFeed: [Vercel Connect is now generally available]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dima Voytenko Published: 2026-08-25T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [SDKs](), [vercel ai sdk]() Tags: [agent](), [agents](), [ai](), [auth](), [authentication](), [cli](), [deployment](), [mcp](), [oauth](), [observability](), [secrets](), [slack](), [vercel]() ### AI overview Vercel Connect is generally available, providing runtime-scoped tokens, OIDC-based deployment authentication, connector management, and access controls without storing long-lived provider secrets. ### Source excerpt Vercel Connect is now generally available on all plans and in v0. Instead of storing long-lived provider secrets, your code requests short-lived, scoped tokens at runtime. Deployments authenticate with their existing Vercel OIDC identity. Each token is scoped to the task, refreshed automatically, and expires on its own. Any service with one command Register a connector once from the CLI. Pass the service name and the CLI pre-populates the brand name, icon, auth type, and MCP or discovery URL, then prompts for any credentials the service requires: Connect ships with 100+ preset connectors for tools like Notion and Workday, managed connectors for Slack, GitHub, Linear, Salesforce, Snowflake, and Microsoft, plus generic OAuth, API key authentication, and MCP servers. Tokens at runtime, not secrets at rest Request a token only when your code needs one, with getToken: Switch the subject from the app to a named user and the token acts on that user's behalf, triggering the authorization flow when consent is needed. Access your team can inspect and prove New at GA: Fine-grained RBAC controls who can create and manage connectors Audit logs record authorization and connector activity Token and trigger observability shows how tokens are used across projects Together with per-environment attachment, including Custom Environments, and one-command revocation, external access becomes something your team can inspect, prove, and cut off in seconds. Triggers without stored webhook secrets Triggers deliver provider events to your app without a stored secret. Vercel Connect verifies signatures server-side, re-attests each event using an OIDC identity, and forwards the event to your project, even when Deployment Protection is enabled. Connect also manages private keys and the full credential lifecycle, so you get standards-compliant OAuth without building the infrastructure yourself. Works with your stack Connect works wherever your functions run and is supported in v0, eve, and Chat SD ## How Postman Passport keeps API secrets inside your network DevFeed: [How Postman Passport keeps API secrets inside your network]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Talia Kohan Published: 2026-08-24T16:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Postman Blog]() Topics: [API](), [Postman](), [API keys](), [Security](), [Architecture & Design](), [Network]() Tags: [api](), [api-keys](), [api-security](), [architecture](), [general](), [network](), [postman-passport](), [secret-store](), [secrets](), [secrets-management](), [security](), [token]() ### AI overview Postman Passport keeps real API secrets inside an organization's network by issuing credential references instead of exposing underlying keys. An internal proxy resolves the references, injects the credentials, and forwards requests while cryptographically binding references to their authorized holders. ### Source excerpt Postman Passport grants API access using credential references, keeping the real secret inside your network. Here's how the architecture works. The post How Postman Passport keeps API secrets inside your network appeared first on Postman Blog. ## Connect v0 apps to Slack, Google, and 100+ other services DevFeed: [Connect v0 apps to Slack, Google, and 100+ other services]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Vishal Yathish Published: 2026-08-24T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [Vercel](), [Slack](), [Google](), [GitHub](), [Notion](), [dashboards](), [Playwright]() Tags: [agent](), [apps](), [browser](), [connectors](), [github](), [google](), [secrets](), [slack](), [tokens](), [vercel](), [voice]() ### AI overview Vercel Connect lets apps and agents built in v0 securely connect to more than 100 services, including Slack, Google, Notion, GitHub, and Salesforce. It provides guided connector setup, reusable team configuration, managed app registration for some services, and short-lived runtime tokens. Examples include a voice-controlled browser agent that generates Playwright code and a dashboard combining Slack, Gmail, and Linear information. ### Source excerpt Apps and agents built in v0 can now securely connect to more than 100 services, including Slack, Google, Notion, GitHub, and Salesforce, through Vercel Connect. Ask v0 to connect your app to a service. It opens the connector setup and guides you through it. You set up each connector once for your team, then reuse it across apps. For managed connectors like Slack and GitHub, Vercel handles app registration, so you don't need to create or configure an app with the provider. For other services, you can provide your own credentials. In both cases, Vercel Connect issues short-lived tokens at runtime, so your application doesn't need to store or rotate long-lived secrets. Using v0 and Vercel Connect, Danny from KERNEL built a voice-controlled browser agent that generates Playwright code to operate a real browser. We built a personal dashboard that brings Slack messages, Gmail, and Linear issues into one view and summarizes what needs attention. Read the documentation or try it yourself in v0: Read more ## Environment variables now use Config and Secret types DevFeed: [Environment variables now use Config and Secret types]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Brooke Mosby Published: 2026-08-24T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [configuration](), [Vercel](), [Security](), [Command-line interface](), [API keys](), [passwords]() Tags: [config](), [development](), [documentation](), [passwords](), [policy](), [secrets](), [security](), [tokens](), [vercel]() ### AI overview Vercel now uses Config and Secret types for environment variables instead of the Sensitive toggle. Config values remain readable to authorized members, while Secret values remain available to deployments but cannot be viewed or retrieved after saving. The update also introduces a policy for separating Production secret values and adds CLI support through visibility settings. ### Source excerpt When you add or edit an environment variable in Vercel, you now choose Config or Secret instead of using the Sensitive toggle. Existing variables marked Sensitive are automatically treated as Secrets and continue to work without migration. Config: The value remains readable after saving for members with access. Use Config for non-sensitive values you may need to inspect later, such as variables with a public framework prefix. Secret: The value remains available to your deployments and can be replaced, but members cannot view or retrieve it after saving. Use Secret for passwords, API keys, and tokens. You can select an environment or Preview branch for each value. The environment variable list in the dashboard shows each variable's type and where it applies. Team policy changes The Enforce Sensitive Environment Variables team policy is deprecated with this update. When enabled, it required every environment variable created by a team member to be Sensitive, including non-sensitive configuration. With Config and Secret types, members can choose the appropriate type for each variable. A new Separate Production Secret Values policy is available in your Security settings. When enabled, the Production value for a Secret must differ from the values used for the same key in Preview, Development, and custom environments. If your team had the legacy policy enabled, confirm whether the Separate Production Secret Values policy should be enabled for your team. The deprecated policy is no longer enforced by the Vercel CLI. Set variable types from the CLI To choose whether an environment variable is a Config or Secret from the CLI, pass --visibility config or --visibility secret to vercel env add or vercel env update: The existing flags continue to work. When --visibility is omitted, --no-sensitive maps to Config and --sensitive maps to Secret. After adding or updating a variable, the CLI output shows its type under Visibility. Learn more in the Environment Variables documentation ## How v0 authenticates to Snowflake without exposing the user's OAuth token DevFeed: [How v0 authenticates to Snowflake without exposing the user's OAuth token]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Nicolás Montone Published: 2026-08-20T04:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [AI-assisted coding](), [AI Chat]() Tags: [ai](), [api](), [app](), [applications](), [firewall](), [oauth](), [sandbox](), [sandboxes](), [secrets](), [tls](), [vercel]() ### AI overview The article explains how v0 lets AI-generated applications access Snowflake through a proxy without exposing a user's OAuth token to unreviewed generated code. ### Source excerpt AI-generated applications often need to authenticate to external services on behalf of their users. That creates a problem: generated code shouldn't have access to the user's credentials. We faced that decision when building the v0 Snowflake integration. It lets users connect Snowflake, inspect schemas, query data, and generate applications that run against their warehouses. That generated code has to authenticate to Snowflake, but it is written by a model and runs without human review, and prompt injection can steer it into exfiltrating whatever it can read, so the user's OAuth token should never enter the environment the code runs in. We solved this with a Snowflake request proxy for v0 sandboxes, built on the Vercel Sandbox firewall. The sandbox can run normal Snowflake clients, but the real credential is resolved at request time in a server proxy outside the sandbox runtime. This lets existing Snowflake clients work inside the sandbox without exposing the user's credential to generated code. The harder problem was deciding where the proxy could safely inject the credential. The obvious implementation, replacing a placeholder token wherever it appears, introduces another credential leak. Isolation doesn't protect secrets v0 runs generated applications in isolated sandboxes. Isolation protects the rest of the system from untrusted code, but it doesn't protect secrets inside the sandbox. If a generated app can read a token from the filesystem, that token can be copied into logs, returned in an API response, embedded into generated client code, or sent to another host. Sandbox isolation limits what the application can access, but it does not help once the credential itself is available inside the sandbox. For Snowflake, the credential represents the Snowflake role the user connected with. v0 should be able to help the user explore and build with data they are authorized to access, but generated code should not receive raw provider credentials just because it needs o ## GitLab 19.3 released DevFeed: [GitLab 19.3 released]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: GitLab Published: 2026-08-20T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [GitLab]() Topics: [GitLab](), [Release notes](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [CI/CD](), [YAML](), [audit trail](), [Authorization](), [Command-line interface]() Tags: [agent](), [ai](), [audit-trail](), [ci-cd](), [command-line](), [release](), [release-notes](), [secrets]() ### AI overview GitLab 19.3 release notes describe the Flow Creator foundational agent, which generates runnable flow YAML through plain-language conversation and can help debug flows and explain framework concepts. The release also introduces GitLab Secrets Manager in Limited Availability on GitLab.com, with scoped credentials, existing permission integration, and audit-trail logging. ### Source excerpt GitLab 19.3 released with Flow Creator foundational agent ## Vercel Connect now supports Microsoft DevFeed: [Vercel Connect now supports Microsoft]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ben Sabic Published: 2026-08-19T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [Vercel](), [Microsoft](), [API](), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](), [SDKs](), [Authorization](), [Command-line interface](), [Deployment]() Tags: [api](), [cli](), [deployment](), [identity](), [microsoft](), [oidc](), [sdk](), [secrets](), [vercel]() ### AI overview Vercel Connect now provides a managed Microsoft connector that lets applications access Microsoft products such as Teams and OneDrive. Vercel handles Entra application registration and federated credentials, while the @vercel/connect SDK uses deployment OIDC identity to obtain scoped, short-lived tokens with application or delegated user permissions. ### Source excerpt Vercel Connect now includes a managed connector for Microsoft, so your apps and agents can access all Microsoft products such as Teams, OneDrive and more. As a Vercel Managed Connector, Vercel registers the Entra application and configures federated credentials for it, so you don't have to create an app registration or manage client secrets yourself. Authorize the app for your Microsoft tenant once, then attach the connector to the projects and environments it needs. Create a connector from the dashboard or the Vercel CLI: With the connector attached, your code requests a token only when it needs one. The @vercel/connect SDK authenticates with your deployment's OIDC identity and returns a short-lived token for the app itself, using the application permissions your admin granted: Each token is scoped to what you request and refreshed automatically, so there's nothing to leak or rotate. To act as a specific person instead, pass that user as the subject and the token carries their delegated permissions: Read the Vercel Connect docs and create a Microsoft connector to get started. Read more ## Implement custom authentication for tools integration using request Lambda interceptor in AgentCore Gateway DevFeed: [Implement custom authentication for tools integration using request Lambda interceptor in AgentCore Gateway]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Nishant Mainro Published: 2026-08-18T20:46:26Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [AWS Security Blog]() Topics: [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore](), [Amazon Bedrock](), [AI Agent](), [Security](), [IAM](), [Model Context Protocol](), [OAuth 2.0](), [Architecture & Design](), [JSON Web Tokens]() Tags: [advanced-300](), [ai-agents](), [amazon-bedrock](), [amazon-bedrock-agentcore](), [artificial-intelligence](), [aws-identity-and-access-management-iam](), [aws-lambda](), [model-context-protocol](), [oauth](), [prompt-injection](), [secrets](), [security](), [security-blog](), [security-identity-compliance](), [technical-how-to]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how to use a request Lambda interceptor in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway to support legacy Basic Authentication for downstream tool APIs. The interceptor retrieves service credentials from AWS Secrets Manager and constructs the authentication header while keeping credentials isolated from the AI agent. The article also describes the inbound MCP request flow and cautions that Basic Auth should be treated as an interim measure, with modernization toward OAuth 2.0, SAML, OpenID Connect, or IAM recommended. ### Source excerpt When deploying AI agents with Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, organizations benefit from built-in modern support for OAuth 2.0, AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), and API key authentication through Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway. However, some enterprise environments still use legacy authentication mechanisms such as HTTP Basic Authentication (Basic Auth) (RFC 7617). The extensible architecture of AgentCore [...] [Next page]()