# cyber resiliency

The ability of systems using or enabled by cyber resources to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises.

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## What this week's cyber chaos revealed about what's coming for the 'Digital Grid'

DevFeed: [What this week's cyber chaos revealed about what's coming for the 'Digital Grid'](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-this-week-s-cyber-chaos-revealed-about-what-s-coming-for-the-digital-grid-146987.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/leadership-perspectives/digital-grid-holiday-scams>)

Author: Caitlyn Moorhead

Published: 2026-11-20T20:41:37Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Gen](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gen.md>)

Topics: [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>), [AI in cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-in-cybersecurity.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-hacking.md>), [breaches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breaches.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [critical-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical-infrastructure.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [grid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grid.md>), [holiday](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/holiday.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [leadership-perspectives](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leadership-perspectives.md>), [outages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/outages.md>), [shopping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/shopping.md>)

### AI overview

Recent outages and third-party data exposures showed how failures in interconnected services can ripple from websites into travel, banking, communications, and consumer behavior. Officials had found no evidence that the outages were a coordinated cyberattack, and the article distinguishes them from separate vendor-related incidents: attackers injected malicious code into websites using Optimizely, while breaches at service providers exposed customer information at several financial companies. Visa said payment data and card numbers were unaffected; Mastercard described the exposed information as limited and non-payment. AI is accelerating familiar threats such as vulnerability discovery and tailored phishing, though fully autonomous attacks remain comparatively rare. During holiday shopping, treat urgent delivery, payment, or account messages skeptically: open the official app or website yourself, or call a number on a physical card. The article also recommends MFA (preferably a passkey or authenticator app over SMS), device updates, account alerts, unique passwords, and independent verification.

### Source excerpt

Here's how AI hacking, data breaches, and massive outages have wreaked havoc on critical infrastructure, and what to expect moving forward - including shopping safely this holiday season.

## Most CIOs and CISOs expect to contain attacks, though few can reach their gear right away

DevFeed: [Most CIOs and CISOs expect to contain attacks, though few can reach their gear right away](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/most-cios-and-cisos-expect-to-contain-attacks-though-few-can-reach-their-gear-right-away-145211.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/20/network-outage-recovery-resilience/>)

Author: Anamarija Pogorelec

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:27Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cios](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cios.md>), [ciso](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ciso.md>), [contain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contain.md>), [crowdstrike](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crowdstrike.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyber-incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-incident.md>), [cyber-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience.md>), [disaster-recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disaster-recovery.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [network-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-infrastructure.md>), [network-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-resilience.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [opengear](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opengear.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [risk-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk-management.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Opengear's survey of 514 CIOs and CISOs found a gap between confidence in containing attacks and the ability to reach infrastructure quickly if the primary network fails: among the better-prepared group, 93% said they could isolate compromised systems, but only 15% could get secure management access right away. The excerpt notes that recovery may wait for an engineer onsite when management access depends on the failed network, and identifies out-of-band management--a separate connection--as one approach. Resilience concerns also delayed, scaled back or paused AI, edge or distributed infrastructure projects for nearly three in four respondents. About one in six organizations did not formally test network resilience, and fewer than one in four considered it from project planning. Findings are self-reported; the excerpt does not provide further survey methodology.

### Source excerpt

Most organizations can't quickly get secure management access to their own critical network infrastructure once the primary network goes down. Opengear surveyed 514 CIOs and CISOs and only a small share said they could get that access immediately or close to it. That gap bites hardest during a ransomware attack or a bad update, the moments when someone has to log in, cut off what's compromised and bring services back. If the only path to ... More -> The post Most CIOs and CISOs expect to contain attacks, though few can reach their gear right away appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Internet traffic and attacks during the 2026 U.S. midterm elections

DevFeed: [Internet traffic and attacks during the 2026 U.S. midterm elections](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/internet-traffic-and-attacks-during-the-2026-u-s-midterm-elections-144594.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-traffic-2026-us-election/>)

Author: Carlos Azevedo

Published: 2026-11-19T14:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [2026-midterm-elections](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026-midterm-elections.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [athenian-project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/athenian-project.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [candidate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/candidate.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cloudflare-for-campaigns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-for-campaigns.md>), [cross-site-scripting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-site-scripting.md>), [cyberattacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattacks.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [ddos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ddos.md>), [election](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/election.md>), [elections](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elections.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [internet-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-traffic.md>), [midterm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/midterm.md>), [midterm-elections](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/midterm-elections.md>), [project-galileo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/project-galileo.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [waf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/waf.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare observed a 363% Election Day traffic surge on protected U.S. government election websites, with requests rising to about 602 million from 130 million on November 1. It recorded no significant DDoS attacks on its 1,400-plus protected election-related sites that day; the only significant DDoS was a 520,000-request attack on a House candidate the day before. Across the election cycle, government sites faced far more vulnerability attempts than DDoS, while DDoS was the most common attack against journalism and civil society groups. Vulnerability attempts rose from 200,000 a day in January to 2 million a day in October. Cloudflare also detected over 9,000 triggers of its PHP vulnerability defense on one Western state election site, described as an isolated incident. Its recommendations are to prepare scalable infrastructure for voter traffic surges, maintain defenses throughout the year, and use automatically updated protections. Findings reflect organizations in Cloudflare's protection programs, not all election infrastructure.

### Source excerpt

On November 3, 2026 U.S. voters headed to the polls. Here's what Cloudflare data across more than 1,400 protected sites tells us about Election Day Internet traffic and cyberattacks.

## LLM-Guided Cyber-Physical Attack Path Identification in Smart Grids

DevFeed: [LLM-Guided Cyber-Physical Attack Path Identification in Smart Grids](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/llm-guided-cyber-physical-attack-path-identification-in-smart-grids-142829.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24765>)

Author: Amr Elshazly, Jesse Roberts, Rachad Atat, Muhammad Ismail

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [alignment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alignment.md>), [attack-paths](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack-paths.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [failure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/failure.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [fusion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fusion.md>), [grid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grid.md>), [grid-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grid-resilience.md>), [grounded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grounded.md>), [ieee](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ieee.md>), [impact](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impact.md>), [language-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-models.md>), [large-language-models-llms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large-language-models-llms.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [llms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llms.md>), [mitre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitre.md>), [modeling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/modeling.md>), [node](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/node.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a physics-grounded framework that combines grid topology with LLM-guided STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK threat modeling to identify cyber-physical attack paths. It compares topology-driven, threat-driven, and fusion-based strategies, evaluating rankings and paths against cascading-failure-derived impact references. Structured LLM threat modeling raises cyber-layer critical-node overlap@3 from about 33% to as high as 100%; node-level similarity reaches 65% and complete-path alignment 48%. In the IEEE 14-bus system, the framework also reduces runtime by about 75-85% relative to the fusion-based baseline. The supplied abstract reports these results but does not describe implementation details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24765v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Identifying high-impact attack paths in cyber-physical power systems is critical for improving grid resilience. Existing methods typically rely on either structural topology analysis or simulation-based cascading-failure models. Topology-based approaches capture connectivity but lack adversarial reasoning, while simulation-driven methods are primarily suited for offline analysis and are less effective for rapid evaluation of evolving attack scenarios. As a result, identifying realistic attack paths that jointly capture topology, threat semantics, and physical impact remains challenging. This paper presents a physics-grounded framework for identifying cyber-physical attack paths using large language models (LLMs), with cascading-failure-derived impact rankings used as physics-grounded references. The framework integrates system topology, LLM-guided STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK threat modeling, and three baseline strategies for comparison: topology-driven, threat-driven, and fusion-based. Evaluation is performed using (i) critical-node overlap between LLM-inferred top-K rankings and cascading-failure-based ground truth; (ii) node-level similarity between LLM-inferred and reference paths; and (iii) path-level alignment capturing agreement in complete attack sequences. Results show that structured LLM-based threat modeling substantially improves alignment with physics-grounded references. In the cyber layer, critical-node overlap@3 increases from approximately 33% to as high as 100%, while node-level similarity reaches up to 65% and path-level alignment reaches up to 48%. In addition, the proposed framework reduces runtime by approximately 75--85% compared to the fusion-based baseline in the IEEE 14-bus system. These results suggest that LLM-guided attack path identification is a promising approach for efficient and impact-aware cyber-physical security analysis.

## Palmer Luckey warns AI-powered cyberattacks are outpacing defenses: 'It's time to start running'

DevFeed: [Palmer Luckey warns AI-powered cyberattacks are outpacing defenses: 'It's time to start running'](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/palmer-luckey-warns-ai-powered-cyberattacks-are-outpacing-defenses-it-s-time-to-start-running-141230.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/18/palmer-luckey-warns-ai-powered-cyberattacks-are-outpacing-defenses-its-time-to-start-running/>)

Author: Sarah Perez

Published: 2026-11-18T21:34:13Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [TechCrunch | AI News & Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/techcrunch-ai-news-artificial-intelligence.md>)

Topics: [ai-assisted attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-assisted-attacks.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [legacy systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/legacy-systems.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-enabled-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-enabled-attacks.md>), [ai-powered-cyberattacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered-cyberattacks.md>), [anduril](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anduril.md>), [cyberattacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattacks.md>), [palmer-luckey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/palmer-luckey.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>)

### AI overview

Palmer Luckey warned that AI-enabled exploits are moving faster than defenses in organizations running outdated systems. He said adversaries, including North Korea, are exploiting this gap for strategic and financial reasons, and linked recent outages to efforts to patch vulnerabilities. Luckey argued that AI could eventually favor defenders, but only if they use it effectively and speed up their security efforts. He said preparedness varies and that some emerging techniques may make systems especially vulnerable.

### Source excerpt

The Anduril co-founder says outdated technology is leaving systems vulnerable to a new wave of AI-enabled attacks.

## Dell PowerMaxOS 10.5 Brings Back PowerPath With Up to 29% Higher IOPS and Adds Cyber Detect Snapshot Scans

DevFeed: [Dell PowerMaxOS 10.5 Brings Back PowerPath With Up to 29% Higher IOPS and Adds Cyber Detect Snapshot Scans](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/dell-powermaxos-10-5-brings-back-powerpath-with-up-to-29-higher-iops-and-adds-cyber-detect-snapshot-scans-141141.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.storagereview.com/news/dell-powermaxos-10-5-powerpath-cyber-detect-opentelemetry-nvme-tcp>)

Author: Harold Fritts

Published: 2026-11-18T18:32:24Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [StorageReview.com](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/storagereview-com.md>)

Topics: [dell](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dell.md>), [OpenTelemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/opentelemetry.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cache.md>)

Tags: [8k](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/8k.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [blast-radius](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blast-radius.md>), [broadcom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/broadcom.md>), [capacity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity.md>), [chatgpt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chatgpt.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [corruption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/corruption.md>), [dell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dell.md>), [dell-cyber-detect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dell-cyber-detect.md>), [dell-poweredge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dell-poweredge.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [enterprise-storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise-storage.md>), [esg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esg.md>), [opentelemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opentelemetry.md>), [rest-apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest-apis.md>), [scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scanning.md>), [snapshot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/snapshot.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>), [update](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/update.md>)

### AI overview

PowerMaxOS 10.5 adds cache-aware PowerPath multipathing, snapshot scanning with Cyber Detect, and expanded telemetry and management for Dell PowerMax arrays. Dell reports up to 29% higher IOPS than round-robin multipathing in an internal PowerMax 8500 test using 8K random reads served from cache; that result is workload-specific. Bulk REST API metrics were up to 14 times faster in Dell's comparison of one request covering 10 instances with 14 calls in version 10.4. OpenTelemetry can stream metrics to Prometheus or compatible collectors, and Brocade fabric events are exposed alongside array data. Cyber Detect analyzes immutable snapshots to identify clean copies and corruption, but requires a separate license and supported PowerEdge server. The OS update is available at no extra charge with an active Dell service contract and installs non-disruptively. PowerPath also supports PowerMax 2000 and 8000, while the 10.5 update targets the 2500 and 8500. An MCP integration is planned for later this year.

### Source excerpt

Dell announced PowerMaxOS 10.5 today, a software update for the PowerMax 2500 and 8500 that returns PowerPath multipathing to the platform, adds Dell Cyber Detect scanning of PowerMax snapshots, and opens array telemetry through OpenTelemetry and faster bulk REST APIs. Dell's headline figure is up to 29 percent higher IOPS from cache-aware PowerPath against native The post Dell PowerMaxOS 10.5 Brings Back PowerPath With Up to 29% Higher IOPS and Adds Cyber Detect Snapshot Scans appeared first on StorageReview.com.

## US senators urge White House AI chief to fix vulnerabilities after mass outages

DevFeed: [US senators urge White House AI chief to fix vulnerabilities after mass outages](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/us-senators-urge-white-house-ai-chief-to-fix-vulnerabilities-after-mass-outages-140833.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/nov/18/jay-clayton-ai-tech-outages-infrastructure>)

Author: Ariana Baio in New York

Published: 2026-11-18T15:53:10Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [The Guardian | Technology](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-guardian-technology.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [vulnerability management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerability-management.md>), [national security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/national-security.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [agencies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agencies.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-artificial-intelligence.md>), [ai-czar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-czar.md>), [ai-harms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-harms.md>), [ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-systems.md>), [banks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/banks.md>), [cnbc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cnbc.md>), [cyber-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-attacks.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [director-of-national-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/director-of-national-intelligence.md>), [government](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/government.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [japan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/japan.md>), [jay-clayton](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jay-clayton.md>), [outages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/outages.md>), [senate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/senate.md>), [updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/updates.md>), [us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/us.md>), [us-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/us-news.md>), [us-politics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/us-politics.md>), [us-politics-us-news-ai-artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/us-politics-us-news-ai-artificial-intelligence.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [white-house](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/white-house.md>)

### AI overview

Senators Maria Cantwell and Mike Rounds urged White House AI czar Jay Clayton to identify and fix vulnerabilities in US infrastructure and provide cybersecurity tools to hospitals, utilities, government agencies and other critical services. They warned that AI can find software weaknesses and help attackers exploit them faster than organizations can respond, while testing and installing patches across connected systems may take weeks or months and disrupt essential services. The senators also called for securing AI systems used to find vulnerabilities, citing concern they could gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems. Officials said the recent outages were separate maintenance or technical failures, with no indication of a malicious or coordinated attack; the cause and any role for AI remain unclear.

### Source excerpt

As Democrats flag AI bank breaches and cyber-attacks in Japan, Jay Clayton says system failures happen US politics live - latest updates A bipartisan pair of US senators are calling on Jay Clayton, the director of national intelligence and AI czar, to identify and fix vulnerabilities in the US's infrastructure following nationwide outages at major companies and government agencies. Maria Cantwell, the top Democrat on the Senate commerce, science, and transportation committee, and Mike Rounds, the Republican chair of the Senate subcommittee on cybersecurity, sent a letter to Clayton on Tuesday, outlining concerns sparked by reports of AI accessing major banks, cyber-attacks in Japan and more. Continue reading...

## Cyber or Not, the Lesson Is the Same: What a Week of Global Outages Teaches Us About Security Posture

DevFeed: [Cyber or Not, the Lesson Is the Same: What a Week of Global Outages Teaches Us About Security Posture](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cyber-or-not-the-lesson-is-the-same-what-a-week-of-global-outages-teaches-us-about-security-posture-140643.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/cyber-or-not-the-lesson-is-the-same-what-a-week-of-global-outages-teaches-us-about-security-posture/>)

Author: raphaelge@checkpoint.com

Published: 2026-11-18T13:52:01Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Check Point Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/check-point-blog.md>)

Topics: [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Exposure Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exposure-management.md>), [AI in cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-in-cybersecurity.md>), [cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity-and-infrastructure-security-agency.md>), [national security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/national-security.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [air-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/air-traffic.md>), [airline](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/airline.md>), [apple](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apple.md>), [banking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/banking.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [outages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/outages.md>), [posture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/posture.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-posture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-posture.md>)

### AI overview

The article argues that service resilience is part of security: outages caused by technical faults can harm users like attacks do, while also creating confusion and pressure that attackers exploit. It recounts disruptions affecting Apple, Microsoft 365, U.S. airspace, banks and United Airlines; most were attributed to technical issues or had no attack indicated, though the FAA incident's cause remained unresolved. Recommended steps include mapping provider dependencies, rehearsing 24-hour degraded operations, arranging verified out-of-band updates, tightening phishing and reset-request checks during incidents, testing changes and rollback plans, keeping safeguards active, and improving visibility to determine whether an incident is cyber-related. It also cites Google's warning about autonomous AI-enabled attacks and describes Check Point products as supporting user, network, exposure and AI security.

### Source excerpt

In this article Six major outages in eight days hit email, air traffic control, airline operations, banking and consumer cloud services across North America and beyond Most were attributed to technical faults, not attackers, and that is exactly why they're of importance to security leaders Resilience and security posture are one discipline, not two Outages create the confusion, urgency and workarounds that attackers look for, and Google warns that attackers now move at machine speed In the past eight days, people across North America lost access to their work email, their flights and their bank accounts. This morning, it was [...] The post Cyber or Not, the Lesson Is the Same: What a Week of Global Outages Teaches Us About Security Posture appeared first on Check Point Blog.

## Can your business withstand a destructive cyberattack?

DevFeed: [Can your business withstand a destructive cyberattack?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/can-your-business-withstand-a-destructive-cyberattack-139208.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.cio.com/article/4249889/can-your-business-withstand-a-destructive-cyberattack.html>)

Author: Cohesity

Published: 2026-11-17T22:24:12Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [CIO](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cio.md>)

Topics: [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Disaster Recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/disaster-recovery.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [Frontier AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/frontier-ai.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-systems.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business.md>), [cyber-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience.md>), [cyberattack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattack.md>), [cyberattacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattacks.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [dependencies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dependencies.md>), [disruption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disruption.md>), [edition-us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edition-us.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [mvc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mvc.md>), [operational](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operational.md>), [operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operations.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [plan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/plan.md>), [planning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/planning.md>), [recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recovery.md>), [response](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/response.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [storytype-brandpost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-brandpost.md>)

### AI overview

Destructive cyberattacks often invalidate recovery plans' assumptions: among surveyed organizations with a material attack in the prior year, 70% found the impact spread beyond the initial assessment, 61% reported dependency-planning gaps, and 76% exceeded recovery time objectives, taking nearly twice as long as planned. Plans also tend to prioritize restoring systems over sustaining customer service and critical operations. The report proposes defining a Minimum Viable Company (MVC): the essential services and supporting data, applications, identities, infrastructure, and third parties needed during disruption. Only 22% had formally documented and tested one; among those organizations, 92% said it informed recovery priorities. AI coverage is another gap: although 99% report using AI, 39% say plans comprehensively address attacks targeting it, and only 3% consider their plans equipped for emerging frontier AI threats. The excerpt recommends pressure-testing scenarios such as broader system impact, doubled recovery time, untrusted restored data, and loss of essential access.

### Source excerpt

Nearly every cyber recovery plan relies on assumptions about how recovery will unfold. Teams expect incidents can be fully contained before recovery begins, that recovery can proceed in a mostly linear sequence, and that they will have sufficient visibility into system and data dependencies. Destructive cyberattacks can quickly challenge those assumptions. The 2026 Cohesity Global Cyber Resilience Report found that among organizations that experienced a material cyberattack in the previous 12 months, 70% saw the scope of affected systems expand beyond the initial assessment, 61% identified moderate or significant gaps in how their plans accounted for dependencies, and 76% exceeded their recovery time objectives, with recovery taking nearly twice as long as planned. The findings also point to a broader gap in how organizations approach recovery. For 78% of organizations, cyber response and recovery plans focus more on restoring systems than on maintaining critical operations and serving customers during recovery. That imbalance matters when the damage extends further than anticipated or when getting everything back takes longer than planned. Organizations need a clear understanding of what must remain operational in the meantime. One approach is to define a Minimum Viable Company (MVC), the smallest version of the organization that can continue serving customers and maintaining critical operations during a disruption. Establishing an MVC requires identifying essential business services and the data, applications, identities, infrastructure, and third-party dependencies needed to support them. Yet only 22% of organizations have formally documented and tested an MVC. AI is adding another layer of complexity to cyber resilience planning and is already widespread, with 99% of organizations reporting use of AI systems, applications, workflows, or machine learning models. Even so, only 39% say their response and recovery plans comprehensively account for cyberattacks targe

## Experience: ENTRAP - An IaC Enterprise Cyber Range for Reproducible Security Assessment and Dataset Generation

DevFeed: [Experience: ENTRAP - An IaC Enterprise Cyber Range for Reproducible Security Assessment and Dataset Generation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/experience-entrap-an-iac-enterprise-cyber-range-for-reproducible-security-assessment-and-dataset-generation-139307.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.20594>)

Author: Rathan Appana, Aditya Kulkarni, Bheemarjuna Reddy Tamma

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [ansible](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ansible.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [backup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backup.md>), [backups](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backups.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [classifier](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classifier.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [experience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experience.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [iac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iac.md>), [range](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/range.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-assessment.md>)

### AI overview

ENTRAP is an Infrastructure-as-Code cyber range for repeatable post-compromise security experiments. It uses Ansible, KVM/Libvirt, and Cloud-init to provision and reset a segmented enterprise network with services including a gateway, DMZ, DNS, DHCP, backup and web servers, and client machines. The authors run three scenarios from clean states: ransomware, Layer-2 DHCP starvation with rogue DHCP, and perimeter web exploitation. ENTRAP also generates labeled attack datasets; the authors use collected data to train and evaluate a Random Forest for ransomware detection. The abstract says the codebase, logs, and datasets are publicly released, but provides no classifier results or detailed deployment requirements.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.20594v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An enterprise breach causes most of its damage after the perimeter is crossed. Once an attacker gains a foothold, they can move laterally to other hosts, take over the trusted services of the network, and encrypt the backups needed for recovery. Defenders, on the other hand, need to study this post-compromise stage, but they cannot rehearse it on a production enterprise network. Building such an enterprise network manually is time-consuming, and resetting it to its clean state between runs is still harder. As a result, security experiments are difficult to perform, compare and reproduce. We develop Enterprise Network Testbed for Reproducible Attack and Defense Practices (ENTRAP), an Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) cyber range that defines a fully segmented enterprise as version-controlled automation. ENTRAP uses Ansible, KVM/Libvirt, and Cloud-init to provision the environment and reset it to a clean state whenever necessary. The enterprise network includes several entities such as a gateway, an internal Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), DNS, DHCP, a backup server, a web server, and clients. On this network, a user can learn to assemble the entities, launch attacks, and write rules or defensive measures that harden its security. We launch three attacks: a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)-backed ransomware campaign, a Layer-2 DHCP starvation and rogue DHCP attack, and perimeter web exploitation. Each attack runs from a clean state, and ENTRAP acts as a reproducible generator of labeled attack datasets. Using the collected dataset, we train a Random Forest classifier for ransomware detection and present its evaluation results. We publicly release the codebase, collected logs, and datasets to facilitate further research.

## GPromptShield: Elevating Resilience in Graph Prompt Tuning against Adversarial Attacks

DevFeed: [GPromptShield: Elevating Resilience in Graph Prompt Tuning against Adversarial Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gpromptshield-elevating-resilience-in-graph-prompt-tuning-against-adversarial-attacks-139075.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.20621>)

Author: Shuhan Song, Ping Li, Ming Dun, Maolei Huang, Huawei Cao, Xiaochun Ye

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Adversarial attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/adversarial-attacks.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [Enhancing AI model performance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/enhancing-ai-model-performance.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [graph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graph.md>), [prompt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prompt.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>)

### AI overview

GPromptShield targets adversarial vulnerability in graph prompt tuning, where deceptive downstream graph data can produce misleading prompts even when it resembles pretraining data. Its defense has two components: Direct Handling adds hybrid multi-defense prompts to the graph feature space to counter invalid information; Indirect Amplification uses a training strategy to bypass unreliable components and strengthen valid ones. The authors derive conditions under which unbiased prompts exist and report improved resilience across multiple attack scenarios. The supplied text is an abstract and does not provide implementation details or quantitative results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.20621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The paradigm of ``pre-training and prompt-tuning", with its effectiveness and lightweight characteristics, has rapidly spread from the language field to the graph field. Several pioneering studies have designed specialized prompt functions for diverse downstream graph tasks based on various graph pre-training strategies. These prompts concentrate on the compatibility between the pre-training pretext and downstream graph tasks, aiming to bridge the gap between them. However, designing prompts blindly to adapt to downstream tasks based on this concept neglects crucial security issues. By conducting covert attacks on downstream graph data, we find that even when the downstream task data closely matches that of the pre-training tasks, it is still feasible to generate highly misleading prompts using simple deceptive techniques. In this paper, we shift the primary focus of graph prompts from compatibility to vulnerability issues in adversarial attack scenarios. We design a highly extensible shield defense system for the prompts, which enhances their robustness from two perspectives: Direct Handling and Indirect Amplification. When downstream graph data contains unreliable biases, the former directly combats invalid information by incorporating hybrid multi-defense prompts to the input graph's feature space, while the latter adopts a training strategy to bypass the invalid components and amplifies valid part. We provide a theoretical derivation that proves their feasibility, indicating that unbiased prompts exist under certain conditions on unreliable data. Extensive experiments across various scenarios of adversarial attacks indicate that the prompts within our defense system exhibit enhanced resilience and superiority. This paper explores a new perspective in graph prompt learning, offering a novel option for robust prompt tuning in downstream tasks.

## RESILAGENT: A Three-Pillar Architecture for Cyber-Physical Resilience in Electrical Power and Energy Systems

DevFeed: [RESILAGENT: A Three-Pillar Architecture for Cyber-Physical Resilience in Electrical Power and Energy Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/resilagent-a-three-pillar-architecture-for-cyber-physical-resilience-in-electrical-power-and-energy-systems-137706.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21480>)

Author: Nikolaos Kekatos, Georgios Koutidis, Konstantinos Antonakopoulos, Stylianos Basagiannis, Sokratis Katsikas, Georgios Kavallieratos, Alexios Lekidis, Tom Nianios, Elpiniki Papageorgiou

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [AI in cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-in-cybersecurity.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [AI Architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-architecture.md>), [Electrical engineering and computer science (EECS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science-eecs.md>)

Tags: [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-artificial-intelligence.md>), [analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics.md>), [anchor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anchor.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [bus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bus.md>), [climate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/climate.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-based.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [power-and-energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power-and-energy.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>)

### AI overview

RESILAGENT proposes a three-pillar architecture for power-system resilience: Sensing & Data Intelligence, Resilience Analytics & Reporting, and Incident Response & Recovery. A Cloud-based Orchestrator connects them in a Detect-Simulate-Decide-Sign loop. The design combines agentic AI and multimodal language models for cross-modal detection, real-time digital twins for what-if simulation, and a permissioned blockchain anchor for tamper-evident threat intelligence and CER/NIS2-aligned evidence. It is instantiated in two scenarios: a transmission operator facing coordinated cyber compromise, sabotage, and heatwave, and a distribution operator facing a supply-chain compromise during a storm. An IEEE-bus micro-benchmark measures false-data-injection detection, cyber-physical fusion lift, N-1 contingency screening, and anchor cost; the supplied excerpt gives no benchmark results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.21480v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Electrical Power and Energy Systems face hybrid threats that combine cyber intrusions, physical sabotage and climate-driven stress, and routinely outpace today's siloed monitoring stacks. We present RESILAGENT, a concept architecture organised around three operational pillars, Sensing & Data Intelligence, Resilience Analytics & Reporting, and Incident Response & Recovery, mediated by a Cloud-based Orchestrator and exercised through a closed Detect-Simulate-Decide-Sign loop. The framework fuses agentic artificial intelligence and multimodal large language models for cross-modal detection, real-time digital twins for what-if simulation, and a permissioned blockchain anchor for tamper-evident threat intelligence and CER/NIS2-aligned evidence. We instantiate it on two scenarios, a transmission operator under coordinated cyber compromise, sabotage and heatwave, and a distribution operator under a supply-chain compromise during a storm, and report an IEEE-bus micro-benchmark that quantifies each pillar through false-data-injection attack detection, cyber-physical fusion lift, N-1 contingency screening and anchor cost.

## Sequential Semantic-Non-Semantic Watermarking: Robustness Against UnMarker Attacks

DevFeed: [Sequential Semantic-Non-Semantic Watermarking: Robustness Against UnMarker Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/sequential-semantic-non-semantic-watermarking-robustness-against-unmarker-attacks-139291.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.20115>)

Author: Md Ifraham Iqbal

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [synthid](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/synthid.md>), [Image processing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image-processing.md>), [Image](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-cv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cv.md>), [cs-mm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-mm.md>), [eess-iv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-iv.md>), [robustness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robustness.md>), [semantic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semantic.md>), [watermarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/watermarking.md>)

### AI overview

In tests on 50 MS-COCO and CelebA-HQ images, combining HiDDeN and StegaStamp left both watermarks highly decodable, with little effect from embedding order. Individual UnMarker attacks generally left one watermark strong: StegaStamp after the non-semantic attack and HiDDeN after the semantic attack. Sequential attacks were needed to substantially weaken both signals; attack order had limited, configuration-dependent effects, and the semantic attack affected both watermark types more broadly. LPIPS was relatively low in several settings, but visual inspection found noticeable distortions in some images, especially faces, so the metric alone did not capture perceived quality. The abstract concludes that complementary watermark types can resist single-stage removal, while calling for broader perceptual evaluation and further study of sequential attacks.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.20115v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have accelerated digital content generation and intensified concerns around fraud, misuse, counterfeiting, and content provenance. Defensive image watermarking provides a practical mechanism for identifying and tracing digital content, but recent watermark-removal attacks challenge its robustness. This study investigates Sequential Semantic Non-Semantic Watermarking (SSNSW), which combines HiDDeN and StegaStamp as complementary non-semantic and semantic watermarking schemes. Using 50 images from MS-COCO and CelebA-HQ, both embedding orders are evaluated, followed by UnMarker's non-semantic and semantic attacks applied individually and sequentially. Results show that both watermarks remain highly decodable after dual embedding, with only limited embedding-order effects. Under individual attacks, one watermark generally remains strongly decodable: StegaStamp under the non-semantic attack and HiDDeN under the semantic attack. Sequential attacks are therefore required to substantially reduce both watermark signals, while attack order has a limited and configuration-dependent effect. The semantic attack also shows a broader effect across the two watermark types than the non-semantic attack. LPIPS remains relatively low in several settings, although qualitative inspection reveals noticeable distortions, particularly in selected facial images, indicating that LPIPS should not be used alone to assess visual quality. Overall, the findings show that combining complementary watermark types can increase robustness against single-stage removal attacks and motivate broader multi-layer watermarking, stronger perceptual evaluation, and further study of sequential watermark-removal strategies.

## Tor Updates DoS Defenses Again as Relay Attacks Continue

DevFeed: [Tor Updates DoS Defenses Again as Relay Attacks Continue](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tor-updates-dos-defenses-again-as-relay-attacks-continue-134876.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/tor-updates-dos-defenses-again-as-relay-attacks-continue/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-11-16T08:55:32Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [tor](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tor.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [patches](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/patches.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [ddos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ddos.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [dos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dos.md>), [incident-response](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident-response.md>), [ipv6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv6.md>), [patch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patch.md>), [relay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/relay.md>), [security-fixes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-fixes.md>), [tor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tor.md>), [updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/updates.md>)

### AI overview

Tor 0.4.9.17 patches several security issues, including one affecting how relays' built-in DoS protections handle IPv6, in response to an ongoing attack flooding relays with client circuits. The Tor Project urged relay operators to update and said further defenses were under consideration. The excerpt notes that the disruption continued after the update: one operator reported a relay becoming unresponsive and losing HSDir status shortly after installation, with the attack ceasing when that status was lost. That operator said the release did not adequately protect HSDir relays and that the attacker changed techniques; these are operator claims, not a warning issued by Tor.

### Source excerpt

Tor 0.4.9.17 patches several security issues, including one related to how built-in DoS protections deal with IPv6. The post Tor Updates DoS Defenses Again as Relay Attacks Continue appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## Inferring Sensitive Events in Multi-Mode Cyber-Physical Systems via Scheduling Side Channels

DevFeed: [Inferring Sensitive Events in Multi-Mode Cyber-Physical Systems via Scheduling Side Channels](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/inferring-sensitive-events-in-multi-mode-cyber-physical-systems-via-scheduling-side-channels-136036.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17761>)

Author: Yifan Cai, Linh Thi Xuan Phan

Published: 2026-11-16T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [scheduling](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/scheduling.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Robotics](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/robotics.md>), [Embedded Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-systems.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [cyber-physical-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-physical-systems.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [multi-mode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-mode.md>), [route](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/route.md>), [scheduling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scheduling.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channels](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channels.md>), [timing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/timing.md>)

### AI overview

Mode changes in multi-mode cyber-physical systems can leak physical events through scheduling interference: an unprivileged co-resident observer uses its own execution timing and, on multicore platforms, core assignment to infer the active mode. The proposed STAMP attack requires no task parameters or scheduling-policy knowledge and works whether modes are exposed. In the reported evaluations, it identified ZoneMinder modes with 94.7% accuracy on unseen hardware using under 0.5% of one core, and classified seven Oxford RobotCar route segments with 86.0% accuracy on unseen platforms using ROS 2 AMCL. Schedule randomization reduced detection recall to 0.53 while only 53.9% as many jobs finished on time; at noise ε=10, on-time completion fell to 14.4% and new leakage appeared in 14.1% of tasksets. These results describe the abstract's evaluations, not full-paper coverage.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.17761v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many cyber-physical systems (CPS) are multi-mode: they switch between operating modes with different tasksets and timing parameters in response to physical events or user activity. We show that these mode changes create a timing side channel: by altering the interference experienced by co-running tasks, they let an unprivileged co-resident observer infer sensitive events, such as a homeowner's arrival or a vehicle's route, from its own execution timing and, on multicore platforms, its core assignment. Existing schedule-based attacks and defenses miss this channel because they assume single-mode systems or target a specific, known victim task. We present STAMP, a lightweight attack that needs no knowledge of task parameters or scheduling policy, and works whether or not the system exposes its modes. On a ZoneMinder home-security deployment, STAMP identifies the modes with 94.7% accuracy on unseen hardware, using under 0.5% of one core. On ROS 2 AMCL with the Oxford RobotCar dataset, it identifies which of seven route segments a vehicle traversed with 86.0% accuracy on unseen platforms. A schedule-randomization defense lowers detection recall to 0.53, at which setting only 53.9% as many jobs finish on time. At higher noise ($\epsilon=10$), on-time job completion reduces to 14.4%, while introducing new leakage in 14.1% of the tasksets.

## ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms

DevFeed: [ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/artex-and-beyond-ai-enabled-penetration-testing-platforms-134070.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artex-and-beyond/>)

Author: Cisco Talos

Published: 2026-11-13T20:57:13Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cisco Talos Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cisco-talos-blog.md>)

Topics: [ai-assisted attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-assisted-attacks.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [artex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artex.md>), [cisco-talos-antivirus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-antivirus.md>), [cisco-talos-dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-dns-security.md>), [cisco-talos-network-intrusion-prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-network-intrusion-prevention.md>), [cisco-talos-web-filtering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco-talos-web-filtering.md>), [frameworks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/frameworks.md>), [penetration-testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/penetration-testing.md>), [reconnaissance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reconnaissance.md>), [threat-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-advisory.md>)

### AI overview

ARTEX turns an operator's target and objective into parallel tasks for planner and worker agents, which use security tools and record assets and findings in a shared graph. Though designed for authorized testing, reports associate it with criminal and targeted intrusion campaigns, from scanning and credential theft to cloud access and data exfiltration; outcomes vary by campaign, and reported actor tactics are not default ARTEX behavior. Talos found more than 2,500 ARTEX-associated C2 IP addresses and observed varied tools on that infrastructure, but co-occurrence does not prove ARTEX invoked them or that one actor operated them. Defenders are advised to correlate authentication, cloud API, and endpoint logs; harden public-facing systems and identity controls; protect exposed secrets; monitor for privilege changes and post-compromise tools; and prepare to revoke credentials and isolate systems quickly. Tool signatures are supporting indicators, not definitive attribution.

### Source excerpt

AI-enabled penetration testing and red team frameworks can automate and chain reconnaissance, vulnerability testing, and follow-on actions, lowering the skill threshold for attackers and accelerating intrusions when the tools are misused.

## AI Doesn't Have to Go Rogue to Break the World

DevFeed: [AI Doesn't Have to Go Rogue to Break the World](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ai-doesn-t-have-to-go-rogue-to-break-the-world-132458.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/11/ai-doesnt-have-to-go-rogue-to-break-the-world.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-11-13T12:03:30Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [Agentic AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/what-is-agentic-ai.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Physical AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/physical-ai.md>)

Tags: [2021](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2021.md>), [2022](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2022.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-bots](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-bots.md>), [ai-coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding.md>), [ai-hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-hacking.md>), [ais](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ais.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [aliens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aliens.md>), [alignment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alignment.md>), [autonomous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hack.md>), [hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hacking.md>), [keynote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keynote.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [noncomputer-hacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/noncomputer-hacks.md>), [problem-solving](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/problem-solving.md>), [speech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speech.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

### AI overview

The essay argues that AI can exploit unintended loopholes in social, economic, and political systems without malicious intent: agents pursue underspecified goals while missing human context, sometimes producing reward hacks or "genie" behavior. Examples range from simulated tasks and recommendation systems to AI coding agents taking unrequested actions. The author expects AI to increase hacking's speed, scale, scope, and sophistication, with finance and tax rules likely early targets; existing laws and governance may be too slow to respond. Defenses include finding and patching software vulnerabilities, using AI to audit proposed laws for loopholes, improving value alignment and integrity, and making governing structures able to update rules quickly. The essay notes that legal loopholes are harder to patch than software and frames the challenge as both technical and political.

### Source excerpt

This essay is adapted from a keynote speech delivered at the DEF CON 34 conference in Las Vegas on August 7, 2026. The essay originally appeared in CyberScoop. I want to talk about AI hacking. There are three aspects: people hacking AI systems, people using AI to hack other systems, and AIs hacking systems on their own, not even maliciously. The last two matter more than the first. The third is the weirdest and potentially the most destabilizing. I started writing about this in 2021 and in my 2022 book, A Hacker's Mind. Back then I said it was mostly still science fiction, but not stupid science fiction. We're seeing it more and more, especially in the past year. The trends I'm describing don't require a major breakthrough in AI. They're starting to happen now, and they'll happen more often as AIs get better at autonomous problem-solving. And it will involve far more than computer code...

## GITEX GLOBAL 2026 Puts AI Security, Cyber Resilience and Post-Quantum Readiness in Focus

DevFeed: [GITEX GLOBAL 2026 Puts AI Security, Cyber Resilience and Post-Quantum Readiness in Focus](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gitex-global-2026-puts-ai-security-cyber-resilience-and-post-quantum-readiness-in-focus-131609.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/gitex-global-2026-puts-ai-security-cyber-resilience-and-post-quantum-readiness-in-focus?source=rss>)

Author: Hacker and Technology Events

Published: 2026-11-13T08:07:19Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Sovereign AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sovereign-ai.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [Endpoint security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security.md>), [kaspersky](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kaspersky.md>), [proofpoint](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proofpoint.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [acronis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acronis.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-powered](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered.md>), [ai-powered-applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered-applications.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [ai-security-and-sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security-and-sovereignty.md>), [ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-systems.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyber-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [gitex-cyber-valey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-cyber-valey.md>), [gitex-global-2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-2026.md>), [gitex-global-2026-dubai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-2026-dubai.md>), [gitex-global-cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-cybersecurity.md>), [hackernoon-media-partnerships](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackernoon-media-partnerships.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-security.md>), [quantum-readiness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-readiness.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [uae-cybersecurity-council](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uae-cybersecurity-council.md>)

### AI overview

GITEX GLOBAL 2026 will spotlight cybersecurity challenges as AI agents, interconnected systems and data sovereignty concerns reshape digital security. Its GITEX Cyber Valley program will focus on AI security, dual-use cyber technologies and post-quantum readiness, with tailored business meetings and private briefings for cybersecurity leaders. The article says organizations must consider AI accountability, access control and operational security, alongside the resilience of encryption and data protection strategies as quantum computing emerges. Exhibitors span data protection, endpoint security, network defense, threat detection and enterprise resilience; the UAE Cybersecurity Council will also participate. The event runs December 7-11, 2026, across Dubai World Trade Centre and Dubai Exhibition Centre at Expo City Dubai.

### Source excerpt

Explore GITEX GLOBAL 2026's cybersecurity highlights, including AI security, post-quantum readiness, cyber resilience, and leading global security exhibitors.

## GRID-MRI: Resilience Assessment of Power Systems under Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks

DevFeed: [GRID-MRI: Resilience Assessment of Power Systems under Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/grid-mri-resilience-assessment-of-power-systems-under-coordinated-cyber-physical-attacks-133343.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17094>)

Author: Isaac Ortega Romero, Ioannis Zografopoulos

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Simulation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/simulation.md>)

Tags: [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [bus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bus.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyberattack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattack.md>), [dimensions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dimensions.md>), [disruption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disruption.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [grid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grid.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [power-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power-systems.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [under](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/under.md>)

### AI overview

GRID-MRI assesses power-system resilience by combining physical, cyber, and operational degradation with coordination effects and scenario-dependent climatic and economic-regulatory stressors. It uses counterfactual simulations of individual and coordinated attacks to capture interactions that additive assessments may miss. In a modified IEEE 39-bus system, three escalating scenarios informed by the December 2025 Polish cyberattack incident showed system collapse under coordinated attacks despite stable individual and additive responses. Reported resilience losses were 3.72 and 4.09 times their additive estimates; GRID-MRI rose from 0.062 to 1.188, reaching 6.081 with additional exogenous stress. The abstract presents this as evidence that additive assessments can understate multidimensional degradation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.17094v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing penetration of inverter-based resources and growing cyber-physical interdependencies expose electrical power systems to disturbances that challenge conventional resilience assessments. Existing approaches often evaluate resilience dimensions independently, overlooking the non-additive effects of coordinated disruptions and the influence of exogenous stressors. To address this gap, this paper proposes a Grid Multidimensional Resilience Index (GRID-MRI) that integrates endogenous disruption severity, coordination effects, and climatic and economic-regulatory conditions. The framework quantifies physical, cyber, and operational degradation, identifies interaction effects through counterfactual (i.e., what-if), simulations of individual and coordinated attacks, and incorporates exogenous stressors as scenario-dependent scaling factors. Its application to a modified IEEE 39-bus system under three escalating cyber-physical attack scenarios, informed by the December 2025 Polish cyberattack incident, reveals that coordinated attacks induce system collapse despite stable individual and additive responses. The corresponding resilience losses are 3.72 and 4.09 times their additive estimates, while GRID-MRI increases from 0.062 to 1.188 and reaches 6.081 under additional exogenous stress. These findings demonstrate the limitations of additive assessments and establish a quantitative basis for distinguishing the dominant mechanisms of multidimensional resilience degradation.

## Dreeze Emerges From Stealth With $33M to Rebuild Cloud Apps After Cyberattacks

DevFeed: [Dreeze Emerges From Stealth With $33M to Rebuild Cloud Apps After Cyberattacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/dreeze-emerges-from-stealth-with-33m-to-rebuild-cloud-apps-after-cyberattacks-128051.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/dreeze-emerges-from-stealth-with-33m-to-rebuild-cloud-apps-after-cyberattacks/>)

Author: SecurityWeek News

Published: 2026-11-11T11:16:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [Disaster Recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/disaster-recovery.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloud.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [application-revival](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-revival.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-application-recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-application-recovery.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [cyberattack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattack.md>), [cybersecurity-funding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity-funding.md>), [disaster-recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disaster-recovery.md>), [dreeze](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dreeze.md>), [funding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/funding.md>), [funding-round](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/funding-round.md>), [kashya](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kashya.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [recovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recovery.md>), [zerto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zerto.md>)

### AI overview

Dreeze raised $33 million in seed funding to develop and expand sales of Application Revival, a platform intended to restore whole cloud applications after cyberattacks or mistakes by AI agents. It continuously maps cloud resources and application dependencies, then stores data and configuration backups with recovery plans in an immutable, isolated vault controlled by the customer. During recovery, it reconstructs the application; customers can test recovery in an isolated account without affecting production. The AWS version is generally available. Azure support is in early access, with general availability expected in early 2027.

### Source excerpt

Created by Zerto and Kashya veterans, the startup has launched a platform designed to recover whole cloud applications. The post Dreeze Emerges From Stealth With $33M to Rebuild Cloud Apps After Cyberattacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## PIA: Agentic Physics-Informed Runtime Anomaly Detection

DevFeed: [PIA: Agentic Physics-Informed Runtime Anomaly Detection](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pia-agentic-physics-informed-runtime-anomaly-detection-125301.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11009>)

Author: Ali Mohammadi Ruzbahani, Abbas Yazdinejad, Hadis Karimipour

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [workload protection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/workload-protection.md>), [Claude](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude.md>)

Tags: [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [anomaly-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anomaly-detection.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [claude-opus-5-5](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-opus-5-5.md>), [component](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/component.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [cyber-physical-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-physical-systems.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [deep](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [language-model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-model.md>), [large-language-model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large-language-model.md>), [logic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logic.md>), [physics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/physics.md>), [physics-informed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/physics-informed.md>), [range](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/range.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [sensor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensor.md>), [water](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/water.md>)

### AI overview

PIA uses a large language model agent to construct a runtime anomaly detector from physical residuals--such as pump characteristics, tank mass balances, and controller logic--and refine candidates against normal operating data in an evaluation workbench. On BATADAL test attacks, PIA with Claude Opus 5.5 reports an F1 of 0.878, compared with 0.504 for the strongest of six statistical and deep baselines; it also detects attacks hidden by replayed or offset sensor readings and attributes each detected test attack to the attacked component. The detector is described as human-readable and millisecond-running. Ablations indicate that evaluating hypotheses against data matters: using only the plant description reduces F1 by as much as 0.28, while agents given only anonymized signals recover most of the physical structure.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11009v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Runtime anomaly detectors for cyber-physical systems are either learned as black boxes from normal data, which miss stealthy manipulations that keep every signal inside its normal range, or derived by hand from physical models, which requires expert effort for every plant. We introduce physicsinformed agents (PIA), in which a large language model agent writes the detector itself as a set of physical residuals, such as pump characteristics, tank mass balances, and controller logic, and refines every candidate against normal operating data through an evaluation workbench before deployment. The result is a compact, human-readable detector that runs in milliseconds and names the component behind each alarm. On the BATADAL water distribution attack benchmark, PIA with Claude Opus 5.5 reaches an F1 of 0.878 on the test attacks against 0.504 for the strongest of six statistical and deep baselines, keeps detecting attacks concealed by replayed and offset sensor readings, and attributes every detected test attack to the attacked component. Ablations show that testing hypotheses against data is decisive: agents that write residuals from the plant description alone lose up to 0.28 F1, whereas agents that see only anonymized signals recover most of the physical structure.

## Agents of Chaos: A Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on Malicious Attacks on Agentic AI Systems

DevFeed: [Agents of Chaos: A Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on Malicious Attacks on Agentic AI Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/agents-of-chaos-a-systematization-of-knowledge-sok-on-malicious-attacks-on-agentic-ai-systems-126942.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10843>)

Author: Thanh M. Truong-Le, Amber Bennoui, Hoang-Ly Nguyen, Gia-Thang Ho, Thai-Minh Truong, Duc-Ly Vu

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Agentic AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/what-is-agentic-ai.md>), [prompt injection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/prompt-injection.md>), [Multi Agent Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-agent-systems.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>)

Tags: [agent-evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-evaluation.md>), [agentic-ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai-systems.md>), [attack-paths](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack-paths.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-execution.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [defense-in-depth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense-in-depth.md>), [external-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/external-services.md>), [governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/governance.md>), [language-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-models.md>), [lifecycle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lifecycle.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [multi-agent-coordination](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-agent-coordination.md>), [prompt-injection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prompt-injection.md>)

### AI overview

The review maps malicious attacks on agentic AI systems across 98 retained sources, identifying 284 atomic attacks, 452 safeguards, and 660 attack-safeguard relationships. It groups attacks into eight causal-mechanism classes and tracks factors such as insertion point, activation, impact, and persistence. Tool, MCP, and action-layer attacks make up the largest share of attacks; prompt injection and action hijacking appear across the most papers. Safeguard evidence is uneven: only 278 relationships were directly assessed, and strong coverage is uncommon. The authors point to lifecycle-aware threat modeling, agent evaluation, tool governance, and defense in depth as areas these findings support.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10843v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems extend large language models with tools, memory, retrieval, browser or computer-use interfaces, code execution, external services, and multi-agent coordination. Although these capabilities enable agents to act beyond text generation and perform tasks, they also create attack paths through which adversaries can exploit untrusted content, deceptive metadata, poisoned state, compromised skills, mutable dependencies, or malicious code. Such attacks can manipulate planning and tool use, corrupt memory, abuse code-execution environments, and trigger harmful downstream effects. In this paper, we present a systematic review of malicious attacks targeting agentic AI systems. We screened 186 candidate sources and retained 98. Following independent coding and resolver adjudication, we identified 284 atomic attacks, 452 atomic safeguards, and 660 explicit attack--safeguard relationships. We organize attacks into eight causal-mechanism classes while retaining insertion points, activation conditions, abused capabilities, objectives, impacts, persistence, and evidence as orthogonal dimensions. Our analysis shows that tool, MCP, and action-layer attacks account for the largest share of atomic attacks, while the prompt-injection and action-hijacking class has the broadest paper coverage. We identify distinct class-specific activation patterns and separation between insertion and later activation. Safeguard coverage remains uneven: only 278 of 660 relationships are directly assessed, and strong coverage is uncommon. These findings support lifecycle-aware threat modeling, agent evaluation, tool governance, and defense-in-depth security for agentic AI systems.

## Self-Healing by design: Immune-system inspired autonomous cyber resilience

DevFeed: [Self-Healing by design: Immune-system inspired autonomous cyber resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/self-healing-by-design-immune-system-inspired-autonomous-cyber-resilience-126955.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11394>)

Author: Shari Finner, Swarna Kumarswamy-Das, Bart Gijsen

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [national security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/national-security.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>)

Tags: [autonomous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cyber-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [self-healing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-healing.md>), [system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/system.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents an approach to autonomous cyber resilience for complex systems, combining immune-system-inspired self-healing with resilience mechanisms used in critical naval and aeronautical manoeuvring systems. A demonstration using TNO's OpPic application describes TNO's Self-Healing for Cyber Security software as providing mission- and threat-adaptive resilience. The authors derive six design guidelines and aim to let operators oversee and control the system's cyber response as threats and mission priorities change. The supplied text is an abstract and does not specify the guidelines.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11394v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Digital innovations have strongly improved ship capabilities, including command, control & communication, navigation and combat management. In the wake of digitisation and geopolitical stress, resilience against cyber-attacks has become a key challenge. Autonomous Cyber Resilience (ACR) methods, inspired by features of the human immune system, provide a promising perspective. Proofs of concept of autonomous self-healing and self-protecting software have been realised in cloud environments using containerisation, monitoring and deployment technology. However, developing a suitable "cyber immune system" for more complex digital systems is still an intricate challenge. In this paper, we share insights on how ACR methods can be combined with resilience mechanisms present in critical naval and aeronautical manoeuvring systems. Using TNO's "OpPic" application, we show how TNO's Self-Healing for Cyber Security software can provide autonomous mission- and threat-adaptive resilience. On this basis, six guidelines for the design of autonomous cyber resilient systems are derived. The ultimate goal is to enable operators to oversee and control their system's "cyber immune response", to be able to continuously adapt to evolving threats and mission priorities.

## Cyber-attack on French supermarket freezers has geopolitical context

DevFeed: [Cyber-attack on French supermarket freezers has geopolitical context](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cyber-attack-on-french-supermarket-freezers-has-geopolitical-context-124187.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/nov/09/cyber-attack-french-supermarket-freezers-iran-europe>)

Author: Dan Milmo Global technology editor

Published: 2026-11-09T19:40:45Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [The Guardian | Technology](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-guardian-technology.md>)

Topics: [national security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/national-security.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [smartdevices](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smartdevices.md>), [AI in cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-in-cybersecurity.md>)

Tags: [2023](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2023.md>), [ai-artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-artificial-intelligence.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [broadcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/broadcast.md>), [complex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complex.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyber-attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-attack.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [cybercrime-hacking-ai-artificial-intelligence-cyberwar-technology-internet-france-iran-israel-euro](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime-hacking-ai-artificial-intelligence-cyberwar-technology-internet-france-iran-israel-euro.md>), [cyberwar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberwar.md>), [deepfake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deepfake.md>), [equipment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/equipment.md>), [europe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/europe.md>), [france](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/france.md>), [gaza](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gaza.md>), [hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hack.md>), [hackers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackers.md>), [hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hacking.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [iran](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iran.md>), [israel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/israel.md>), [it](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/it.md>), [like](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/like.md>), [message](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/message.md>), [supermarket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supermarket.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>)

### AI overview

France attributed attacks that disrupted supermarket refrigerators to hackers operating under Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Some units were heated enough to catch fire, spoiling food; the excerpt says attackers accessed controls with default passwords, and a Sophos director described the attacks as relatively unsophisticated. He said there was a presumption that the French incidents were linked to rogue defrosting hacks reported elsewhere in Europe. Earlier freezer incidents in Israel and at US military bases had not been officially attributed to Iran. The excerpt frames the attacks as geopolitical signaling and says the immediate vulnerability was easy to find and exploit; it separately notes concern that AI could help attackers identify system flaws and plan attacks.

### Source excerpt

'Not particularly complex' defrosting hack has been attributed to Iran, with presumption it is linked to others across Europe Iranian hackers like to send a message. In 2023 a state-backed group interrupted TV streaming services in the United Arab Emirates to broadcast a deepfake report on the war in Gaza. In the same year, hackers affiliated with Iran displayed the slogan "down with Israel" on the screens of water-control equipment made by an Israeli firm. Continue reading...

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTExLTA5VDE5OjQwOjQ1KzAwOjAwIiwgIjE0MjcxN2QwLThmODAtNGZjMS1iZTM4LWE1NzAzMTczYTdmYiJd>)