# AWS Security Token Service

AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) is an AWS service that generates temporary security credentials for controlling access to AWS resources.

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## 56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion

DevFeed: [56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/56-aws-api-calls-in-141-milliseconds-inside-an-ai-run-intrusion-133228.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/cyberstrikeai-aws-cloudtrail-intrusion>)

Author: Samir Bousseaden,Bryan Porras Blanch,Terrance DeJesus

Published: 2026-11-13T15:27:20Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [AWS CloudTrail](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-cloudtrail.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [Amazon EC2](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-ec2.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon GuardDuty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-guardduty.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-platform.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-assisted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assisted.md>), [ai-assisted-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assisted-attacks.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [cloudtrail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudtrail.md>), [cyberstrikeai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberstrikeai.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [detection-rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-rules.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>)

### AI overview

The article documents a 16-day intrusion in which one server attributed to CyberStrikeAI used eight AWS identities across four accounts. Activity included validating credentials, harvesting secrets, reading EC2 user data, decrypting an SSM parameter, and issuing an SSM command; the audit log does not reveal the command or whether it succeeded. The authors characterize the activity as AI-assisted based on attribution and machine-speed behavior, but cannot establish that an LLM agent made decisions or how credentials were obtained. Six Elastic rules produced 78 mostly medium- and low-severity alerts; shared source IP and a 14-day gap made correlation essential. The article proposes two high-severity detections for bulk user-data and account enumeration, behavioral CloudTrail hunts, and an Elastic Workflows proof of concept to deactivate keys and restrict IAM access. Its response steps include rotating credentials and sessions, reviewing SSM history, treating user-data secrets as exposed, and limiting access to userData. IPs are offered for retrospective hunting, while behavioral indicators are described as more durable.

### Source excerpt

A CyberStrikeAI server spent 16 days in four AWS accounts using eight identities, and the CloudTrail record shows why six detection rules each caught only part of it.

## Where to run AWS workloads and how to limit their access

DevFeed: [Where to run AWS workloads and how to limit their access](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/where-to-run-aws-workloads-and-how-to-limit-their-access-129355.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.datadoghq.com/blog/aws-account-management/>)

Author: Mallory Mooney

Published: 2026-11-11T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Datadog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/datadog-the-monitor-blog.md>)

Topics: [AWS Organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-organizations.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [least privilege](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/least-privilege.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon GuardDuty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-guardduty.md>)

Tags: [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [amazon-elastic-compute-cloud-amazon-ec2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-elastic-compute-cloud-amazon-ec2.md>), [amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service-amazon-eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service-amazon-eks.md>), [amazon-guardduty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-guardduty.md>), [amazon-s3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-s3.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-cloudtrail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-cloudtrail.md>), [aws-fargate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-fargate.md>), [aws-identity-and-access-management-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-identity-and-access-management-iam.md>), [aws-lambda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-lambda.md>), [aws-organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-organizations.md>), [aws-waf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-waf.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [deployment-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment-tools.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

AWS recommends running workloads in member accounts and reserving the management account for organization-wide tasks such as billing, because SCPs and RCPs add restrictions in member accounts but do not apply in the management account. A compromised management-account workload may also reach member accounts through trusted roles such as `OrganizationAccountAccessRole` or, where enabled, privileged `sts:AssumeRoot` sessions. Organize workload accounts by ownership, purpose, and isolation needs, and use delegated administration for shared services. For deployment pipelines, narrowly scope IAM `sts:AssumeRole` permissions and destination-role trust policies; an SCP can further deny assumption of roles outside an ARN allowlist. Restrict which GitHub Actions workflows can assume the pipeline's initial role. Test SCPs in a small test OU before broad rollout, verifying both required work and denied access, then review account placement, roles, and policies as workloads change.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to organize AWS workloads and shared services, how that affects security, and which permissions to review as you set up or reorganize your accounts.

## Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments

DevFeed: [Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hackers-exploit-trusted-aws-access-to-breach-multiple-cloud-environments-127362.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-trusted-aws-access-to-breach-multiple-cloud-environments/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-11-10T19:31:11Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [account takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/account-takeover.md>)

Tags: [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-environments.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [customers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customers.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [qubole](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/qubole.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [supply-chain-attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chain-attack.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Between October 14 and 26, an attacker used two compromised Qubole IAM users to assume roles in customer AWS accounts whose trust policies allowed access from Qubole's AWS account. Using the roles' existing permissions, the attacker surveyed resources, retrieved secrets and environment variables, validated discovered credentials, and downloaded accessible S3 data through a repeated sequence of listing buckets and objects, inspecting them, then calling GetObject. The report describes dozens of victims and millions of files stolen from one customer, but does not establish the compromise method or exact victim count. Administrators potentially affected are advised to review CloudTrail from October 1 onward, investigate secret and S3 access, rotate exposed credentials, revoke active role sessions, remove unused integrations, and restrict remaining roles' permissions, trusted identities, and source networks.

### Source excerpt

A threat actor used compromised identity and access management (IAM) credentials for a Qubole big data platform's AWS account to access and exfiltrate data from multiple customers' AWS environments. [...]

## Self-Service Namespace Onboarding on Amazon EKS: Automating Access Entries and RBAC with GitHub...

DevFeed: [Self-Service Namespace Onboarding on Amazon EKS: Automating Access Entries and RBAC with GitHub...](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/self-service-namespace-onboarding-on-amazon-eks-automating-access-entries-and-rbac-with-github-127576.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.devops.dev/self-service-namespace-onboarding-on-amazon-eks-automating-access-entries-and-rbac-with-github-74f0347e71e2?source=rss----33f8b2d9a328---4>)

Author: Oleh Adam Dubnytskyy

Published: 2026-11-10T09:42:12Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [DevOps.dev](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/devops-dev.md>)

Topics: [rbac](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rbac.md>), [Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [self-service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-service.md>), [internal developer platform automation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internal-developer-platform-automation.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>)

Tags: [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [amazon-eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-eks.md>), [amazon-web-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-server.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-eks.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [cluster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cluster.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eks.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [job](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/job.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes.md>), [onboarding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/onboarding.md>), [rbac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rbac.md>), [self-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-service.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt describes namespace onboarding on Amazon EKS as two coordinated permission updates: an EKS access policy scope and Kubernetes RBAC. GitHub Actions authenticates through OIDC and temporary IAM role credentials. The EKS authorizer and RBAC authorizer can each allow a request, so effective permissions are their union; a restrictive custom RBAC role cannot narrow permissions already granted by a broader managed policy. The proposed setup uses separate workflows: one applies ClusterRoles and per-namespace RoleBindings, while another updates the access entry's namespace scope from files in a namespaces directory. The scripts validate namespace names, reject empty desired scopes, skip unchanged access-policy updates, and optionally prune stale managed RoleBindings. The excerpt notes that RBAC synchronization requires cluster-scoped rights and that missing namespaces are skipped with a warning before the workflow reports an error. The supplied text ends after describing this implementation and its pull request workflow.

### Source excerpt

Self-Service Namespace Onboarding on Amazon EKS: Automating Access Entries and RBAC with GitHub ActionsTwo authorization layers on Amazon EKS Every call my pipeline makes to the cluster's Kubernetes API server passes through two authorizers: Kubernetes RBAC and EKS access policies. Authentication: the access entry says who you are The pipeline never holds long-lived AWS keys. A GitHub Actions job gets an OIDC token, exchanges it for temporary credentials of an IAM role, and calls the cluster with them. More details on how it works can be seen here. Layer 1: Kubernetes RBAC RBAC is the standard Kubernetes model: Roles and ClusterRoles define rules, and RoleBindings attach them to a user or group. These objects live inside the cluster. You can write any rule you need, including rules for custom resources such as KEDA ScaledObject. Layer 2: EKS access policies Access policies are permission sets that AWS manages and that you attach to an access entry through the EKS API. They mirror the Kubernetes user-facing roles: AmazonEKSEditPolicy corresponds to edit, AmazonEKSAdminPolicy to admin, and so on. Each association has a scope: the whole cluster (type=cluster) or a list of namespaces (type=namespace). You can't modify an access policy or create your own. When the managed policies don't fit, more control can be configured by leveraging Kubernetes RBAC objects instead. How the two layers combine The API server chains its authorizers. The RBAC authorizer runs first and returns immediately if it allows the request. If RBAC has no opinion, the request goes to the EKS authorizer, which checks the access policies. If neither allows it, the request is denied. The access entry only establishes who the caller is; RBAC and access policies each get one chance to allow the request. Both authorizers can only allow or pass, so the effective permissions of ci-github-actions in a namespace are the union of both layers. That has two consequences for the automation: Onboarding a namespace

## Simplify cross-partition access with AWS IAM outbound identity federation

DevFeed: [Simplify cross-partition access with AWS IAM outbound identity federation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/simplify-cross-partition-access-with-aws-iam-outbound-identity-federation-126474.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/simplify-cross-partition-access-with-aws-iam-outbound-identity-federation/>)

Author: Bill Wells

Published: 2026-11-09T16:08:30Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>)

Tags: [access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-management.md>), [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [amazon-s3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-s3.md>), [amazon-web-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services.md>), [amazon-web-services-aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services-aws.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-iam.md>), [aws-identity-and-access-management-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-identity-and-access-management-iam.md>), [china](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/china.md>), [cross](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross.md>), [govcloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/govcloud.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [partition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/partition.md>), [partitions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/partitions.md>), [resources](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resources.md>), [roles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/roles.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [sovereign-cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sovereign-cloud.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

IAM outbound identity federation enables cross-partition AWS access by having a workload request a short-lived, AWS-signed JWT in its source partition and exchange it through `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` for temporary credentials in the destination partition. The destination role's trust policy can restrict access using token audience, subject, source Region, account, organization, or principal context. CloudTrail records a shared token ID across issuance and exchange for correlation, and destination policies can revoke sessions. Setup requires enabling federation in the source account, registering its issuer as an OIDC provider in the destination account, and configuring role trust and permissions. The feature is available across Commercial, China, GovCloud (US), and European Sovereign Cloud partitions at no additional cost; it does not support same-partition federation. AWS advises least privilege, short token lifetimes, audit monitoring, and compliance review. Organizations with existing PKI can alternatively use IAM Roles Anywhere.

### Source excerpt

You can now use tokens from AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) outbound federation to assume roles in other Amazon Web Services (AWS) partitions. When your workloads run across AWS partitions such as Commercial, China, GovCloud (US), and European Sovereign Cloud, a workload in one partition might need to access resources or communicate with AWS [...]

## Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild

DevFeed: [Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/trusted-by-default-qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild-123993.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild>)

Author: Benjamin Read

Published: 2026-11-09T14:56:32Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/wiz-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [okta](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/okta.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [actor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actor.md>), [addition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/addition.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-threat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-threat.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [cirt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cirt.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cross](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross.md>), [customer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customer.md>), [environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/environments.md>), [here-s](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/here-s.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [integration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integration.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [roles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/roles.md>), [threat-intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intel.md>), [used](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/used.md>), [wild](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wild.md>)

### AI overview

From October 14-26, 2026, an actor used IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume customer integration roles; the observed requests included External IDs and succeeded. In affected environments, the actor enumerated cloud resources, read secrets and Lambda configuration, tested discovered credentials, and downloaded accessible S3 objects. Wiz recommends reviewing CloudTrail from October 1 onward for the specified account, principal IDs, unusual source networks and indicators, then tracing each role session and rotating exposed credentials while revoking active sessions. For prevention, inventory and remove unused vendor trusts, narrow trusted principals and network sources, treat External IDs as non-secret, limit role permissions, and enable S3 data events or access logs for sensitive buckets. The article notes that management events do not show S3 object reads. A separate October 8-11 activity involving customer-owned keys is not linked to the role-abuse campaign; the ISO's deployment or use could not be confirmed.

### Source excerpt

A threat actor used IAM credentials from Qubole's AWS account to assume integration roles in customer AWS environments. Here's what we observed and how to hunt for it.

## How to Give AI Agents Cloud Access Without Long-Lived Keys

DevFeed: [How to Give AI Agents Cloud Access Without Long-Lived Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-give-ai-agents-cloud-access-without-long-lived-keys-98731.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.lyzr.ai/blog/give-ai-agents-cloud-access-without-long-lived-keys/>)

Author: Lyzr Team

Published: 2026-10-23T09:49:11Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Lyzr.ai](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/lyzr-ai.md>)

Topics: [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Cloud Architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud-architecture.md>), [Security, Identity, & Compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-identity-compliance.md>), [Azure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/azure.md>), [Entra ID](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/entra-id.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-control.md>), [agent-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-identity.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agent-governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-governance.md>), [ai-agent-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-identity.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-control-plane](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-control-plane.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-gateway.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>)

### AI overview

Avoid long-lived cloud keys by having an agent runtime authenticate through workload identity, an attached role or federation, then obtain temporary credentials scoped to the required resources and actions. The implementation depends on runtime and cloud: AWS uses attached IAM roles with STS, IAM Roles Anywhere for X.509-based external workloads, or web identity federation; Google Cloud supports Workload Identity Federation and attached service accounts; Azure uses managed identities or Entra workload identity federation. For sensitive calls, a trusted tool server, gateway or proxy can check permissions and execute operations without exposing raw credentials to the agent, though this is not required everywhere. Short expiry does not compensate for excessive permissions, and temporary credentials do not prevent unsafe actions by an authorized or compromised agent. Monitoring, revocation plans, action controls and governance remain necessary. Opencontroller is presented as a visibility and governance layer; it does not replace cloud IAM, manage secrets, issue STS credentials or configure federation.

### Source excerpt

TL;DR An agent needs to read a storage object, inspect cloud resources or call an internal service. A developer creates an access key, drops it...

## Best practices for integrating IAM Roles Anywhere with your PKI

DevFeed: [Best practices for integrating IAM Roles Anywhere with your PKI](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/best-practices-for-integrating-iam-roles-anywhere-with-your-pki-93081.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/best-practices-for-integrating-iam-roles-anywhere-with-your-pki/>)

Author: Abhishek Avinash Agawane

Published: 2026-10-21T17:03:50Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [principle of ephemerality](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/principle-of-ephemerality.md>)

Tags: [access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-management.md>), [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [amazon-web-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services.md>), [amazon-web-services-aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services-aws.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-certificate-manager](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-certificate-manager.md>), [aws-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-iam.md>), [aws-identity-and-access-management-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-identity-and-access-management-iam.md>), [best](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/best.md>), [best-practices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/best-practices.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [getting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/getting.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [iam-roles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam-roles.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [identity-and-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [pki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pki.md>), [practices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/practices.md>), [roles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/roles.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

IAM Roles Anywhere lets workloads outside AWS exchange CA-signed X.509 certificates for temporary IAM credentials. The article recommends distinct certificates and IAM roles per workload, trust policies that restrict access using certificate-derived subject, issuer or SAN attributes, and session policies to narrow permissions. Trust-anchor placement affects which certificates are accepted; short certificate validity limits exposure, while just-in-time issuance can apply role changes immediately but depends on CA support. Protect private keys with PKCS #11 stores or TPM 2.0 where available; macOS Keychain and Windows certificate stores are also supported. For credentials, SDKs refresh credential_process results in memory, but the AWS CLI invokes it on every command; `serve` avoids that repeated call, while `update` writes credentials to disk and carries file-access risk. The article also recommends expiry monitoring and blue/green trust-anchor rotation. Its sample deployment requires session duration not to exceed the IAM role's MaxSessionDuration and matching configured certificate attributes.

### Source excerpt

Using temporary credentials is a security best practice to reduce the risk from credentials getting compromised. With AWS IAM Roles Anywhere, now your workloads outside of Amazon Web Services (AWS) will be able to access AWS resources by obtaining temporary security credentials in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). IAM Roles Anywhere relies on public [...]

## Netflix Bridges AWS IAM and Internal Identity with Workload Attestation

DevFeed: [Netflix Bridges AWS IAM and Internal Identity with Workload Attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/netflix-bridges-aws-iam-and-internal-identity-with-workload-attestation-92917.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/10/netflix-workload-attestation-aws/>)

Author: Leela Kumili

Published: 2026-10-21T13:45:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [App attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/app-attestation.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [control-plane](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/control-plane.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>)

Tags: [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [amazon-emr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-emr.md>), [apache-spark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apache-spark.md>), [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-iam.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [combines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/combines.md>), [compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compute.md>), [control-plane](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control-plane.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [distributed-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed-systems.md>), [emr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emr.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [identity-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-management.md>), [jobs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jobs.md>), [managed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/managed.md>), [mapreduce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mapreduce.md>), [mechanism](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mechanism.md>), [netflix](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netflix.md>), [netflix-workload-attestation-aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netflix-workload-attestation-aws.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [service-identification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service-identification.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [spark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spark.md>)

### AI overview

Netflix's design lets Spark jobs on Amazon EMR use AWS IAM identity to obtain short-lived internal Metatron X.509 certificates without manually injecting credentials. The control plane maps each Data Project to a dedicated IAM role, signs metadata identifying the intended workload, and distributes roles across dedicated AWS accounts to accommodate many projects. The driver presents an AWS STS GetCallerIdentity pre-signed request; Netflix's Identity service checks the independently verified AWS role against the signed metadata before issuing a certificate. For executor fan-out, the driver attests once and sends credentials over authenticated, encrypted Spark RPC, avoiding per-executor attestation traffic while making the driver a credential-distribution trust boundary. The driver periodically re-attests before its certificate expires; executors do not renew independently. The text says the pattern may also apply to other managed environments with cloud identities and a separate organizational identity.

### Source excerpt

Netflix has developed a workload attestation mechanism for Apache Spark jobs running on Amazon EMR. The design combines AWS IAM identity with signed claims from Netflix's control plane before issuing short-lived internal X.509 certificates, allowing managed compute workloads to authenticate to internal services without directly injecting credentials. By Leela Kumili

## Configuring Terraform IaC pipelines to provision cloud resources in Cloud and Kubernetes...

DevFeed: [Configuring Terraform IaC pipelines to provision cloud resources in Cloud and Kubernetes...](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/configuring-terraform-iac-pipelines-to-provision-cloud-resources-in-cloud-and-kubernetes-90782.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.devops.dev/configuring-terraform-iac-pipelines-to-provision-cloud-resources-in-cloud-and-kubernetes-3ff863fe983e?source=rss----33f8b2d9a328---4>)

Author: Oleh Adam Dubnytskyy

Published: 2026-10-20T13:25:47Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [DevOps.dev](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/devops-dev.md>)

Topics: [Terraform](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/terraform.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [rbac](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rbac.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>), [Amazon S3](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-s3.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [amazon-eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-eks.md>), [amazon-web-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services.md>), [amazon-web-services-aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-web-services-aws.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-iam.md>), [aws-sts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-sts.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eks.md>), [environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/environments.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [iac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iac.md>), [kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pipelines.md>), [resources](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resources.md>), [terraform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/terraform.md>)

### AI overview

The example uses GitHub Actions OIDC federation to obtain temporary AWS credentials for Terraform without storing long-lived AWS keys in GitHub. It provisions an IAM OIDC provider and a role whose trust policy restricts the audience and accepted repository refs, then grants that role AWS permissions for services including EKS, S3, DynamoDB, KMS, IAM, and Secrets Manager. For Kubernetes access, it creates an EKS access entry and shows associating cluster administrator access, with AmazonEKSAdminPolicy or namespace-scoped access as narrower alternatives. The workflow runs Terraform formatting, validation, linting, and planning on pull requests, then applies after merge to main. The author calls this a starting point and recommends separate plan/apply roles, an approval gate, isolated self-hosted runners, and least-privilege Kubernetes access; a GitOps setup with ArgoCD or FluxCD can remove the pipeline's need for cluster access.

### Source excerpt

Configuring Terraform IaC pipelines to provision cloud resources in Cloud and Kubernetes environments How do you build a GitHub Actions workflow that provisions cloud resources securely, without storing long-lived credentials? In this post I'll walk through my setup: GitHub Actions for CI, AWS (including Amazon EKS) as the cloud platform, and Terraform as the IaC tool. Security Secure interaction between CI and Cloud platform practice can be adapted with Open ID Connect in Amazon Web Services. OpenID Connect (OIDC) allows your GitHub Actions workflows to access resources in Amazon Web Services (AWS), without needing to store the AWS credentials as long-lived GitHub secrets. OIDC federation lets external workloads exchange a token from a trusted identity provider for temporary AWS credentials. Here, GitHub signs a short-lived JWT for each job, AWS STS validates it against the IAM OIDC provider and the role's trust policy, and returns credentials that expire automatically, so no AWS keys are stored in GitHub. AWS docs Follow the principle of least privilege for CI/CD. Think twice before granting broad permissions to IaC pipelines that assume roles via OIDC. Step 1. Provision GitHub OIDC provider to IAM # OIDC resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github_actions" { url = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" client_id_list = ["sts.amazonaws.com"] } Step 2. Provision IAM role -- github-actions-iac-pipeline to provision cloud resources in cloud platform. Trusted Entity The trust policy defines which principals can assume the role, and under which conditions. A trust policy is a specific type of resource-based policy for IAM roles. { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::aws-account-id:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", "Condition": { "StringEquals": { "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com" }, "StringLike": { "

## Writing to AWS S3 from Fly.io (in Go)

DevFeed: [Writing to AWS S3 from Fly.io (in Go)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/writing-to-aws-s3-from-fly-io-in-go-89758.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.jvt.me/posts/2026/10/18/fly-s3/>)

Author: Jamie Tanna

Published: 2026-10-18T16:46:39Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Jamie Tanna](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/articles-on-jamie-tanna-software-engineer.md>)

Topics: [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [fly.io](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fly-io.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [IO](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/io.md>)

Tags: [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [blogumentation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blogumentation.md>), [fly](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fly.md>), [fly-io](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fly-io.md>), [go](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/go.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [s3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/s3.md>)

### AI overview

A Go tutorial shows how to obtain a short-lived OpenID Connect token from Fly.io, exchange it through AWS STS for temporary credentials, and use those credentials to write objects to S3. It also gives example IAM trust and bucket policies and notes that overly restrictive trust-policy conditions caused an access-denied error.

### Source excerpt

I'm currently in the process of moving my site's media (under media.jvt.me) from Netlify to AWS S3. The underlying infrastructure for my site that writes this media is hosted on Fly.io, so needs a way to write to S3. I really wanted to avoid long-lived AWS credentials, and fortunately Fly supports OpenID Connect which integrates with AWS' OpenID Connect Federation to allow you to use short-lived OpenID Connect tokens to authenticate as a given IAM role, and then perform any necessary AWS actions. Although Fly has an example with curl, I wanted to blogument the "how to" with Go, as it wasn't super straightforward to do so. I've written this up in a sample repo on GitLab.com. Go code The core pieces are: // via https://gist.github.com/teknoraver/5ffacb8757330715bcbcc90e6d46ac74 var unixClient = http.Client{ Transport: &http.Transport{ DialContext: func(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { return net.Dial("unix", "/.fly/api") }, }, } func getOIDCToken(unixClient http.Client) (string, error) { s3Body := bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"aud":"sts.amazonaws.com"}`)) // or could be `{"aud":"https://sts.amazonaws.com"}` as long as it matches your Trust Policy // get the OIDC token resp, err := unixClient.Post("http://localhost/v1/tokens/oidc", "application/json", s3Body) if err != nil { slog.Error("Failed to call Fly OIDC tokens endpoint", "err", err) return "", err } defer resp.Body.Close() body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) if err != nil { slog.Error("Failed to read body", "err", err) return "", err } return string(body), nil } func newAWSClient(oidcToken string) (*s3.Client, error) { cfg, err := config.LoadDefaultConfig(context.TODO(), config.WithRegion("eu-west-1")) if err != nil { return nil, err } stsClient := sts.NewFromConfig(cfg) assumedRoleInput := &sts.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityInput{ RoleArn: aws.String(os.Getenv("AWS_ASSUME_ROLE_ARN")), RoleSessionName: aws.String("..."), WebIdentityToken: aws.String(oidcToken), } resp, err := stsClient.AssumeRoleWithWeb

## Announcing DPoP Support for Google OAuth: Securing Refresh Tokens

DevFeed: [Announcing DPoP Support for Google OAuth: Securing Refresh Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/announcing-dpop-support-for-google-oauth-securing-refresh-tokens-88204.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://developers.googleblog.com/announcing-dpop-support-for-google-oauth-securing-refresh-tokens/>)

Author: Sergei Akulich; Brian Daugherty

Published: 2026-10-16T02:29:55.043485Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Google Developers Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/google-developers-blog.md>)

Topics: [OAuth](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oauth.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [OAuth 2.0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oauth2.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>)

Tags: [adversary-in-the-middle-aitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary-in-the-middle-aitm.md>), [agent-identities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-identities.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [infostealer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infostealer.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [multi-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-agent.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [refresh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/refresh.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

Google's OAuth platform supports DPoP binding for refresh tokens, cryptographically tying them to a client key pair to reduce theft and replay risks. Short-lived access tokens remain standard bearer tokens to avoid per-request verification overhead. For delegation in multi-agent or MCP workloads, the article recommends Google Cloud STS to issue short-lived federated tokens bound to each agent's key.

### Source excerpt

Google OAuth Platform now supports DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) to sender-constrain refresh tokens, neutralizing Infostealer malware and adversary-in-the-middle attacks. By cryptographically binding long-lived refresh tokens while maintaining short-lived access tokens as standard Bearer tokens, developers achieve robust credential security without incurring high-QPS API performance overhead. Additionally, developers integrating multi-agent or Model Context Protocol (MCP) workloads can use Google Cloud Secure Token Service (STS) to handle secure token delegation across agent chains.

## Penetration testing every deployment with AWS Continuum

DevFeed: [Penetration testing every deployment with AWS Continuum](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/penetration-testing-every-deployment-with-aws-continuum-87255.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/penetration-testing-every-deployment-with-aws-continuum/>)

Author: Jigar Bhatt

Published: 2026-10-14T20:21:52Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [Application Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/application-security.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>)

Tags: [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [generative-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generative-ai.md>), [penetration-testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/penetration-testing.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>)

### AI overview

The tutorial explains how to use AWS Continuum for penetration testing as a CI/CD gate that tests deployed changes in staging before production promotion. It covers OIDC authentication, IAM permissions, severity thresholds, baseline tracking, and credential protection. Report-only runs advance the baseline, and infrastructure errors allow promotion by default unless configured otherwise.

### Source excerpt

Most security tooling that fits into a CI/CD pipeline--static analysis (SAST), software composition analysis (SCA), and dynamic scanners (DAST)--flags potential issues from patterns and signatures. A flagged pattern shows you where to look; penetration testing is what confirms whether something is actually exploitable. That confirmation has traditionally come from a periodic, out-of-band engagement that runs [...]

## Modernizing External Volume Access with Workload Identity Federation

DevFeed: [Modernizing External Volume Access with Workload Identity Federation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/modernizing-external-volume-access-with-workload-identity-federation-84258.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://medium.com/snowflake/modernizing-external-volume-access-with-workload-identity-federation-e5adadde26d0?source=rss----34b6daafc07---4>)

Author: Andries Engelbrecht

Published: 2026-10-09T16:21:12Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Snowflake Builders](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/snowflake-builders.md>)

Topics: [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [Zero Trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zero-trust.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>)

Tags: [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [approach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/approach.md>), [architect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architect.md>), [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [auditability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auditability.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-sts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-sts.md>), [better](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/better.md>), [building](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/building.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [cases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cases.md>), [changes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changes.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [data-lake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-lake.md>), [data-lakehouse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-lakehouse.md>), [external](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/external.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [modernizing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/modernizing.md>), [snowflake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/snowflake.md>), [volume](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/volume.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>), [workload-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workload-identity.md>)

### AI overview

Snowflake's Workload Identity Federation for External Volumes, in Private Preview, replaces a shared Snowflake IAM principal and external-ID trust with a short-lived OIDC token and a unique identity for each volume. AWS STS validates the token and returns temporary credentials for the authorized role. Per-volume `sub` conditions can isolate access by storage location and make it easier to review, revoke, and audit. The AWS setup registers Snowflake's issuer, creates a web identity role and S3 policy, creates the volume with `AUTH_TYPE = 'WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_FEDERATION'`, then adds the volume's exact, case-sensitive subject to the role trust policy before verification. The initial audience-only policy permits any account volume to assume the role, so the subject condition is needed for per-volume isolation. Use requires Snowflake account enablement; the authentication type is fixed at volume creation, and role rotation requires adding a storage location and removing the old one.

### Source excerpt

As organizations embrace open and interoperable data architectures, they are also rethinking how data platforms access cloud storage. It is no longer enough for that access model to simply work -- it also needs to meet a higher bar for security, control, and auditability. That is the idea behind Workload Identity Federation (WIF) for External Volumes, now in Private Preview. WIF gives Snowflake customers a more modern way to connect to cloud storage using short-lived, federated identity instead of stored credentials. Key Contributors: Bonny Mahajan, Product Manager, Snowflake James Sun, Senior Partner Solution Engineer, Snowflake Bosco Albuquerque, Senior Partner Solutions Architect, AWS Why This Matters Many customers are building architectures designed for openness and interoperability. As those environments scale, more critical data lives in customer-managed cloud storage, and the path used to access that data becomes part of the security posture. Customers want stronger boundaries around who or what can access each storage location. They want tighter control, clearer isolation, and an access model that better aligns with evolving enterprise security expectations. What Changes with WIF Traditionally, storage access has relied on a shared trust model. Under this approach, a shared Snowflake-managed IAM principal executes sts:AssumeRole against your designated role, relying on an external ID within the trust policy to mitigate confused-deputy risks. While this model uses temporary AWS STS credentials, it relies on a shared Snowflake principal. That model is proven, but it can make it harder to create clean separation across storage locations and use cases. WIF replaces that approach with short-lived, federated identity. Instead of routing access through a shared principal, Snowflake uses a unique identity for each external volume. When Snowflake needs to access your cloud storage, it signs a short-lived identity token, your cloud provider validates it, and Snowflake

## Beyond valid credentials: How exposed AWS keys are tested for Amazon Bedrock access

DevFeed: [Beyond valid credentials: How exposed AWS keys are tested for Amazon Bedrock access](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access-65392.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/>)

Author: Martin McCloskey

Published: 2026-10-06T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Datadog Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/datadog-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Security, Identity, & Compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-identity-compliance.md>), [Amazon Bedrock](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-bedrock.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>)

Tags: [amazon-bedrock](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>)

### AI overview

The article examines how attackers test stolen AWS credentials for Amazon Bedrock access, including checks with AWS STS and Bedrock APIs, and describes observed credential validation activity. It advises defenders to investigate unexpected Bedrock activity as an early sign of possible credential abuse.

### Source excerpt

In this post, we share LLM-specific validation patterns that attackers use to test exposed AWS credentials for Amazon Bedrock access.

## Exploring AWS STS AssumeRoot

DevFeed: [Exploring AWS STS AssumeRoot](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/exploring-aws-sts-assumeroot-48892.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/blog/exploring-aws-sts-assumeroot>)

Author: Terrance DeJesus

Published: 2024-12-10T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/siem-security.md>), [AWS CloudTrail](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-cloudtrail.md>), [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Terraform](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/terraform.md>), [Python](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/python.md>)

Tags: [aws-sts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-sts.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [cloudtrail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudtrail.md>), [detection-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection-engineering.md>), [least-privilege](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/least-privilege.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [siem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/siem.md>), [terraform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/terraform.md>)

### AI overview

This article examines AWS STS AssumeRoot, explaining how temporary credentials work, the risks of over-permissioned roles, and how attackers could abuse the operation for privilege escalation or account compromise. It also discusses practical scenarios and detection opportunities using Elastic SIEM and AWS CloudTrail data.

### Source excerpt

Explore AWS STS AssumeRoot, its risks, detection strategies, and practical scenarios to secure against privilege escalation and account compromise using Elastic's SIEM and CloudTrail data.

## AWS OIDC Authentication with SPIFFE

DevFeed: [AWS OIDC Authentication with SPIFFE](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/aws-oidc-authentication-with-spiffe-15540.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://developer.squareup.com/blog/aws-oidc-authentication-with-spiffe>)

Author: Roy Xu

Published: 2021-08-26T19:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Square Corner](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/square-corner-blog-medium.md>)

Topics: [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [SPIFFE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/spiffe.md>), [SPIRE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/spire.md>), [Amazon Web Services](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [data centers](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-centers.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [spiffe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spiffe.md>)

### AI overview

Square describes replacing long-lived AWS access keys stored in Keywhiz with short-lived credentials issued through OIDC federation between SPIRE identities and AWS roles. App owners create OIDC-compatible roles with Terraform modules and add a role ARN to their P2 manifest; a generated credentials file invokes `spiffe-aws-assume-role` through the AWS SDK's `credential_process`. The tool requests a signed JWT from the local SPIRE agent and exchanges it with AWS STS. Square publishes SPIRE JWKS and OIDC metadata by syncing them to S3 and serving them through CloudFront, improving availability and avoiding per-request calls into its datacenter. Tokens use the AWS account ID as audience to limit use of a stolen token to that account; the article notes a token could still access other roles available to the app there. Square reports the system reached general availability and app migrations were proceeding smoothly.

### Source excerpt

Easy authentication with automated AWS credentials

## How AWS IAM role, STS and Identity Pool work together

DevFeed: [How AWS IAM role, STS and Identity Pool work together](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-aws-iam-role-sts-and-identity-pool-work-together-29587.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://goteleport.com/blog/aws-iam-role-sts-and-identity-pool/>)

Author: info@goteleport.com (Shuo Yang)

Published: 2021-06-23T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Teleport](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/teleport.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Amazon Cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-cognito.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [Application Development](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/application-development.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [amazon-cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cognito.md>), [application-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-development.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-iam.md>), [aws-sts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-sts.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [programming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/programming.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how AWS IAM roles, AWS STS, and Amazon Cognito Identity Pools work together to let applications obtain temporary AWS credentials. It describes the flow from an OIDC token issued by a Cognito User Pool to temporary credentials obtained through STS and subsequent access to AWS resources.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to access AWS resources using Cognito Identity Pool in combination with AWS STS to provide temporary credentials without long-lived keys.

## Behind the scenes of GitHub Token Scanning

DevFeed: [Behind the scenes of GitHub Token Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/behind-the-scenes-of-github-token-scanning-69166.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/engineering/platform-security/behind-the-scenes-of-github-token-scanning/>)

Author: Patrick Toomey

Published: 2018-10-17T17:30:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-engineering.md>), [GitHub Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>)

Tags: [cloud-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-infrastructure.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [platform-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform-security.md>), [scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scanning.md>)

### AI overview

GitHub describes extending Token Scanning beyond GitHub OAuth and personal access tokens to cover cloud provider tokens and other credentials. The article explains that a Go scanner using Hyperscan replaced a Git-integrated assembly implementation, enabling scans for multiple credential formats across public repository changes and Gists. Providers can validate detected credentials and decide whether to revoke them.

### Source excerpt

We've extended GitHub Token Scanning to include tokens from cloud service providers and additional credentials.

## Secure (and usable) multi-AWS account IAM setup

DevFeed: [Secure (and usable) multi-AWS account IAM setup](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/secure-and-usable-multi-aws-account-iam-setup-83505.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.datadoghq.com/blog/engineering/secure-aws-account-iam-setup/>)

Author: Alexis Le-Quoc

Published: 2017-09-20T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Datadog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/datadog.md>)

Topics: [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [blast-radius](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blast-radius.md>), [multiple-accounts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multiple-accounts.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

The tutorial describes a multi-account AWS IAM design that centralizes users in one account and grants privileged access through temporary, MFA-protected role assumptions. It walks through users, groups, roles, and delegation policies for network, compute, and administrative access. The author notes that IAM group membership limits constrain the design's scalability.

### Source excerpt

If you are part of the team managing the AWS infrastructure at your organization, you've likely had to wrestle with the complexity of managing multiple accounts for some time now.