# Surveillance Technologies Published articles for Surveillance Technologies. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## EFF argues that Amazon Ring's TAKE encryption still gives cloud services temporary access to video DevFeed: [EFF argues that Amazon Ring's TAKE encryption still gives cloud services temporary access to video]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Thorin Klosowski Published: 2026-09-11T16:56:34Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Deeplinks]() Topics: [Encryption](), [Security](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [cloud](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [encryption](), [encryption-at-rest](), [hardware-security](), [law-enforcement-access](), [privacy](), [security](), [servers](), [surveillance-technologies]() ### AI overview The article examines Amazon Ring's Throw Away the Key Encryption feature, which temporarily stores encryption keys in Ring's cloud infrastructure so the service can provide video descriptions, smart alerts, and video search. It argues that although TAKE restricts access to historical footage compared with Ring's default settings, the system still allows cloud services to access unencrypted video when needed. ### Source excerpt Amazon recently debuted a new feature for its Ring cameras that the company is calling Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE). The idea is to cut back on the amount of video content available to the company, and thus potentially available to law enforcement. But while it might technically add a speed bump to accessing full video content, it doesn't deliver nearly the level of privacy we should be demanding from video doorbells and other security cameras. TAKE introduces a new way for Ring to manage encryption keys, where the user's device has its key, then the company holds encryption keys temporarily within its own cloud infrastructure. Ring's servers receive the keys temporarily so it can offer a variety of the features it says it can't offer when a user chooses to use end-to-end encryption, like video descriptions, smart alerts, video search, and more, then deletes the key after 24 hours. This differs from how it works now, where footage is encrypted in transit and at rest, then decrypted by Ring, which always has access to the footage, to process those features. Comparatively, this is an improvement to the default settings Ring has now, because it at least puts some restrictions on historical footage, but it has some serious holes worth exploring. Ring Gets Access to Unencrypted Video for a Short Period Ring has designed its service so many of its camera features, including smart alerts and video search, need cloud processing to work. That means to provide those features, Ring needs to decrypt the footage while it's stored in Ring's cloud servers. With TAKE, in order to decrypt footage to offer these features, Ring gets access to footage stored in the cloud for 24 hours. TAKE adds some small measures using secure enclaves to make base key material harder to directly export, but keys are still released to services that can be modified. With access to the keys, the cloud processing does its thing and delivers the requested feature to the user. The key is then delete ## EFF and Civil Society Groups Call on Nottinghamshire Police to Halt Live Face Recognition DevFeed: [EFF and Civil Society Groups Call on Nottinghamshire Police to Halt Live Face Recognition]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Paige Collings Published: 2026-08-21T16:03:17Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Deeplinks]() Topics: [Facial recognition](), [Risk]() Tags: [camera](), [children](), [crime](), [face-recognition](), [face-surveillance](), [surveillance](), [surveillance-technologies](), [uk]() ### AI overview EFF and civil society organizations urge Nottinghamshire Police to halt a proposed rollout of live facial recognition, citing mass surveillance, disproportionate targeting of children, social risks, and insufficient public support. ### Source excerpt This week, EFF, along with Big Brother Watch, Defend Digital Me, Liberty, Open Rights Group, Race Equality First, Statewatch, and Stopwatch, wrote to Nottinghamshire Police Force in the UK raising concern about the proposed roll-out of live facial recognition technology (LFR), and called for its immediate halt. In particular, the letter highlights six concerns: LFR Is Not "Just Another Tool" Nottinghamshire Police has stated that "facial recognition is just another tool to fight crime." But LFR used in public spaces is an incredibly intrusive biometric mass surveillance technology that scans the faces of everyone who walks past the camera and takes biometric face prints. This is not just another tool, but a major escalation of surveillance that treats everyone as a suspect by default. People Having "Nothing to Worry About" Does Not Hold to Scrutiny According to Nottinghamshire Police, "if you aren't entering the city or county to commit crime then you have nothing to worry about." However, many people have legitimate concerns about the normalisation of invasive technologies. So a public that cannot move around their towns and cities without being subjected to a biometric identity check may be less willing to seek medical care or legal advice, speak with journalists, act in a union, vote, protest, or express their gender, sexual or religious identity. Disproportionate Targeting With LFR We are particularly concerned to learn that Nottinghamshire Police could deploy LFR to tackle low level crimes, such as youth behavior deemed anti-social, as part of Operation View. Reporting suggests that the force already possesses "a watchlist of young people believed to be causing the most problems," including children as young as 11 years old. It would be highly disproportionate to deploy live facial recognition to tackle this behaviour. Many of these children are reportedly known to the police, and it is highly likely that there are more proportionate means for locating them. LF ## Too Little, Too Late: Flock Admits Their Technology Needs Reforms DevFeed: [Too Little, Too Late: Flock Admits Their Technology Needs Reforms]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Guariglia Published: 2026-08-13T20:52:35Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Deeplinks]() Topics: [data](), [audit](), [extend]() Tags: [audit](), [data](), [privacy](), [surveillance](), [surveillance-technologies](), [technology]() ### AI overview An opinion article examines Flock Safety's reforms to its automated license plate reader system, including shorter default data retention, offense filtering, stronger auditing, and blocking suspicious data requests. It argues that these measures do not resolve the broader privacy and abuse risks of mass surveillance. ### Source excerpt Flock Safety, the embattled vendor of mass surveillance technology, has rolled out a handful of new reforms intended to appease the justified nationwide anger that has seen scores of towns cancel or suspend their contracts with the company for automated license plate readers (ALPRs). The reforms are a combination of long overdue changes along with some cosmetic fixes that fail to address the fundamental dangers of this technology. We should not be letting companies decide how much privacy we deserve. So, what do these reforms actually do? The most consequential is Flock's default setting of an optional 7-day retention period for ALPR data, down from its original default optional 30-day retention period. This means if police want to retain data beyond the duration of their retention setting, they need to access "Evidence Mode," i.e., when the desired data is associated with an active investigation and not just a fishing expedition. This is significant because, in at least some circumstances, Flock has previously charged its customers to extend their retention period. So, while towns can likely easily flip the switch to longer retention periods, it might come with a price tag some cities will be unwilling to pay. Flock also has two other, likely easier-to-bypass reforms. The first is offense filtering so that cities can enable other departments to access their ALPR data only if they are investigating certain crimes, e.g., murder or robbery but not immigration-related investigations. The second is supposedly beefing up their audit feature and proactively locking out officers who file suspicious requests for data. The major problem here is the fact that Flock's enhanced audit and transparency tools help to address a problem that Flock itself has created--an abusable mass surveillance system that tracks all cars all the time. In addition to these reforms, there is also a tone shift coming from Flock's CEO, Garrett Langley. Langley went from calling the DeFlock movement "t