# Cryptography

Cryptography, or cryptology is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adversarial behavior. More generally, cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages.

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## UK Government Forced To Disclose Secret Apple Backdoor Order

DevFeed: [UK Government Forced To Disclose Secret Apple Backdoor Order](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/uk-government-forced-to-disclose-secret-apple-backdoor-order-146416.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://yro.slashdot.org/story/26/11/20/0129229/uk-government-forced-to-disclose-secret-apple-backdoor-order>)

Author: BeauHD

Published: 2026-11-20T16:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Slashdot](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/slashdot.md>)

Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/end-to-end-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [advanced-data-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-data-protection.md>), [apple](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apple.md>), [backdoor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backdoor.md>), [court](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/court.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [government](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/government.md>), [legal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/legal.md>), [national-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/national-security.md>), [order](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/order.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [privacy-concerns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy-concerns.md>), [ruling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ruling.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [surveillance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/surveillance.md>), [uk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uk.md>), [uk-government](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uk-government.md>)

### AI overview

The U.K.'s Investigatory Powers Tribunal ordered the government to confirm that the Home Office issued Apple a technical capability notice seeking access to encrypted customer information. It rejected the Home Office's argument that confirming the order would harm national security, but a further hearing on which specific details may be disclosed is expected next year. The dispute began with a reported demand for access to users' data worldwide; Apple disabled Advanced Data Protection for U.K. users and challenged the order. The government later narrowed its demand to British nationals' data, prompting another challenge. Apple welcomed disclosure that the notice existed and said it has never built and will never build a backdoor or master key.

### Source excerpt

An anonymous reader quotes a report from TechCrunch: The U.K. government has been ordered to confirm that it issued a secret order demanding Apple to provide authorities with encrypted customer information. The Thursday ruling from the U.K.'s Investigatory Powers Tribunal, an independent court that allows citizens to challenge government surveillance orders, is a rare rebuke for the government, which sought to keep the encryption backdoor order a state secret. The tribunal's ruling rejected the Home Office's claim that disclosing the order would be damaging to national security. [...] A final hearing on what specific order details can be released is anticipated next year. The order follows a year-long dispute that began when British authorities reportedly sought a backdoor to users' data worldwide, drawing criticism from U.S. lawmakers over privacy concerns. Rather than comply, Apple disabled its Advanced Data Protection feature for U.K. users and challenged the order in court. The government later narrowed its demand to British nationals' data, prompting another legal challenge from Apple. Apple said it welcomes the ruling to make public the fact that the U.K. Home Office issued a technical capability notice, reiterating that it has "never built a backdoor or master key" to its products or services and "never will." Read more of this story at Slashdot.

## What to get right before you ship webhooks

DevFeed: [What to get right before you ship webhooks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-to-get-right-before-you-ship-webhooks-145864.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.sitepoint.com/webhooks-best-practices-before-you-ship/>)

Author: SitePoint Sponsors

Published: 2026-11-20T07:35:47Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [SitePoint](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sitepoint.md>)

Topics: [Publish-subscribe pattern](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pubsub.md>), [event-sourcing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/event-sourcing.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>), [Documentation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/documentation.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-apis.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anthropic.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [deduplication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deduplication.md>), [delivery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delivery.md>), [developer-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer-tools.md>), [event](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event.md>), [js](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/js.md>), [log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/log.md>), [node-js](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/node-js.md>), [retries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/retries.md>), [standard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standard.md>), [webhooks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/webhooks.md>)

### AI overview

Webhooks remove the delay and request load of polling for long-running jobs, but reliable delivery needs durable event storage and clear receiver-facing behavior. The excerpt recommends writing each event to an append-only, per-customer log in the same transaction as the state change, then exposing it through a cursor-based pull endpoint with documented retention. Use a stable event format and IDs, signed raw payloads with per-endpoint secrets, backoff retries stored across restarts, and receiver deduplication; webhook delivery can still be duplicated or arrive out of order. It also calls for per-endpoint limits, blocking private-network destinations and redirects, and customer-visible delivery attempts and replay tools. Teams can build delivery themselves or keep the event log and relay rows to Svix, which handles signing, retries, endpoint disabling, and a customer portal. The excerpt includes adaptable Node.js examples and cites Standard Webhooks verification libraries.

### Source excerpt

Before you ship webhooks: an event log, signed payloads, retries with backoff, deduplication and delivery logs, with working Node.js code and Standard Webhooks. Continue reading What to get right before you ship webhooks on SitePoint.

## No Country for Old Privacy: The Evolving Challenges of Anonymity in Bitcoin

DevFeed: [No Country for Old Privacy: The Evolving Challenges of Anonymity in Bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/no-country-for-old-privacy-the-evolving-challenges-of-anonymity-in-bitcoin-146003.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.00772>)

Author: Ben Hawkins, Joshua Levett, Siamak F. Shahandashti

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bitcoin.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [anonymity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anonymity.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>), [transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transactions.md>)

### AI overview

The study tracks adoption of detectable Bitcoin privacy protocols using refined heuristic filters, identifying over 5 million candidate CoinJoin and 23.3 million candidate CoinSwap transactions. It reports that these protocols typically account for less than 1% of network transactions, and detectable use declined sharply after key regulatory events. CoinShuffle usage closely aligned with coordinator-based CoinJoin services such as Wasabi and Whirlpool. The authors found no evidence of standardized Stealth Address adoption. They suggest that privacy-seeking users may have shifted toward methods that are less transparent and harder to detect; this is an inference from on-chain visibility, not a direct measurement of migration.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.00772v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5 million candidate CoinJoin and 23.3 million candidate CoinSwap transactions. Notably, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the operation of coordinator-based CoinJoin services such as Wasabi and Whirlpool. Our analysis reveals consistently low adoption rates, with these protocols typically constituting less than 1% of network transactions, and a sharp decline in detectable usage following key regulatory events. Furthermore, we find no evidence of standardised Stealth Address adoption, indicating a failure to converge on a common privacy standard. This study provides a comprehensive picture of a niche ecosystem whose on-chain visibility has been largely suppressed, strongly suggesting the migration of privacy-seeking users to less transparent and less detectable methods.

## Classical Oracle Separation of QMA from the QCMA Hierarchy and Quantum Cryptography Even When P = QCMA

DevFeed: [Classical Oracle Separation of QMA from the QCMA Hierarchy and Quantum Cryptography Even When P = QCMA](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/classical-oracle-separation-of-qma-from-the-qcma-hierarchy-and-quantum-cryptography-even-when-p-qcma-146065.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.26574>)

Author: Alper Cakan

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [computational complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/computational-complexity.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complexity.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [hierarchy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hierarchy.md>), [one-way-functions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one-way-functions.md>), [oracle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oracle.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [quant-ph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quant-ph.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [query](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/query.md>), [separate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/separate.md>), [state](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/state.md>)

### AI overview

The paper introduces Codeword-Hash pairs in Noise (CHN), a query-complexity problem in QMA that is hard for the QCMA hierarchy. Using CHN, it constructs a classical oracle where P, BQP, QCMA, and QCMAH coincide, yet QMA is strictly larger and is not contained in QCMAH. The abstract also claims that, relative to such an oracle, quantum cryptographic primitives can exist despite P = QCMA, including pseudorandom states with classical keys and public-key encryption with classical public keys and ciphertexts and copy-protected quantum decryption keys. These are oracle-relative results; the supplied text is an abstract, not the full manuscript.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.26574v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Remark: This work is in submission at STOC'27 and thus the full manuscript has been publicly posted on the conference website since November 3rd, 2026. Inspired by the Codeword-Hash Structure problem recently introduced by Cakan (arXiV, 2026) to separate $\mathsf{QMA}$ from $\mathsf{QCIP}$, we introduce a new problem called Codeword-Hash pairs in Noise ($\mathsf{CHN}$) and prove that, in the query complexity model, it is in $\mathsf{QMA}$ but hard for the $\mathsf{QCMA}$ hierarchy $\mathsf{QCMAH} = \bigcup_{d\geq1}\mathsf{QCMA}^{\mathsf{QCMA}^{\cdots^{\mathsf{QCMA}}}}$, the classical-witness quantum-verifier analogue of $\mathsf{PH}=\bigcup_{d\ge1}\mathsf{NP}^{\mathsf{NP}^{\cdots^{\mathsf{NP}}}}$. Using this problem, we show that there exists a classical oracle ${O}$ such that $\mathsf{P}^{{O}}=\mathsf{BQP}^{{O}}=\mathsf{QCMA}^{{O}} =\mathsf{QCMAH}^{{O}} \subset \mathsf{QMA}^{{O}} \text{ but } \mathsf{QMA}^{{O}}\not\subseteq\mathsf{QCMAH}^{{O}},$ thus showing that quantum state or quantum proof advantage could exist even if classical computers can efficiently solve any problem that can be quantumly verified with a classical proof. Further, using our problem, we show that various quantum cryptographic primitives can exist even when $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{QCMA}$ and thus neither quantum-computable one-way functions nor (verifiable) quantum computational advantage exist. In particular, relative to a classical oracle ${O}$ with $\mathsf{P}^{{O}}=\mathsf{BQP}^{{O}}=\mathsf{QCMA}^{{O}}=\mathsf{QCMAH}^{{O}}$, there exist pseudorandom states with classical keys and public-key encryption with copy-protected quantum decryption keys and classical public keys and ciphertexts, among other primitives, answering an open question of Kretschmer, Qian, and Tal (STOC 2025).

## Living off the Local Model: Abusing Browser-Embedded Language Models for Post-Exploitation

DevFeed: [Living off the Local Model: Abusing Browser-Embedded Language Models for Post-Exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/living-off-the-local-model-abusing-browser-embedded-language-models-for-post-exploitation-145464.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25086>)

Author: William Fleshman, Joseph Lucas

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Local AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/local-ai.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [function calling](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/function-calling.md>)

Tags: [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cl.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploitation.md>), [language-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-models.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [post-exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-exploitation.md>)

### AI overview

The paper reports that Chrome's on-device Gemini Nano can be driven from the host using operating-system interpreters, and that its one-time user-activation check for downloading the model can be met with a simulated click or bypassed. The authors test credential identification, PII detection in email, image classification, and custom tool use. In a simulated operation, they combine these capabilities to read a password from a webcam image, unlock and triage an encrypted archive, and stage a private key for exfiltration without user interaction. These findings describe the current model and a simulated scenario.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25086v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Browsers now ship local language models to ordinary endpoints. Google includes Gemini Nano in Chrome to enable productivity features such as summarization, with inference running entirely on the device. These browser-embedded models provide new living-off-the-land opportunities for attackers, each instance a potential post-exploitation engine already installed, signed by the vendor, and invisible to network monitoring. The Gemini model is multimodal, capable of processing files, analyzing screenshots, or conversing with an attacker. We show that it can be driven from the host using only interpreters that ship with the operating system and find that the one-time user-activation check before the model is downloaded is easily satisfied with a simulated click or bypassed entirely.We measure and report the current model's ability to identify credentials on the host, detect PII in email, classify images, and call custom tools. We combine these capabilities and use the model to carry out a simulated cyber operation: reading a password from a webcam image, unlocking an encrypted archive, triaging the contents, and staging a private key for exfiltration, end-to-end without user-interaction.

## Side-Channel Analysis of the RP2350 Challenge 2

DevFeed: [Side-Channel Analysis of the RP2350 Challenge 2](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/side-channel-analysis-of-the-rp2350-challenge-2-146033.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25479>)

Author: Nikhil Tattikota, Vincent Immler

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>)

Tags: [aes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aes.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [rp2350](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rp2350.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>)

### AI overview

The authors report that their analysis of the RP2350 Challenge 2 hardened AES implementation found comprehensive side-channel leakage, plaintext dependence, and key extraction. They say these weaknesses contradict the challenge authors' claims. The abstract does not describe the analysis methods or extraction conditions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25479v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Bug bounty programs and community challenges have become an established mechanism to incentivize collective action to improve security. In essence, these can be considered as crowd-sourcing mechanisms where participants carry the risk twice over: performing the work in addition to having it officially accepted, which at times can be tied to unacceptable terms. Consequently, independent assessments and publications that are free from third party obligations remain important to highlight deficiencies in implementations of public significance. We consider the RP2350 side-channel analysis challenge and its hardened Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) implementation to be of reasonable importance to justify such an approach, especially so since the presented challenge remained unsolved for more than a year. In our paper, we present our analysis, demonstrating comprehensive leakage detection, plaintext dependence, and key extraction from the challenge implementation. Our work presents concerning weaknesses in the implementation that contradict the challenge authors' claims. We hope by openly sharing this analysis to motivate further public scrutiny.

## Correctable Enrollment and One-Transaction Seed Proofs for Ethereum's Post-Quantum Transition

DevFeed: [Correctable Enrollment and One-Transaction Seed Proofs for Ethereum's Post-Quantum Transition](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/correctable-enrollment-and-one-transaction-seed-proofs-for-ethereum-s-post-quantum-transition-146042.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25663>)

Author: Xin Jin, Maximillian Liao, Handong Chen, Yi Nancy Li, Junyu Liu

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [consensus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consensus.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [legacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/legacy.md>), [machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [proofs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proofs.md>), [quant-ph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quant-ph.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [simulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simulation.md>), [space](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/space.md>), [sponsor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sponsor.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

The proposal lets Ethereum account owners enroll post-quantum keys with existing signatures before ECDSA retirement, then correct enrollments by a shared post-retirement deadline using a zero-knowledge proof of the wallet's BIP-39 seed. Accounts never enrolled remain frozen but recoverable by seed proof without a deadline. Proofs bind the new key, nonce, and fee cap; validators switch to hash-based keys at a finalized checkpoint under a stated bound on attacker voting power. The authors report formal guarantees under explicit assumptions, model checking, and implementations in go-ethereum and a Lean consensus client. Their recursive hash-based STARK seed proof is about 190 KB, verifies in 38 ms, and takes a median 111 seconds to generate on a laptop; four proofs can be aggregated. In a ten-node simulation, block space constrained migration: 4.45 million accounts with at least 0.1 ETH took an estimated 29.4 days to enroll before retirement or 235 days to recover afterward in batches of four. During mass enrollment, public-mempool waiting had a 19.1-minute median, exceeding published estimates for a fast quantum computer to extract a key.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25663v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can extract the private key of every Ethereum account whose public key is published, and accounts exposed by their own transactions hold 54.6% of execution-layer ETH. As the first such machine may stay secret, a migration cannot wait for visible thefts, and once keys are extractable, legacy signatures no longer tell owners from attackers. We design a migration in which owners enroll post-quantum keys cheaply with their existing signatures before ECDSA is retired at a scheduled time, while a zero-knowledge proof of the wallet's BIP-39 seed can correct any such enrollment until a common deadline afterward; an account nobody enrolled stays frozen and recoverable by seed proof without a deadline. Each proof binds the new key, a nonce and a fee cap, so neither a paying sponsor nor a reordering block builder can redirect or replay it. Validators switch to hash-based keys first, at a finalized checkpoint and under a stated bound on the attacker's voting power. We prove the account guarantees under explicit assumptions, model-check the rules, and implement the design in go-ethereum and a Lean consensus client. A three-layer recursive hash-based STARK yields a seed proof of about 190 KB that fits one transaction, verifies in 38 ms and takes a median of 111 s to generate on a laptop; four proofs aggregate into one. In a ten-node simulation with mainnet-derived accounts and fee demand, block space rather than proving sets the duration: the 4.45 million accounts with at least 0.1 ETH would migrate in 29.4 days if all enroll before ECDSA is retired and in 235 days if all recover after it in batches of four. In a mass enrollment, an enrollment waits a median of 19.1 minutes in the public mempool, longer than published estimates for a fast quantum computer to extract its key, so owners with a seed and an unexposed key should migrate by seed proof.

## HDKEM: Authentication Allocation for Deniable Hybrid Key Exchange

DevFeed: [HDKEM: Authentication Allocation for Deniable Hybrid Key Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hdkem-authentication-allocation-for-deniable-hybrid-key-exchange-146008.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16100>)

Author: Kazi Hassan Shakib, Muhammad Asfand Hafeez, Arslan Munir

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [hybrid-key-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid-key-exchange.md>), [impersonation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impersonation.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [oracle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oracle.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [quantum-key-distribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-key-distribution.md>), [random](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/random.md>), [ring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [split](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/split.md>), [x25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x25519.md>)

### AI overview

HDKEM combines ML-KEM-768, X25519, and an optional pre-shared or QKD-delivered key through a split-key pseudorandom function; the session key remains secret if at least one input stays secure. Its four modes allocate authentication differently: source-backed uses key confirmation under k3, so other holders of k3 can impersonate the server; hide also encrypts the client's signature; mutual adds a server ring signature to prevent that impersonation; and source-less uses ring signatures for both endpoints without k3. The authors report proofs of eCK session-key secrecy in the quantum random-oracle model, explicit authentication, forward secrecy, and session-partner deniability, plus a concrete deniability bound in the classical random-oracle model. With FalconRS, source-backed sends 3,813 bytes in about 26 ms, compared with 5,101 bytes and 47 ms for mutual.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.16100v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A deniable authenticated key exchange (DAKE) establishes an authenticated shared key without giving third parties proof of participation. Post-quantum DAKEs use ring signatures, message authentication codes, or split key-encapsulation mechanisms, which differ in who can authenticate and how deniability is achieved. We introduce \emph{authentication allocation} to classify which parties hold secrets that produce accepted authentication messages. For protocols using a fixed two-member ring, we prove that an accuser can simulate a session by either sharing the accused party's authentication key or signing with its own ring key. Thus, deniability relies on key sharing or the ring signature's ability to hide its signer. We propose \HDKEM, combining ML-KEM-768, X25519, and an optional pre-shared or quantum key distribution (QKD)-delivered key $k_3$ through a split-key pseudorandom function. The session key remains secret if at least one input remains secure. Since provisioning services and QKD key managers may know $k_3$, the client always authenticates with its own ring key; the mode determines whether other holders of $k_3$ can impersonate the server. Four modes are supported: \emph{source-backed} authenticates the server through key confirmation under $k_3$, allowing its holders to impersonate the server; \emph{hide} also encrypts the client's signature; \emph{mutual} adds a server ring signature to prevent such impersonation; and \emph{source-less} authenticates both endpoints with ring signatures without $k_3$. We prove extended Canetti--Krawczyk (eCK) session-key secrecy in the quantum random-oracle model, explicit authentication, forward secrecy, and session-partner deniability, with a concrete deniability bound in the classical random-oracle model. With FalconRS, source-backed mode sends 3,813~bytes in about 26~ms, versus 5,101~bytes and 47~ms in mutual mode.

## GPU-Accelerated Secure Inference for Drug--Target Interaction Prediction

DevFeed: [GPU-Accelerated Secure Inference for Drug--Target Interaction Prediction](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gpu-accelerated-secure-inference-for-drug-target-interaction-prediction-145088.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25664>)

Author: Sikha Pentyala, Steven Golob, Daniil Filienko, Ming-Chun Kao, Martine De Cock

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [model architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/model-architecture.md>), [AI Architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-architecture.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [accelerated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerated.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [co-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/co-design.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [comparisons](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/comparisons.md>), [competition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/competition.md>), [compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compute.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [cuda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cuda.md>), [custom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/custom.md>), [deep](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep.md>), [deep-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep-learning.md>), [deep-learning-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep-learning-models.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-accelerated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-accelerated.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [interaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interaction.md>), [prediction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prediction.md>), [target](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/target.md>)

### AI overview

The paper's first-place iDASH 2026 Track III solution combines an MPC-friendly DTI model with GPU protocols for two-party secure inference. SlimDTA reduces operations on the secret drug, especially nonlinear operations that require communication between servers. The GPU framework evaluates linear layers using additive secret sharing and nonlinear layers using function secret sharing, with a custom CUDA comparison kernel. The authors report under 10 ms per prediction on average, with secure predictions matching the plaintext model to within 0.02%.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25664v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep learning models that predict drug--target interactions (DTI) can speed up drug discovery, but the candidate drugs they score are valuable intellectual property that their owners cannot reveal. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) lets two servers compute a prediction on a secret-shared drug, without either server learning the drug. However, secure inference of deep models is slow. Non-linear operations require communication between the servers, and MPC arithmetic does not map naturally to GPUs. In this paper, we present our solution to Track~III of the iDASH 2026 privacy and security competition, which asked for fast two-party secure DTI inference on GPUs. Our solution is built on the co-design of MPC-friendly models and MPC protocols. On the model side, we design SlimDTA, a DTI model that reduces the operations on the secret drug, and in particular the non-linear operations that require communication. On the protocol side, we build a GPU framework that evaluates the linear layers with additive secret sharing and the non-linear layers with function secret sharing, including a custom CUDA kernel for the comparisons. Our solution won first place in the competition, at under 10,ms per prediction on average, and its secure predictions match the plaintext model to within 0.02%.

## CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-61798-netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-boringssl-hpke-private-key-bytes-exposed-through-tostring-and-exception-messages-144620.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61798>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-19T22:18:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Netty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/netty.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [array](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/array.md>), [codec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codec.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-61798](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-61798.md>), [exception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exception.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [hpke](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hpke.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/log.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [messages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/messages.md>), [netty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty.md>), [netty-incubator-codec-ohttp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [tostring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tostring.md>)

### AI overview

Before netty-incubator-codec-ohttp 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSL HPKE private-key bytes could be exposed through two paths: key-pair and private-key parameter toString() output, and exception messages containing rejected privateKeyBytes. Applications that log these objects or initialization exceptions may persist complete private keys in logs or telemetry. Readers of those records could recover a key and potentially compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity while it remains usable. The issue is fixed in 0.0.23.Final.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-61798 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 10:18 p.m. | 2 hours, 54 minutes ago Description :netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. Severity: 8.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-133185-elazarl-goproxy-before-1-9-4-predictable-mitm-leaf-certificate-private-keys-143736.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133185>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-19T14:27:46Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-133185](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-133185.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [elazarl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elazarl.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [goproxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy.md>), [goproxy-project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy-project.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [mitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitm.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Goproxy versions before 1.9.4 have a weak key generation flaw in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey: misuse of hash.Sum causes RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys to be derived from public data. An attacker who has the proxy CA certificate and has observed a leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate it to clients that trust the proxy CA.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-133185 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 2:27 p.m. | 55 minutes ago Description :Goproxy before 1.9.4 contains a weak key generation vulnerability in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey that derives RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys from public data due to misuse of hash.Sum. Attackers with the CA certificate and one observed leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate the host to clients trusting the proxy CA. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Playing the SMR Game with Existential Honesty

DevFeed: [Playing the SMR Game with Existential Honesty](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/playing-the-smr-game-with-existential-honesty-143158.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24586>)

Author: Zeta Avarikioti, Odysseas Sofikitis, Christos Stefo

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>)

Tags: [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [bribe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bribe.md>), [censorship](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/censorship.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [coin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coin.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [fees](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fees.md>), [fetch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fetch.md>), [full](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/full.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [interactive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interactive.md>), [layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/layer.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [node](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/node.md>), [nodes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nodes.md>), [one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one.md>), [smr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smr.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a finalization layer that remains safe even when every validator is rational or Byzantine, assuming one unidentified full node is honest and always online. In a synchronous network, clients relay received certificates to full nodes, wait before confirming, run an existing freezing gadget, and fetch past certificates from the honest node. This prevents honest clients from confirming conflicting ledgers under any validator strategy. Rewards encourage participation but can also fund bribery and censorship: using only its rewards, the adversary can censor less than a fraction of available fees equal to the fraction of the quorum it signs at each height; any additional censorship requires spending its own funds.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: State machine replication protocols are usually proven secure in the honest-Byzantine setting, which requires an honest supermajority of validators. Deployed systems offer no such guarantee: validators participate for profit and may deviate from the protocol whenever doing so increases their gains. In our work, every validator is rational or Byzantine, and none is honest. Rational validators may collude with each other and with the Byzantine ones, who may also bribe them to deviate. Known impossibility results show that, without honest validators, clients that decide whether to accept a transaction based on a non-interactive certificate and without further communication cannot be kept safe. To bypass these results, we let clients relay the certificates they receive to full nodes and wait before confirming transactions. We also assume that one full node, whose identity is unknown, is honest and always online. Under this assumption, we build a finalization layer over any certifiable quorum-based protocol in a synchronous network. Clients run an existing freezing gadget and fetch past certificates from the honest full node, which makes the protocol \emph{always-safe}: no two honest clients confirm conflicting ledgers, for any strategy of the validators. We incentivize participation through rewards, which the adversary may use to bribe rational validators into censoring transactions. In this setting, we formalize censorship and characterize it tightly: paying only with his rewards, the adversary censors less than a $\bw$ fraction of the available fees at each height, where $\bw$ is the fraction of the quorum he signs, and every coin of censorship beyond that comes from his own funds.

## Authenticating IoT Data on Ethereum after Pectra and Fusaka: A Cost Study of Signature Schemes, Batching and Anchoring for Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

DevFeed: [Authenticating IoT Data on Ethereum after Pectra and Fusaka: A Cost Study of Signature Schemes, Batching and Anchoring for Agricultural Supply Chain Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/authenticating-iot-data-on-ethereum-after-pectra-and-fusaka-a-cost-study-of-signature-schemes-batching-and-anchoring-for-agricultural-supply-chain-finance-142969.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23764>)

Author: Ming-Fong Sie, Jian-Hong Chen, Gwan-yen Lin, Yen-Shuo Chen, Shih-wei Liao

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: comparison

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [ECDSA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ecdsa.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>)

Tags: [1-6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-6.md>), [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [finance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/finance.md>), [fusaka](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fusaka.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>), [supply-chain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chain.md>)

### AI overview

The study finds that batching and Merkle anchoring reduce ECDSA authentication costs sixfold, to 8,963 gas per record, while secp256k1 ECDSA remains the least costly authenticated option after Ethereum's Pectra and Fusaka upgrades. P-256 costs 1.6 times as much per record, the pseudonymous identity-based design 2.7 times, and BLS aggregation 3.9 times, largely because of on-chain hash-to-curve; a transaction fits up to 1,754 ECDSA-authenticated records versus 411 BLS-aggregated records. On a Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, pairing-based signing takes 5.7 ms compared with 0.29 ms for ECDSA. The upgrades primarily affect feasibility rather than cost. Pairing-based schemes may suit applications needing their added properties, while the identity-based scheme introduces key escrow at the key generation centre. Results are from the abstract; it says the benchmark harness is released for reproducibility.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23764v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Blockchain-based supply chain finance can turn the sensor-recorded production history of smallholder farms into verifiable credit evidence, but only if every record is authenticated and anchored at a cost that scales to large device fleets. Ethereum's 2025 Pectra and Fusaka upgrades changed this cost landscape: they added precompiles for BLS12-381 and P-256, repriced calldata and MODEXP, and capped transaction gas at $2^{24}$. We organize the authentication and anchoring of IoT records into three trust levels, from posting a Merkle root through a trusted aggregator to verifying every device signature on-chain, and implement four replay-protected signature designs: ECDSA over secp256k1 and P-256, BLS aggregate signatures with on-chain hash-to-curve, and a pseudonymous identity-based signature with batch verification. Measured as signed transactions under the rules before and after both upgrades, the upgrades mainly changed which designs are feasible, not their cost. Batching and Merkle anchoring cut the cost of ECDSA authentication sixfold, to 8,963 gas per record, and secp256k1 ECDSA remains the cheapest authenticated design: P-256 costs 1.6 times as much, the identity-based design 2.7 times and BLS aggregation 3.9 times, dominated by on-chain hashing to the curve. One transaction carries at most 1,754 ECDSA-authenticated records but only 411 BLS-aggregated ones. On a Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, pairing-based signing takes 5.7 ms against 0.29 ms for ECDSA. Pairing-based designs pay off only when the application needs their additional properties, and the identity-based design adds key escrow at the key generation centre. The benchmark harness is released for reproducibility.

## Retained Encrypted Search with Certified Split Joins

DevFeed: [Retained Encrypted Search with Certified Split Joins](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/retained-encrypted-search-with-certified-split-joins-143149.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24265>)

Author: Yavor Litchev, Liwen Ouyang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>)

Tags: [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [adaptive-queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive-queries.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [edits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edits.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [hamming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hamming.md>), [interface](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interface.md>), [invariant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/invariant.md>), [join](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/join.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [learning-with-errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning-with-errors.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [reduce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reduce.md>), [ring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring.md>), [ring-learning-with-errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring-learning-with-errors.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [split](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/split.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents retained encrypted Hamming search that remains usable after data edits or worker replacement while limiting each query preparation to one authorized decryption and decoding attempt. Its privacy reduction to Ring-LWE assumes authenticated prescribed execution, exclusive nonrollback owner state, an ideal public seed-expansion interface, and a stated observation model. Query-independent expanded components enable a retained split join with a smaller-modulus encrypted database; a simultaneous circuit bound covers a finite honest reservation family, including adaptive queries and slot selection, with explicit statistical losses. In three post-calibration local CPU comparisons on 32,768 512-bit vectors, the 60-bit-join construction had a 9.825-second median for an end-to-end two-query workload, versus 12.159 seconds for an optimized full-source-modulus baseline. These local results are not deployment or concrete-security claims.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24265v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retaining encrypted search across data edits and worker replacement requires separating computational validity from current release authority. We give exact Hamming search with at most one authorized decryption and decoding attempt per query preparation. Under authenticated prescribed execution, exclusive nonrollback owner state, an ideal public seed-expansion interface and a stated observation model, we reduce bounded adaptive privacy to ordinary ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE). Expanded second components depend only on public masks and fixed maps, independently of queries and the fresh database key. This compiler invariant permits a retained split join against a smaller-modulus encrypted database. A simultaneous bound on the completed circuit covers a finite honest reservation family, including adaptive queries and slot selection, with explicit statistical correctness and privacy losses. In three post-calibration local CPU comparisons on 32,768 vectors of 512 bits, the 60-bit-join construction takes a median 9.825 s for an end-to-end two-query workload, versus 12.159 s for the optimized full-source-modulus baseline. These times include setup, transfers, preparation and private completion. They are local implementation results, not deployment or concrete-security claims.

## Superspecial curves of genus two over prime fields: Frobenius types and rational (2,2)-kernels

DevFeed: [Superspecial curves of genus two over prime fields: Frobenius types and rational (2,2)-kernels](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/superspecial-curves-of-genus-two-over-prime-fields-frobenius-types-and-rational-2-2-kernels-143130.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23694>)

Author: Hung Dang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [primes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/primes.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [math-ag](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/math-ag.md>), [math-nt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/math-nt.md>), [number-theory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/number-theory.md>)

### AI overview

For superspecial genus-two curves over prime fields with p >= 7, the paper classifies eight Frobenius types and gives the corresponding Weil polynomials, prime congruence conditions, and counts of rational (2,2)-kernels. It proves mass formulas for curves of each type and for rational kernels yielding products of elliptic curves, using class numbers, a zeta value, 2-adic Tate modules, Richelot correspondence, Eichler's mass formula, and quartic CM orders. The proportion of rational kernels with decomposed quotient is of order p⁻¹ᐟ²(1 + L(1,χ)); formulas match exact enumeration for 37 primes from 7 to 173. The computed rational Richelot-isogeny graph is far from connected. These results are framed in relation to genus-two isogeny-based cryptography.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23694v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Superspecial curves of genus two over a prime field $\mathbb{F}_p$, and the rational $(2,2)$-isogenies between their Jacobians, are the vertices and edges of the graph on which genus-two isogeny-based cryptography is built. Let $C$ be such a curve, with Jacobian $J$ and Frobenius endomorphism $\pi$. We show that $\pi^2 = p\,\alpha_*$ for a unique automorphism $\alpha$ of $C$ over $\mathbb{F}_p$ whose action on the Weierstrass points is the square of that of Frobenius. For $p \ge 7$ this gives the list of Frobenius types of the Weierstrass points: eight types, each with its Weil polynomial, a congruence condition on $p$, and its number 15, 3, 3, 7, 1, 1, 3 or 1 of $\mathbb{F}_p$-rational $(2,2)$-kernels; when all Weierstrass points are rational, the 2-Tate pairing on $J[2]$ is determined by $p \bmod 8$. We then prove closed formulas, in terms of class numbers of imaginary quadratic orders and of $\zeta_{\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt p)}(-1)$, for the mass of the curves of each type and for the mass of the rational kernels whose quotient is a product of elliptic curves. For $\pi^2 = \pm p$ the total masses are due to Ibukiyama and to Xue and Yu; our proofs use the 2-adic Tate modules, the symmetry of the Richelot correspondence and Eichler's mass formula, and, for the other curves, modules over orders of a quartic CM field. The kernels are counted through gluings of supersingular elliptic curves. As a consequence, the proportion of rational kernels with decomposed quotient is of order $p^{-1/2}(1+L(1,\chi))$, where $\chi$ is the quadratic character of $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p})$. All formulas agree with an exact enumeration for the 37 primes $7 \le p \le 173$. Finally we describe the graph of $\mathbb{F}_p$-rational Richelot isogenies, which is far from connected in the range computed, and discuss what these results say about its use in isogeny-based cryptography.

## When Shuffling Fails: Token Recovery from Obfuscated KV Caches

DevFeed: [When Shuffling Fails: Token Recovery from Obfuscated KV Caches](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/when-shuffling-fails-token-recovery-from-obfuscated-kv-caches-143150.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24276>)

Author: Chengzhi Yi, Xiao Cheng, Wei Song, Haoyu Wang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [llm-serving](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm-serving.md>), [multiset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multiset.md>), [obfuscation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/obfuscation.md>), [recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recovery.md>), [reuse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reuse.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Repeated tokens can make shuffled KV-cache rows indistinguishable, collapsing the claimed b! permutation states to at most b distinguishable states when only a single-row recovery marker varies. The proposed Repeat-to-Reveal attack uses probes to collect those states and their rank-one differences to recover an equivalent denoiser without the defender's secret parameters. After one-time calibration, it can transfer across requests in the same secret epoch and recover token multisets from observed cache blocks via public-model dictionary matching. On official KV-Cloak, the authors report high-accuracy secret recovery and 100% GPU token-multiset recovery across 3,000 WildChat prompts, nine models, and eleven configurations. Refreshing row-level secrets between epochs interrupts that cross-request transfer. The abstract also reports orbit collapse in the sequence-permutation implementation of Thomas et al. and in PermLLM.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24276v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM serving systems store, offload, and share KV caches, exposing token-level representations to infrastructure operators and co-tenants. Shuffled obfuscation combines secret linear transforms with fresh permutations, claiming security from b! possible shufflings. We show that input symmetry invalidates this counting argument: security depends on distinguishable outputs under chosen inputs. Repeated tokens produce identical first-layer Value rows, making every row permutation leave the data unchanged. Only auxiliary structures such as a single-row recovery marker vary, reducing the effective state space from b! to b. We construct Repeat-to-Reveal. The attacker collects the b distinguishable states from its own probes and exploits their rank-one differences to recover an equivalent denoiser without knowing the defender's secret parameters. A one-time calibration transfers across requests sharing the same secret epoch, enabling passive token-multiset recovery from subsequently observed cache blocks through public-model dictionary matching. We instantiate the attack on official KV-Cloak and evaluate 3,000 real WildChat user prompts across nine models and eleven configurations. The attack recovers the secret parameters with high accuracy and achieves 100 percent token-multiset recovery on GPU. Refreshing row-level secrets between epochs interrupts cross-request transfer, confirming secret reuse scope as the operative vulnerability. We further confirm orbit collapse on two other open-source defenses: the sequence-permutation implementation of Thomas et al. and PermLLM. The KV-Cloak developers invited a detailed report through their private vulnerability reporting channel.

## PMKPIR: Parallel Multi-Keyword PIR with Interleaved Batching for Private Boolean Retrieval

DevFeed: [PMKPIR: Parallel Multi-Keyword PIR with Interleaved Batching for Private Boolean Retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pmkpir-parallel-multi-keyword-pir-with-interleaved-batching-for-private-boolean-retrieval-143148.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24248>)

Author: Rongxi Wang, Guanxiong Ha, Chunfu Jia, Minfen Gao, Hanmiaomiao Wang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [information retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/information-retrieval.md>), [vectorization techniques](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vectorization-techniques.md>)

Tags: [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [boolean](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boolean.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [pir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pir.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [query-processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/query-processing.md>), [retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/retrieval.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-analysis.md>), [simd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simd.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [traversal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traversal.md>)

### AI overview

PMKPIR combines interleaved batching with BFV homomorphic encryption to support parallel multi-keyword matching and universal Boolean computation while preserving the core security guarantees of classic PIR, according to the authors' analysis. Its IBPIR component matches multiple keywords in one database traversal; a Boolean query method extends that parallelism to Boolean operations. Against state-of-the-art schemes, the authors report reductions of up to 79.06% in query time, 75.00% in communication overhead, 97.92% in storage overhead, and 80.26% in peak memory. These are maximum reported reductions; the excerpt gives no benchmark conditions or per-scheme results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24248v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Keyword Private Information Retrieval (Keyword PIR) allows users to retrieve data associated with specific keywords from a database while protecting query privacy. However, existing Keyword PIR schemes supporting boolean retrieval either incur high computational overhead due to multiple database traversals, or fail to support universal boolean computation. We propose PMKPIR, a novel keyword PIR scheme supporting both parallel multi-keyword queries and universal boolean computation. We utilize the single instruction multiple data (SIMD) capability of BFV homomorphic encryption to propose an interleaved batching method, and design IBPIR based on this method, achieving the private matching of multiple keywords in a single database traversal. Furthermore, we design a boolean query processing method, extending the parallel capability of interleaved batching from keyword querying to boolean query computation, to support universal boolean computation and accelerate boolean operations. Building upon IBPIR, we integrate this method to further design PMKPIR. To the best of our knowledge, PMKPIR is the first Keyword PIR scheme to support multi-keyword batch matching within boolean queries. Security analysis demonstrates that, consistent with existing PIR schemes supporting boolean retrieval, PMKPIR preserves the core security guarantees of classic PIR. Compared with state-of-the-art schemes, PMKPIR reduces query time, communication overhead, storage overhead, and peak memory by up to 79.06%, 75.00%, 97.92%, and 80.26%, respectively.

## Robust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout Attacks

DevFeed: [Robust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/robust-lightweight-locally-differentially-private-histogram-estimation-and-the-role-of-dropout-attacks-143159.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24623>)

Author: Haochen Sun, Jacob Imola, Xi He

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/consistency.md>)

Tags: [announce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announce.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consistency.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [differential-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/differential-privacy.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [lightweight](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lightweight.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [manipulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manipulation.md>), [proofs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proofs.md>), [robust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robust.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>), [zero-knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a three-message verification framework for robust locally differentially private histogram estimation. Proofs of plaintext evaluation limit malicious clients to selective dropout rather than output manipulation; in evaluated PI-RAPPOR and Hadamard Response settings, mean per-client online latency is under 500 ms. Tight bounds show that this restriction reduces attack-dependent error for RAPPOR, PI-RAPPOR, and Hadamard Response by a factor proportional to the square root of the domain size. For deployments where client protocols cannot change, server-side consistency checks for RAPPOR and Hadamard Response need no client-side cryptography and can be applied after reports are collected. Experiments find that both approaches reduce attack error for some mechanisms; consistency checks yield errors between verification and unrestricted output manipulation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24623v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Local differential privacy (LDP) is vulnerable to output manipulation by malicious clients. Zero-knowledge proofs can enforce correct report computation, but clients may still selectively drop out after inspecting their outputs. Prior work combines zero-knowledge proofs with homomorphic encryption to hide reports from clients and prevent selective dropout, but incurs substantial computational cost. We instead develop a three-message lightweight verification framework for robust histogram estimation that uses proofs of plaintext evaluation to restrict output manipulation to selective dropout. Across the evaluated settings for PI-RAPPOR and Hadamard Response, mean per-client online latency remains below 500 milliseconds. We further establish tight error bounds showing that, for RAPPOR, PI-RAPPOR, and Hadamard Response, restricting malicious clients to selective dropout reduces attack-dependent error by a factor proportional to the square root of the domain size compared with output manipulation. Additionally, when client protocols cannot be modified, we propose server-side consistency checks for RAPPOR and Hadamard Response. These checks improve robustness without client-side cryptography and can be applied post-hoc to collected reports, offering an alternative under different deployment constraints. Experiments demonstrate that both verification and consistency checks substantially reduce attack error for certain mechanisms, with consistency checks yielding errors intermediate between those obtained with verification and those under unrestricted output manipulation.

## Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking

DevFeed: [Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/asymmetric-optical-image-watermarking-143120.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23350>)

Author: Guang Yang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Image processing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image-processing.md>), [fourier transform](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fourier-transform.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ed25519.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [Image](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-cv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cv.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [image](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/image.md>), [optical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optical.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [simulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simulation.md>), [watermarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/watermarking.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed watermark combines publicly verifiable authorship with a secret-key optical carrier. Its first layer binds an Ed25519 signature to image content in Fourier magnitudes, allowing offline verification with a public key. The second uses a secret phase hologram to write a carrier detected by a matched-filter correlator. In scalar-diffraction simulations, the optical signer closely reproduced the digital pipeline and verified at least 99.5% of 877 images in each of eight post-sensor settings, while accepting none of 40,670 unmarked images. The carrier was detected on 99.8% of unattacked images with the matched key, but detection fell to zero with a 1% scale error or a one-bin mask shift. These are simulation results; no hardware was built. The authors distinguish security claims based on signature and content binding from measured optical performance.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23350v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.

## Analysis of Commit Signing on GitHub

DevFeed: [Analysis of Commit Signing on GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/analysis-of-commit-signing-on-github-142111.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14014>)

Author: Abubakar Sadiq Shittu, Parker Collier, John Sadik, Farzin Gholamrezae, Scott Ruoti

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [commit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commit.md>), [commits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commits.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [everyday](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/everyday.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [sampling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sampling.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>)

### AI overview

The study examines end-to-end Git commit signing through a 2% stratified sample of GitHub accounts, focusing on key management as well as signing behavior. It analyzes 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories from 71,694 sampled accounts that had committed, and collects 208,546 public keys uploaded to sampled accounts. The authors compare their approach with earlier studies that mainly sampled repositories and paid less attention to key management, then outline a path toward more usable developer key management. The supplied abstract does not report the specific usage patterns found.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2604.14014v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Since 1999, the security community has known that managing cryptographic keys is hard for users of cryptographic systems. Git lets software developers use private keys they control to digitally sign the commits that record their code changes to a repository. This practice offers a rare opportunity to study how a large community manages cryptographic keys in everyday work. In this paper, we study end-to-end commit signing, using GitHub accounts as our sampling unit. Our 2% stratified sample of the GitHub population comprises 2,737,649 accounts, 71,694 of which have made at least one commit. For these accounts, we analyze 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories and collect 208,546 public keys uploaded to the sampled accounts. We examine developers' signing key usage patterns and compare our findings with those of prior commit signing studies, most of which used repository-based samples and paid less attention to key management. We then outline a path toward more usable key management for developers.

## A-Tag: Cryptographic File Tagging with Enforced Live Human Presence

DevFeed: [A-Tag: Cryptographic File Tagging with Enforced Live Human Presence](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-tag-cryptographic-file-tagging-with-enforced-live-human-presence-143125.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23602>)

Author: Mohammed Gharib, Sam Burns, Martin Zizi

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [software artifact signing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-artifact-signing.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-generated-content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-generated-content.md>), [artifacts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artifacts.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated.md>), [autonomy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomy.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [event](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event.md>), [file](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/file.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [human-in-the-loop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/human-in-the-loop.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [live](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/live.md>), [presence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/presence.md>), [tag](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tag.md>)

### AI overview

A-Tag binds a digital file to a verified instance of live human presence at tagging time, addressing a gap left by signatures and authentication, which establish identity or integrity but not live presence. It combines micro-motion-based liveness checks, cryptographic binding to the artifact, and publicly verifiable logging. The transferable tag attests that a live human triggered the action; it does not establish the actor's identity, the file's origin, or its semantic content. The authors report implementation on commodity devices, over 99% recovery success for image artifacts after real-world transformations, deterministic verification, sub-second verification, and practical tagging latency. The abstract says the system's guarantees and limitations are analyzed but does not detail them.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The increasing autonomy of software agents and the proliferation of AI-generated content have weakened the reliability of digital actions as evidence of human involvement. Existing mechanisms, such as digital signatures and authentication protocols, verify identity and integrity, but do not establish whether a live human was present at the time an action was performed. In this paper, we introduce A-Tag, a system for verifiable human-in-the-loop tagging of digital artifacts. A-Tag cryptographically binds a file to a verified instance of live human presence at the moment of tagging. The resulting tag serves as a persistent and transferable proof that the action was triggered by a live human, without making claims about the origin, identity of the actor, or semantic content of the file. A-Tag is a modular framework combining liveness verification based on micro-motion signals shaped by human motor control, a secure cryptographic binding between the verified event and the artifact, and a publicly verifiable logging mechanism enabling independent validation. We formalize security properties of human presence signals, define an adversarial model capturing automated and relay attacks, and analyze the system's guarantees and limitations. We implement A-Tag on commodity devices and evaluate it under realistic conditions. Our evaluation shows that A-Tag provides cryptographically sound artifact binding with deterministic verification, while enabling robust recovery under real-world transformations, achieving over 99 percent success for image-based artifacts, and maintaining sub-second verification and practical tagging latency.

## Post-Quantum Cryptography Education for Software Developers: A Multivocal Literature Review

DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography Education for Software Developers: A Multivocal Literature Review](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-cryptography-education-for-software-developers-a-multivocal-literature-review-142171.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23311>)

Author: R. D. N. Shakya, C. P. Wijesiriwardana, S. M. Vidanagamachchi, Nalin A. G. Arachchilage

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/learning.md>), [Developer skills](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-skills.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [alignment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alignment.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing.md>), [coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coverage.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [education](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/education.md>), [literature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/literature.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [software-developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-developers.md>)

### AI overview

The review examines whether existing education prepares software developers to implement and migrate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) securely. It analyzes 8 research publications and 15 professional training offerings across competencies, practical tasks, teaching, learner support, and evaluation. All 23 sources cover PQC foundations and algorithms, but coverage of practical software engineering tasks is uneven. The review identifies gaps in developer-focused evaluation, authentic tasks and competency alignment, pedagogy and learner support, security-focused assessment, and long-term validation of learning and transfer. It recommends strengthening PQC education, though the supplied abstract does not detail the recommendations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23311v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptography, making post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption a software engineering challenge. However, it remains unclear how well existing educational provision prepares software developers for secure PQC implementation and migration. We conducted a multivocal literature review of 8 research publications and 15 professional training offerings, examining competency coverage, practical software engineering tasks, pedagogical approaches, learner support, and evaluation. All 23 sources covered PQC foundations and algorithms, but coverage of practical software-engineering tasks was uneven. Our analysis identifies six gaps concerning developer focused evaluation, authentic software engineering tasks, task competency alignment, pedagogical design and learner support, security-focused assessment, and long term validation of learning outcomes and transfer. We derive recommendations for strengthening PQC education and better preparing software developers to implement and migrate cryptographic systems securely.

## New Site-to-Site VPN connections will default to recommended cryptography

DevFeed: [New Site-to-Site VPN connections will default to recommended cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/new-site-to-site-vpn-connections-will-default-to-recommended-cryptography-142037.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/networking-and-content-delivery/new-site-to-site-vpn-connections-will-default-to-recommended-cryptography/>)

Author: Durgesh Potnis

Published: 2026-11-18T21:10:11Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Networking & Content Delivery](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/networking-content-delivery.md>)

Topics: [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>)

Tags: [2027](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2027.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-site-to-site-vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-site-to-site-vpn.md>), [change](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/change.md>), [changes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changes.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [diffie-hellman](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/diffie-hellman.md>), [existing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/existing.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [ikev2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ikev2.md>), [intermediate-200](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate-200.md>), [learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learn.md>), [migrate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migrate.md>), [recommended](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recommended.md>), [site-to-site-vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/site-to-site-vpn.md>), [vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vpn.md>)

### AI overview

Starting March 1, 2027, new AWS Site-to-Site VPN connections will default to IKEv2, AES256-GCM-16, SHA2-384, and Diffie-Hellman group 20; existing connections retain their configured algorithms. Customers whose gateway devices need other algorithms must explicitly select them when creating connections, including through CloudFormation, CDK, or Terraform, or negotiation may fail. To migrate existing tunnels, audit negotiated algorithms with GetActiveVpnTunnelStatus, update the customer gateway, validate connectivity, then remove non-recommended options on the AWS side one tunnel at a time with ModifyVpnTunnelOptions. Each tunnel update causes brief downtime. The article also provides an audit script for enabled Regions and lists its required read-only IAM permissions.

### Source excerpt

Starting March 1, 2027, new AWS Site-to-Site VPN connections will default to only the recommended cryptographic algorithms (IKEv2, AES256-GCM-16, SHA2-384, and Diffie-Hellman group 20). Existing connections are unaffected. Learn what changes, how to check whether you are affected, and how to audit and migrate your existing tunnels before the change.

## Email Dumpster Diving

DevFeed: [Email Dumpster Diving](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/email-dumpster-diving-142365.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.jim-nielsen.com/2026/email-dumpster-diving/>)

Author: Jim Nielsen

Published: 2026-11-18T19:00:00Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Jim Nielsen's Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/jim-nielsen-s-blog.md>)

Topics: [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Use Cases for Every Cloud Service Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/use-cases-for-every-cloud-service-model.md>)

Tags: [cloud-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-services.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/phishing.md>), [ransomware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ransomware.md>), [saas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/saas.md>), [scam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scam.md>), [spam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spam.md>)

### AI overview

The author uses spam-folder browsing to learn scam tactics and occasionally finds a legitimate message wrongly flagged. The excerpt describes phishing emails that mimic cloud-service billing warnings, a message claiming to be from Gina Rinehart that builds credibility through a Wikipedia link, and a purported Trump Accounts notice. To assess the last email, the author checked its links, sender, and headers; they matched the IRS-listed GovDelivery sender and official destinations, so the message was legitimate despite Gmail's spam classification. The author also notes how scam demands for payment can resemble SaaS billing practices.

### Source excerpt

Sometimes, for fun, I like to go rummage around in my email's Spam folder. Why? Who knows (probably a question for a licensed medical professional). I think there's some part of me that chases the dopamine hit of finding a "needle in the haystack": an email flagged as spam that shouldn't be (which almost never happens, so I guess this behavior falls under the label of addictive/impulsive seeking). I think there's also a part of me that enjoys keeping a finger on the pulse of scam tactics, like "Let's see how people are trying to trick me today..." Almost like a form of inoculation: deliberate exposure to scam tactics in a controlled environment. It helps me develop an immunity, which comes in handy when family members come to me with their emails and ask, "Is this legit?" Here's a little exposure to what I've seen recently. First: I see a lot of emails that exploit the way cloud services bill us. For example: "You've hit your limits! Better log in or you'll lose access!" Or, "Your credit card has expired. Better log in and enter your new credit card so you can keep doing what you're doing." ⁣ (Note the little green banner at the top -- "This message was sent from a trusted sender." A kind of "Why would I deceive you?") These emails are interesting not only as an exercise in analyzing scam tactics, but also as a meta-commentary on legitimate software use cases. For example, isn't it interesting how difficult it can be to distinguish scammer tactics from legitimate software company practices? "Hey, you better give us your credit card or you'll lose access to your thing!" That's what ransomware is; it's also what SaaS is, lol. It's kinda funny, yeah? No, just me? Ok, I digress. Next email. This is an interesting one. Usually phishing emails are pretty overt in their intentions: click this big button and get taken to a page where you do what we want, e.g. enter sensitive info like a password or credit card. (Again, interesting that legitimate marketing teams follow the sam

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