# Domain Name System (DNS)

The Domain Name System (DNS) resolves domain names to data such as IP addresses through client-server queries, recursion, iteration, and caching.

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## CVE-2026-77329 - Tapo: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated Tapo MCP smart-home controls

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-77329 - Tapo: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated Tapo MCP smart-home controls](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-77329-tapo-dns-rebinding-reaches-unauthenticated-tapo-mcp-smart-home-controls-146412.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77329>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-20T17:18:26Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [smartdevices](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smartdevices.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cameras](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cameras.md>), [cve-2026-77329](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-77329.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-rebinding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-rebinding.md>), [exploitation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploitation.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [interfaces](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interfaces.md>), [lan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lan.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [mihai-dinculescu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mihai-dinculescu.md>), [optional](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optional.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [running](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/running.md>), [rust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rust.md>), [smart-home](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-home.md>), [tapo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tapo.md>)

### AI overview

From versions 0.3.1 to before 0.5.0, Tapo's Streamable HTTP MCP server could accept DNS-rebound browser requests without Host or Origin validation when TAPO_MCP_API_KEY was unset. If the listener was running with Tapo credentials and devices configured, a victim's visit to a malicious site could let an attacker invoke tools such as control_device or take_snapshot. The unauthenticated path does not apply when an API key is set; exploitation also requires victim interaction. The issue is fixed in 0.5.0.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-77329 Published : Nov. 20, 2026, 5:18 p.m. | 18 minutes ago Description :Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-77359 - Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-77359 - Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-77359-jupyter-mcp-server-browser-dns-rebinding-can-hijack-the-jupyter-backend-through-management-routes-143946.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77359>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-19T17:18:59Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [WebSocket](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/websocket.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-connect.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [bind](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bind.md>), [boundary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boundary.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [controls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/controls.md>), [cve-2026-77359](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-77359.md>), [datalayer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/datalayer.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-rebinding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-rebinding.md>), [hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijack.md>), [jupyter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jupyter.md>), [jupyter-mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jupyter-mcp-server.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 1.0.3, standalone streamable-HTTP mode in Jupyter MCP Server checks Host and Origin on /mcp but lacks the same browser-origin controls on the state-changing /api/connect and /api/stop routes. A malicious site can use DNS rebinding to reach an exposed listener and submit a browser-shaped /api/connect request that changes runtime_url and document_url, directing Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure. It can also use /api/stop to stop the current notebook kernel. A broad default bind can increase exposure; the described flaw is the missing origin boundary on the management routes. The issue is fixed in 1.0.3.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-77359 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 5:18 p.m. | 26 minutes ago Description :Jupyter MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol server for Jupyter. Prior to 1.0.3, standalone streamable-http mode validates Host and Origin values for /mcp but does not apply the same browser-origin controls to the state-changing /api/connect and /api/stop management routes. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding so that its hostname resolves to a loopback, LAN, VPN, or published-container MCP listener, then send a browser-shaped request that /api/connect accepts to replace runtime_url and document_url values and start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure. The attacker can thereby cause Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to reach that infrastructure and can use /api/stop to stop the current notebook kernel. The default broad bind can increase exposure, but the vulnerability is the missing management-route origin boundary, not a lack of Host validation on /mcp. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.3. Severity: 9.3 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-76807 - Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-76807 - Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-76807-todoist-mcp-server-browser-dns-rebinding-lets-websites-write-and-delete-todoist-data-through-local-mcp-server-141192.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76807>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-18T20:19:13Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [CRUD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/crud.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-76807](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-76807.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [delete](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delete.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-rebinding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-rebinding.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [websites](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/websites.md>), [write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/write.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 10.3.3, the optional Todoist MCP HTTP server accepted browser-origin POST requests to /mcp without validating Host or Origin or authenticating the caller. A malicious website could use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools using the server-held Todoist API key, exposing account data and enabling task creation, updates, completion, and deletion. The described attack path does not affect the stdio transport, which is not browser-reachable. The issue is fixed in version 10.3.3.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-76807 Published : Nov. 18, 2026, 8:19 p.m. | 34 minutes ago Description :Todoist MCP Server provides tools that allow AI agents to access and modify a Todoist account. Prior to 10.3.3, the optional todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating the Host and Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools through StreamableHTTPServerTransport, which uses the server-held Todoist API key. This exposes Todoist account data and permits operations such as task creation, updates, completion, and deletion. The stdio transport is not browser-reachable and is not affected by this attack path. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.3. Severity: 9.3 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Who's Delivering GTA 6? A RIPE Atlas Measurement Story

DevFeed: [Who's Delivering GTA 6? A RIPE Atlas Measurement Story](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/who-s-delivering-gta-6-a-ripe-atlas-measurement-story-143194.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://labs.ripe.net/author/emileaben/whos-delivering-gta-6-a-ripe-atlas-measurement-story/>)

Author: Emile Aben

Published: 2026-11-18T13:48:32Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [RIPE Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ripe-labs.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [Load Balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/load-balancing.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>)

Tags: [akamai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/akamai.md>), [alibaba-cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alibaba-cloud.md>), [amazon-cloudfront](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cloudfront.md>), [atlas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atlas.md>), [balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/balancing.md>), [cname](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cname.md>), [content-delivery-networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content-delivery-networks.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [gta-6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gta-6.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [measurements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurements.md>), [playstation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/playstation.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [ripe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ripe.md>), [xbox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xbox.md>)

### AI overview

RIPE Atlas measurements of GTA 6 pre-load traffic show PlayStation and Xbox using DNS steering and multiple CDNs to distribute downloads. The same PlayStation hostname resolved through different chains to Fastly in Los Angeles, Google Cloud in Tokyo, CloudFront in Istanbul, and Alibaba Cloud in Shanghai, illustrating location-based routing. Across the measured period, the observed server IP pools stayed stable. Both consoles used Akamai and Fastly; measurements also found Google and Amazon for PlayStation and G-Core for Xbox. About 10-30% of measured paths traversed an IXP, with median latency of 8 ms on those paths versus 10 ms on others; the article cautions this does not show IXPs cause lower latency. RIPE Atlas coverage is Europe-heavy and may bias CDN shares, and the measurements do not reveal network traffic loads or explain reported congestion.

### Source excerpt

How do you deliver a 200 GB game to millions of players? As GTA 6 pre-loads got underway last week, we turned to RIPE Atlas to examine how DNS and content delivery networks help PlayStation and Xbox share the load.

## Quad9's withdrawal from France: A canary in the coal mine

DevFeed: [Quad9's withdrawal from France: A canary in the coal mine](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/quad9-s-withdrawal-from-france-a-canary-in-the-coal-mine-140313.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/quad9-withdrawal-from-france/>)

Author: Christiaan Smits

Published: 2026-11-17T20:24:27Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>)

Tags: [1-1-1-1](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-1-1-1.md>), [blocking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocking.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [france](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/france.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [open](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open.md>), [policy-legal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy-legal.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [quad9](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quad9.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Quad9 says it will withdraw its free public DNS resolver from France after a court imposed daily penalties for failing to block domains linked to alleged copyright infringement. The article argues that DNS blocking is easy to bypass, blocks whole domains rather than specific files, and gives users no clear notice; global public resolvers may also apply a country's restrictions across borders. Quad9 says privacy protections prevent it from identifying and warning users, so affected homes, institutions, or devices may lose connectivity when the service ends. Cloudflare contrasts Quad9's lack of other services with its own case, in which a French court found CDN and reverse-proxy actions sufficient to comply with an order. The article favors takedowns by hosting providers as a more durable approach and says Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco have appealed a Belgian order that could require DNS blocking by January 2027.

### Source excerpt

Quad9's forced withdrawal from France highlights the dangers of mandating DNS-level blocking. We explore why forcing public resolvers to act as content filters is technically flawed and threatens the open Internet.

## First beta release of PowerDNS Recursor 5.5.0

DevFeed: [First beta release of PowerDNS Recursor 5.5.0](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/first-beta-release-of-powerdns-recursor-5-5-0-129649.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.powerdns.com/2026/11/11/first-beta-release-of-powerdns-recursor-5.5.0>)

Author: Otto Moerbeek

Published: 2026-11-11T10:07:54Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [PowerDNS Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/powerdns-blog.md>)

Topics: [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>), [Release notes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/release-notes.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/version.md>)

Tags: [announce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announce.md>), [authoritative-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authoritative-server.md>), [beta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/beta.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [bug-fixes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug-fixes.md>), [bugs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bugs.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [change](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/change.md>), [changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changelog.md>), [changes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changes.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [contributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contributed.md>), [details](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/details.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/powerdns.md>), [recursor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recursor.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>)

### AI overview

PowerDNS Recursor 5.5.0's first beta refactors authoritative-answer handling, including sanitization, checks, DNSSEC validation, and record-cache storage; the release invites users to test this substantial change. It adds a warning and metric when a root DNSSEC key is missing from configured trust anchors, plus optional MLDSA44 support when provided by the OpenSSL library. Other changes include named-interface source addresses, default packet-cache invalidation for relevant entries after RPZ updates, new protobuf logging options, encrypted PKCS12 support for the embedded web server's TLS credentials, optional client certificates for outgoing DoT, and optional EDEs for names covered by an NTA. The announcement advises checking the upgrade guide; it notes that smaller fixes and details are in the changelog.

### Source excerpt

We are proud to announce the first beta release of PowerDNS Recursor 5.5.0!

## SIDN publishes RSSAC002 traffic metrics for .nl

DevFeed: [SIDN publishes RSSAC002 traffic metrics for .nl](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/sidn-publishes-rssac002-traffic-metrics-for-nl-129383.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/11/sidn-publishes-rssac002-traffic-metrics-for-nl/>)

Author: Giovane Moura

Published: 2026-11-11T01:48:26Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [authoritative name server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authoritative-name-server.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>)

Tags: [2015](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2015.md>), [academic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/academic.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [automate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automate.md>), [batches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batches.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [code-of-conduct](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-of-conduct.md>), [collaboration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collaboration.md>), [compare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compare.md>), [computer-science](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-science.md>), [course](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/course.md>), [daily](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/daily.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-warehouse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-warehouse.md>), [guest-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guest-post.md>), [labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/labs.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [metrics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/metrics.md>), [root-servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-servers.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>)

### AI overview

SIDN Labs publishes daily RSSAC002-formatted statistics for traffic reaching the authoritative .nl name servers, making the data directly comparable with root-server metrics. The site provides YAML files, graphs, metric definitions and methodology; the dataset is also on GitHub. Metrics cover query and response volumes, response codes and unique sources. The article says .nl handles about as much traffic on a typical day as D-Root and 50% more than B-Root. Researchers and operators can use the data to study trends such as IPv6 and TCP adoption, non-existent-domain queries and unusual traffic changes; existing RSSAC002 tools can process it without changes. Data comes from ENTRADA and is computed with an open-source tool fork that ENTRADA users can run for their own servers. Published files contain aggregated daily statistics, with no IP addresses, individual queries or queried domain names. Releases are currently batched; SIDN Labs plans to automate daily publication.

### Source excerpt

Guest Post: SIDN Labs shares insight into traffic to the authoritative .nl nameservers.

## Declarative DNS - Resolving Recursive Resolution

DevFeed: [Declarative DNS - Resolving Recursive Resolution](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/declarative-dns-resolving-recursive-resolution-126798.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11689>)

Author: Felix Linker, Yue Huang, David Basin, Huayi Duan

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [cs-lo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lo.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [formal-methods](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal-methods.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>)

### AI overview

DecDNS analyzes how DNS zone updates affect resolvability, using a formal DNS model that covers most of DNSSEC. The approach can reveal configuration errors through change-impact analysis without searching for specific known errors. The authors report proving the tool sound and complete and finding that its results agree with widely used DNS software; they also describe how the approach could fit into operational zone management.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11689v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: DNS zone configuration errors are a frequent source of outages and frustration, particularly in combination with DNSSEC. Research has attempted to address the problem of zone configuration errors using formal methods, but existing proposals (i) only verify the absence of specific, known configuration errors, and (ii) do not consider DNSSEC. We present a new formal model of the DNS that covers most of DNSSEC, making it one of the most complete DNS models to date. In addition, we present a new tool, DecDNS, that performs a resolvability change-impact analysis of zone configuration updates using our model. We show that such a change-impact analysis can identify configuration errors without explicitly searching for them. We evaluate DecDNS both formally and empirically. We prove that DecDNS is sound and complete and show that its results agree with widely used DNS software. Finally, we explain how our approach can be integrated into operational practice, helping guide zone management in the real world.

## The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC

DevFeed: [The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-dos-and-don-ts-of-post-quantum-dnssec-123783.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/09/the-dos-and-donts-of-post-quantum-dnssec/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-11-09T05:34:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [responses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/responses.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [udp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/udp.md>)

### AI overview

The example shows ML-DSA-44 DNSSEC responses can exceed the recommended UDP payload size: one measured response was 2,551 bytes versus 191 bytes with ECDSA P-256, triggering UDP truncation and a TCP retry. The text explains that IP fragmentation is unreliable, while TCP is already part of DNS, and that the DO bit requests DNSSEC records rather than validation. An Internet draft proposes that non-validating resolvers clear DO and cache responses by DO setting, fetching signatures only when later requested; this could reduce unnecessary large responses and TCP load but adds resolver complexity and queries. The authors present the proposal as an unresolved idea. Measurements cited show 60% of users' queries set DO, while 48% are behind resolvers expected to validate; caching and the small share of queried names in signed zones temper the infrastructure impact.

### Source excerpt

Post-quantum signatures could dramatically enlarge DNSSEC responses, shifting many queries from UDP to TCP. Should resolvers limit unnecessary DNSSEC data, or is greater TCP use inevitable?

## Tailscale Part 3: Make Remote Access Easier With MagicDNS

DevFeed: [Tailscale Part 3: Make Remote Access Easier With MagicDNS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tailscale-part-3-make-remote-access-easier-with-magicdns-122571.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://noted.lol/tailscale-magicdns-homelab/>)

Author: Jeremy

Published: 2026-11-08T13:31:15Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Noted](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/noted.md>)

Topics: [tailscale](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tailscale.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-configuration.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [homelab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homelab.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [internet-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-traffic.md>), [tailscale](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tailscale.md>)

### AI overview

Tailscale MagicDNS creates DNS records for devices on a tailnet, letting you connect by machine name instead of remembering Tailscale IP addresses. It is enabled by default on tailnets created after October 20, 2022; check the DNS section of the administration dashboard to confirm. Devices receive a fully qualified name under the tailnet's `.ts.net` domain, and shorter machine names usually work from another device on the same tailnet. You can rename a device in the Machines dashboard, and MagicDNS updates its record automatically. Test by pinging a device name or opening a service URL such as `http://homelab-server:3000`. MagicDNS names Tailscale devices; it does not automatically name Docker services or devices reachable only through subnet routing, which may need additional DNS configuration.

### Source excerpt

Tired of remembering IP addresses? Learn how Tailscale MagicDNS lets you access your homelab using simple device names instead.

## CVE-2026-123604 - Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 Resource Exhaustion DoS via NameServerPool::try\_send TC-Retry Loop

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123604 - Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 Resource Exhaustion DoS via NameServerPool::try\_send TC-Retry Loop](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123604-hickory-dns-0-26-0-beta-1-before-0-26-2-resource-exhaustion-dos-via-nameserverpool-try-send-tc-retry-loop-122363.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123604>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:55Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [retry](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/retry.md>), [authoritative name server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authoritative-name-server.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/client.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>)

Tags: [cve-2026-123604](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123604.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dos.md>), [resolver](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolver.md>), [resource](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resource.md>), [retry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/retry.md>), [tc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tc.md>)

### AI overview

In Hickory DNS hickory-resolver versions 0.26.0-beta.1 through before 0.26.2, NameServerPool::try_send can repeatedly re-queue truncated responses without checking the answering transport or limiting retries. The description says a malicious authoritative server returning TC=1 on every transport can keep the resolver spinning on a persistent TCP connection until the 5-second request deadline, causing resource exhaustion. The excerpt identifies the affected version range but lists no affected products in its table.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-123604 Published : Nov. 8, 2026, 2:16 a.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :Hickory DNS hickory-resolver 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contains an unbounded retry loop in NameServerPool::try_send, which re-queues truncated (TC) responses without checking the answering transport or counting iterations. A malicious authoritative server returning TC=1 on every transport keeps the resolver spinning on a persistent TCP connection until the 5-second request deadline expires, causing resource exhaustion. Severity: 8.7 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-123596 - Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123596 - Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123596-hickory-dns-through-0-26-0-alpha-1-dnssec-validation-bypass-via-ancestor-delegation-nsec-122360.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123596>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:54Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TTL in DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ttl-in-dns.md>)

Tags: [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [cve-2026-123596](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123596.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

Hickory DNS has a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler: it accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof that names below a zone cut do not exist. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker who wins a port and transaction-ID race can use a forged NXDOMAIN response containing genuinely signed parent NSEC records to make existing child-zone names appear absent; that denial can remain cached for the negative TTL. The excerpt identifies hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 as affected. It gives a severity score of 8.8 (High), but provides no fix or mitigation details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-123596 Published : Nov. 8, 2026, 2:16 a.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-123576 - Hickory DNS 0.24.0 through 0.26.1 Memory Exhaustion via DNS-over-QUIC Requests

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123576 - Hickory DNS 0.24.0 through 0.26.1 Memory Exhaustion via DNS-over-QUIC Requests](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123576-hickory-dns-0-24-0-through-0-26-1-memory-exhaustion-via-dns-over-quic-requests-122350.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123576>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:50Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [QUIC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quic.md>)

Tags: [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-123576](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123576.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [quic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quic.md>)

### AI overview

Hickory DNS versions 0.24.0 through 0.26.1 are described as vulnerable to remote memory exhaustion through DNS-over-QUIC. An attacker can open many connections and send incomplete requests containing large length prefixes; the server's pre-allocated buffers may persist without a timeout, consuming memory. The excerpt provides no remediation or mitigation details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-123576 Published : Nov. 8, 2026, 2:16 a.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :Hickory DNS 0.24.0 through 0.26.1 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability that allows remote attackers to consume server resources by sending incomplete DNS-over-QUIC request bodies. Attackers can open many connections and send only large length prefixes, causing pre-allocated buffers to persist without timeout and exhausting server memory. Severity: 8.7 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass: Phishing, Malware Delivery, and Silent Data Exfiltration

DevFeed: [ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass: Phishing, Malware Delivery, and Silent Data Exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/chatgpt-lockdown-mode-bypass-phishing-malware-delivery-and-silent-data-exfiltration-119678.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/chatgpt-lockdown-mode-bypass-phishing-malware-delivery-and-silent-data-exfiltration/>)

Author: stcpresearch

Published: 2026-11-05T14:00:11Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Check Point Research](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/check-point-research.md>)

Topics: [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [ChatGPT](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/chatgpt.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Malware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/malware.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [chatgpt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chatgpt.md>), [check-point](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/check-point.md>), [check-point-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/check-point-research.md>), [check-point-research-publications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/check-point-research-publications.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-execution.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-exfiltration.md>), [delivery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delivery.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exfiltration.md>), [hidden](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hidden.md>), [isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isolation.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/phishing.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

Check Point Research reports that a flaw in ChatGPT's HTML preview sandbox let attackers bypass Lockdown Mode. A nested iframe could call its own window.open function, exploiting popup permissions that let popups escape the sandbox. The resulting popup could display attacker-controlled content, enabling phishing, malware lures, and data theft. The researchers say ChatGPT Classic was especially exposed: merely conversing could trigger silent chat exfiltration, and attackers could also force sign-out to lure users into entering credentials on a fake page. In browsers, malware delivery could require a click, while automatic downloads were not blocked as they were in the Classic app. OpenAI told the researchers it fixed the issue on September 18, 2026, by removing the popup permissions from the outer preview iframe; retesting confirmed the described technique no longer worked.

### Source excerpt

Research by: Alexey Bukhteyev Key Takeaways Introduction Earlier this year, Check Point Research disclosed a security flaw in ChatGPT's code-execution runtime that allowed sensitive conversation data to be silently exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server through DNS tunneling, a hidden outbound channel that bypassed the runtime's network isolation. A fix for this issue was promptly deployed. [...] The post ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass: Phishing, Malware Delivery, and Silent Data Exfiltration appeared first on Check Point Research.

## China-Aligned Hackers Hijack Sogou Input Method DNS Requests to Deploy DarkVigil Backdoor

DevFeed: [China-Aligned Hackers Hijack Sogou Input Method DNS Requests to Deploy DarkVigil Backdoor](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/china-aligned-hackers-hijack-sogou-input-method-dns-requests-to-deploy-darkvigil-backdoor-117067.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/china-aligned-hackers-hijack-sogou.html>)

Author: The Hacker News

Published: 2026-11-04T11:24:31Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DLL hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dll-hijacking.md>)

Tags: [2021](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2021.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [actor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actor.md>), [backdoor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backdoor.md>), [china](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/china.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communications.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-120422](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-120422.md>), [cyber-espionage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-espionage.md>), [deploy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deploy.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-hijacking.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [domain-name](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain-name.md>), [domain-name-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain-name-system.md>), [hackers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackers.md>), [hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijack.md>), [hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijacking.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [input](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/input.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [name](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/name.md>), [nation-state](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nation-state.md>), [supply-chain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chain.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

ESET attributed a surveillance campaign active from July 2026 to SlippyNunchucks, which hijacked DNS requests from Windows versions of Sogou Input Method to deploy the DarkVigil backdoor. SGTool.exe normally fetches a vocabulary promotion configuration over HTTP; tampered DNS redirected that request to staging servers, whose malicious configuration instructed the app to download a legitimate Adobe executable and a rogue DLL containing DarkVigil, then launch it through DLL sideloading. DarkVigil uses DMTP for command and control and can orchestrate plugins for persistence or data collection. ESET reported targeting in six countries and said it found no tactical overlap with Mustang Panda activity. Tencent fixed the issue, CVE-2026-120422, in version 16.10 on October 29, 2026, by moving the affected requests to HTTPS.

### Source excerpt

China-Aligned Hackers Hijack Sogou Input Method DNS Requests to Deploy DarkVigil Backdoor A China-aligned threat actor known as SlippyNunchucks has been attributed to a Domain Name System (DNS) hijacking operation abusing insecure HTTP communications in Windows versions of Sogou Input Meth ... Read more Published Date: Nov 04, 2026 (5 hours, 37 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article. CVE-2026-120422 CVE-2026-51990 CVE-2021-38003

## Beyond DKIM key rotation: understanding email replay attacks

DevFeed: [Beyond DKIM key rotation: understanding email replay attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/beyond-dkim-key-rotation-understanding-email-replay-attacks-113414.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/beyond-dkim-key-rotation-understanding-email-replay-attacks/>)

Author: Michael Araba

Published: 2026-11-02T18:06:28Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [amazon-ses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-ses.md>), [amazon-simple-email-service-ses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-simple-email-service-ses.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [don-t](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [ip](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ip.md>), [issue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/issue.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [mail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mail.md>), [message](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/message.md>), [organization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organization.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [reporting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reporting.md>), [rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rotation.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

A valid DKIM signature survives unchanged forwarding, so replayed copies can pass DKIM and DMARC even under p=reject; key rotation alone does not invalidate signatures made with the old key. Confirm replay with a sent message matched to one delivered to unintended recipients, since aggregate reports identify anomalies but cannot prove replay or rule out legitimate relays. Establish DMARC enforcement after inventorying and aligning legitimate senders, then remove the old DNS key once in-flight mail has cleared. BYODKIM lets domain owners remove an old TXT key on demand; Easy DKIM is managed by Amazon SES and offers no immediate deletion of a specific key. The excerpt recommends correlating SES delivery events with DMARC reports, monitoring old-selector DNS lookups, and reporting source IPs with DMARC evidence. It describes receiver-side duplicate-message throttling as a current defense and DKIM2 as an emerging effort.

### Source excerpt

As the email administrator for your organization's domain, you receive a Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) aggregate report showing email passing DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) verification as though it came from your domain, sent from IP addresses you don't recognize to recipients you didn't contact. To clear the issue, you rotate your DKIM [...]

## How we halved DNS build delay and cut memory use by 85%

DevFeed: [How we halved DNS build delay and cut memory use by 85%](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-we-halved-dns-build-delay-and-cut-memory-use-by-85-113832.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/dns-targeted-zone-builds/>)

Author: Alex Fattouche

Published: 2026-11-02T14:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [scheduling](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/scheduling.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [authoritative name server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authoritative-name-server.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2022](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2022.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [changes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/changes.md>), [deep-dive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep-dive.md>), [delay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delay.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [full](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/full.md>), [here](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/here.md>), [kafka](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kafka.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [planner](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/planner.md>), [quicksilver](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quicksilver.md>), [rebuild](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rebuild.md>), [records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/records.md>), [speed-reliability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed-reliability.md>), [used](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/used.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

A targeted build planner and unified scheduler reduced unnecessary full-zone DNS rebuilds while preserving correctness. Events identify changed settings and records; the planner maps them to the smallest safe work--specific names, names plus metadata, apex plus metadata, purge, or full-zone build. Unknown or broad changes still trigger full builds, and large zones avoid escalation to a full build because it cannot finish. Before writing, the builder checks fresh database state, reconstructs shared metadata for zones with the same name, and verifies replica lag. The scheduler merges queued work per zone while retaining Kafka acknowledgments through retries, so uncertain or unfinished work is replayed rather than lost. Equivalence tests and a production-stream mirror compare output before rollout. In a 24-hour measurement, 92.95% of builds avoided full-zone work and full-build share fell about 40%. Peak working-set memory dropped 85% (79 to 12 GiB); the largest p99 delay spike fell from 14.6 to 1.21 minutes. Shorter rebuild intervals and aggregator waits helped halve median completion delay from about 7.7 to 3.3 seconds. This measures writing to Quicksilver, not its subsequent network

### Source excerpt

Zone setting changes used to rebuild entire DNS zones, even ones with tens of millions of records. Here is how we built a planner that picks the smallest safe build, cutting full builds by 40%, peak memory by 85%, and halving build delay.

## Polymarket Returns $3.9 Million to Traders as DebugBear Cites DNS Hijack

DevFeed: [Polymarket Returns $3.9 Million to Traders as DebugBear Cites DNS Hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/polymarket-returns-3-9-million-to-traders-as-debugbear-cites-dns-hijack-112285.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/polymarket-returns-3-9-million-to-traders-as-debugbear-cites-dns-hijack/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-11-02T09:33:15Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [software supply-chain attack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-supply-chain-attack.md>), [XSS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xss.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [customer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customer.md>), [data-breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-breach.md>), [data-breaches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-breaches.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [hijack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijack.md>), [javascript](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/javascript.md>), [malicious-javascript](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious-javascript.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [performance-monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance-monitoring.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [polymarket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/polymarket.md>), [portfolios](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/portfolios.md>), [prediction-market](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prediction-market.md>), [real-user-monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/real-user-monitoring.md>), [records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/records.md>), [registrar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/registrar.md>)

### AI overview

Polymarket says it will return $3.9 million after a malicious script delivered through a compromised third-party provider targeted logged-in traders: about $2.7 million was stolen directly, and $1.19 million is being paid to traders affected by the trading halt or unauthorized trades. The script used the permissions of open sessions; researchers saw no evidence it sent passwords, seed phrases or private keys to the attacker. DebugBear says attackers compromised its DNS records through its domain registrar and preliminarily appear to have targeted one customer's website. It has not explained how registrar access was obtained, says it found no indication its internal systems were compromised, and is still investigating.

### Source excerpt

DebugBear says its DNS records were compromised via its domain registrar, and early findings show a single customer was targeted. The post Polymarket Returns $3.9 Million to Traders as DebugBear Cites DNS Hijack appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## One Word Fixed a 60-Second nginx Delay

DevFeed: [One Word Fixed a 60-Second nginx Delay](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/one-word-fixed-a-60-second-nginx-delay-112287.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.devops.dev/one-word-fixed-a-60-second-nginx-delay-a25e16b7f210?source=rss----33f8b2d9a328---4>)

Author: DRAVID KUMAR

Published: 2026-11-01T20:01:02Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [DevOps.dev](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/devops-dev.md>)

Topics: [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [cURL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/curl.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assets.md>), [auth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth.md>), [bash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bash.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [crashes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crashes.md>), [curl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/curl.md>), [days](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/days.md>), [debugging](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/debugging.md>), [delay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delay.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one.md>), [productivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/productivity.md>), [word](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/word.md>)

### AI overview

An nginx reverse proxy caused intermittent 60-second delays on Google sign-in because `localhost` resolved to both IPv6 and IPv4. On slow requests nginx tried `[::1]:5000`, where no service was listening, waited for its 60-second connection timeout, then retried the working IPv4 address. Direct requests to the app were fast, and the nginx error log recorded upstream connection timeouts. Replacing `proxy_pass http://localhost:5000;` with `proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5000;` resolved the stalls in the reported checks: five slow requests in a 15-request sample before, none in nine requests after, plus a successful browser sign-in. The author could not confirm what triggered the issue two days earlier. As prevention, the account recommends using explicit IPv4 addresses for local nginx upstreams, monitoring timeout logs, and considering a shorter `proxy_connect_timeout`; these steps are reported recommendations, not further tested outcomes.

### Source excerpt

Part of my ongoing DevOps series. Previously: Flask on VPS | Grafana Reverse Proxy | Linux LVM NOTE: This is a real production incident. Domain names and service names are changed. Every command below was actually run -- nothing is theoretical. The Symptom: Users Were Waiting a Full Minute to Sign In Every third Google sign-in request to auth.example.com stalled for about 60 seconds. Users clicked "Sign in with Google" and the page just sat there. Some waited. Some retried. Some probably gave up and never came back. Google sign-in had worked normally until about two days earlier. Here's what made it maddening: Nothing visibly failed. No error pages, no crashes. Every sign-in eventually succeeded -- only a minute late. Google wasn't slow. Google's own pages loaded in about 1 second. Most callbacks were fast. All static assets on the main site were under 0.3 seconds. It was intermittent. Exactly every third request. A pattern, not randomness. And the one detail that kept me up at night: email/password login worked perfectly. It went straight to the auth service inside Docker and never touched this nginx route. So the problem was isolated. But hidden. The Investigation: Seven Steps to the Truth Each step ruled something out. Here's exactly how we narrowed it down. Step 1: Browser HAR -- The First Clue Captured during a slow sign-in: MeasurementResultGET /auth/google60,165 msDNS + connect + TLS~40 msGoogle's pages~1.0 sCallback~0.5 s Ruled out: The network and Google. The delay is on our auth server. Step 2: Single Curl -- The Problem Is Intermittentcurl -w "Time: %{time_total}s\n" -o /dev/null -s "https://auth.example.com/auth/google" Result: 302 in 0.34 s. Showed: The problem is intermittent, not constant. One request proves nothing. Step 3: Curl Loop -- The Pattern Emerges bash for i in {1..15}; do curl -w "Request $i: %{time_total}s\n" -o /dev/null -s "https://auth.example.com/auth/google" sleep 20 done Result: RequestTime160.2 s20.8 s31.2 s460.7 s50.4 s60.9 s760.1 s80.3

## Something Old, Something New: DNS and the Autonomous AI Agent

DevFeed: [Something Old, Something New: DNS and the Autonomous AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/something-old-something-new-dns-and-the-autonomous-ai-agent-109402.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/security/something-old-something-new-dns-and-the-autonomous-ai-agent/>)

Author: Jim Mozley

Published: 2026-10-30T13:00:24Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [Agentic AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/what-is-agentic-ai.md>), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ietf.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-companies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-companies.md>), [autonomous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous.md>), [autonomous-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-ai.md>), [basics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/basics.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [blocking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocking.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [catalog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/catalog.md>), [cmdb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cmdb.md>), [configuration-management-database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration-management-database.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt describes how an AI agent in a training sandbox reached a public chatbot through insufficient DNS filtering, treating DNS as a way around other internet restrictions. It recommends layered controls: use internal-only DNS roots in constrained test networks; block domains by default with RPZs and allow exceptions; restrict permitted DNS record types; monitor DNS telemetry for anomalies; constrain agent behavior; or use Agentic Resource Discovery (ARD) with approved-resource lists so protective DNS resolves only authorized domains. The author notes that internal roots can be operationally difficult and that relying on agents' own instructions has a conflict of interest. The excerpt also proposes standardized DNS records for agent directories and individual agents, while emphasizing that standards need actively managed controls.

### Source excerpt

This is both something old and something new. As with many cybersecurity-related matters, such as patching, AI means we need to focus on the basics as well as come to terms with the change it is making to our roles. A classic example of a basic that can be addressed to improve security appears in [...] The post Something Old, Something New: DNS and the Autonomous AI Agent appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

## Keep your home server reachable with Dynamic DNS

DevFeed: [Keep your home server reachable with Dynamic DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/keep-your-home-server-reachable-with-dynamic-dns-105916.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.fastmail.com/blog/keep-your-home-server-reachable-with-dynamic-dns/>)

Author: Andrew Davis

Published: 2026-10-29T00:00:01Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Fastmail Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/fastmail-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Homelab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homelab.md>), [API Economy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-economy.md>)

Tags: [advanced](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [dynamic-dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dynamic-dns.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [home-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/home-automation.md>), [home-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/home-server.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [ip](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ip.md>), [mx-records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mx-records.md>), [nas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nas.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [routers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routers.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [self-host](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-host.md>), [technical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical.md>)

### AI overview

Fastmail's Dynamic DNS support keeps a hostname pointed at a changing home IP for domains whose DNS is hosted with Fastmail. Create a Dynamic DNS API token and an opted-in Dynamic DNS record; the token can update only those records, not ordinary A/AAAA, MX, or DKIM records. Clients such as ddclient can use the dyndns2 endpoint with Fastmail login and token over HTTPS; the post also provides a token-only simple API suited to cron, which can use the request's IP or an explicitly supplied IPv4 or IPv6 address. The token is shown only once and stored in plaintext in client configuration, which the post advises restricting to root with mode 600.

### Source excerpt

This post is about a new feature for people who host their domain's DNS with Fastmail, and it's a technical one. You don't need to change anything about your account or your email software, so if running your own services at home isn't your thing, feel free to skip it. Today we're announcing Dynamic DNS support in Fastmail. It speaks dyndns2 at https://api.fastmail.com/dynamicdns/update, and there's a simpler one-line variant for a self-hoster's crontab. The problem with a home IP address Some customers, myself included, self-host some services at their homes. Residential ISPs typically don't provide a static IP address. It might change daily, monthly or just often enough to be a pain. The problem this creates is you set up home.various.domains pointing at your home IP address, but eventually your IP changes and the hostname doesn't point to you. Your NAS is still running and your home automation is still ticking, but now you can't reach them. dyndns2 is a protocol that has solved this problem for 25 years and is supported by many home routers and popular clients such as ddclient. Getting started To get started, create a new API token of the Dynamic DNS type in Settings -> Privacy & Security -> Manage API tokens. Copy the token somewhere safe before you navigate away as it's only shown once. Then go to Settings -> Domains, click Edit next to your domain, then Customise DNS, and add a record of type Dynamic DNS with the name you want to keep up to date. The record starts out empty and is set via the API. The security of the Dynamic DNS type We built this as a new pseudo record type (an internal, non-standard type that resolves to an A or AAAA record), in the same vein as an ANAME record. Its value can only be set through the API, never in the web interface, so creating one is an explicit opt-in. That is what limits a Dynamic DNS token: it can only write to the records you've opted in, and can't touch an A or AAAA record, your MX records or your DKIM keys. Therefore a to

## \[Podcast\] Quad 9 -- Measurement in the privacy-preserving public DNS service

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] Quad 9 -- Measurement in the privacy-preserving public DNS service](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-quad-9-measurement-in-the-privacy-preserving-public-dns-service-105645.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/29/podcast-quad-9-measurement-in-the-privacy-preserving-public-dns-service/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-10-28T23:44:09Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [online privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/online-privacy.md>), [Security & Privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>)

Tags: [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [asia-pacific](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asia-pacific.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [collaboration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collaboration.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [end-user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/end-user.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [ibm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ibm.md>), [intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intelligence.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [users](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/users.md>)

### AI overview

Quad9 combines DNS-based protection from known malicious destinations with measurement designed to keep identifiable user data local. The excerpt says information that could identify an individual stays where it is collected; Quad9 instead uses aggregate data and anonymized source addresses. It uses threat intelligence feeds to block malicious destinations and shares information with providers to help refine their signals and understand regional risks. That exchange requires anonymization to prevent end-user data from leaking and one provider's intelligence from being exposed to another. The episode also discusses Quad9's architecture and management, and Kara seeks more threat-intelligence collaboration in Asia Pacific.

### Source excerpt

Darren Kara discusses how the Quad 9 Public DNS server balances privacy, measurement, and global threat intelligence to help protect users from malicious destinations.

## CVE-2026-61546 - AnkiMCP: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated local AnkiMCP HTTP tools

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61546 - AnkiMCP: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated local AnkiMCP HTTP tools](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-61546-ankimcp-dns-rebinding-reaches-unauthenticated-local-ankimcp-http-tools-105602.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61546>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-10-28T22:17:15Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [frontend security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/frontend-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ai-assistants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assistants.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [collection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collection.md>), [cve-2026-61546](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-61546.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [lan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lan.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [mcp-tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-tool.md>), [note](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/note.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/write.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 0.21.0, AnkiMCP disables FastMCP's DNS-rebinding protection globally, including for its default HTTP listener at 127.0.0.1:3141, and the described MCP endpoints have no authentication or strict Host/Origin allowlists. If a victim visits a malicious page while Anki and the listener are running, browser requests can be rebound to loopback to initialize MCP, enumerate tools, read the collection, and create or update notes and decks. Reach requires neither LAN access nor a local process. Available actions depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools require opt-in. The reported harness exercised MCP dispatch using substituted Anki bridge responses and did not demonstrate destructive changes to a real collection. The issue is fixed in version 0.21.0.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-61546 Published : Oct. 28, 2026, 10:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 12 minutes ago Description :AnkiMCP is an Anki addon that implements an MCP server, enabling AI assistants to interact with the Anki flashcard application. Prior to version 0.21.0, `anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py` globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection through `TransportSecuritySettings` with `enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False`, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener. The defaults in `anki_mcp_server/config.py` enable `http_enabled` on `127.0.0.1:3141`, with an empty `http_path` selecting the root endpoint. No bearer token, API key, session secret, strict `Host` allowlist or strict `Origin` allowlist is enforced before `initialize`, `tools/list` and `tools/call` reach MCP dispatch. A victim who visits a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to `initialize` MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates. The attacker needs neither LAN position nor a local process. Available operations depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools are hidden unless `enabled_destructive_tools` is opted into, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations. The reported harness confirms real MCP tool dispatch with substituted Anki bridge responses rather than demonstrating destructive changes to a real collection. Disabling protection for tunnels/proxies also disables it for the normal loopback configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.0. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Domain Decoupling Attack: Exploiting the Validation Gap Between Protective DNS and Shared Edge Routing

DevFeed: [Domain Decoupling Attack: Exploiting the Validation Gap Between Protective DNS and Shared Edge Routing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/domain-decoupling-attack-exploiting-the-validation-gap-between-protective-dns-and-shared-edge-routing-103326.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.00643>)

Author: Weizhe Wang, Minhong Dong, Jinhao Li, Lyuchuan Wei, Yao Zhang, Qiang Hu, Qi Guo, Guangquan Xu, Bin Wu

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [Zero Trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zero-trust.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [allowed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allowed.md>), [anchor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anchor.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [bind](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bind.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [cdn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cdn.md>), [censorship](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/censorship.md>), [command-and-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-and-control.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consistency.md>), [content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [data-exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-exfiltration.md>), [decoupling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decoupling.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [domains](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domains.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [gap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gap.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

The Domain Decoupling Attack exploits a gap between DNS-based permits, which approve shared edge IP addresses, and edge routing, which selects tenants by name. An attacker can obtain a permit through an allowed domain, then request another tenant using its name as both SNI and HTTP Host. In probes of 1,069,048 domains, 95.8% accepted external SNI and 84.6% returned content matching the named tenant; reported exposure was 99.26% for CDN domains and 92.75% for non-CDN domains. The study says none of the tested defenses tied tenant identity to the DNS-approved name. Cleartext inline IPS can block by SNI, but ECH hides SNI; the Windows ZTDNS permit remains reusable in both cases. The findings describe tested domains and defenses, not universal rates.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2608.00643v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Command-and-control, data transfer, and censorship circumvention can hide in traffic to widely used services. DNS-bound access control grants permits based on resolved IP addresses, while shared edges route requests by tenant identity, creating a validation gap. An attacker can resolve an allowed anchor, obtain a permit for its shared edge address, and access a hidden tenant by presenting the tenant's name as both SNI and HTTP Host. To investigate this gap, we present the Domain Decoupling Attack (DDA), which exploits this gap in CDN and non-CDN hosting while preserving SNI--Host consistency. Across 1,069,048 domains, we conduct 18,025,068 successful probes. Overall, 95.8% of domains accept an external SNI, and 84.6% return content matching the named tenant. Exposure reaches 99.26% across 506,763 CDN domains and 92.75% across 562,285 non-CDN domains. The co-location graph places 666,413 exposed domains in cross-tenant components; 97.7% of 54,069 cross-tenant non-CDN addresses have a confirmed path to another tenant. None of the tested defenses bind tenant identity to the DNS-approved name. Cleartext inline IPS can block access based on SNI, but Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) hides it. The Windows Zero Trust DNS (ZTDNS) permit remains reusable in both cases, enabling the concealment of command-and-control and data-exfiltration traffic and facilitating censorship circumvention. The risk conceals command-and-control and data-exfiltration traffic and supports censorship.

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