# BGP BGP is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol that exchanges network reachability information between BGP systems. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## MPLS/VPN with SR-MPLS Core DevFeed: [MPLS/VPN with SR-MPLS Core]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-15T05:45:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [SR-MPLS](), [MPLS VPN](), [networking](), [BGP](), [IS-IS](), [Network](), [GitHub]() Tags: [bgp](), [devices](), [github](), [is-is](), [mpls](), [mpls-vpn](), [netlab](), [sr-mpls](), [vpn]() ### AI overview This article explains how to build and test an MPLS/VPN service over an SR-MPLS core. It describes the required lab topology changes, including enabling MPLS/VPN, disabling LDP, configuring PE routers with IS-IS, SR-MPLS, BGP, MPLS, and VRF modules, and moving PE-to-host links into tenant VRFs. It also outlines how to run the lab using GitHub Codespaces, an Arista cEOS container, and netlab. ### Source excerpt As we discussed in the BGP-Free Core with SR-MPLS blog post, SR-MPLS works as a drop-in replacement for the traditional MPLS control plane. No wonder it works well (when properly implemented) with MPLS/VPN services - the second "fun" scenario in my ITNOG10 Segment Routing workshop. It uses the same topology as the BGP-Free Core scenario: Simplest possible MPLS/VPN network with SR-MPLS core Read more ... ## Indian backbones need AS\_PATH filters DevFeed: [Indian backbones need AS\_PATH filters]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-07T20:11:07Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Security]() Tags: [airtel](), [as4755](), [as55836](), [as9498](), [bgp](), [india](), [jio](), [network](), [rcom](), [routing](), [tata-comm]() ### AI overview The article argues that route leaks are a longstanding security problem for India's routing infrastructure. It explains limitations of IRR AS-SETs, discusses ASPA and AS_PATH filters or peer lock, and questions whether major Indian backbones can consistently apply those filters because of indirect routing and smaller downstream networks. ### Source excerpt The security of India's routing infrastructure is something that isn't discussed as much as cybersecurity, software vulnerabilities, etc. Part of the blame for that has to go to our industry, which is relatively closed when it comes to sharing incidents and also lacks good documentation on the deployment side of things. Some of these things came to light after the RCom (AS18101) BGP hijack of Telegram prefixes in June 2026. One silent problem for a long time has been route leaks. BGP route leak Route leaks happen when a network ends up announcing a route to a BGP adjacency where it is not supposed to announce that route. Take, for example, a network "leaking" routes learnt from a peer to transit, or vice versa. One can filter downstreams which are small, but it's very hard to filter large downstream networks which have further downstreams, or if one is far removed from that ASN. IRR AS-SETs exist for this reason, but they have not worked well due to tooling challenges. Furthermore, IRR (Internet Routing Registry) by design is a public register where one "publishes intent" before actually doing that in BGP, and then anyone can match the intent with the state in BGP. New tech ASPA will help address this issue, but it's new, vendor support is still in the development phase and it will take its own adoption time. AS_PATH filters / Peer lock This is older tech which can play a very effective role in controlling leaks. If network A decides to peer with network B, they both can agree to announce all routes to each other over the peering & agree to reject each other's ASN from all other BGP sessions. It's a common practice between large transit-free Tier-1 networks as well as major backbones and is often referred to by the fancy name of "peer lock". In India, I doubt backbones like Airtel, Jio, and Tata Comm can have AS_PATH filters rejecting each other from everywhere except direct sessions because there is some indirect routing visible all the time. It could be because of ## BGP-Free Core with SR-MPLS DevFeed: [BGP-Free Core with SR-MPLS]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-03T05:30:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [SR-MPLS](), [BGP](), [networking](), [Network](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Containers](), [Linux](), [GitHub]() Tags: [bgp](), [containers](), [edge](), [examples](), [github](), [is-is](), [linux](), [mpls](), [netlab](), [network](), [router](), [routing](), [sr-mpls]() ### AI overview This article demonstrates how to build a BGP-free transport core with SR-MPLS using netlab. It describes a lab topology with IS-IS, BGP, Linux container hosts, and PE routers, then shows how SR-MPLS labels provide end-to-end connectivity without BGP routes on the core router. ### Source excerpt The beauty of SR-MPLS is that it's a drop-in replacement for the traditional (LDP- or RSVP-based) MPLS control plane. For example, you could replace LDP with SR-MPLS in a network using MPLS to implement a BGP-free transport core, and it just keeps working. This scenario was the first "fun" scenario in the ITNOG10 Segment Routing workshop. The core network uses the same topology as in the previous examples; I added two hosts and BGP routing. Simplest possible network using a BGP-free core Read more ... ## The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace DevFeed: [The IRR Landscape: What RPKI Can Replace]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthias Wichtlhuber Published: 2026-09-01T12:20:33Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing Security](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Databases](), [Internet]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [competition](), [data](), [database](), [ixps](), [measurements](), [overview](), [research](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [series]() ### AI overview This article analyzes which parts of the Internet Route Registry landscape can safely be replaced by RPKI using traffic and route-server data from AMS-IX and DE-CIX. It concludes that third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain important for BGP filter generation. ### Source excerpt In the third part of our IRR landscape series, we use traffic measurements from AMS-IX and DE-CIX to assess which parts of the IRR landscape can safely be replaced with RPKI. Third-party ROUTE(6) objects can largely be phased out, while third-party AS-SETs remain essential for BGP filter generation. ## Arista cEOS Does Not Apply ACLs to Control-Plane Traffic DevFeed: [Arista cEOS Does Not Apply ACLs to Control-Plane Traffic]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-08-24T05:20:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [Network](), [BGP](), [Containers](), [Finite-state machine](), [configuration]() Tags: [bgp](), [containers](), [netlab](), [network](), [release](), [security](), [testing]() ### AI overview The article reports that Arista cEOS containers do not apply inbound ACLs to control-plane traffic or to traffic sent to the container's own IP addresses. This behavior differs from Arista vEOS virtual machines and can cause BGP connectivity tests using ACLs to produce unexpected results. ### Source excerpt When someone starts singing the Use Digital Twins to Test Your Network hymn (or, more recently, tells you how AI agents can do that to validate their ideas), ask them about these minor details. If they persist, point them (not that it would help) to this long list of gotchas. That list just got longer: Arista cEOS container does not apply inbound ACLs to control-plane traffic (Arista vEOS VM does). Read more ... ## BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234 DevFeed: [BGP Role model: tracking the adoption of RFC 9234]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Mingwei Zhang Published: 2026-08-18T15:21:32Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Cloudflare Blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Networks](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Cloudflare](), [Monitoring]() Tags: [analysis](), [bgp](), [cloudflare](), [internet](), [monitoring](), [network](), [networks](), [research](), [router](), [routing](), [routing-security](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article examines the adoption of RFC 9234, which uses BGP Roles and the Only to Customer (OTC) attribute to help routers prevent and detect route leaks. Cloudflare measured deployment through its global peering presence and found that two large Tier-1 networks were stripping OTC attributes from forwarded routes. ### Source excerpt RFC 9234 lets routers reject route leaks on their own, using BGP Roles and the Only to Customer attribute. We measured who has deployed it, and found two Tier 1 networks unexpectedly stripping OTC. ## Exploring the BGP Neighbor CONNECT State DevFeed: [Exploring the BGP Neighbor CONNECT State]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-08-18T05:16:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Finite-state machine](), [Routing (disambiguation)]() Tags: [bgp](), [blog-post](), [debug](), [routing]() ### AI overview An exploration of how Cisco IOS/XE presents the BGP neighbor CONNECT state during an incoming TCP session. The article tests several lab scenarios involving passive neighbors, static discard routes, ACLs, and suppressed ICMP unreachable messages, finding that CONNECT appears in BGP debugging output while the neighbor remains Idle in the displayed operational state. ### Source excerpt Sakar left an interesting comment on my The Curious Case of the BGP Connect State blog post, claiming that Cisco IOS/XE goes through a CONNECT state when opening an incoming BGP session. I wanted to double-check this behavior, so I needed a scenario where one router would keep sending TCP SYN requests, the other would not (or we wouldn't learn anything), and the two routers could not communicate (or they'd quickly go into the OPEN state). Here's my first attempt at meeting those requirements: Read more ... ## Using Cisco Prefix Lists Inside Route Maps for BGP Filtering DevFeed: [Using Cisco Prefix Lists Inside Route Maps for BGP Filtering]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-08-11T14:48:44Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [Cisco](), [Network]() Tags: [bgp](), [bgp-filtering](), [cisco](), [internet-architecture](), [network-engineering](), [network-engineering-resources](), [prefix-lists](), [route-maps](), [routing-policy]() ### AI overview This tutorial explains how Cisco prefix lists and route maps work together for BGP filtering. Prefix lists define which routes match, while route maps apply actions such as permitting, denying, or modifying route attributes. It also describes route-map sequence order and implicit deny behavior. ### Source excerpt Prefix lists define which BGP routes match a policy. Route maps use those matches to permit routes, deny them, or change attributes such as local preference. The post Using Cisco Prefix Lists Inside Route Maps for BGP Filtering appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Worth Reading 080826 DevFeed: [Worth Reading 080826]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-08-08T14:34:21Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](), [BGP](), [Open Source Models & Datasets]() Tags: [ai](), [bgp](), [open-source](), [worth-reading]() ### AI overview A roundup titled "Worth Reading 080826" includes commentary about workplace surveillance, the possibility of an AI industry crash, BGP community configuration and route selection, and conflict within U.S. AI company leadership over open-source AI. ### Source excerpt Would you work differently if you knew every keystroke was being saved, every website logged, every idle minute counted against you? Everything I read about the AI industry leads me to think there will be an AI crash. I designed this to help with different BGP communities and configuring them on your routers. It's commonly believed that when selecting between a number of routes for the same address prefix, a BGP speaker will select the route with the shortest AS Path. There is an interesting fight within the leadership of U.S. AI companies. It is between the supporters of open-source AI and those driven to oppose open-source AI. ## Why your KubeVirt VMs can't move between clusters -- and how EVPN fixes it DevFeed: [Why your KubeVirt VMs can't move between clusters -- and how EVPN fixes it]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Miguel Duarte Barroso Published: 2026-08-08T14:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Kubernetes Overview, News and Trends | The New Stack]() Topics: [evpn](), [networking](), [BGP](), [configuration]() Tags: [bgp](), [cncf](), [configuration](), [evpn](), [kubernetes](), [kubernetes-networking](), [network](), [networking](), [platform-engineering](), [post-contributed](), [sponsor-cncf](), [sponsored-post-contributed]() ### AI overview The article explains why moving KubeVirt virtual machines between Kubernetes clusters requires a stretched Layer 2 network and a separate migration path. It presents EVPN/VXLAN, managed by OpenPERouter through Kubernetes custom resources, as an overlay-based approach intended to preserve VM IP and MAC addresses while separating migration traffic. ### Source excerpt Your team has moved VMs to Kubernetes with KubeVirt. The workloads are running. The team is gaining confidence. Then someone The post Why your KubeVirt VMs can't move between clusters -- and how EVPN fixes it appeared first on The New Stack. ## History of Transit-Free (Tier 1) Networks DevFeed: [History of Transit-Free (Tier 1) Networks]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-08-05T21:48:07Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Personal blog of Anurag Bhatia]() Topics: [Routing (disambiguation)](), [BGP](), [networking](), [Internet]() Tags: [as1](), [as1239](), [as174](), [as701](), [bgp](), [history](), [networks](), [ripe-ris](), [routing](), [tier1](), [transit]() ### AI overview The article examines the history of transit-free, or Tier 1, networks and tracks when autonomous systems became or ceased to be transit-free. It discusses historical evidence from BGP routing table dumps, RIPE RIS, Oregon Route Views, and related records. ### Source excerpt I find the concept of transit-free / Tier 1 networks fascinating. These are networks which, by definition, are transit-free. They do not have any transit and can reach the entire routing table just through peering relationships. The importance of these networks has reduced over time as more and more peering happens directly between eyeball networks and content networks. But regardless, I always find it fascinating that these networks effectively define the full autonomy of the internet routing table. Together with the trust in 13 magical root DNS servers and these transit-free networks define what we call "the internet" today. I was once chatting with my friend and guru Martin Levy (now happily retired) about which networks were possibly transit-free when the internet started. He suggested that Wikipedia history on Tier 1 networks has many of them. The challenge with the Wikipedia page on Tier 1 networks is that the list of transit-free networks appears on 14 Nov 2005. This leaves a gap around which networks were transit-free before Nov 2005. Before Nov 2005, Nov 2005 and till now I had an email exchange with Mr Randy Bush and he kindly replied with some hints. According to him AS701/702/703/704 (UUnet / now Verizon), AS174 (PSI / now Cogent), AS1 (BBN) and AS1239 (Sprint) were transit-free networks before this period. The oldest routing dump on RIPE RIS is from 1999 but those dumps are very small and contain too few routes to establish anything. RIPE RRC00 from September 1999 has "view" files, which are essentially a "sh ip bgp dump" and the following month they seem to have moved to the MRT format. On Oregon Route Views, the oldest I can find is this dump from 08 Nov 1997. This brings me to a possible, although not perfect, method to document the history of transit-free networks. Timeline Method Before-Nov 1997 Assume AS1, AS1239, AS701 and AS174 to be transit-free and find who else was adjacent to all of them along with BGP routing table dumps Pre - Nov 2005 Use ## Worth Reading 080126 DevFeed: [Worth Reading 080126]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-08-01T13:09:17Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [DevOps](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [BGP](), [Encryption](), [Internet](), [Latency](), [Cloud](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [Databases](), [event driven](), [Artificial Intelligence]() Tags: [ai](), [article](), [bgp](), [cloud](), [databases](), [devops](), [encryption](), [event-driven](), [internet](), [latency](), [software](), [storage](), [systems](), [worth-reading]() ### AI overview A curated "Worth Reading" roundup covering goodput and latency targets, the efficiency costs of Big AI, internet infrastructure and BGP's ORIGIN attribute, and current debates over end-to-end encryption. ### Source excerpt The honest target is goodput, meaning requests per second that actually met your latency targets. Count anything else and you are counting cold plates. I find it strange that as a software industry, we put in so much effort to make our systems efficient to design, build, and scale with DevOps practices, cloud native architectures, event-driven functions, optimized databases and storage, and resource-sipping Lean IT -- then we threw it all out the window when Big AI came along. If there is one universal law in internet infrastructure, it is that no good intention goes unpunished by the practical realities of legacy software maintenance. This Article updates and expands on 2012 research on encryption and globalization, analyzing what the authors call "Round 3" of the Going Dark Debate: the current controversies over end-to-end encryption (E2EE). Using our unique position on the Internet, we took an investigative look at one of the well-known mandatory attributes in BGP, the ORIGIN attribute. ## The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker DevFeed: [The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-31T12:17:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [App](), [Cisco](), [MikroTik]() Tags: [application](), [bgp](), [irr](), [j2-networks](), [j2-updates](), [network-engineering-resources](), [network-tools](), [network-troubleshooting](), [prefix-advertisement](), [ripe-ris](), [roa](), [routing](), [routing-policy](), [rpki](), [visibility]() ### AI overview This article describes the J2SW Prefix Advertisement Checker, an application that evaluates an exact IPv4 or IPv6 prefix using live BGP data. It reports observed origin ASNs from RIPE RIS collectors, collector visibility, RPKI/ROA status, and matching IRR route objects, with an optional expected origin ASN for comparison. ### Source excerpt A prefix can appear in the global BGP table and still have a routing problem. The route may originate from the wrong ASN. Its ROA may also authorize a shorter prefix but reject the advertised prefix length. Checking each part normally means pulling data from several routing tools. The J2SW Prefix Advertisement Checker, my 3rd ... Read more The post The Third App from J2sw: Prefix Advertisement Checker appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Introducing the J2SW BGP Community Builder DevFeed: [Introducing the J2SW BGP Community Builder]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-29T18:30:21Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [configuration]() Tags: [aws-direct-connect](), [bgp](), [bgp-communities](), [builder](), [cisco](), [cogent](), [frrouting](), [hurricane-electric](), [juniper](), [mikrotik](), [network-engineering-resources](), [ntt](), [routing-policy]() ### AI overview The J2SW BGP Community Builder helps users select documented provider communities and routing actions, then generates scoped configuration fragments. It includes RFC well-known communities and policies from AWS Direct Connect, NTT DATA, Hurricane Electric, and Cogent Communications, with support for MikroTik RouterOS 7, Cisco IOS-XE, Juniper Junos, and FRRouting. ### Source excerpt The J2SW BGP Community Builder selects documented provider communities and generates scoped policy fragments for MikroTik, Cisco, Junos, and FRRouting. The post Introducing the J2SW BGP Community Builder appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Why Your Traffic Didn't go the way you expected DevFeed: [Why Your Traffic Didn't go the way you expected]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-28T15:16:02Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking]() Tags: [bgp](), [fd-ix](), [network-engineering](), [network-operations](), [networking](), [peering](), [routing](), [routing-table](), [transit]() ### AI overview This troubleshooting article explains why traffic may not use an expected peering path even when a BGP session is established. It focuses on routing-table selection, Local Preference, BGP policy, and the possibility that return traffic follows a different path. ### Source excerpt 3 Mintue read timeJustin Wilson PacketsDownRange A common problem I run into when diagnosing route issues is traffic not going across the path it's supposed to. An established BGP session only means the routers successfully exchanged routes. It says nothing about which route your router actually installed in the forwarding table. Let's get into some ... Read more The post Why Your Traffic Didn't go the way you expected appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Understanding BGP Route Types: Full Routes vs Partial vs Default vs Customer Routes DevFeed: [Understanding BGP Route Types: Full Routes vs Partial vs Default vs Customer Routes]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-24T16:28:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [Internet](), [gateway](), [Networks]() Tags: [bgp](), [cpu](), [flexibility](), [internet-architecture](), [isp](), [memory](), [network-engineering](), [network-operations](), [route](), [router](), [routing](), [routing-policy](), [routing-table](), [traffic-engineering](), [visibility]() ### AI overview This article explains BGP route choices, comparing default routes, full routes, partial routes, and customer routes. It describes the tradeoffs between small routing tables, Internet visibility, traffic engineering control, and router resource requirements. ### Source excerpt 5 minute read time.Justin Wilson j2sw.com When you configure a BGP session, one of the first questions is what routes you actually want to receive. If you have ever filled out a questionnaire with Hurricane Electric or another transit provider, they ask you what "kind" of routes you want. In this article, I plan to ... Read more The post Understanding BGP Route Types: Full Routes vs Partial vs Default vs Customer Routes appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Worth Reading 072226 DevFeed: [Worth Reading 072226]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-07-22T20:46:22Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [Authentication](), [Internet](), [datacenter](), [ai-coding](), [cursor](), [Security](), [BGP](), [data](), [coding]() Tags: [ai](), [ai-coding](), [authentication](), [bgp](), [code](), [coding](), [data](), [data-center](), [development](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [security](), [software](), [software-development](), [worth-reading]() ### AI overview A curated reading list covering advances in email authentication, community concerns about data centers, the security risks and costs of AI-generated code, changes affecting BGP, and consistency in distributed Internet infrastructure. ### Source excerpt Email authentication has quietly held the internet's mail together for two decades, and it has just taken its biggest step forward yet. A few months ago in Mercer County, Kentucky, more than 200 residents packed a planning and zoning commission meeting until every seat was filled, with citizens standing along the walls. Yard signs reading "NO DATA CENTER" lined farm roads from Harrodsburg to Burgin. AI coding tools have changed the software development world in a few short years, but security risks and rising costs associated with AI-generated code mean organizations should consider their potential return on investment (ROI) before jumping into the deep end. A recent PING episode noted that, for the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) at least, 'the shape of the curve' appears to have changed. Today's Internet runs on a vast infrastructure of replicated data, and the difference between order and chaos lies in maintaining consistency through synchronization across the many distributed points where that data is published. ## Inside a Shutdown: BGP Evidence from an Operator Who Was There DevFeed: [Inside a Shutdown: BGP Evidence from an Operator Who Was There]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Md.Kamruzzaman Khan Published: 2026-07-22T11:29:16Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Cloudflare](), [Internet]() Tags: [api](), [article](), [bgp](), [cloudflare](), [competition](), [internet](), [network](), [outage](), [outages](), [radar](), [research](), [ris](), [routing]() ### AI overview This article examines Bangladesh's July 2024 internet shutdown through public BGP routing data and firsthand observations from one affected network. It compares operator experiences with measurements from RIPE RIS, Cloudflare Radar, IODA, and OONI, while explaining what the data can and cannot establish about the event. ### Source excerpt When Bangladesh vanished from the global routing table in July 2024, public routing data captured the event as it unfolded. Drawing on first-hand observations from inside one affected network, this article explores what that data can and cannot tell us. ## Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating DevFeed: [Beyond Origin Validation: Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Antonio Prado Published: 2026-07-21T12:33:47Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [networking](), [Routing Security](), [Security]() Tags: [2025](), [article](), [attacks](), [bgp](), [internet-attacks](), [operational](), [routing-security](), [rpki](), [security](), [validation]() ### AI overview The article argues that RPKI and cryptographic origin validation do not cover every BGP attack. It describes a malformed Prefix-SID incident that caused widespread updates and session resets, then presents a taxonomy of four macro-categories and eight micro-categories for routing attacks and their operational defences. ### Source excerpt RPKI has made real progress against prefix hijacking. But when you map every known class of BGP attack against the defences that exist, four of them turn out to sit entirely outside cryptographic validation: handled with local filters, static thresholds and reactive response. ## Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers? DevFeed: [Who's Running All Those Tiny RPKI Servers?]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ties Dirksen Published: 2026-07-20T07:57:23Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [RIPE Labs]() Topics: [BGP](), [Routing (disambiguation)](), [networking](), [Server]() Tags: [bgp](), [infrastructure](), [internet](), [internet-infrastructure](), [publication](), [research](), [routing](), [rpki](), [servers]() ### AI overview This article investigates the independently operated RPKI publication servers that supplement the Regional Internet Registries and help secure BGP routing. It explains how RPKI and Route Origin Authorisations reduce the risk of accidental or malicious prefix hijacks. ### Source excerpt Who runs the hidden infrastructure behind secure Internet routing? An internship report from SIDN Labs looks beyond the RIRs at the independently operated RPKI publication servers helping to secure BGP. ## Sentinelle, un outil pour analyser le routage de votre réseau DevFeed: [Sentinelle, un outil pour analyser le routage de votre réseau]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-07-14T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: fr Sources: [Blog de Stéphane Bortzmeyer]() Topics: [BGP](), [configuration]() Tags: [article](), [bgp](), [blog](), [rpki]() ### AI overview This article reviews Sentinelle, a tool that analyzes an autonomous system's BGP routing configuration and security, including RPKI protection. It demonstrates the tool with several AS examples and briefly describes features available in its free and paid offerings. ### Source excerpt Vous gérez un AS ou, tout simplement, vous êtes curieux du routage d'un réseau que vous utilisez ? Il existe plusieurs outils d'analyse de la configuration et de la sécurité du routage, aujourd'hui, voyons un des plus récents, Sentinelle (https://sentinelle-routage.fr/). ## netlab 26.07: GRE, Wireguard, Graceful Restart, and Scale-Out Labs DevFeed: [netlab 26.07: GRE, Wireguard, Graceful Restart, and Scale-Out Labs]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-07-13T06:23:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [ipSpace.net blog]() Topics: [releases](), [BGP](), [Server](), [evpn](), [VXLAN](), [configuration](), [GitHub]() Tags: [bgp](), [configuration](), [evpn](), [getting-started](), [github](), [gre](), [guide](), [installation](), [netlab](), [ospf](), [policy](), [release](), [releases](), [router](), [upgrade](), [vxlan]() ### AI overview The netlab 26.07 release adds scale-out labs through a multiserver plugin, GRE and WireGuard tunnel support, graceful restart capabilities, BGP policy roles, and expanded BIRD, FortiOS, MikroTik RouterOS, and OpenBSD functionality. It also removes the VirtualBox provider, makes BIRD v3 the default, and changes MikroTik RouterOS 7 BGP template syntax. ### Source excerpt The highlights of netlab release 26.07 include: The multiserver plugin by @muddyblack distributes containerlab devices across multiple servers. The GRE tunnel plugin supports GRE tunnels on Cisco IOS, FRR, VyOS, and Junos (vSRX and vJunos-router) (most device implementations done by @ssasso and @jbemmel). The WireGuard tunnel plugin by @jbemmel supports WireGuard tunnels on FRR. The bgp.session plugin and the OSPF module support graceful restart on Arista EOS, BIRD, FortiOS, and FRR (by @jbemmel and @a-v-popov) The bgp.policy plugin supports the bgp.role attribute on FRR and BIRD (by @jbemmel). But wait, there's more ;) Read more ... ## Isovalent Networking for Kubernetes 1.19: BGP Route Import, Policy Tiers, and Timescape enhancements DevFeed: [Isovalent Networking for Kubernetes 1.19: BGP Route Import, Policy Tiers, and Timescape enhancements]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Dean Lewis Published: 2026-07-10T08:58:39Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Isovalent - The latest articles covering eBPF-based Networking, Observability, and Security]() Topics: [networking](), [Kubernetes](), [BGP](), [import]() Tags: [bgp](), [import](), [isovalent](), [kubernetes](), [latest](), [networking](), [release]() ### AI overview Isovalent Networking for Kubernetes 1.19 is presented as a release featuring BGP route import, policy tiers, and Timescape enhancements. ### Source excerpt Learn about the latest Isovalent Networking for Kubernetes 1.19 release ## RFC 10005: BGP Community for link capacity DevFeed: [RFC 10005: BGP Community for link capacity]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-01T13:31:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [BGP](), [standard](), [Load Balancing](), [Network]() Tags: [bgp](), [capacity](), [internet](), [load-balancing](), [network](), [network-operations](), [rfc](), [rfc-10005](), [route](), [routers](), [routing](), [standard](), [traffic]() ### AI overview RFC 10005 defines a BGP extended community for carrying link bandwidth information in routes. When multiple BGP paths are eligible, routers can use the value to weight traffic according to link capacity, while normal best-path policy still determines route eligibility. The RFC is currently a draft. ### Source excerpt RFC 10005 defines a BGP extended community that lets a router attach link bandwidth information to a route. Another router can use that value when it spreads traffic across multiple BGP paths. RFC 10005 matters because links are not always of the same capacity. This RFC provides routers with a standard way to carry bandwidth ... Read more The post RFC 10005: BGP Community for link capacity appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). [Next page]()