# side-channel attacks

Published articles for side-channel attacks.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters

DevFeed: [MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mammothdp-private-boosted-decision-trees-ready-for-trusted-hardware-and-leakage-free-hyperparameters-128824.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14317>)

Author: Moritz Kirschte, Thorsten Peinemann, Kari Kostiainen, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi

Published: 2026-11-11T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [decision-trees](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decision-trees.md>), [differential-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/differential-privacy.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [machine-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine-learning.md>), [privacy-filter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy-filter.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [sensitive-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensitive-data.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [tabular-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tabular-data.md>), [trusted-execution-environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trusted-execution-environments.md>)

### AI overview

MammothDP combines a trusted execution environment (TEE) and timing side-channel hardening to protect processing, with differential privacy (DP) to protect released studies on tabular data. It builds on the S-BDT gradient-boosted decision tree learner and is described as provably DP when used within a privacy filter and deployed on a TEE. The abstract highlights two additions: adaptive early stopping chooses the number of trees without extra privacy overhead, and improved rollback protection addresses vulnerability to timing side-channel attacks. These are abstract-level claims; the supplied text gives no experimental results or implementation details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.14317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Data spaces like the European Health Data Space (EHDS) require the protection of sensitive data in studies during the data's processing and the study's release alike. In this work, we investigate how to implement this mandate using established trusted execution environments (TEEs) and timing side-channel hardening to protect the processing even under a compromised server, and the state-of-the-art differential privacy (DP) notion to protect the release of studies on tabular data. This combined setup could seem to complete the picture, but in fact raises unexpected security challenges that we mitigate by introducing MammothDP: a significant milestone towards a holistic machine learning system based on the recent gradient boosted decision tree learner S-BDT that is provably DP if used within a privacy filter, timing side-channel hardened, and deployed on a TEE. To achieve a strong privacy-utility tradeoff, we introduce two novel components: an early stopping criterion that adaptively selects the number of trees without any privacy overhead, and an improved rollback protection that is no longer vulnerable under timing side-channel attacks.

## Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards

DevFeed: [Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/domain-invariant-and-language-model-assisted-acoustic-side-channel-attacks-on-keyboards-128371.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13922>)

Author: Bikrant Bikram Pratap Maurya

Published: 2026-11-11T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [text-generation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/text-generation.md>)

Tags: [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [invariant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/invariant.md>), [keyboards](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keyboards.md>), [language-model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-model.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>)

### AI overview

The abstract claims keyboard keystrokes can be inferred from audio recorded with a commodity microphone, without access to the victim's device, even across unseen keyboards, different users, noisy settings, and compressed transmission. It attributes this broader performance to an acoustic model designed to be domain-invariant, with a language model correcting noisy predictions. The excerpt does not provide methods or measured results to assess the claim.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.13922v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) recover typed text from the sound of keystrokes, using only a commodity microphone and no access to the victim's device. Prior work establishes that such attacks succeed under idealized laboratory conditions - a single keyboard, a fixed microphone, a quiet room, and training and testing on the same device but leaves open the question that matters for security: whether keystroke inference survives the open world of unseen keyboards, diverse users, noisy environments, and compressed transmission channels. The answer developed here is that it does, provided the acoustic model is made explicitly domain-invariant and its noisy predictions are corrected by a language model.

## Practice Makes (Im)Perfect: A Look Back at Benchmarking Practices for Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks

DevFeed: [Practice Makes (Im)Perfect: A Look Back at Benchmarking Practices for Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/practice-makes-im-perfect-a-look-back-at-benchmarking-practices-for-microarchitectural-side-channel-attacks-118676.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03893>)

Author: Iliana Fayolle, Antoine Geimer, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Cl\\'ementine Maurice

Published: 2026-11-05T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [benchmarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarking.md>), [benchmarks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarks.md>), [completeness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/completeness.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [reproducibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reproducibility.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [survey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/survey.md>)

### AI overview

A survey of 83 microarchitectural side-channel attack papers from top-ranked security and architecture conferences (2014-2024) finds an average of 5.72 recurring benchmarking flaws per paper. The 19 flaws affect evaluation completeness, relevance, soundness, and reproducibility, including unfair or missing comparisons, unavailable code or materials, and failure to measure key attack properties. The authors note that inherited benchmarks such as covert-channel bandwidth or key recovery on naive AES and RSA implementations may not assess newer primitives well, while small changes in experimental conditions can alter results. They propose relevant properties for evaluating new attacks and report trends over time and differences between security and architecture conferences.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2609.03893v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Microarchitectural side-channel research has grown at an exceptional pace in recent years, increasing the need for rigorous and meaningful benchmarking. Early attack papers typically relied on indirect proxies, such as covert-channel bandwidth or key-recovery on naive AES and RSA implementations, setting de facto standards that many subsequent works continued to replicate, sometimes by directly comparing against raw numbers from prior work. While these practices offer convenient points of comparison, current benchmarks may not be the most relevant to assess specific properties of new primitives. Even more problematic, microarchitectural attacks are notoriously sensitive to experimental conditions: minimal changes in the target system can significantly alter outcomes and performance. As a result, inadequate evaluation practices undermine reproducibility and cast doubt on the relevance of comparisons, even in top-tier venues where such issues should be identified. This paper tackles the core problem of proper benchmarking for microarchitectural side-channel attacks and examines its broader impact on research quality in the field. We survey 83 attack papers published in top-ranked security and architecture conferences from 2014 to 2024. From this corpus, we identify and define 19 recurrent benchmarking flaws that affect evaluation completeness, relevance, soundness, and reproducibility. These flaws include unfair or absent comparisons, missing code or materials, and the failure to evaluate the key attack properties. On average, each paper exhibits 5.72 such flaws, highlighting how widespread the issue is, even in highly selective venues. Based on our findings, we identify and suggest key properties that are relevant to properly evaluate new attacks. We also highlight trends over time and different practices between security and architecture conferences.

## Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)

DevFeed: [Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech-115787.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://semiengineering.com/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech/>)

Author: Technical Paper Link

Published: 2026-11-03T18:01:10Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Semiconductor Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/semiconductor-engineering.md>)

Topics: [CPU Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cpu-cache.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Chip design](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/chip-design.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [asic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asic.md>), [cache-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache-security.md>), [fpga](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fpga.md>), [georgia-tech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/georgia-tech.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [last-level-cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/last-level-cache.md>), [max-planck-institute-for-security-and-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/max-planck-institute-for-security-and-privacy.md>), [microarchitecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microarchitecture.md>), [processor-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processor-architecture.md>), [randomized-caches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/randomized-caches.md>), [risc-v](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risc-v.md>), [ruhr-university-bochum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ruhr-university-bochum.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [spec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spec.md>), [technical-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-papers.md>)

### AI overview

The researchers implemented CEASER-S, ScatterCache, SassCache, and MIRAGE as last-level caches in a multicore, out-of-order RISC-V system-on-chip to examine practical hardware challenges that architectural descriptions leave unexplored. They report common and design-specific implementation challenges and practical solutions. Their complete FPGA implementations were evaluated by running SPEC CPU 2017 rate and GAPBS workloads to completion, providing, to their knowledge, the first comparative evaluation of these designs on a shared full-system hardware platform. The excerpt does not give the designs' specific overheads, limitations, or comparative results.

### Source excerpt

Researchers at Ruhr University Bochum, the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, and Georgia Tech published "Randomized Caches in Hardware: Challenges and Trade-offs." Abstract Excerpt: "Randomized caches protect against side-channel attacks by obfuscating the mapping of memory addresses to cache locations. Existing proposals typically describe architectural behavior, leaving practical hardware implementation challenges largely unexplored.... " read more The post Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech) appeared first on Semiconductor Engineering.

## Reviving TEMPEST Attacks with an Injected Signal

DevFeed: [Reviving TEMPEST Attacks with an Injected Signal](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/reviving-tempest-attacks-with-an-injected-signal-55649.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackaday.com/2026/09/20/reviving-tempest-attacks-with-an-injected-signal/>)

Author: Aaron Beckendorf

Published: 2026-09-20T23:00:06Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Hackaday](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackaday.md>)

Topics: [TEMPEST](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tempest.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [circuit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/circuit.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [circuit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/circuit.md>), [computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer.md>), [eavesdropping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eavesdropping.md>), [emissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emissions.md>), [mixing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mixing.md>), [radio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/radio.md>), [radio-hacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/radio-hacks.md>), [rf-modulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rf-modulation.md>), [sdr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sdr.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-hacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-hacks.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [tempest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tempest.md>)

### AI overview

The article describes InjectEave, a technique that irradiates modern electronics with a tuned radio-frequency signal to induce emissions from internal antennas. Nonlinear components mix the injected and internal signals, allowing attackers to recover audio and detect device states over short distances, including through walls.

### Source excerpt

TEMPEST attacks are often the most effective way to break air-gapped security: rather than directly accessing a computer, the attacker records the system's unintended radio emissions and uses them to ...read more

## L3 cache mapping on Sandy Bridge CPUs

DevFeed: [L3 cache mapping on Sandy Bridge CPUs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/l3-cache-mapping-on-sandy-bridge-cpus-21570.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<http://lackingrhoticity.blogspot.com/2015/04/l3-cache-mapping-on-sandy-bridge-cpus.html>)

Author: Mark Seaborn (noreply@blogger.com)

Published: 2015-04-27T21:59:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Mark Seaborn](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/mark-seaborn.md>)

Topics: [CPU Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cpu-cache.md>), [Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cache.md>), [Cache Coherence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cache-coherence.md>)

Tags: [2013](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2013.md>), [aslr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aslr.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [bits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bits.md>), [bus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bus.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [cpus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpus.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [dram](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dram.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [l3-cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/l3-cache.md>), [map](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/map.md>), [mapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mapping.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [ring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring.md>), [rowhammer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rowhammer.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [size](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/size.md>), [slices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/slices.md>)

### AI overview

On Sandy Bridge, physical address bits 6-16 select one of 2,048 L3 cache sets within a slice, bits 17-31 are used to hash the address to a slice, and bits 0-5 give the offset within a 64-byte cache line; bits 32 and above are unused. The cache has one slice per core, connected by a ring bus, and accessing another core's slice adds one or two hops. Slices are 1.5 MB with 12-way associativity on lower-end CPUs and 2 MB with 16-way associativity on higher-end CPUs. Hund, Willems, and Holz published the mapping for four-core CPUs; the source author reports deriving it for two-core CPUs. The excerpt gives the beginning of the four-core slice hash equations but cuts off before completing them.

### Source excerpt

In 2013, some researchers reverse-engineered how Intel Sandy Bridge CPUs map physical addresses to cache sets in the L3 cache (the last-level cache). They were interested in the cache mapping because it can be used to defeat kernel ASLR. I'm interested because the cache mapping can be used to test whether cached memory accesses can do row hammering (which can cause exploitable bit flips in some DRAM devices). The researchers published the details in the paper "Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks Against Kernel Space ASLR" (Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems and Thorsten Holz). They only published the mapping for 4-core CPUs, but I have figured out the mapping for 2-core CPUs as well. Some background: On Sandy Bridge CPUs, the L3 cache is divided into slices. Physical addresses are hashed to determine which slice of the L3 cache they will be stored in. The L3 cache is distributed and ring-based. There is one slice per core, but all the cores in a CPU can access all the cache slices via a ring bus which connects all the cores and their caches together. When a core accesses a memory location, the location will be slightly slower to access if it maps to a different core's cache slice, because it would take one or two hops around the ring bus to access it. The protocol used on the ring bus is based on QPI (Intel's QuickPath Interconnect). (QPI is a protocol used for connecting multiple CPUs together on high-end multi-socket systems.) Each cache slice contains 2048 cache sets. On lower-end CPUs, cache sets are 12-way associative, so a cache slice is 1.5MB in size (2048 sets * 12 ways * 64 bytes per cache line = 1.5MB). On higher-end CPUs, cache sets are 16-way associative, so a cache slice is 2MB in size (2048 sets * 16 ways * 64 bytes per cache line = 2MB). Cache mapping The researchers (Hund et al) figured out that the L3 cache uses the bits of a physical address as follows: Bits 0-5: These give the 6-bit byte offset within a 64-byte cache line. Bits 6-16: These give the 11-b