# Certificate Transparency

A protocol for publicly logging TLS server certificates so certificate-authority activity and suspect certificate issuance can be audited.

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## Cloudflare Develops Public Certificate Authority for Post-Quantum Web Security

DevFeed: [Cloudflare Develops Public Certificate Authority for Post-Quantum Web Security](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloudflare-develops-public-certificate-authority-for-post-quantum-web-security-123777.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/11/cloudflare-merkle-certificates/>)

Author: Leela Kumili

Published: 2026-11-09T14:35:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-ml-data-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-ml-data-engineering.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browser-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-support.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cloudflare-merkle-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-merkle-certificates.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [digital-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-identity.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [experiment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiment.md>), [faster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/faster.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [median](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/median.md>), [merkle-tree-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree-certificates.md>), [ml-data-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-data-engineering.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [production](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/production.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transparency.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [web-browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-browser.md>)

### AI overview

Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) reduce certificate-chain data by recording certificates in an append-only Merkle tree and letting clients verify inclusion with compact proofs. Cloudflare says landmark-based verification can bring the common TLS handshake to one public key, one signature, and an inclusion proof under 1 KB; servers still prove private-key possession and must retain standalone MTCs for clients without a relevant landmark. A Chrome Beta 146 experiment served billions of MTCs to 50% of the beta for selected Cloudflare domains and reported 9% faster median performance, mostly from eliminating intermediate certificates. It used classical signatures, so it did not establish performance with larger post-quantum signatures. Cloudflare is developing a public CA for MTC issuance, with planned evaluation for possible inclusion in Chrome's quantum-resistant Root Store in early 2027. Wider deployment still requires browser support, independent monitoring at production volume, and a diverse CA and cosigner ecosystem; revocation and incident handling were also raised as open questions.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare is developing a public certificate authority for Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) to reduce the bandwidth overhead of post-quantum cryptography. A Chrome experiment served billions of MTCs to 50% of Chrome Beta 146 for selected domains, reporting 9% faster median performance. Wider deployment depends on browser support, transparency, and production-scale validation. By Leela Kumili

## What the eMudhra SSL Compromise Means for Your App | Guardsquare

DevFeed: [What the eMudhra SSL Compromise Means for Your App | Guardsquare](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-the-emudhra-ssl-compromise-means-for-your-app-guardsquare-116535.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.guardsquare.com/blog/what-the-emudhra-ssl-compromise-means-for-your-app-guardsquare>)

Author: Jan Seredynski - Security Researcher & Pentester

Published: 2026-11-03T14:36:01Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Guardsquare](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/guardsquare-blog.md>)

Topics: [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Android](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android.md>), [App](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/app.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [App attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/app-attestation.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>)

Tags: [17](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/17.md>), [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [app-attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app-attestation.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [dexguard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dexguard.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [means](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/means.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [ssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssl.md>), [technical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical.md>), [uses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uses.md>)

### AI overview

The eMudhra incident exposed private keys for eight intermediate CAs, potentially allowing forged HTTPS certificates from April 2025; the excerpt says it is unknown whether attackers used them. Protection varies: SSL pinning rejects chains without an approved key; Google and Apple distributed certificate blocks on 19 October 2026, but delivery can lag and devices without Google Play Services may depend on their manufacturer, OS maintainer, or app developer; Certificate Transparency checks would reject the forged certificates because none were logged, where those checks apply and are enabled. The excerpt recommends testing with a MITM proxy using a compromised key across supported OS versions, and protecting app connections with pinning, platform networking APIs, and application-level signing and encryption. Unupdated Android devices may remain exposed if they still trust the compromised CAs and lack other defenses.

### Source excerpt

Your app uses HTTPS. Your server has a valid certificate. You have never bought anything from eMudhra.

## 4 real? Tracking exploitation and patching of eMudhra's weak keys

DevFeed: [4 real? Tracking exploitation and patching of eMudhra's weak keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/4-real-tracking-exploitation-and-patching-of-emudhra-s-weak-keys-109523.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/emudhra-patching/>)

Author: Bas Westerbaan

Published: 2026-10-30T17:38:50Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Bug Bounty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bugbounty.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>)

Tags: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploitation.md>), [incident-response](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident-response.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tracking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tracking.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare says it patched high priority systems within hours of discovering eMudhra's eight trivially weak certificate signing keys; its Pingora service rejects certificates signed by them. Logging recorded about 22,000 attempted handshakes in a week, mostly test sites or servers using their own certificates. Around 160 certificates named unrelated organizations, but Cloudflare found no evidence they intercepted its connections; targeted interception cannot be ruled out. Visitor probes suggest modern browsers are mostly patched, while 30-40% of Android WebView clients and more than half of probes on large networks still accepted the compromised chain. These figures are uncertain because challenge page traffic is bot-heavy, probe coverage and certificate setup changed, and a monitoring gap occurred. The post urges affected users and developers to patch and describes work toward faster trust-store updates.

### Source excerpt

Four, just four: that's the key to break into any unpatched connection on the Internet that is using eMudhra certificates. Here's how we quickly patched Cloudflare, what evidence we can see of attempted exploitation, and how much of the rest of the Internet remains exposed.

## Compromised TLS Certificates

DevFeed: [Compromised TLS Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-tls-certificates-97564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/10/compromised-tls-certificates.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-10-23T11:04:22Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [elliptic-curve-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curve-cryptography.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [encrypted-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted-traffic.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

### AI overview

Eight TLS certificates issued by India's eMudhra had private keys with only 3 to 8 bits of entropy, far below the roughly 384 bits cited for a typical NIST P-384 key. The excerpt says the immediate concern may be VPN users, particularly where governments could intercept traffic. Exploitation still requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack to intercept and relay TLS traffic; local-network control makes that easier, while some attacks may demand well-resourced actors. Transparency logs help reveal unauthorized certificates, but require active monitoring and work only after issuance. The excerpt says end users may need to wait for assurances that updates are in place before using some non-browser TLS communications.

### Source excerpt

The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys: The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that's challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237...

## CA shutdown puts Java, containers, and security appliances in the certificate crosshairs

DevFeed: [CA shutdown puts Java, containers, and security appliances in the certificate crosshairs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ca-shutdown-puts-java-containers-and-security-appliances-in-the-certificate-crosshairs-97467.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4239637/ca-shutdown-puts-java-containers-and-appliances-in-the-certificate-crosshairs.html>)

Author: Gyana Swain

Published: 2026-10-23T10:44:57Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>)

Tags: [appliances](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/appliances.md>), [browser-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security.md>), [browser-security-java-security-software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security-java-security-software-development.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authorities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authorities.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [containers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/containers.md>), [data-sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-sovereignty.md>), [java](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/java.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [pki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pki.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [sectigo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sectigo.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [shutdown](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/shutdown.md>), [software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-development.md>), [ssl-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssl-tls.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

After private keys for eight intermediate CAs were compromised, eMudhra is exiting the global SSL/TLS certificate business and offering free Sectigo replacements. It says its G1 roots and certificate revocation/status services will remain supported during the transition; CertiNext users can request replacements in their accounts, while others can contact support. Analysts caution that relying on G1 as a bridge should have a firm end date and migration plan, and recommend inventorying CA chains, cross-signing, revocation, and browser trust. Replacing website certificates may not fix separate trust stores in Java, containers, appliances, mutual TLS, and other systems. Azul says Java does not check revocation by default; its updated Azul Zulu and Prime builds block the affected certificates. Google said Chrome Root Store removal of the signing root was expected October 27, and warned operators with chains to that root to install new TLS certificates.

### Source excerpt

A certificate authority's decision to abandon the global SSL/TLS market is exposing a weakness many organizations rarely examine: their dependence on complex PKI trust chains. Following the compromise of private keys behind eight of its intermediate certificate authorities, eMudhra is exiting the global SSL/TLS certificate business and is offering customers Sectigo-issued replacements. However, analysts warn that enterprises may discover they have only limited visibility into the certificate hierarchies underpinning critical services. The company's board decided "to voluntarily withdraw from the global SSL/TLS certificate business," eMudhra said in a press note. It added that data sovereignty and compliance requirements had increased the business's complexity and cost. "The level of social media amplification around this incident has brought scrutiny that is out of proportion to SSL/TLS's place in our business," eMudhra Chairman V Srinivasan said in the announcement. The company said it will contact affected customers to replace certificates free of cost. It also said it will keep revocation and certificate status services running until every issued certificate has expired or been replaced. Sectigo offered as an alternative In the customer update, eMudhra said it is making Sectigo-issued certificates available to all its customers. "Our G1 root certificates remain active and continue to be fully supported," the company said in the update. The October 22 release said the G1 RSA roots "will continue to serve customers until this transition is complete." eMudhra said it would provide replacement certificates free of charge through its partners and continue operating revocation and certificate-status services until all certificates it issued had expired or been replaced. CertiNext users can request Sectigo certificates through their accounts; other customers can contact eMudhra support, the statement added. Niyati Daftary, principal analyst at Gartner, said organization

## eMudhra quits global TLS certificate market after compromise of CA signing keys

DevFeed: [eMudhra quits global TLS certificate market after compromise of CA signing keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-quits-global-tls-certificate-market-after-compromise-of-ca-signing-keys-97537.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.computerworld.com/article/4239619/emudhra-quits-global-tls-certificate-market-after-compromise-of-ca-signing-keys.html>)

Author: Gyana Swain

Published: 2026-10-23T10:27:24Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Computerworld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/computerworld.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [digital sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-sovereignty.md>)

Tags: [browser-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security.md>), [browser-security-browsers-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security-browsers-security.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authorities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authorities.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compliance.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [customer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customer.md>), [data-sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-sovereignty.md>), [digital-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-trust.md>), [edition-us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edition-us.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [g1](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/g1.md>), [gartner](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gartner.md>), [global](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/global.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

eMudhra is exiting the global SSL/TLS certificate business after private keys for eight intermediate CAs were compromised. It offers customers free Sectigo-issued replacement certificates and says it will maintain revocation and certificate-status services until its issued certificates expire or are replaced. CertiNext users can request replacements in their accounts; other customers can contact support. eMudhra says its G1 RSA roots remain active during the transition, but analysts describe them as a possible bridge and urge migration of critical services to an independent, trusted CA. Google said removal of the affected emSign root from Chrome's trust store was expected October 27; sites chaining to it must replace certificates to avoid breakage. Separate fixes may be needed in Java and other systems with their own trust stores: Azul updated its JDK builds to block the eight certificates, while Java does not check revocation by default. The excerpt characterizes residual risk as limited and targeted, and notes that some organizations may not know where certificate trust decisions occur.

### Source excerpt

Indian digital trust company eMudhra has announced that it is exiting the global SSL/TLS certificate business and is offering customers certificates issued by Sectigo as an alternative, following the compromise of private keys behind eight of its intermediate certificate authorities. The company's board decided "to voluntarily withdraw from the global SSL/TLS certificate business," eMudhra said in a press note. It added that data sovereignty and compliance requirements had increased the business's complexity and cost. "The level of social media amplification around this incident has brought scrutiny that is out of proportion to SSL/TLS's place in our business," eMudhra Chairman V Srinivasan said in the announcement. The company said it will contact affected customers to replace certificates free of cost. It also said it will keep revocation and certificate status services running until every issued certificate has expired or been replaced. Sectigo offered as an alternative In the customer update, eMudhra said it is making Sectigo-issued certificates available to all its customers. "Our G1 root certificates remain active and continue to be fully supported," the company said in the update. The October 22 release said the G1 RSA roots "will continue to serve customers until this transition is complete." eMudhra said it would provide replacement certificates free of charge through its partners and continue operating revocation and certificate-status services until all certificates it issued had expired or been replaced. CertiNext users can request Sectigo certificates through their accounts; other customers can contact eMudhra support, the statement added. Niyati Daftary, principal analyst at Gartner, said organizations should view the G1 roots "as a possible bridge, not automatically as the final destination." "With the company exiting global SSL/TLS and its remaining roots still subject to browser scrutiny, the prudent course is to move critical services to an indepen

## EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Compromised

DevFeed: [EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Compromised](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates-compromised-96032.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emudhra-certificate-compromise/>)

Author: Unit 42

Published: 2026-10-22T17:15:32Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Unit 42](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/unit-42.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/interception.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [principle of ephemerality](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/principle-of-ephemerality.md>)

Tags: [000](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/000.md>), [acme](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acme.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [high-profile-threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/high-profile-threats.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interception.md>), [intermediate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [mitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitm.md>), [pki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pki.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [risk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [unit-42](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/unit-42.md>)

### AI overview

Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were compromised after a certificate-generation defect produced insufficient randomness, potentially allowing attackers to derive the keys, issue unauthorized TLS certificates, and intercept or impersonate traffic. eMudhra revoked the eight certificates, and browser and OS vendors moved to revoke or distrust the intermediates. The guidance calls for identifying certificates and trust anchors tied to the affected CAs, reissuing affected certificates through another trusted CA, updating trust stores, and enforcing CRL and OCSP checks. It also recommends reviewing network, authentication, and identity logs for signs of interception or session replay, monitoring Certificate Transparency logs, restricting issuers with CAA records, and hardening automated certificate lifecycle management. Palo Alto Networks describes its Next-Gen Trust Security solution as supporting lifecycle management and emergency response; the text does not establish that it prevents this specific compromise.

### Source excerpt

Eight compromised eMudhra intermediate CA private keys risk unauthorized TLS signing and MitM interception. Read our analysis and containment guide. The post EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Compromised appeared first on Unit 42.

## Compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates

DevFeed: [Compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-emudhra-intermediate-certificates-93884.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/compromised-intermediate-certificates/>)

Author: Cisco Talos

Published: 2026-10-21T20:43:29Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cisco Talos Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cisco-talos-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [cisco](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco.md>), [cisco-talos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos.md>), [cisco-talos-network-intrusion-prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-network-intrusion-prevention.md>), [cisco-talos-web-filtering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-web-filtering.md>), [cloud-native-ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-native-ecosystem.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [embedded-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded-systems.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [enterprise-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise-infrastructure.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [intermediate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate.md>), [threat-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-advisory.md>)

### AI overview

A flaw in eMudhra's April 30, 2025 key-generation process produced weak P-384 keys that were used in eight intermediate CA certificates: six for TLS and two for code signing. An attacker with a compromised private key could issue fraudulent certificates, potentially enabling server impersonation and traffic interception where clients still trust the key and protections do not block it. Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, and Microsoft have blocked affected certificates; eMudhra revoked them and stopped issuing under its G3 root. Because some applications use separate or embedded trust stores and may ignore revocation, the source recommends updating TLS-using software and trust stores as vendor fixes become available. Go versions 1.27.3 and 1.26.10 filter chains containing the affected SPKI hashes. Talos reported no related malicious incidents observed as of October 21, 2026.

### Source excerpt

Cisco Talos is aware of eight intermediate certificates belonging to the intermediate certificate authority, eMudhra.

## Compromised security certificates blocked in Chrome, Firefox

DevFeed: [Compromised security certificates blocked in Chrome, Firefox](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-security-certificates-blocked-in-chrome-firefox-95826.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.computerworld.com/article/4239086/google-mozilla-revoke-emudhra-intermediates-after-private-key-compromise-3.html>)

Author: Gyana Swain

Published: 2026-10-21T14:06:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Computerworld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/computerworld.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Mozilla](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/mozilla.md>), [Firefox](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/firefox.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>)

Tags: [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [blocking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocking.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [blog-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog-post.md>), [browser-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security.md>), [browser-security-browsers-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-security-browsers-security.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [cas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cas.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authorities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authorities.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [digital-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-trust.md>), [edition-us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edition-us.md>), [firefox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firefox.md>), [governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/governance.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>)

### AI overview

Weak key generation exposed private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities, making it possible to forge trusted certificates and impersonate websites or services. Mozilla independently recovered the keys, confirming the flaw; researcher Scott Helme said all eight could be recovered from public certificates in under a second. Six intermediates were for TLS and two for code signing. Google blocked the affected authorities through Chrome's Revocation List Set, with Android and Chromebook protection delivered through Google Play Services; Firefox distributed a OneCRL block. Google also planned to remove the signing root from Chrome Root Store devices on October 27. eMudhra said the affected intermediates had issued no end-entity certificates and that its root keys and other intermediates were unaffected, though a compromised key could still be used to create certificates independently. Organizations should check certificates they present and trust stores used by enterprise applications, appliances and clients, and test rejection of affected and cross-signed chains. Cloudflare reported mitigations and no active exploitation identified on its services.

### Source excerpt

Private keys associated with eight intermediate certificate authorities operated by Indian digital trust provider eMudhra have been compromised, potentially allowing attackers to forge trusted certificates and impersonate websites or services, according to Google and Mozilla. "On 17th October @ 20:06 UTC, Mozilla received a report to certificates@mozilla.org, forwarded by the Chrome Root program, that the private key of 8 eMudhra Intermediate certificates have been compromised," Dennis Jackson, a member of Mozilla's engineering team, wrote in a public Mozilla bug report. "An attacker with the private key of any of the compromised intermediate CAs could impersonate any website or service." Mozilla independently recovered the keys later that day, confirming that they were vulnerable. "Mozilla was able to recover the private keys for the impacted certificates independently @ 21:48 UTC and without any knowledge of the method the original reporter used," Jackson added in the report. He said the recovery confirmed that "the key generation process was flawed and is trivial to exploit." The report was submitted by a researcher identified as Wayne and forwarded by the Chrome Root Program. Mozilla acknowledged it and subsequently began blocking the affected certificates in Firefox. eMudhra acknowledged the report and said it was investigating, according to the Mozilla report. "One of eMudhra's certificate authority private keys is the number 4," security researcher Scott Helme wrote in a separate analysis. Two other keys had values of 56 and 115, he said. Helme recovered all eight from their public certificates in less than a second. Six of the eight affected intermediate certificates were intended for Transport Layer Security (TLS), which browsers and applications use to authenticate websites and establish encrypted connections, according to Google's security blog post. The other two were for code signing. "The private keys for these certificates were generated with insuffic

## 8 eMudhra certificates are compromised. Here's what you need to know

DevFeed: [8 eMudhra certificates are compromised. Here's what you need to know](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/8-emudhra-certificates-are-compromised-here-s-what-you-need-to-know-91268.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/emudhra-certificate-compromise/>)

Author: Jeremy Hartman

Published: 2026-10-20T22:20:16Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>)

Tags: [active-exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/active-exploitation.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [base-images](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/base-images.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [cdn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cdn.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [customers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customers.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [intermediate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/updates.md>)

### AI overview

Eight compromised eMudhra intermediate certificate keys can enable forged certificates for any domain, threatening server authentication; Cloudflare says its review found no active exploitation on its services. Cloudflare updated services and shared trust stores, deployed mitigations across CDN, Developer, and Zero Trust, and released updates for WARP/1.1.1.1 and cloudflared. Zero Trust Gateway users with an up-to-date client are automatically protected, but customers operating their own software or trust configurations, especially origin servers, may need to act. Developers should identify the actual certificate-verification path beneath their SDK, update relevant dependencies, rebuild images, and reload or redeploy where needed. Validate through the application's own TLS path: browser or curl checks may not cover other verifiers. Do not disable certificate verification to address resulting errors.

### Source excerpt

Following the discovery that eight eMudhra intermediate certificates use weak keys, Cloudflare is deploying mitigations and releasing client updates. We explain the impact, our response, and what customers and developers should do next.

## Protecting Chrome and Android Users from Compromised eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates

DevFeed: [Protecting Chrome and Android Users from Compromised eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/protecting-chrome-and-android-users-from-compromised-emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates-91282.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.google/security/protecting-chrome-and-android-users-from-compromised-emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates/>)

Author: Chrome and Android Security Teams

Published: 2026-10-20T19:49:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/security.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Android Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android-security.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [android-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android-security.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [blocking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocking.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cas.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [certification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certification.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [chrome-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome-security.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [intermediate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [none](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/none.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [program](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/program.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [users](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/users.md>)

### AI overview

A researcher reported that weak randomness exposed the private keys of eight eMudhra subordinate CAs, allowing forged HTTPS certificates to impersonate websites for clients that still trusted them. Chrome blocked the affected intermediates by SPKI hash via CRLSet, protecting users without a browser update or restart; Android and Googlebooks received an equivalent Google Play Services update, and restarting an Android device can trigger it immediately. No certificates chaining to the six intermediates mentioned in the CT finding were logged before the block, so they could not be used against CT-enforcing clients. Chrome also removed the signing root, emSign ECC Root CA - G3, for Chrome Root Store consumers that do not receive CRLSet updates. Some legitimate certificates will stop working; website operators must obtain and install certificates from another PKI hierarchy in the Chrome Root Store. The excerpt says root removal was expected October 27, 2026, with earlier release on prerelease channels, and that eMudhra's other roots remain under review.

### Source excerpt

The Chrome Root Program received a report from a security researcher regarding the compromise of private keys associated with eight eMudhra subordinate Certification Aut...

## Let's Encrypt Cuts Default Certificate Validity to 64 Days Ahead of 45-Day Switch

DevFeed: [Let's Encrypt Cuts Default Certificate Validity to 64 Days Ahead of 45-Day Switch](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/let-s-encrypt-cuts-default-certificate-validity-to-64-days-ahead-of-45-day-switch-85280.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/lets-encrypt-cuts-default-certificate-validity-to-64-days-ahead-of-45-day-switch/>)

Author: Ionut Arghire

Published: 2026-10-12T07:53:28Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>)

Tags: [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [data-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-protection.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [let-s-encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let-s-encrypt.md>)

### AI overview

Let's Encrypt plans to issue certificates with 64-day lifetimes by default beginning February 10, 2027, ahead of a planned move to 45-day certificates in 2028. It recommends testing renewal processes before the change, especially where renewal timing is hardcoded. The CA also plans to shorten authorization reuse periods, while leaving ACME endpoints, issuance chains, and rate limits unchanged.

### Source excerpt

Beginning February 2027, all newly issued certificates will have a 64-day validity period by default. The post Let's Encrypt Cuts Default Certificate Validity to 64 Days Ahead of 45-Day Switch appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## Let's Encrypt to Cut SSL Certificate Lifetimes to 64 Days in February 2027

DevFeed: [Let's Encrypt to Cut SSL Certificate Lifetimes to 64 Days in February 2027](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/let-s-encrypt-to-cut-ssl-certificate-lifetimes-to-64-days-in-february-2027-85190.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://it.slashdot.org/story/26/10/12/0211238/lets-encrypt-to-cut-ssl-certificate-lifetimes-to-64-days-in-february-2027>)

Author: EditorDavid

Published: 2026-10-12T03:09:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Slashdot](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/slashdot.md>)

Topics: [AWS Certificate Manager](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-certificate-manager.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>)

Tags: [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Let's Encrypt plans to reduce its default TLS certificate lifetime from 90 days to 64 days starting February 10, 2027, with a further reduction to 45 days planned for 2028. Existing certificates will remain valid until they expire, and the transition will not revoke valid certificates. Administrators with hardcoded renewal intervals should review their configurations; staging certificates will be available for testing from October 14, 2026. The article also reports shorter reuse periods for domain authorizations.

### Source excerpt

Let's Encrypt "will shorten the default validity period of its TLS certificates from 90 days to 64 days, starting February 10, 2027," reports the blog Linuxiac: All certificates issued or renewed from that date will have a 64-day lifespan unless users explicitly select one of the shorter options already available: 45 or six days. Existing certificates will remain valid until their expiration dates. Let's Encrypt expects the final 90-day certificate to expire on May 11, 2027. The organization also confirmed no valid certificates will be revoked during the transition. To help administrators prepare, Let's Encrypt will introduce 64-day certificates in its staging environment on October 14, 2026, allowing users to test their renewal setups before the change reaches production. The move is part of a broader effort to improve web security by reducing how long compromised or incorrectly issued certificates remain usable... Looking further ahead, the organization plans to reduce the default certificate lifetime again, this time to 45 days in 2028. That makes the upcoming 64-day limit an intermediate step rather than the final destination. "Administrators using cron jobs or scripts with hardcoded renewal intervals should review their configurations," the article suggests. "Another upcoming change concerns domain validation. Let's Encrypt will reduce the period during which a previously completed domain authorization can be reused from 30 days to 10 days. In 2028, that period will shrink further to just seven hours." Read more of this story at Slashdot.

## Let's Encrypt moving to 64-day certificate lifetimes in 2027

DevFeed: [Let's Encrypt moving to 64-day certificate lifetimes in 2027](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/let-s-encrypt-moving-to-64-day-certificate-lifetimes-in-2027-83965.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://lwn.net/Articles/1099588/>)

Author: jzb

Published: 2026-10-09T14:02:44Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [LWN.net](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/lwn-net.md>)

Topics: [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [let-s-encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let-s-encrypt.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Let's Encrypt will issue certificates with 64-day lifetimes beginning February 10, 2027, and expects its last 90-day certificate to expire on May 11, 2027. This is the second stage of its plan to move to 45-day certificates in 2028, as required by CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements. It says it will not revoke valid certificates during the transition.

### Source excerpt

Let's Encrypt, the nonprofit that provides free TLS certificates for millions of sites, has announced that it will be moving to certificates with 64-day lifetimes on February 10, 2027: This means that any certificate we issue or renew on and after that date will have a 64 day validity period, and we expect the last 90-day certificate to expire on May 11, 2027. We will not revoke valid certificates as a part of this process. This is the second stage of Let's Encrypt's plan, announced in 2025, to move to 45-day certificate lifetimes as required by the the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements. In 2028, Let's Encrypt will switch to 45-day certificates.

## Google Domains Impacted by Recent ccTLD Hijacks

DevFeed: [Google Domains Impacted by Recent ccTLD Hijacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/google-domains-impacted-by-recent-cctld-hijacks-84048.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/google-domains-impacted-by-recent-cctld-domain-hijacks/>)

Author: Ionut Arghire

Published: 2026-10-09T11:43:14Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Google](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google.md>)

Tags: [cctld](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cctld.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [chrome-155](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome-155.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [domain-hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain-hijack.md>), [domain-hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain-hijacking.md>), [downloads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/downloads.md>), [featured](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/featured.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [npm-malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm-malware.md>), [patches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patches.md>), [tld](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tld.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Attackers hijacked the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code domains, changed DNS records, and obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates for Google and other organizations. Google blocked its affected certificates in Chrome and worked with certificate authorities to revoke them. It advises domain owners to monitor Certificate Transparency logs and restore restrictive CAA records after DNS control returns.

### Source excerpt

Hackers hijacked the .gh, .sl, and .as ccTLDs and obtained HTTPS certificates for several Google domains. The post Google Domains Impacted by Recent ccTLD Hijacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## Post-quantum authentication: Why organizations should start testing certificate ecosystems now

DevFeed: [Post-quantum authentication: Why organizations should start testing certificate ecosystems now](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-authentication-why-organizations-should-start-testing-certificate-ecosystems-now-77347.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/08/post-quantum-authentication-why-organizations-should-start-testing-certificate-ecosystems-now/>)

Author: Microsoft Security Research

Published: 2026-10-08T20:44:28Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Microsoft Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/microsoft-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-management.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-authentication.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

The article argues that organizations should start preparing for post-quantum authentication by inventorying certificate dependencies, assessing vendor readiness, and testing interoperability in non-production environments. It describes Microsoft's PQC TLS Pilot Program, which lets eligible certificate authorities evaluate certificate issuance and compatibility; pilot certificates are not for production or public trust.

### Source excerpt

Prepare for post-quantum authentication by testing certificate ecosystems now. Learn how Microsoft's PQC TLS Pilot Program helps advance future readiness. The post Post-quantum authentication: Why organizations should start testing certificate ecosystems now appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

## Hackers hijack Google domains after breaching ccTLD registries

DevFeed: [Hackers hijack Google domains after breaching ccTLD registries](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hackers-hijack-google-domains-after-breaching-cctld-registries-67018.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-hijack-google-domains-after-breaching-cctld-registries/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-10-07T20:50:13Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>)

Tags: [atlassian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atlassian.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cctld](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cctld.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-hijacker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-hijacker.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [google-chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google-chrome.md>), [hackers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackers.md>), [hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijack.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [registries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/registries.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [tld](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tld.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Attackers compromised third-party operators in the .GH, .SL, and .AS country-code domains, changed authoritative DNS records, and obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and other organizations. Google blocked certificates for its properties in Chrome and used Certificate Transparency logs to identify additional potentially affected organizations. Google advises domain owners to monitor CT logs and use restrictive CAA records, while warning that not all affected domains may have been identified and that Chrome protections do not cover users of other browsers.

### Source excerpt

Hackers obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and hijacked domains in the country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs) for Ghana, American Samoa, and Sierra Leone after compromising third-party operators and modifying authoritative DNS records. [...]

## Hackers hijack three country-code domain registries, obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains

DevFeed: [Hackers hijack three country-code domain registries, obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hackers-hijack-three-country-code-domain-registries-obtain-https-certificates-for-google-domains-66697.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/07/google-unauthorized-https-certificates-cctld-hijacks/>)

Author: Sinisa Markovic

Published: 2026-10-07T11:10:29Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>)

Tags: [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Attackers compromised operators of the .gh, .sl and .as country-code domains and changed authoritative DNS records, enabling them to obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains and other organizations. Google blocked and revoked certificates it identified, but said its analysis might not have found every affected domain and browser protections vary. It plans broader HTTPS ecosystem improvements.

### Source excerpt

Attackers who took control of three country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs) used that access to obtain HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and for domains run by other large organizations, Google disclosed on Tuesday. Attackers compromised the third-party operators of the .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone) and .as (American Samoa) ccTLDs, putting every domain under those endings at risk, and then changed the authoritative DNS records. "These incidents did not involve a compromise of Google's systems," ... More -> The post Hackers hijack three country-code domain registries, obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Cloudflare Plans Public Certificate Authority to Issue Quantum-Safe TLS Certificates

DevFeed: [Cloudflare Plans Public Certificate Authority to Issue Quantum-Safe TLS Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloudflare-plans-public-certificate-authority-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates-64805.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/10/postquatam-certificates/>)

Author: Olimpiu Pop

Published: 2026-10-05T05:05:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [postquatam-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postquatam-certificates.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare plans to offer free public quantum-safe TLS certificates using Merkle Tree Certificates. The approach combines certificate issuance with transparency logging and uses compact inclusion proofs to reduce handshake data, with conventional X.509 certificates available for legacy clients. Public issuance is targeted for early 2027.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare will operate a free public Certificate Authority to issue quantum-safe Transport Layer Security certificates. This initiative addresses challenges in migrating from classical public key cryptography to post-quantum methods. It utilizes Merkle Tree Certificates to reduce data payloads and maintain system efficiency, while also enhancing certificate transparency and revocation processes. By Olimpiu Pop

## Post-quantum website certificates from Cloudflare are scheduled for early 2027

DevFeed: [Post-quantum website certificates from Cloudflare are scheduled for early 2027](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-website-certificates-from-cloudflare-are-scheduled-for-early-2027-62202.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/30/cloudflare-certificate-authority-2027/>)

Author: Mirko Zorz

Published: 2026-09-30T03:09:51Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>)

Tags: [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [f](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/f.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [merkle-tree-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree-certificates.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare plans to become a public certificate authority, issuing conventional certificates and post-quantum Merkle Tree Certificates. Production issuance of the post-quantum certificates is scheduled for the first quarter of 2027, while its applications to browser root programs remain pending. The company says the certificates use lightweight proofs to let browsers check trusted registry entries without sending heavy post-quantum signatures with every connection.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare plans to become a public certificate authority (CA), an organization that issues the digital certificates websites use to encrypt traffic and prove who they are. The company said that its CA will issue conventional certificates and a post-quantum type called Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), with production MTC issuance scheduled for the first quarter of 2027. Cloudflare says much of the web's certificate issuing rests on a small set of dominant CAs, so one failure ... More -> The post Post-quantum website certificates from Cloudflare are scheduled for early 2027 appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Cloudflare to become a public certificate authority with post-quantum certificates

DevFeed: [Cloudflare to become a public certificate authority with post-quantum certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloudflare-to-become-a-public-certificate-authority-with-post-quantum-certificates-61766.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://siliconangle.com/2026/09/29/cloudflare-to-become-a-public-certificate-authority-with-post-quantum-certificates/>)

Author: Duncan Riley

Published: 2026-09-29T13:00:27Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SiliconANGLE](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/siliconangle.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>)

Tags: [apple](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apple.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [digital-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-certificates.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [internet-engineering-task-force](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-engineering-task-force.md>), [let-s-encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let-s-encrypt.md>), [matthew-prince](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matthew-prince.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [merkle-tree-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree-certificates.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [mozilla](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mozilla.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [rfc-9773](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rfc-9773.md>), [root-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-certificates.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [the-latest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/the-latest.md>), [universal-ssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/universal-ssl.md>), [web-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-security.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare plans to become a public certificate authority and issue Merkle Tree Certificates designed to address the size of post-quantum signatures. The certificates use lightweight proofs tied to a trusted public log, and Cloudflare says its joint experiment with Google's Chrome team succeeded. To support older devices, Cloudflare plans to acquire an established root certificate they already recognize; the announcement did not identify the root or its owner.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare Inc. today announced plans to become a public certificate authority that will offer certificates designed for the point when quantum computers can break current encryption. The new authority will issue a post-quantum format called Merkle Tree Certificates from the same system as conventional ones. The format is aimed at a size problem in post-quantum [...] The post Cloudflare to become a public certificate authority with post-quantum certificates appeared first on SiliconANGLE.

## Building a certificate authority for the whole Internet

DevFeed: [Building a certificate authority for the whole Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/building-a-certificate-authority-for-the-whole-internet-61628.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-certificate-authority/>)

Author: Steve Goldsmith

Published: 2026-09-29T13:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [enterprise certificate authority certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enterprise-certificate-authority-certificates.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [AWS Certificate Manager](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-certificate-manager.md>), [Web](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/web.md>), [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>), [digital sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-sovereignty.md>)

Tags: [birthday-week](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/birthday-week.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [ssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssl.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare is applying to become a public certificate authority, seeking inclusion in major browser root programs and agreeing to acquire a trusted GlobalSign root to expand certificate reach. It also plans to pursue post-quantum certificates, but has not begun issuing certificates.

### Source excerpt

Twelve years after launching Universal SSL, Cloudflare is applying to become a certificate authority. By combining an established root, an ACME-first approach, and Merkle Tree Certificates, we are building a post-quantum CA for the open web.

## Building a post-quantum certificate authority with Merkle Tree Certificates

DevFeed: [Building a post-quantum certificate authority with Merkle Tree Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/building-a-post-quantum-certificate-authority-with-merkle-tree-certificates-61631.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-ca-with-mtcs/>)

Author: Mari Galicer

Published: 2026-09-29T13:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [birthday-week](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/birthday-week.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-transparency.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare describes its plans to issue Merkle Tree Certificates through its new certificate authority, targeting early 2027 for inclusion in Chrome's Quantum-resistant Root Store. MTCs are presented as a way to make post-quantum signatures more efficient while preserving certificate transparency and supporting secure web authentication.

### Source excerpt

As post-quantum signatures threaten to inflate TLS handshakes and certificate transparency logs, Merkle Tree Certificates offer a path to compact, auditable authentication. Cloudflare's new certificate authority will support MTC issuance at scale.

## Cloudflare adds per-domain visibility into post-quantum TLS adoption

DevFeed: [Cloudflare adds per-domain visibility into post-quantum TLS adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/is-your-domain-using-post-quantum-encryption-now-you-can-see-for-yourself-61630.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-visibility/>)

Author: Sharon Goldberg

Published: 2026-09-29T13:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>)

Tags: [analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics.md>), [application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-security.md>), [birthday-week](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/birthday-week.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [fips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fips.md>), [fips-203](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fips-203.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [visibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/visibility.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare has added tools in Logpush, Log Explorer, and its HTTP Traffic Analytics dashboard to inspect and graph post-quantum TLS 1.3 adoption for live traffic. The features expose negotiated key exchange algorithms per incoming request, helping customers audit their post-quantum posture, assess compliance, and find cryptographic gaps across their domains.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare has added visibility into post-quantum (PQ) encryption in TLS 1.3 directly into HTTP Analytics, Log Explorer, and Logpush. Learn how to make sure your domain is protected with PQ encryption.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTA5LTI5VDEzOjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjA1NTkyNjU2LTE3NzItNDg1Zi04MWM3LTM5MzQyOTMzZjk3OSJd>)