# teampcp Published articles for teampcp. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Growing up the hard way DevFeed: [Growing up the hard way]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-07-22T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Chainguard: Unchained]() Topics: [Open Source](), [open-source-security](), [ai regulation](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [Security]() Tags: [chainguard-software-supply-chain-security](), [open-source](), [open-source-security](), [open-source-software](), [oss](), [security](), [shai-hulud](), [software-supply-chain-security](), [solarwinds](), [supply-chain](), [teampcp]() ### AI overview This opinion argues that open source is entering a difficult transition after supply-chain incidents, regulatory pressure, and the industrialization of malware. It forecasts that the Open Source definition will remain intact while enterprise and regulatory requirements change which open source software organizations are willing or permitted to consume, with AI-driven vulnerability discovery and poisoned distribution channels creating pressure on both fronts. ### Source excerpt Open source is growing up. Explore why AI, regulation, and enterprise security are reshaping how organizations consume open source software. ## Mini Shai-Hulud Hits AntV: 300+ Malicious npm Packages Published via Compromised Maintainer Account DevFeed: [Mini Shai-Hulud Hits AntV: 300+ Malicious npm Packages Published via Compromised Maintainer Account]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Liran Tal Published: 2026-05-18T23:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [Data visualization](), [npm packages](), [Malware](), [npm](), [C2](), [Bun](), [JavaScript](), [GitHub]() Tags: [awareness](), [blog](), [c2](), [data-visualization](), [developer](), [devops](), [devrel](), [javascript](), [malware](), [npm-packages](), [payload](), [secrets](), [security](), [snyk-open-source](), [snyk-platform](), [supply-chain](), [supply-chain-security](), [teampcp](), [tokens]() ### AI overview This article analyzes the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain attack targeting the AntV data visualization ecosystem through a compromised npm maintainer account. It describes the mass publication of malicious package versions, the embedded Bun payload, credential and secret theft, C2 persistence, and self-propagation using stolen npm tokens. ### Source excerpt A compromised npm maintainer account triggered an automated burst of over 300 malicious package versions across 323 packages in the AntV data visualization ecosystem, part of the ongoing Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm campaign. Here's what the malware does, how to detect exposure, and how to respond. ## Shai-Hulud Goes Open Source DevFeed: [Shai-Hulud Goes Open Source]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ryan Simon, Sebastian Obregoso, Greg Foss Published: 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Datadog Security Labs]() Topics: [Open Source](), [Code](), [TypeScript](), [Bun](), [JavaScript](), [CI/CD](), [Cloud](), [Persistence](), [Linux](), [macOS](), [AI Agent](), [ssh]() Tags: [analysis](), [attacks](), [c2](), [ci-cd](), [cloud](), [code](), [framework](), [github](), [javascript](), [kubernetes](), [linux](), [macos](), [open-source](), [persistence](), [ssh](), [supply-chain](), [teampcp](), [typescript]() ### AI overview A static analysis of the Shai-Hulud offensive framework attributed to TeamPCP. The article examines its TypeScript/Bun architecture, credential harvesting, supply-chain poisoning, CI/CD targeting, persistence, and encrypted data exfiltration. ### Source excerpt A static analysis of the open-sourced Shai-Hulud offensive framework attributed to TeamPCP, covering its credential harvesting, supply chain poisoning, and exfiltration capabilities. ## TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack DevFeed: [TanStack Npm Packages Compromised Inside The Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Stephen Thoemmes Published: 2026-05-11T05:00:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [incident]() Tags: [article](), [attacks](), [cache](), [ci-cd](), [cryptographic](), [developer](), [devops](), [devsecops](), [github](), [github-actions](), [identity](), [incident](), [maintainers](), [memory](), [npm-packages](), [open-source-security](), [sbom](), [scm](), [security](), [snyk-open-source](), [snyk-security-intel](), [supply-chain](), [supply-chain-security](), [teampcp](), [tech](), [toolchain](), [vulnerability-insights](), [workflow]() ### AI overview TanStack's legitimate release pipeline was hijacked to publish malicious npm packages with valid SLSA provenance. The article describes the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain attack, its impact, and remediation guidance to rotate secrets on affected install environments. ### Source excerpt On May 11, 2026, the Mini Shai-Hulud worm compromised 84 npm package artifacts across 42 @tanstack/* packages (as well as @squawk/*, @mistralai/* packages, and others) by chaining a GitHub Actions "Pwn Request," cache poisoning, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory -- producing the first npm supply chain attack with valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations. Here's what happened, what was stolen, and what you need to do right now. ## PCPJack | Cloud Worm Evicts TeamPCP and Steals Credentials at Scale DevFeed: [PCPJack | Cloud Worm Evicts TeamPCP and Steals Credentials at Scale]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Alex Delamotte Published: 2026-05-07T10:00:17Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [SentinelLabs - We are hunters, reversers, exploit developers, and tinkerers shedding light on the world of malware, exploits, APTs, and cybercrime across all platforms.]() Topics: [pcpjack](), [Credential theft](), [Malware](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [Security](), [Docker](), [Kubernetes](), [web applications](), [MongoDB](), [Redis](), [VirusTotal](), [ransomware]() Tags: [cloud](), [credential-theft](), [database](), [docker](), [kubernetes](), [malware](), [open-source](), [pcpjack](), [ransomware](), [redis](), [security](), [teampcp](), [virustotal](), [web-applications]() ### AI overview SentinelLABS describes PCPJack as a credential-theft framework that spreads across exposed cloud infrastructure, removes TeamPCP-related artifacts, harvests credentials from cloud, container, developer, productivity, and financial services, and exfiltrates the data. The framework targets services including Docker, Kubernetes, Redis, MongoDB, and vulnerable web applications, with suspected monetization through fraud, spam, extortion, or resale of stolen access rather than cryptomining. ### Source excerpt Cloud attack framework skips cryptomining, harvests financial, messaging, and enterprise credentials for fraud, spam, and potential extortion. ## Attacks rewritten: Where malware enters the build DevFeed: [Attacks rewritten: Where malware enters the build]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-04-07T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Chainguard: Unchained]() Topics: [supply-chain-security](), [Malware](), [CI/CD](), [Maintainers](), [Vulnerabilities]() Tags: [attacks](), [chainguard-libraries](), [ci-cd](), [maintainers](), [malware](), [package-malware](), [security](), [sha1-hulud](), [software-supply-chain](), [solarwinds](), [supply-chain](), [supply-chain-attacks](), [teampcp]() ### AI overview This article explains how modern software supply chain attacks can affect production deployments, CI/CD clusters, developer workstations, and other systems. It describes the shift from exploiting known production vulnerabilities to injecting malicious code upstream through compromised maintainer accounts, package managers, and binary dependencies. ### Source excerpt Modern supply chain attacks target CI, dev machines, and dependencies. Learn how building from source helps prevent malware and reduce risk. ## How to protect your organization from the telnyx PyPI compromise DevFeed: [How to protect your organization from the telnyx PyPI compromise]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-03-27T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Chainguard: Unchained]() Topics: [Malware](), [open-source-security](), [SDKs](), [C2](), [Python](), [API keys](), [Encryption](), [Open Source](), [chainguard](), [ssh](), [GitHub Actions]() Tags: [api-keys](), [c2](), [chainguard](), [chainguard-libraries](), [encryption](), [github-actions](), [malware](), [open-source-security](), [pypi](), [pypi-attack](), [pypi-compromise](), [rsa](), [security](), [ssh](), [supply-chain](), [teampcp](), [telnyx](), [telnyx-attack](), [telnyx-compromise](), [trivy]() ### AI overview The article explains that malicious versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 of the Telnyx Python SDK were published to PyPI after publishing credentials were compromised. The malware executes at module scope, downloads from a remote C2 server, and uses a WAV file to conceal a Windows persistence binary or credential harvester for Linux and macOS. It recommends immediate removal, version pinning, credential rotation, and persistence checks. The article also attributes the attack to TeamPCP and connects it to a broader coordinated supply chain campaign. ### Source excerpt Malicious telnyx versions hit PyPI in a wider supply chain attack. Chainguard customers stayed protected by using source-built, verified libraries. ## How a Poisoned Security Scanner Became the Key to Backdooring LiteLLM DevFeed: [How a Poisoned Security Scanner Became the Key to Backdooring LiteLLM]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Stephen Thoemmes Published: 2026-03-24T04:00:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [open-source-security](), [CI/CD](), [incident](), [Processes](), [cursor]() Tags: [ai](), [application-security](), [aspm](), [awareness](), [blog](), [ci-cd](), [cloud-security](), [code-security](), [container-security](), [developer](), [devops](), [devsecops](), [docker](), [github-actions](), [incident](), [kubernetes](), [malware](), [open-source-security](), [python](), [secrets](), [security](), [supply-chain](), [supply-chain-security](), [teampcp](), [vulnerability-insights]() ### AI overview Snyk reports that compromised Trivy GitHub Action credentials enabled TeamPCP to publish malicious LiteLLM package versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to PyPI. The payload ran at Python startup and recursively spawned subprocesses, causing unintended RAM exhaustion and a fork bomb. ### Source excerpt On March 24, 2026, threat actor known as TeamPCP published backdoored versions of the litellm Python package after stealing PyPI credentials via a compromised Trivy GitHub Action in LiteLLM's CI/CD pipeline. Here's what happened, how the three-stage malware works, and how to check if you're affected.