# digital signature

A cryptographic technique using asymmetric keys to authenticate a signatory, detect unauthorized data modifications, and support non-repudiation.

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## Google DeepMind's AI Agents Make 1024-Bit RSA Keys Cheaper to Attack

DevFeed: [Google DeepMind's AI Agents Make 1024-Bit RSA Keys Cheaper to Attack](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/google-deepmind-s-ai-agents-make-1024-bit-rsa-keys-cheaper-to-attack-122995.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/google-deepminds-ai-agents-make-1024-bit-rsa-keys-cheaper-to-attack/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-11-09T08:35:50Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [agentic workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-workflows.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cpu-time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu-time.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [data-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-protection.md>), [days](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/days.md>), [deepmind](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deepmind.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [factor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/factor.md>), [featured](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/featured.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [google-deepmind](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google-deepmind.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [rsa-1024](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa-1024.md>)

### AI overview

DeepMind researchers working with UC San Diego and Inria report cheaper attacks on obsolete 1024-bit RSA systems, while saying modern protocols using 2048-bit or larger keys remain secure. For PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, padding provides no protection when an attacker controls roughly half or more of the signed block. In a sandboxed test, AI agents reduced the CPU time for an earlier forgery attack from 1,380 to 391 core-years. The forgery does not recover the private key, needs about 4 billion signing queries in advance, and fails against devices that hash messages internally. For attackers with less control, such as over a 32-byte hash, the paper estimates a method roughly 1,600 times better than the previous approach. A separate, unimplemented algorithm theoretically makes each additional same-size RSA key about 30 times cheaper to factor after an initial computation costing as much as factoring one key.

### Source excerpt

Working with cryptographers, DeepMind's AI agents cut the cost of forging RSA-1024 signatures and found a cheaper way to factor keys. The post Google DeepMind's AI Agents Make 1024-Bit RSA Keys Cheaper to Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## Revision-Bound Evidence Cuts: Authenticated Queries and Contextual Witness Capacity

DevFeed: [Revision-Bound Evidence Cuts: Authenticated Queries and Contextual Witness Capacity](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/revision-bound-evidence-cuts-authenticated-queries-and-contextual-witness-capacity-108340.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37982>)

Author: Faruk Alpay, Taylan Alpay

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [rdbms](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rdbms.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [aggregates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregates.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [bags](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bags.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [capacity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [comparison](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/comparison.md>), [compiler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compiler.md>), [complete](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complete.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [disclosures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosures.md>), [encoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encoding.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [revision](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/revision.md>)

### AI overview

Revision-bound evidence cuts authenticate supporting and opposing inference obligations across source revisions, allowing unaffected certificates to carry forward and alternative cuts to be recovered. An authenticated relational query contract binds source records, selected result bags, counting units, parameters, and aggregates regardless of execution strategy. In tests on 16,824 Chogha Mish records, three SQLite strategies agreed and eight contract or view mutations were rejected. A 340-row NISP cohort showed that changing the permitted weighting rule could reverse a comparison without changing source records. The SCENE prototype evaluated these mechanisms, scoped disclosures, and adversarial mutations at up to one million records. The guarantees depend on declared policies and independently pinned trust roots: they authenticate specified computations and obligations, not historical truth, complete counterevidence, or institutional endorsement.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.37982v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Authentic records can support unauthorized narratives when their qualifications, query scope, or counterevidence are silently dropped. We present revision-bound evidence cuts, a framework for authenticating both supporting and opposing inference obligations across changing source versions. Signed complete-update frontiers permit transport of unaffected certificates, alternative-cut recovery, and an exact certified-reuse radius given by a frontier-hypergraph transversal number. Their source obligations induce an integral model of context-bound authorization. To secure database-derived claims, we introduce an authenticated relational query contract that binds original source records, complete selected bags, counting units, parameters, and aggregates independently of execution strategy. A full-source verifier checks 16,824 Chogha Mish records across SQLite scans, indexes, and materialized views; three valid strategies agree and eight contract/view mutations are rejected. A separate 340-row NISP cohort shows that changing the admitted weighting rule can reverse a comparison while preserving every source record. A frozen English text-to-frame compiler produces qualified evidence receipts, with linguistic accuracy evaluated separately from cryptographic integrity. We also separate logical-source from transport commitments so lossless re-encoding need not invalidate unchanged scientific evidence. The SCENE prototype evaluates signed revisions, authenticated queries, scoped disclosures, and adversarial mutations at scales reaching one million source records. These guarantees rely on declared policies and independently pinned trust roots; they authenticate specified computations and obligations, not historical truth, complete counterevidence, or institutional endorsement.

## Support for modern cryptographic algorithms in Workers

DevFeed: [Support for modern cryptographic algorithms in Workers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/support-for-modern-cryptographic-algorithms-in-workers-63120.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/workers-ml-kem-ml-dsa-support/>)

Author: Thibault Meunier

Published: 2026-10-01T13:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Cloudflare Workers](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare-workers.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [cloudflare-workers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-workers.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [ml-dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-dsa.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare Workers adds opt-in Web Crypto support for post-quantum ML-KEM key encapsulation and ML-DSA signatures, along with helper APIs and JWK support. The implementation is gated by the `webcrypto_modern_algorithms` compatibility flag while the specification remains in draft. The article describes how developers can use the primitives with libraries such as jose and HPKE, while noting that the change provides building blocks rather than a complete migration path.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare Workers is adding opt-in support for post-quantum-resistant algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA. You can try it today.

## QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm

DevFeed: [QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-119-potential-attacker-controlled-format-string-in-qvm-open-in-vm-47159.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/15/qsb-119/>)

Published: 2026-09-15T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [Debian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/debian.md>)

Tags: [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [debian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/debian.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 119 describes a potential attacker-controlled format-string vulnerability in qvm-open-in-vm. Under certain conditions, exploiting an attacker-controlled filename or path could allow code execution in the qube where the command was invoked. Supported Qubes OS releases are affected, with Debian templates identified among the affected official templates; users should continue updating normally.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ]===--- 2026-09-15 Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- Under certain circumstances (see "Technical details" below), if the user invokes qvm-open-in-vm (either directly or through the "Edit in disposable qube" GUI integration) on a file with an attacker-controlled filename or path, the attacker might be able to execute code in the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm. Impact ------- An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can take control over the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm. Affected systems ----------------- All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Among official Qubes OS templates, only Debian templates are affected. Technical details ------------------ When qvm-open-in-vm is invoked with a file (not an URI), the source-side part of the qrexec call is handled by the qopen-in-vm helper program. After sending the file content to the other side, qopen-in-vm tries to open a temporary file alongside the original file in order to save the response in case the user has edited the file in the target qube. If creating this file fails (e.g., because the directory is read-only), qopen-in-vm creates a temporary file in /tmp and shows an error message to the user. When printing this error message, it incorrectly invokes the gui_nonfatal function, such that the original filename ends up in a printf format string, which is unsafe. For this vul

## Why Agent Commerce Needs DNS-AID for Domain and Agent Authentication

DevFeed: [Why Agent Commerce Needs DNS-AID for Domain and Agent Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-the-world-needs-dns-aid-52703.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/company/why-the-world-needs-dns-aid/>)

Author: Wei Chen

Published: 2026-09-09T15:00:29Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/domain.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-identity.md>), [agent-to-agent-communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-to-agent-communication.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agentic-commerce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-commerce.md>), [ai-agent-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-trust.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [autonomous-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-agents.md>), [company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/company.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [dns-aid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-aid.md>), [dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-security.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [secure-ai-transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secure-ai-transactions.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

This article uses a hypothetical procurement exchange between AI agents to examine the risks of agentic commerce, including spoofed AI traffic and uncertainty about whether an automated procurement address is authentic. It presents DNSSEC and digitally signed domains as ways to verify agent addresses.

### Source excerpt

A Hypothetical: Beacon Got an RFP from AI Late on a Friday afternoon, Beacon, an industrial pump manufacturer, finds itself reluctantly dragged into agentic commerce. They receive an RFP from Acme, a major customer. If booked, this would be Beacon's largest order of the year, but the party initiating the RFP is an AI agent, [...] The post Why the World Needs DNS-AID appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

## QSB-118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting

DevFeed: [QSB-118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-118-dom0-arbitrary-code-execution-in-qvm-copy-to-vm-error-reporting-47156.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/29/qsb-118/>)

Published: 2026-08-29T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [Command-line interface](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cli.md>)

Tags: [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploit.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 118 describes a vulnerability in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting. A compromised qube can inject an arbitrary command into dom0 when a user copies a file from dom0 to that qube. Users should continue updating normally to receive the security fixes.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 118 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 118 ]===--- 2026-08-28 Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- If `qvm-copy-to-vm` is used to copy a file from dom0 to a malicious qube, that qube can inject an arbitrary command into dom0. Impact ------- If an attacker has compromised a qube, and if the user initiates a `qvm-copy-to-vm` call from dom0 to the compromised qube, then the attacker can exploit this vulnerability in order to inject an arbitrary command into dom0, which allows the attacker to take control of Qubes OS. Technical details ------------------ The `qvm-copy-to-vm` tool allows copying files from dom0 to a specified qube. It uses the "qfile" protocol, which is a simplified archive format, including simple file metadata (much simpler than `tar` or `cpio`). The protocol also includes transfer confirmation at the end, which is sent by the target back to the source. This confirmation includes a checksum of all the transferred files, an error code (if any), and the name of the last received file. In the case of an error, as reported by the error code field, dom0 displays a GUI message that includes the error information and the name of the affected file, as reported by the target qube. The vulnerability exists in the processing of that file name: 1. The `wait_for_result()` function calls `sanitize_remote_filename()` on the received name before passing it to the error handler: linux-utils/qrexec-lib/pack.c: 55 static v

## QSB-116: Multiple Xen issues (XSA-500, XSA-505, XSA-506, XSA-507)

DevFeed: [QSB-116: Multiple Xen issues (XSA-500, XSA-505, XSA-506, XSA-507)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/qsb-116-multiple-xen-issues-xsa-500-xsa-505-xsa-506-xsa-507-47152.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/07/28/qsb-116/>)

Published: 2026-07-28T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Qubes OS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/qubes-os.md>)

Topics: [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Xen](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xen.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [Command-line interface](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cli.md>), [standard](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/standard.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcement.md>), [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [patching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patching.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-vulnerabilities.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [standard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standard.md>), [xen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xen.md>)

### AI overview

Qubes Security Bulletin 116 reports four Xen security issues: a grant-table type confusion, a race involving FIFO event channels, insufficient buffer checks in DM_OP hypercalls, and an issue involving special pages with Populated on Demand. Users are instructed to continue normal updates to receive the security fixes. The bulletin also explains how to authenticate it using accompanying PGP signatures.

### Source excerpt

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 116: Multiple Xen issues (XSA-500, XSA-505, XSA-506, XSA-507). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. Qubes Security Bulletin 116 ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 116 ]===--- 2026-07-28 Multiple Xen issues (XSA-500, XSA-505, XSA-506, XSA-507) User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- On 2026-07-28, the Xen Project published the security advisories below. XSA-500 [3] "grant-table: type confusion in grant-copy": | When grant-copy operations are processed, the respective grant may or | may not already be in use by another operation (a mapping or another | copy). For all copy operations the referenced guest frame is looked | up. When another operation is already active for the grant (the grant | is "pinned"), what is being supplied back to actually carry out | permission checks and copy operation may not be consistent: The | permission check may be carried out on a page different from the one | involved in the copy. XSA-505 [4] "evtchn: Race between FIFO expand and reset": | The EVTCHNOP_expand_array hypercall checks for whether FIFO event | channels are enabled, but without holding the correct lock. It can | race with EVTCHNOP_reset, resulting in deferencing a NULL pointer. XSA-506 [5] "correct buffer checks for DM_OP hypercalls": | Parts of the DM_OP handling code assumes the caller has provided the | required number of buffers for the given operation without any | checking being done. As a result, certain operations might access | stack rubble as structures are possibly uninitialized. XSA-507 [6] "PoD: Don't try to reclaim special pages": | A guest started with Populated on Demand enabled (PoD) can attempt to | rec

## Breaking Down the White House's Actions on Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness

DevFeed: [Breaking Down the White House's Actions on Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/breaking-down-the-white-house-s-actions-on-post-quantum-cryptography-readiness-54033.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/white-house-post-quantum-cryptography-executive-order>)

Author: Mitch Herckis

Published: 2026-07-02T01:48:01Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/wiz-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/migration.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Critical Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/critical-infrastructure.md>), [risk-management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/risk-management.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [cost-optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cost-optimization.md>)

Tags: [cost-optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost-optimization.md>), [critical-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical-infrastructure.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography-pqc.md>), [public-sector](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-sector.md>), [risk-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk-management.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains how a White House executive order and an OMB memorandum accelerate federal migration to post-quantum cryptography. It discusses deadlines for protecting key establishment and digital signatures, along with implications for legacy systems, risk management, cost planning, critical infrastructure, and industry.

### Source excerpt

The U.S. Federal Migration to PQC Just Got Real

## State of Post Quantum Cryptography

DevFeed: [State of Post Quantum Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/state-of-post-quantum-cryptography-53988.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/state-of-post-quantum-cryptography>)

Author: Scott Piper

Published: 2026-05-28T13:34:55Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/wiz-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/migration.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/implementation.md>), [standard](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/standard.md>), [OpenSSH](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssh.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/browser.md>)

Tags: [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [standard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standard.md>)

### AI overview

This article reviews the state of post-quantum cryptography, including Google's announced 2029 migration timeline, the shift toward PQC authentication, and the need to migrate both key exchange and digital signature algorithms. It also discusses implementation progress for TLS and SSH and the risks posed by quantum computing.

### Source excerpt

Discussion of PQC relevant statistics that we see across our customers and other data sources.

## Investigating a Mysteriously Malformed Authenticode Signature

DevFeed: [Investigating a Mysteriously Malformed Authenticode Signature](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/investigating-a-mysteriously-malformed-authenticode-signature-49077.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/malformed-authenticode-signature>)

Author: Elastic Security Labs

Published: 2025-09-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Elastic Security Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/elastic-security-labs.md>)

Topics: [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Continuous integration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/continuous-integration.md>), [debugging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/debugging.md>), [Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>)

Tags: [binaries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binaries.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [debugger](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/debugger.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [error](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error.md>), [platform-internals](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform-internals.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Elastic Security Labs investigates a Windows Authenticode signature validation failure affecting a signed binary. The investigation traces vague error codes through debugging to undocumented validation routines and identifies a missing attribute as the cause.

### Source excerpt

An in-depth investigation tracing a Windows Authenticode validation failure from vague error codes to undocumented kernel routines.

## Ed25519 Support Arrives in Chrome

DevFeed: [Ed25519 Support Arrives in Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ed25519-support-in-chrome-making-the-web-faster-and-safer-35623.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.ipfs.tech/2025-08-ed25519/>)

Author: Bumblefudge

Published: 2025-08-13T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [IPFS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ipfs.md>)

Topics: [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ed25519.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/browser.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Web Development](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/web-development.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [object-object](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/object-object.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Chrome 137 adds Ed25519 support to the WebCrypto API, completing support across the major browser engines described in the article.

### Source excerpt

Ed25519 is now supported in Chrome, finally joining the other browsers after much effort.

## Exposing AWS KMS Asymmetric Keys as a JWKS

DevFeed: [Exposing AWS KMS Asymmetric Keys as a JWKS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/exposing-aws-kms-asymmetric-keys-as-a-jwks-20125.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://benchling.engineering/exposing-aws-kms-asymmetric-keys-as-a-jwks-7f183657f0d9?source=rss----3d4aa8fb07ea---4>)

Author: Brian Maloney

Published: 2023-02-02T20:53:31Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Benchling](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/benchling.md>)

Topics: [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>)

Tags: [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [aws-kms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-kms.md>), [benchling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchling.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [jwks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwks.md>), [kms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kms.md>), [oauth2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth2.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Benchling describes exposing AWS KMS asymmetric public keys as a JWKS so an identity provider can discover rotated keys for OIDC private_key_jwt authentication. This avoids static administrator API tokens, which require careful handling and rotation and tie privileges to their creator; KMS keeps private keys in AWS while clients use AWS APIs to sign. The proposed service is a Lambda Function URL that selects enabled keys by alias, since ListKeys omits tags and per-key tag lookups would not scale to a short response window. It converts GetPublicKey's DER output to PEM with Python's Cryptography library, then uses JWCrypto to create JWKs and returns them as JSON. JWT signing is treated as a separate, already documented client-side step. The code is described as proof of concept: frequent JWKS reloads may call for writing updates to object storage and serving from there or a CDN, and production use should add error handling.

### Source excerpt

Here at Benchling, interaction with services is a large part of our business, from employees interacting with the software-as-a-service products with which we conduct our daily business, all the way down to interactions between the services that make up the Benchling application platform itself. Secure authentication and authorization to services is a long-standing issue in the industry, but one that has been improving in recent years due to the widespread adoption of modern standards such as OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect (OIDC). One specific use case for service-to-service authentication that is important to Benchling Security is connecting our Threat Detection Pipeline to our enterprise identity services vendor. We use this connection to connect log and other data provided by the vendor to our centralized Threat Detection Platform, where we correlate this with other sources of intelligence to detect risky or suspicious user activity in near real-time. Modern Authentication with OIDC Our specific identity services vendor offers two options for authenticating to its API: either an API token that an administrator can generate, or interaction by acting as an Application. API tokens, while very easy to use, are a poor choice for two reasons: First, they are a static secret that must be handled carefully and rotated frequently to mitigate the risk of a leaked key, which causes significant management overhead. Second, the identity services vendor links the privileges and identity of an API token inextricably to the administrator who generated it. This causes actions using the key to be attributed to the administrator and also makes it impossible to implement the principle of least privilege. Client authentication when acting as an Application allows the use of OIDC, and this vendor specifically requires the use of the private_key_jwt Client Authentication method. Enforcing this requirement is a good choice on the part of the vendor -- by using public-key encryption, no sec

## Can we encrypt data using Elliptic Curves?

DevFeed: [Can we encrypt data using Elliptic Curves?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/can-we-encrypt-data-using-elliptic-curves-90360.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://andrea.corbellini.blog/2023/01/02/ec-encryption/>)

Author: andreacorbellini

Published: 2023-01-02T06:30:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Andrea Corbellini](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/andrea-corbellini.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [ecc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecc.md>), [elgamal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elgamal.md>), [elliptic-curve-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curve-cryptography.md>), [elliptic-curves](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curves.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>)

### AI overview

The article demonstrates direct encryption of arbitrary data with elliptic-curve ElGamal, including a Python example for mapping messages to curve points and encrypting and decrypting them. It cautions that the padding shown is for demonstration only and explains why hybrid encryption is generally more practical because it uses less space and compute and avoids some pitfalls.

### Source excerpt

From time to time, I hear people saying that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cannot be used to directly encrypt data, and you can only do key agreement and digital signatures with it. This is a common misconception, but it's not actually true: you can indeed use elliptic curve keys to encrypt arbitrary data. And I'm not talking about hybrid-encryption schemes (like ECIES ...

## npm signature verification using PGP keys is now deprecated.

DevFeed: [npm signature verification using PGP keys is now deprecated.](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/npm-signature-verification-using-pgp-keys-is-now-deprecated-73804.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2022-11-01-npm-signature-verification-using-pgp-keys-is-now-deprecated>)

Author: Kevin Duck

Published: 2022-11-01T11:10:37Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [ECDSA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ecdsa.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [deprecated](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/deprecated.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [deprecated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deprecated.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [expire](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/expire.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm.md>), [pgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pgp.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [registry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/registry.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

The public npm registry migrated from PGP to ECDSA signatures in July 2022. From March 31, 2023, no new packages would be signed with PGP keys, and the PGP public key hosted on Keybase would expire.

### Source excerpt

In July 2022 the public npm registry migrated away from the existing PGP signatures to a new ECDSA signatures for signature verification. PGP based registry signatures will be deprecated on...

## Removed unencrypted Git protocol and certain SSH keys

DevFeed: [Removed unencrypted Git protocol and certain SSH keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/removed-unencrypted-git-protocol-and-certain-ssh-keys-74135.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2022-03-15-removed-unencrypted-git-protocol-and-certain-ssh-keys>)

Author: Sidi Merzouk

Published: 2022-03-15T14:50:49Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Git](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/git.md>)

Tags: [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [changes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changes.md>), [dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dsa.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [hmac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hmac.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [legacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/legacy.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [required](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/required.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>)

### AI overview

GitHub removed DSA key support and legacy SSH algorithms HMAC-SHA-1 and CBC ciphers, and permanently disabled the unencrypted Git protocol. RSA keys uploaded after November 2, 2021 must use SHA-2 signatures; keys uploaded before that cutoff may still use SHA-1.

### Source excerpt

GitHub changed which keys are supported in SSH and removed the unencrypted Git protocol. You can read more about the motivation behind these changes in our blog post from last...

## The Asset Trap

DevFeed: [The Asset Trap](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-asset-trap-36999.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://shostack.org/blog/the-asset-trap/>)

Author: Adam

Published: 2020-12-16T00:00:00Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Shostack & Friends Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/shostack-friends-blog.md>)

Topics: [solarwinds](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solarwinds.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/systems.md>)

Tags: [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [solarwinds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solarwinds.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>)

### AI overview

This commentary uses the SolarWinds attack to explain an asset-focused threat-modeling trap. It argues that defenders should consider assets attackers want, such as DKIM keys, which can be used to forge emails that pass validity checks, and recommends rotating those keys regularly.

### Source excerpt

As we look at what's happened with the Russian attack on the US government and others via Solarwinds, I want to shine a spotlight on a lesson we can apply to threat modeling.

## Mumble: A referral was returned from the server.

DevFeed: [Mumble: A referral was returned from the server.](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mumble-a-referral-was-returned-from-the-server-41580.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/2014-05-31-Mumble-referral-was-returned-from-the.md>)

Author: ben@benjojo.co.uk

Published: 2014-05-31T19:05:22Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Benjojo](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/benjojo-blog.md>)

Topics: [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>)

Tags: [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

This troubleshooting article explains that the Windows error "A referral was returned from the server" can occur when launching digitally signed applications such as Mumble. It identifies an expired digital signature as a likely cause and recommends updating Mumble when the signature is out of date.

### Source excerpt

Mumble: A referral was returned from the server. You may get A referral was returned from the server. when launching Digitally signed applications like Mumble on windows. This is normally caused by the Digital Signature expiring. You can check