# vulnerability-disclosure Published articles for vulnerability-disclosure. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## A "proof" of Fermat's Last Theorem that fits the margin DevFeed: [A "proof" of Fermat's Last Theorem that fits the margin]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: "Marc Ilunga" Published: 2026-09-09T11:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [The Trail of Bits Blog](), [The Trail of Bits Blog]() Topics: [Lean](), [bug](), [Memory safety verification]() Tags: [bug](), [exploits](), [memory-safety](), [open-source](), [vulnerability-disclosure]() ### AI overview A Lean string-slicing bug caused its logical evaluator and compiled native code to disagree, allowing a contradiction that could make an invalid proof appear checked. The issue was fixed after disclosure. ### Source excerpt Fermat famously claimed to have a "truly marvelous proof" of his Last Theorem, but he never wrote it down, insisting the margin of his page was too narrow to contain it. A few centuries later, Anthropic announced a complete formalization of Fermat's Last Theorem using 13 million lines of Lean code (clearly not what Fermat intended). Luckily, we found a wonderfully cursed Lean bug, shown below, that suggests the proof may have fit the margin after all. The issue affects all stable versions of Lean up to 4.33.1, and the patch is incorporated in v4.34.0-rc1. A "checked" proof of Fermat's Last Theorem using Lean 4.33.1 The blue checkmarks in the screenshot above would suggest that Lean considers this proof correct. This seems odd given the amount of work Sir Andrew Wiles put into this problem and the vast size of Claude's proof. So what is going on? The "proof" clearly doesn't make any sense and exploits an issue in Lean. We found the issue while using GPT-5.6 to experiment with a new skill for code review. We want to clarify up front that the issue is not a kernel soundness issue, but it happens to nicely fit any discussion of strings, lengths, and substrings. The issue affects String.Pos.Raw.extract, Lean's low-level string-slicing function. When asked to extract a one-byte slice at an astronomically large position, Lean's logical definition returns the empty string. But the compiled native code returns the entire original string. That disagreement is enough to manufacture a contradiction. Lean's ordinary evaluator "proves" that the tiny slice was empty, while native evaluation "proves" that the very same slice contained "a truly marvelous proof." Put those together, and Lean concludes that the empty string equals a non-empty string. And once you have a contradiction, you can prove anything, including Fermat's Last Theorem. On the bright side, the Lean team was considerably faster than mathematical history. About 90 minutes after we reported the issue, hargoniX opened ## PortSwigger X Intigriti: Burp Suite Professional licenses up for grabs with this new collaboration DevFeed: [PortSwigger X Intigriti: Burp Suite Professional licenses up for grabs with this new collaboration]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Fran Hutchings Published: 2026-03-11T10:36:26Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [PortSwigger Blog]() Topics: [Vulnerabilities]() Tags: [bug-bounty](), [collaboration](), [security](), [testing](), [vulnerability-disclosure](), [web]() ### AI overview PortSwigger and Intigriti announced a collaboration that awards eligible bug bounty researchers a six-month Burp Suite Professional license after reaching 400 reputation points on Intigriti. ### Source excerpt At PortSwigger, we're always looking for ways to enable the world to secure the web, and today we're excited to take that mission a step further. We're pleased to announce a new collaboration bringing ## 7 tips to become a successful bug bounty hunter DevFeed: [7 tips to become a successful bug bounty hunter]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ben Sadeghipour Published: 2024-01-25T05:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [Bug Bounty](), [Vulnerabilities](), [Security](), [Hacking](), [web applications]() Tags: [ambassador](), [awareness](), [blog](), [bug-bounty](), [code-security](), [developer](), [hacking](), [open-source-security](), [security](), [snyk-security-intel](), [sql](), [tech](), [testing](), [vulnerability](), [vulnerability-disclosure](), [web-applications](), [xss]() ### AI overview This article explains bug bounty hunting, including how security researchers identify and responsibly report vulnerabilities in web applications, IoT devices, mobile applications, and smart contracts. It distinguishes vulnerability disclosure programs from bug bounty programs and recommends that beginners start with a Vulnerability Disclosure Program before pursuing paid bug bounties. ### Source excerpt In this post, we'll cover what bug bounty hunting is, the difference between vulnerability disclosure programs and bug bounty programs, and seven tips to get you started. ## Vulnerability disclosure: Which comes first, the security bug in PHP or the CVE? DevFeed: [Vulnerability disclosure: Which comes first, the security bug in PHP or the CVE?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Liran Tal; DeveloperSteve Coochin Published: 2023-12-19T06:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Blog RSS Feed | Snyk]() Topics: [Vulnerabilities](), [PHP](), [Security](), [bug](), [Open Source](), [Maintainers]() Tags: [application-security](), [awareness](), [blog](), [bug](), [cve](), [cve-reporting](), [devrel](), [incident](), [maintainers](), [open-source](), [php](), [report](), [security](), [security-vulnerabilities](), [snyk](), [vulnerability](), [vulnerability-disclosure]() ### AI overview This article examines the disclosure of a PHP Use After Free vulnerability and the difficulties of getting security reports recognized, fixed, and published as CVEs. It follows the dompdf incident timeline, including delayed maintainer responses, public disclosure, exploitation leading to a reverse shell, and the eventual CVE assignment. ### Source excerpt In this post, we cover the CVE reporting process using the Use After Free vulnerability type as an example. ## PSA: Vulnerability Disclosure 2020/09/17 DevFeed: [PSA: Vulnerability Disclosure 2020/09/17]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2020-09-17T00:00:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Community blog on PINE64]() Topics: [vulnerability](), [WordPress Plugins](), [Exploit](), [Website](), [servers]() Tags: [automated](), [bots](), [exploit](), [plugins](), [spam](), [vulnerability](), [vulnerability-disclosure](), [wordpress-plugins]() ### AI overview PINE64 disclosed an intrusion into its Pine Store web instance on September 17, 2020. Spam and scam pages were hidden on the server and configured to appear only to crawler bots. The company attributed the incident to an exploit in a WordPress plugin, shut down the server, investigated, and reported no evidence that customer or financial information was exposed. ### Source excerpt PINE64 (both the business and the community around it) prides itself on transparency. Often, this transparency is used to give you a behind the scenes look into our operations. But today, we're afraid we must be transparent about something else. As of approximately 4:30am GMT on 2020/09/17, we discovered an intrusion to our Pine Store web instance. This took on the form of spam/scam pages hidden on our web server, with scripting to only be visible to crawler bots. After discovering this, we immediately shutdown the web server and began investigation. To our knowledge, this happened via an exploit in one of the Wordpress plugins on the Pine Store, with initial attempts logged as early as 2020/09/05. It appears this was not an active malicious attack on our server, but merely automated bots tasked with placing scam store pages. Needless to say, we remedied the situation and took extensive steps to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. Due to the nature of the attacks we've reviewed, we do not suspect that customer information was a target, nor we expect any was exfiltrated. We can guarantee that, without a doubt, no credit card or other financial information was placed at any risk of being exposed. We hope that this event does not damage your trust in us beyond repair, as we work to recover from this event. -- Lukasz Erecinski, Community Manager