# Android Security Android Security is the security architecture, features, and programs used to protect the Android platform, apps, devices, data, and networks. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## Introducing the AndroidX Security State Libraries: A Unified View of Device Security DevFeed: [Introducing the AndroidX Security State Libraries: A Unified View of Device Security]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Android Developers (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2026-09-17T19:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Android Developers Blog]() Topics: [Android Security](), [Library](), [Android](), [version](), [Google]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [libraries](), [release](), [security](), [version]() ### AI overview Android announces the stable release of AndroidX Security State 1.1.0 and Security State Provider 1.0.0. The libraries let developers and enterprises inspect component-level device security, compare installed, published, and available patch levels, expose update availability, and check whether selected vulnerabilities have been patched. ### Source excerpt Posted by Maunik Shah, Staff Software Engineer, Alec Garcia, Software Engineer, and Joseph Yong, Technical Program Manager At Android, we are constantly working to provide developers and enterprise partners with the data they need to keep devices protected. Today, we're thrilled to announce the stable release of the AndroidX Security State version 1.1.0 and Security State Provider version 1.0.0 libraries which provides a centralized mechanism designed to bring further transparency to the comprehensive security posture and pending updates across the Android ecosystem. Whether you develop security-critical, consumer-facing apps (such as banking, fintech, or healthcare) or Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions, these libraries enable you to programmatically verify the security state of the device per component. Rather than relying on a coarse, monolithic Security Patch Level (SPL), you can evaluate true component-level protection and whether remediations are actively pending via the androidx.security.state library. For OEMs and Over-The-Air (OTA) client developers, the companion androidx.security.state.provider library allows you to expose update availability via standardized mechanisms. Understanding Security Patch Levels (SPL) As Android has evolved to deliver rapid, independent component updates through modular systems like Google Play system updates, relying on a single SPL build property is no longer the best way to determine a device's true security posture. To provide component level visibility, the Security State libraries provide APIs for three distinct patch levels: Device SPL (DSPL): The security patch level currently installed and running on the device for specific system components, queried from device properties and configs without network calls. Published SPL (PSPL): The latest patch level officially published in the Android Security Bulletin for those components. Available SPL (ASPL): The patch level ready to be downloaded and installed on the specif ## Google's September 2026 Pixel update addresses a modem vulnerability reportedly under limited, targeted exploitation DevFeed: [Google's September 2026 Pixel update addresses a modem vulnerability reportedly under limited, targeted exploitation]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Pieter Arntz Published: 2026-09-16T10:39:04Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Malwarebytes]() Topics: [Google](), [pixel](), [Vulnerabilities](), [Android Security](), [Security & Privacy](), [Mobile]() Tags: [android-security](), [bugs](), [cve-2026-58704](), [google](), [mobile](), [modem](), [news](), [pixel](), [security](), [update](), [vulnerabilities](), [vulnerability]() ### AI overview Google's September 2026 Pixel security update fixes 110 vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-58704, a high-severity cellular modem permission-bypass flaw that may be under limited, targeted exploitation. Pixel users should install the update and verify that their device shows the September 5, 2026 security patch level or later. ### Source excerpt Google's September Pixel update fixes 110 vulnerabilities, including a modem flaw being used in limited, targeted attacks. ## What's New in Android Security and Privacy in 2026 DevFeed: [What's New in Android Security and Privacy in 2026]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Eugene Liderman Published: 2026-05-12T17:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Security]() Topics: [Android](), [Android Security](), [Security](), [spoofing](), [Social engineering](), [threat detection](), [On-device AI](), [Chrome]() Tags: [ai](), [android](), [android-security](), [fraud](), [none](), [on-device-ai](), [security](), [social-engineering](), [spoofing](), [threat-detection]() ### AI overview The article describes planned Android security and privacy enhancements for 2026, including verified financial calls to combat spoofed banking scams. Android can verify incoming calls through participating financial apps and automatically end calls that are not genuine. It also highlights expanded Live Threat Detection, which uses on-device AI to analyze app behavior and warn about suspicious activity. ### Source excerpt New Android security and privacy features ## Android Theft Protection Updates Add Authentication Controls and Recovery Safeguards DevFeed: [Android Theft Protection Updates Add Authentication Controls and Recovery Safeguards]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Edward Fernandez (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2026-01-27T16:59:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Google Online Security]() Topics: [Android Security](), [LineageOS](), [Security](), [Authentication](), [passwords](), [Google]() Tags: [2025](), [android](), [android-security](), [authentication](), [banking](), [brazil](), [browser](), [feature](), [none](), [password](), [recovery](), [security](), [time](), [updates]() ### AI overview Google announces Android theft protection updates including more control over Failed Authentication Lock, expanded Identity Check coverage, longer lockout times after failed screen-lock attempts, and an optional security challenge for Remote Lock. ### Source excerpt Posted by Nataliya Stanetsky, Fabricio Ferracioli, Elliot Sisteron, Irene Ang of the Android Security Team Phone theft is more than just losing a device; it's a form of financial fraud that can leave you suddenly vulnerable to personal data and financial theft. That's why we're committed to providing multi-layered defenses that help protect you before, during, and after a theft attempt. Today, we're announcing a powerful set of theft protection feature updates that build on our existing protections, designed to give you greater peace of mind by making your device a much harder target for criminals. Stronger Authentication Safeguards We've expanded our security to protect you against an even wider range of threats. These updates are now available for Android devices running Android 16+. More User Control for Failed Authentications: In Android 15, we launched Failed Authentication Lock, a feature that automatically locks the device's screen after excessive failed authentication attempts. This feature is now getting a new dedicated enable/disable toggle in settings, giving you more granular control over your device's security. Expanding Identity Check to cover more: Early in 2025, we enabled Identity Check for Android 15+, which requires the user to utilize biometrics when performing certain actions outside of trusted places. Later in the year, we extended this safeguard to cover all features and apps that use the Android Biometric Prompt. This means that critical tools that utilize Biometric Prompt, like third-party banking apps and Google Password Manager, now automatically benefit from the additional security of Identity Check. Stronger Protection Against Screen Lock Guessing: We're making it much harder for a thief to guess your PIN, pattern, or password by increasing the lockout time after failed attempts. To ensure you aren't locked out by mistake (by a curious child, for instance), identical incorrect guesses no longer count toward your retry limit. Enhanced Rec ## Android Security: mobsfscan DevFeed: [Android Security: mobsfscan]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Dolan Published: 2026-01-16T17:51:35Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Stories by Matthew Dolan on Medium]() Topics: [Android Security](), [Mobile Security](), [Security](), [GitHub Actions](), [CI/CD](), [GitHub](), [Docker Image]() Tags: [android-app-development](), [android-security](), [androiddev](), [build-secure-apps](), [ci-cd](), [docker-image](), [github](), [github-actions](), [mobile-security](), [security]() ### AI overview A tutorial on using the free, open-source mobsfscan tool to detect insecure code patterns in mobile applications. It focuses on running mobsfscan with GitHub Actions and uploading SARIF results to GitHub's Security tab. ### Source excerpt Not a medium member? "Read for free" Continue reading on Stackademic " ## How Pixel and Android are bringing a new level of trust to your images with C2PA Content Credentials DevFeed: [How Pixel and Android are bringing a new level of trust to your images with C2PA Content Credentials]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Edward Fernandez (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2025-09-10T15:59:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Google Online Security]() Topics: [Google](), [Android Security](), [Security](), [Mobile](), [Hardware](), [Generative AI]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [digital-signature](), [generative-ai](), [google](), [hardware](), [pixel](), [security]() ### AI overview Google describes how Pixel 10, Pixel Camera, and Google Photos will support C2PA Content Credentials to improve the provenance and verification of digital media. The article outlines Android-specific security capabilities, including Assurance Level 2, private certificate management, trusted timestamps, offline support, and hardware-backed protection, and says developers can apply the model to Android apps. ### Source excerpt Posted by Eric Lynch, Senior Product Manager, Android Security, and Sherif Hanna, Group Product Manager, Google C2PA Core At Made by Google 2025, we announced that the new Google Pixel 10 phones will support C2PA Content Credentials in Pixel Camera and Google Photos. This announcement represents a series of steps towards greater digital media transparency: The Pixel 10 lineup is the first to have Content Credentials built in across every photo created by Pixel Camera. The Pixel Camera app achieved Assurance Level 2, the highest security rating currently defined by the C2PA Conformance Program. Assurance Level 2 for a mobile app is currently only possible on the Android platform. A private-by-design approach to C2PA certificate management, where no image or group of images can be related to one another or the person who created them. Pixel 10 phones support on-device trusted time-stamps, which ensures images captured with your native camera app can be trusted after the certificate expires, even if they were captured when your device was offline. These capabilities are powered by Google Tensor G5, Titan M2 security chip, the advanced hardware-backed security features of the Android platform, and Pixel engineering expertise. In this post, we'll break down our architectural blueprint for bringing a new level of trust to digital media, and how developers can apply this model to their own apps on Android. A New Approach to Content Credentials Generative AI can help us all to be more creative, productive, and innovative. But it can be hard to tell the difference between content that's been AI-generated, and content created without AI. The ability to verify the source and history--or provenance--of digital content is more important than ever. Content Credentials convey a rich set of information about how media such as images, videos, or audio files were made, protected by the same digital signature technology that has secured online transactions and mobile apps for decades. I ## Android pKVM Achieves SESIP Level 5 Security Certification DevFeed: [Android pKVM Achieves SESIP Level 5 Security Certification]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Edward Fernandez (noreply@blogger.com) Published: 2025-08-12T16:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Google Online Security]() Topics: [Android](), [Android Security](), [Security](), [open-source-security](), [Google](), [virtualization](), [On-device AI]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [google](), [integrity](), [none](), [on-device-ai](), [open-source-security](), [security](), [standard](), [virtualization](), [vulnerability]() ### AI overview Google announces that protected KVM (pKVM), the hypervisor powering the Android Virtualization Framework, achieved SESIP Level 5 certification after evaluation by Dekra against the TrustCB SESIP scheme. The article says this certification is intended to support highly critical isolated workloads, including on-device AI handling personalized data, and provide a common open-source security foundation for Android device manufacturers. ### Source excerpt Posted by Dave Kleidermacher, VP Engineering, Android Security & Privacy Today marks a watershed moment and new benchmark for open-source security and the future of consumer electronics. Google is proud to announce that protected KVM (pKVM), the hypervisor that powers the Android Virtualization Framework, has officially achieved SESIP Level 5 certification. This makes pKVM the first software security system designed for large-scale deployment in consumer electronics to meet this assurance bar. Supporting Next-Gen Android Features The implications for the future of secure mobile technology are profound. With this level of security assurance, Android is now positioned to securely support the next generation of high-criticality isolated workloads. This includes vital features, such as on-device AI workloads that can operate on ultra-personalized data, with the highest assurances of privacy and integrity. This certification required a hands-on evaluation by Dekra, a globally recognized cybersecurity certification lab, which conducted an evaluation against the TrustCB SESIP scheme, compliant to EN-17927. Achieving Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP) Level 5 is a landmark because it incorporates AVA_VAN.5, the highest level of vulnerability analysis and penetration testing under the ISO 15408 (Common Criteria) standard. A system certified to this level has been evaluated to be resistant to highly skilled, knowledgeable, well-motivated, and well-funded attackers who may have insider knowledge and access. This certification is the cornerstone of the next-generation of Android's multi-layered security strategy. Many of the TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments) used in the industry have not been formally certified or have only achieved lower levels of security assurance. This inconsistency creates a challenge for developers looking to build highly critical applications that require a robust and verifiable level of security. The certified pKVM changes this p ## Android Security: Beware of the default IV! DevFeed: [Android Security: Beware of the default IV!]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: SystemDotRun Published: 2017-09-27T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [SystemDotRun]() Topics: [Android Security](), [Cryptography](), [Encryption](), [Security](), [Code]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [code](), [cryptographic](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [security]() ### AI overview This Android security article explains why AES encryption should use a random or pseudorandom initialization vector (IV). It reports that Android 4.3's AndroidOpenSSL provider could return an all-zero IV, while newer APIs and the AndroidKeyStore provider appeared to return randomized IVs in limited testing, and recommends explicitly declaring an IV when appropriate. ### Source excerpt A quick one today. A couple of people I have spoken to recently have been unaware of the need to ensure a random IV is being used when performing AES encryption on Android. What is an IV? In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable (SV)[1] is a fixed-size input to a cryptographic primitive that is typically required to be random or pseudorandom. Randomization is crucial for encryption schemes to achieve semantic security, a property whereby repeated usage of the scheme under the same key does not allow an attacker to infer relationships between segments of the encrypted message. For block ciphers, the use of an IV is described by the modes of operation. Wikipedia The unawareness seems to fall into two camps: I didn't know I needed to use an IV I am using the IV that is generated by the Cipher I didn't know I needed to use an IV Yup! I am using the IV that is generated by the Cipher Potentially an Uh oh! Poking around a little, I can see that on old versions of Android (tested 4.3) the AndroidOpenSSL provider can return an all 0 IV with the below, whereas the same code on 7 will spit out seemingly-random IVs. secret_key_iv.java Using the newer KeyGenParameterSpec APIs and the AndroidKeyStore Provider seems to be fine regarding this issue from the small amount of testing I have done. Enforcing a random IV It may be worth explicitly declaring an IV to avoid the potential of the default one zero-ing out, which from the above depends on the providers implementation in use. This can be as simple as: explicit_iv.java Worth being aware of isRandomizedEncryptionRequired() exists if you want to manually ensure the IV is randomised, otherwise cipher.init will throw if an IV is supplied. Some of the Android examples do now suggest this, but I find it can be easy to forget when looking at other example code. If interested in Android security take a look at doridori/Android-Security-Reference ## Disable Screenshot, Copy & Paste DevFeed: [Disable Screenshot, Copy & Paste]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Shai Almog Published: 2017-01-31T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [CodeName One]() Topics: [Android Security](), [Security](), [App](), [Jailbreak](), [iOS]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [app](), [ios](), [jailbreak](), [security]() ### AI overview The article describes Codename One features for blocking screenshots and copy-and-paste operations in Android apps. Screenshot blocking uses the android.disableScreenshots=true build hint, may affect task view, and may fail on jailbroken devices. Screenshot blocking is Android-specific, while copy-and-paste blocking is discussed for Android and future iOS support. ### Source excerpt Continuing our security trend from the past month we have a couple of new features for Android security that allow us to block the user from taking a screenshot or copying & pasting data from fields. Notice that these features might fail on jailbroken devices so you might want to check for jailbreak/rooting first. Blocking screenshots is an Android specific feature that can't be implemented on iOS. This is implemented by classifying the app window as secure and you can do that via the build hint android.disableScreenshots=true. Once that is added screenshots should no longer work for the app, this might impact other things as well such as the task view etc. ## Android Security: Welcome To Shell (Permissions) DevFeed: [Android Security: Welcome To Shell (Permissions)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: SystemDotRun Published: 2016-08-16T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [SystemDotRun]() Topics: [Android](), [Android Security](), [Security](), [Process](), [Kernel](), [POSIX]() Tags: [adb](), [android](), [android-security](), [kernel](), [posix](), [process](), [security]() ### AI overview This article examines whether a shell started by an Android application has the same permissions as a shell accessed through ADB. It explains that Android process privileges depend on UID, GID, supplementary GIDs, and kernel-enforced resource access, then compares shell processes from ADB and an installed application. ### Source excerpt Does a shell started from an application have the same permissions as a shell started via adb? What a good question! ADB is a shell that you get on a PC with the same permissions as if you were to run a shell/terminal app on the phone itself. I came across this statement on Reddit which went against my intuition and I had a quick look into it. It was important for me so I can understand the difference in potential attack vectors surrounding open shells. I started by flicking through the excellent Android Security Internals: An In-Depth Guide to Android's Security Architecture to get an overview about how process permissions worked on android. Most of the overview is just a condensed version of a few pages of this great book. This post will mostly talk about how this stuff works with low-level kernel permissions work in the OS, as opposed to high-level operations that involve the package manager (pm). A brief summary of the low-level stuff is: Privileges are based upon the processes UID, GID and supplementary GIDs Like all POSIX systems [clarification needed] access to system resources regulated by the kernel (files, sockets etc) is based on the owner and access mode of the resource and the UID & GID of accessing process Some permissions on Android are mapped to GIDs data/etc/platform.xml Other permissions are checked via pm and I'm guessing are not checkable by the process outlined in this post. These GIDs are mapped to AIDs android_filesystem_config.h For applications (quick diversion) the package manager will add the GIDs for the application at install time, for permissions that appear in the platform.xml file, to data/system/packages.list for the applications entry. When a process is forked from the zygote process, as it does for new application processes, the UID and GIDs are set. Kernel and system daemons use these to grant access to resources and functions. Relative shell permissions So, does a shell started from an application have the same permissions as a s ## Reverse engineering and removing Pokémon GO's certificate pinning DevFeed: [Reverse engineering and removing Pokémon GO's certificate pinning]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Eaton Published: 2016-07-31T06:59:28Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Eaton Works Feed]() Topics: [Reverse Engineering](), [Android](), [Android Security](), [APK](), [Network]() Tags: [android](), [android-security](), [apk](), [mitm](), [reverse-engineering]() ### AI overview A technical walkthrough of certificate pinning in Pokémon GO version 0.31.0 on Android. It explains how pinning blocks HTTPS interception and discusses a method for reverse engineering and removing the pinning, including limitations involving root access, account bans, Google login, and later security updates. ### Source excerpt A deep dive into Pokémon GO's certificate pinning.