# DNSSEC

DNSSEC is a set of Domain Name System security extensions that provide data-origin authentication and data integrity for DNS data.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## Mind the Gap: Cross-RFC Formal Analysis Exposes DNSSEC's Hidden Vulnerabilities

DevFeed: [Mind the Gap: Cross-RFC Formal Analysis Exposes DNSSEC's Hidden Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mind-the-gap-cross-rfc-formal-analysis-exposes-dnssec-s-hidden-vulnerabilities-137010.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11431>)

Author: Qifan Zhang, Zilin Shen, Imtiaz Karim, Elisa Bertino, Daiping Liu, Zhou Li

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Formal verification](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/formal-verification.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [availability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/availability.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [caching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/caching.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-fl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-fl.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [formal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [interaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interaction.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [rfc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rfc.md>), [specifications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/specifications.md>), [synthesis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/synthesis.md>), [test](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/test.md>)

### AI overview

The paper's cross-RFC formal models find that selected DNSSEC authentication properties hold under modeled assumptions, but wildcard expansion has an interaction flaw that breaks integrity. In Cross-Zone Wildcard Cache Poisoning, a malicious zone operator can exploit that gap to place forged records for some out-of-zone domains in resolver caches; clients may receive attacker-chosen positive answers marked DNSSEC-authentic with the AD bit set. All four tested major resolvers using the affected caching optimization accepted the malformed material, though impact depends on each resolver's synthesis path. All four vendors have released fixes. The study also reports two modeled availability flaws, three known attack classes, tests six resolvers, scans resolver and TLD deployment prerequisites, and proposes updates to four RFCs.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2512.11431v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents a cross-RFC formal analysis of selected DNSSEC mechanisms using SAPIC+ models of cryptographic operations and stateful caching. We analyze properties concerning data origin authenticity, integrity, chain of trust, and authenticated denial of existence within these models. Our analysis shows that core authentication properties hold under the modeled assumptions, while wildcard expansion, the mechanism that bridges positive and negative authentication, exhibits a cross-RFC interaction vulnerability that defeats DNSSEC's integrity guarantee. Specifically, we discover Cross-Zone Wildcard Cache Poisoning: a new attack in which a malicious zone operator exploits a gap in the DNSSEC specifications to poison resolver caches with forged records for some domains outside its authority, served to clients as DNSSEC-authentic. The tested versions of all four major resolvers implementing the affected caching optimization accept the malformed wildcard material. The resulting impact depends on the resolver's synthesis path. All four vendors have publicly released fixes. The distinctive integrity failure is a synthesized, attacker-chosen positive answer with the Authenticated Data (AD) bit set: prior attacks instead exhausted availability, downgraded to AD=0, or skipped validation. Our models also identify two cross-RFC availability flaws and rediscover three known attack classes. We test six resolvers and measure deployment prerequisites through focused resolver and TLD scans. We propose updates to four RFCs.

## Declarative DNS - Resolving Recursive Resolution

DevFeed: [Declarative DNS - Resolving Recursive Resolution](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/declarative-dns-resolving-recursive-resolution-126798.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11689>)

Author: Felix Linker, Yue Huang, David Basin, Huayi Duan

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [cs-lo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lo.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [formal-methods](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal-methods.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>)

### AI overview

DecDNS analyzes how DNS zone updates affect resolvability, using a formal DNS model that covers most of DNSSEC. The approach can reveal configuration errors through change-impact analysis without searching for specific known errors. The authors report proving the tool sound and complete and finding that its results agree with widely used DNS software; they also describe how the approach could fit into operational zone management.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11689v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: DNS zone configuration errors are a frequent source of outages and frustration, particularly in combination with DNSSEC. Research has attempted to address the problem of zone configuration errors using formal methods, but existing proposals (i) only verify the absence of specific, known configuration errors, and (ii) do not consider DNSSEC. We present a new formal model of the DNS that covers most of DNSSEC, making it one of the most complete DNS models to date. In addition, we present a new tool, DecDNS, that performs a resolvability change-impact analysis of zone configuration updates using our model. We show that such a change-impact analysis can identify configuration errors without explicitly searching for them. We evaluate DecDNS both formally and empirically. We prove that DecDNS is sound and complete and show that its results agree with widely used DNS software. Finally, we explain how our approach can be integrated into operational practice, helping guide zone management in the real world.

## The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC

DevFeed: [The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-dos-and-don-ts-of-post-quantum-dnssec-123783.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/09/the-dos-and-donts-of-post-quantum-dnssec/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-11-09T05:34:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [responses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/responses.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [udp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/udp.md>)

### AI overview

The example shows ML-DSA-44 DNSSEC responses can exceed the recommended UDP payload size: one measured response was 2,551 bytes versus 191 bytes with ECDSA P-256, triggering UDP truncation and a TCP retry. The text explains that IP fragmentation is unreliable, while TCP is already part of DNS, and that the DO bit requests DNSSEC records rather than validation. An Internet draft proposes that non-validating resolvers clear DO and cache responses by DO setting, fetching signatures only when later requested; this could reduce unnecessary large responses and TCP load but adds resolver complexity and queries. The authors present the proposal as an unresolved idea. Measurements cited show 60% of users' queries set DO, while 48% are behind resolvers expected to validate; caching and the small share of queried names in signed zones temper the infrastructure impact.

### Source excerpt

Post-quantum signatures could dramatically enlarge DNSSEC responses, shifting many queries from UDP to TCP. Should resolvers limit unnecessary DNSSEC data, or is greater TCP use inevitable?

## CVE-2026-123596 - Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123596 - Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123596-hickory-dns-through-0-26-0-alpha-1-dnssec-validation-bypass-via-ancestor-delegation-nsec-122360.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123596>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:54Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TTL in DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ttl-in-dns.md>)

Tags: [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [cve-2026-123596](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123596.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

Hickory DNS has a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler: it accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof that names below a zone cut do not exist. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker who wins a port and transaction-ID race can use a forged NXDOMAIN response containing genuinely signed parent NSEC records to make existing child-zone names appear absent; that denial can remain cached for the negative TTL. The excerpt identifies hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 as affected. It gives a severity score of 8.8 (High), but provides no fix or mitigation details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-123596 Published : Nov. 8, 2026, 2:16 a.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-123587 - Hickory-DNS 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Nonexistence Forgery via Wraparound NSEC

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123587 - Hickory-DNS 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Nonexistence Forgery via Wraparound NSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123587-hickory-dns-0-26-0-before-0-26-2-dnssec-nonexistence-forgery-via-wraparound-nsec-122355.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123587>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-08T02:16:52Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [CVSS v4.0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cvss-v4-0.md>)

Tags: [cve-2026-123587](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123587.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [forgery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forgery.md>)

### AI overview

In Hickory DNS's hickory-net crate, versions 0.26.0 through before 0.26.2 are affected by a DNSSEC nonexistence-forgery flaw. Validation identifies a wraparound NSEC record by comparing its next domain name with an SOA record in the response, but accepts that SOA even when it fails validation. An attacker able to supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge the nonexistence of any RRset. The source rates the issue 8.9 (HIGH); it provides no fix details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-123587 Published : Nov. 8, 2026, 2:16 a.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset. Severity: 8.9 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Do Registrars Use DNSSEC on Their Own Domains?

DevFeed: [Do Registrars Use DNSSEC on Their Own Domains?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/do-registrars-use-dnssec-on-their-own-domains-118819.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://labs.ripe.net/author/tobiassattler/do-registrars-use-dnssec-on-their-own-domains/>)

Author: Tobias Sattler

Published: 2026-11-05T07:09:04Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [RIPE Labs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ripe-labs.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [cctld](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cctld.md>), [cds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cds.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [domains](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domains.md>), [europe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/europe.md>), [measurements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurements.md>), [registrar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/registrar.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>)

### AI overview

A June 2025 survey found DS records on 66 of 698 registrar primary domains (9.46%); counting each ICANN accreditation instead yields 2.32%, because large multi-accreditation groups were often unsigned. European registrars were more likely to sign: 22% of domains but 53% of signed domains were European. Europe remained associated with signing after controlling for registrar size, while size did not; the study cannot determine whether regulation, market structure, or operational habits explain the regional gap. The .com-based size measure may understate registrars focused on ccTLDs. The DS-record measure is only a proxy and an upper bound on working deployments: it does not verify signature validity or freshness. The author notes that registrar expertise and automated DS-update mechanisms weaken technical complexity as a complete explanation, but key management remains necessary. A failed rollover can make services such as websites and email unreachable to users of validating resolvers. Comparisons of adoption rates should account for whether studies count domains or accreditations.

### Source excerpt

Registrars must support DNSSEC for customers, but how many use it themselves? A study of 698 registrar domains finds fewer than one in ten has a DS record, with European registrars ahead of the rest. Tobias Sattler explores the gap and its possible explanations.

## Restating the case for DNSSEC

DevFeed: [Restating the case for DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/restating-the-case-for-dnssec-114864.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/03/restating-the-case-for-dnssec/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-11-03T03:41:45Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [argument](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/argument.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [challenges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenges.md>), [complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/complexity.md>), [content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [outages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/outages.md>), [real-world](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/real-world.md>), [risks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risks.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

DNSSEC adds signed, verifiable proof of origin for information published by a domain, a capability TLS alone does not provide. A browser must resolve a name through DNS before validating a TLS certificate, so redirected DNS can send users elsewhere; absent strongly enforced certificate pinning, an attacker may still obtain a certificate authority-backed TLS connection, and homograph attacks can further undermine trust. The excerpt also weighs concerns about state control and incomplete deployment: it says jurisdictional controls arise from broader legal and social frameworks, while acknowledging partial deployment as a real challenge and citing IPv6 and RPKI as examples of technologies that take time to reach useful adoption. It references the IANIX record of DNSSEC-related outages, but gives no outage analysis or detailed deployment guidance.

### Source excerpt

Does TLS make DNSSEC unnecessary? An examination of common DNSSEC assumptions challenges that argument and considers DNSSEC's role in establishing trust, the risks of partial deployment, and the evidence from real-world outages.

## Building Automotive Security on Internet Standards: In-Car Service Authentication with DNSSEC, DANE, and DANCE

DevFeed: [Building Automotive Security on Internet Standards: In-Car Service Authentication with DNSSEC, DANE, and DANCE](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/building-automotive-security-on-internet-standards-in-car-service-authentication-with-dnssec-dane-and-dance-101334.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.13261>)

Author: Timo Salomon, Mehmet Mueller, Philipp Meyer, Thomas C. Schmidt

Published: 2026-10-27T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [cryptographic audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptographic-audit.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automotive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive.md>), [automotive-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automotive-security.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [standards](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standards.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes integrating DNSSEC, DANE, and DANCE with automotive middleware to authenticate and authorize in-vehicle services. It separates service authentication from deployment: suppliers generate service certificates, while the OEM publishes them at deployment through OEM-signed DNSSEC TLSA records. The authors say this simplifies key management and protects service discovery and invocation while supporting multiple protocols and credential management across millions of vehicles. They assess the design with STRIDE threat analysis and an emulation of a realistic in-vehicle setup; the supplied abstract reports effectiveness but gives no specific results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2506.13261v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The automotive industry trends to softwarizing cars according to flexible, service-oriented architectures. At the same time, connected cars become networked computer systems but lack proper security measures. In this paper, we propose to authenticate and authorize in-vehicle services by integrating DNSSEC, DANE, and DANCE with automotive middleware. Our approach decouples the cryptographic authentication of the service from that of the service deployment with the help of DNSSEC and thereby largely simplifies key management. We propose to authenticate in-vehicle services by certificates that are solely generated by the service suppliers but published on deployment via DNSSEC TLSA records solely signed by the OEM. We further show how these established Internet standards secure the service discovery and invocation, ensure interoperability with various protocols, and scale management of credentials for millions of connected vehicles at robust security levels. We back our design proposal by a security analysis using the STRIDE threat model and by evaluations in an emulation of a realistic in-vehicle setup that demonstrate its effectiveness.

## DNSSEC Validation and Deployment Planning for ISPs

DevFeed: [DNSSEC Validation and Deployment Planning for ISPs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/dnssec-validation-and-deployment-planning-for-isps-99286.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.j2sw.com/inetarch/dnssec-validation-deployment-planning-isps/>)

Author: j2sw

Published: 2026-10-25T12:38:43Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/justin-wilson-j2sw.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>)

Tags: [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [internet-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-architecture.md>), [isp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isp.md>), [network-operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-operations.md>), [planning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/planning.md>), [recursive-resolver](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recursive-resolver.md>), [resolver](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolver.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>), [validating](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validating.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

A DNSSEC validating resolver should return SERVFAIL for a signed domain with a broken chain of trust, while unsigned domains and valid signed domains resolve normally. Test this with dnssec-failed.org, inspect resolver logs to distinguish signature or chain errors from timeouts, and check each node's clock. Verify UDP and TCP port 53 from the resolver VLAN, and identify which resolver actually performs validation when queries are forwarded. For a controlled pilot, use a separate test resolver and identifiable subscribers; on anycast networks, confirm which node receives their queries. When a domain fails validation, investigate its DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG records rather than disabling validation globally. If an exception is necessary, use a negative trust anchor with an end date and ticket reference. Signing ISP authoritative zones is a separate project: check parent DS records, key rollovers, signature refresh, and reverse zones independently.

### Source excerpt

When a signed domain has a broken chain of trust, a validating resolver returns SERVFAIL. ISP operators need enough resolver data to tell that failure from an ordinary DNS outage. The post DNSSEC Validation and Deployment Planning for ISPs appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw).

## PowerDNS Security Advisory 2026-12 for PowerDNS Recursor

DevFeed: [PowerDNS Security Advisory 2026-12 for PowerDNS Recursor](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/powerdns-security-advisory-2026-12-for-powerdns-recursor-92572.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.powerdns.com/2026/10/21/powerdns-security-advisory-2026-12-for-powerdns-recursor>)

Author: Otto Moerbeek

Published: 2026-10-21T08:56:43Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [PowerDNS Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/powerdns-blog.md>)

Topics: [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [releases](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/releases.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [cves](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cves.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [ecs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecs.md>), [latest-releases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latest-releases.md>), [medium](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/medium.md>), [multiple](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multiple.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/powerdns.md>), [recursor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recursor.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-advisory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-advisory.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>)

### AI overview

PowerDNS Recursor 5.3.12 and 5.4.8 fix seven issues covered by Security Advisory 2026-12: crafted DNS packets can trigger denial of service during name decompression; malicious clients can create excessive TCP connections in TIME_WAIT; out-of-band NS resolution can enable DNSSEC validation bypass and cache poisoning; missing OPT record owner-name validation bypasses ECS hardening; a web client that never completes a TLS handshake can monopolize web access; closed TCP client addresses can remain allocated until process exit; and findScopeZero has an out-of-bounds read. The advisory rates three CVEs High and the others Medium or Low. It directs readers to the release changelogs and full advisory for details.

### Source excerpt

Today we have released PowerDNS Recursor 5.3.12 and 5.4.8. These releases provide fixes for PowerDNS Security Advisory 2026-12 for PowerDNS Recursor: Multiple issues There are several CVEs associated with this advisory, three with severity High and the remaining with severity Medium or Low.

## EasyDMARC and GMO GlobalSign connect email authentication with verified branding

DevFeed: [EasyDMARC and GMO GlobalSign connect email authentication with verified branding](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/easydmarc-and-gmo-globalsign-connect-email-authentication-with-verified-branding-90477.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/20/easydmarc-gmo-globalsign-partnership/>)

Author: Industry News

Published: 2026-10-20T06:00:13Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [easydmarc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/easydmarc.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [globalsign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/globalsign.md>), [industry-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry-news.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>)

### AI overview

EasyDMARC and GMO GlobalSign have partnered to combine email authentication management with verified brand identity. The offering brings together SPF, DKIM, and DMARC management, monitoring of email authentication and deliverability, and certificates that enable BIMI logos in supported inboxes. It is available to GMO GlobalSign customers across the Americas, EMEA, and Asia Pacific.

### Source excerpt

EasyDMARC has partnered with GMO GlobalSign to help organizations establish trusted email identities through DNS security, sender authentication, and verified branding in recipients' inboxes. As organizations rely on an increasing number of cloud applications, marketing platforms, CRMs, helpdesk systems, and third-party services to communicate with customers, managing the email ecosystem has become significantly more complex. Every sender introduces new DNS records, authentication requirements, and potential risks that can impact security, deliverability, and brand reputation. Rather ... More -> The post EasyDMARC and GMO GlobalSign connect email authentication with verified branding appeared first on Help Net Security.

## This Week in Security: Critical DNS Keys Rotated, Hacking Freezers Isn't Cool, OpenAI Spies On Itself, and Advanced Hardware Wallet Hacks

DevFeed: [This Week in Security: Critical DNS Keys Rotated, Hacking Freezers Isn't Cool, OpenAI Spies On Itself, and Advanced Hardware Wallet Hacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/this-week-in-security-critical-dns-keys-rotated-hacking-freezers-isn-t-cool-openai-spies-on-itself-and-advanced-hardware-wallet-hacks-88612.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackaday.com/2026/10/16/this-week-in-security-critical-dns-keys-rotated-hacking-freezers-isnt-cool-openai-spies-on-itself-and-advanced-hardware-wallet-hacks/>)

Author: Mike Kershaw

Published: 2026-10-16T14:00:42Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Hackaday](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackaday.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [SELinux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/selinux.md>)

Tags: [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [hackaday-columns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackaday-columns.md>), [joe-grand](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/joe-grand.md>), [ledger](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ledger.md>), [ransomware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ransomware.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-hacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-hacks.md>), [supermarkets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supermarkets.md>)

### AI overview

This security roundup covers the October 11, 2026 DNSSEC root-key rollover and other incidents, including alleged ransomware recovery fraud, attacks on internet-connected refrigeration controllers, an employee charged with spying at OpenAI, supermarket website outages, and hardware-wallet implants used to steal cryptocurrency. It explains the DNSSEC key transition and describes security risks involving exposed devices and compromised hardware supply chains.

### Source excerpt

Critical Internet keys changed this week. Did you notice? The keys behind DNSSEC, the system for cryptographically validating DNS responses, rolled over on October 11 2026. This is the second ...read more

## DANE for HTTPS

DevFeed: [DANE for HTTPS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/dane-for-https-89169.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://specification.website/spec/security/dane/>)

Author: Joost de Valk

Published: 2026-10-15T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [The Website Specification](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-website-specification.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>)

Tags: [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [firefox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firefox.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssl.md>), [optional](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optional.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [smtp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smtp.md>)

### AI overview

DANE publishes TLSA records in DNS to associate a TLS service with a certificate or public key, and it depends on DNSSEC for authenticity. Mainstream browsers do not validate DANE for HTTPS, so the page describes it as optional for websites; DANE has more practical use for SMTP, where mail providers check records. It also explains record selection, key rotation, common mistakes, and verification.

### Source excerpt

A TLSA record at _443._tcp pins your HTTPS certificate or key in DNSSEC-signed DNS. No mainstream browser checks it, so for websites it is optional; its real home is SMTP.

## Root DNSSEC trust anchors

DevFeed: [Root DNSSEC trust anchors](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/root-dnssec-trust-anchors-87242.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://jpmens.net/2026/10/14/root-dnssec-trust-anchors/>)

Author: Jan-Piet Mens

Published: 2026-10-13T22:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Jan-Piet Mens](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/jan-piet-mens.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [jan-piet-mens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jan-piet-mens.md>), [jpm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jpm.md>), [jpmens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jpmens.md>), [ksk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk.md>), [root-zone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-zone.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains how DNSSEC trust anchors support validation from the signed DNS root through recursive resolvers. It walks through the recent root Key Signing Key rollover, ways to verify and configure the current trust anchor, and how an outdated trust anchor in Gematik connectors is implicated in an ongoing infrastructure failure.

### Source excerpt

The root DNSSEC trust anchor, the Key Signing Key or KSK as it's called, was rolled, i.e. renewed, on Sunday 2026-10-11. To be precise the key was created two years ago, but it is now used for signing the root DNSKEY resource record set (RRset). I'm not involved in the process, but I am an avid follower, and as such I tooted before the event and after: The second screen shot shows an arrow pointing at 38696 which is the key tag (or key id) of this new key, and dig(1) is showing how it was used to sign the set of DNSKEY resource records. During a discussion on Tuesday which began because of a quite disastrous and currently ongoing failure in the German medical IT infrastructure of Gematik, it turns out that some people I thought would know all about this don't, so I'll jot down some notes about how I think it ties in together. Let's begin with trust anchor; what is that? DNSSEC validation is performed by a recursive resolver which obtains cryptographically signed answers to queries. These signatures, created by the the authoritative DNS server responsible for the data, need to be verified, and the verification process needs a form of trust. Just like you trust the content your favorite Web site offers you because you trust your Web browser and it trusts that site, we need a similar chain of trust for the DNS. So resolvers need to begin their chain of trust somewhere, but how should they do that? The need to trust the signed DNS root zone, and from thereon down to the name of your favorite Web site (e.g. www.example.com). (Many moons ago I created a diagram to depict the DNSSEC chain of trust.) The current root signing key, the Key Signing Key code-named KSK-2024, was actually generated in April of 2024 during what is known as a key ceremony, and you can watch the video of how that happens at the Root KSK Ceremony 53. It's quite interesting to watch, but let me say you won't need popcorn: it's a long and tedious thing, but it's interesting nevertheless to scroll throu

## ICANN set to expand gTLD: Brands, AI, and crypto all get new domains

DevFeed: [ICANN set to expand gTLD: Brands, AI, and crypto all get new domains](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/icann-set-to-expand-gtld-brands-ai-and-crypto-all-get-new-domains-84396.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.networkworld.com/article/4233275/icann-set-to-expand-gtld-brands-ai-and-crypto-all-get-new-domains.html>)

Author: Sean Michael Kerner

Published: 2026-10-09T19:24:53Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Network World](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/network-world.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>)

Tags: [edition-us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edition-us.md>), [icann](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/icann.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>)

### AI overview

ICANN has received 1,615 applications for a new round of generic top-level domains, including corporate, AI, cryptocurrency, and network-related names. The article describes changes to the application process and explains software readiness concerns: name collisions can expose or disrupt internal network names, while Universal Acceptance affects how applications handle valid domains and email addresses. The applications have been disclosed, with further review milestones planned.

### Source excerpt

For the first time in 14 years, the internet is getting a ton more generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs). When the internet's domain system started back in 1985, there were only a few primary TLDs: .com, .net, .org, .edu, .gov and .mil. The number of TLDs grew in small fits and spurts until 2012, when 1,241 new gTLDs were added. The internet has changed over the last 14 years, and now ICANN is opening up the process for the next round of new gTLD, which could bring 1,600 new names to the internet. This time around, big brands are in the mix trying to get their own corporate name as a TLD, and cryptocurrency is well represented. And, of course, it wouldn't be a tech story if there wasn't AI in the mix, too. Among the applications for new gTLDs are: Corporate names: .adidas, .adobe, .airbnb, .cloudflare, .stripe, .tiktok, .zoom Cryptocurrency: .bitcoin, .btc, .crypto, .ethereum, .ether, .nft, .usdt AI: .agent, .llm, superintelligence, .prompt, .mcp, .openai, .anthropic "The last time ICANN accepted applications for new gTLDs was in 2012," Marika Konings, vice president, New gTLD Program lead at ICANN, told Network World. "Since then, ICANN and the community have worked to make adjustments to the next round of the New gTLD Program." What is different from the 2012 round ICANN changed several parts of the application process after the 2012 round. Konings explained that the program now includes a standalone Registry Service Provider (RSP) Evaluation Program. RSPs run the back-end operations for a registry operator. Some operators act as their own RSP, and others outsource the work. Providers can now be pre-evaluated, so the technical review does not have to happen at the same time as the application evaluation. The Applicant Support Program offers financial support to applicants who need it. The program received 76 applications this round, and 56 qualified. Of those, 51 submitted a gTLD application. In 2012, the program received three applications and one applicant progresse

## When a Wallet Drainer Asks DNS Where to Go

DevFeed: [When a Wallet Drainer Asks DNS Where to Go](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/when-a-wallet-drainer-asks-dns-where-to-go-84243.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/when-a-wallet-drainer-asks-dns-where-to-go/>)

Author: Infoblox Threat Intel

Published: 2026-10-09T14:00:31Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>)

Tags: [1-1-1-1](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-1-1-1.md>), [ai-developed-malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-developed-malware.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [cloud-hosted-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-hosted-infrastructure.md>), [cloudflare-pages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-pages.md>), [crypto-phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-phishing.md>), [cryptocurrency-theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency-theft.md>), [detecting-dns-command-and-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detecting-dns-command-and-control.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-abuse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-abuse.md>), [dns-c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-c2.md>), [dns-over-https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-over-https.md>), [dns-txt-records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-txt-records.md>), [doh-abuse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/doh-abuse.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [infoblox-threat-intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infoblox-threat-intel.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [noir-drainer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/noir-drainer.md>), [phishing-kit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/phishing-kit.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [wallet-drainer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wallet-drainer.md>), [walletconnect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/walletconnect.md>)

### AI overview

The Noir cryptocurrency wallet drainer uses DNS TXT records and public DNS-over-HTTPS services to locate its active backend pool, allowing operators to redirect existing lure pages when infrastructure changes. The report describes the drainer's wallet-permission theft flow and unusually detailed source comments, while noting that AI assistance is a possibility rather than a confirmed fact.

### Source excerpt

How the Noir kit uses DNS TXT records and DoH as a dynamic infrastructure control plane Executive summary We found a cryptocurrency wallet-drainer kit, self-branded as Noir, that uses DNS TXT records to locate its hosted pool; currently these run on Cloudflare Pages. The loader races three public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) services and uses the first [...] The post When a Wallet Drainer Asks DNS Where to Go appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

## Rolling the root key

DevFeed: [Rolling the root key](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rolling-the-root-key-77621.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/10/09/rolling-the-root-key-2/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-10-09T02:15:56Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [TTL in DNS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ttl-in-dns.md>)

Tags: [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [isp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isp.md>), [ksk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk.md>), [ksk-roll](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk-roll.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [validating](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validating.md>)

### AI overview

The DNS root key is scheduled to roll on 11 October 2026. The article explains how DNSSEC resolvers learn and trust the incoming KSK-2024, then examines adoption measurements: about 90% of reporting resolvers and about 70% of tested systems that appear to support RFC 8509 indicated that the new key had been loaded. The measurements do not directly establish how many end users may be affected.

### Source excerpt

The root key of the DNS is scheduled to roll on 11 October. How many DNSSEC-validating recursive resolvers have learned of KSK-2024 and incorporated it into their TA sets?

## Preparing for Post Quantum DNSSEC with PowerDNS

DevFeed: [Preparing for Post Quantum DNSSEC with PowerDNS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/preparing-for-post-quantum-dnssec-with-powerdns-65565.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.powerdns.com/preparing-for-post-quantum-dnssec-with-powerdns>)

Author: Peter van Dijk

Published: 2026-10-06T12:31:22Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [PowerDNS Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/powerdns-blog.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>)

Tags: [authoritative-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authoritative-server.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [dilithium](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dilithium.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnsdist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnsdist.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [fips-204](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fips-204.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [linux-distribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux-distribution.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/powerdns.md>), [recursor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recursor.md>)

### AI overview

PowerDNS describes its support for ML-DSA-44 in DNSSEC signing and validation, including the software versions and OpenSSL requirements involved. It also discusses post-quantum key exchange and certificates for encrypted DNS transports, along with performance and deployment tradeoffs as operators prepare for cryptographic changes.

### Source excerpt

Post Quantum for DNSSEC

## APNIC 62: Updates in DNS, DHCP, certificate security, and BGP routing resilience

DevFeed: [APNIC 62: Updates in DNS, DHCP, certificate security, and BGP routing resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/apnic-62-updates-in-dns-dhcp-certificate-security-and-bgp-routing-resilience-55662.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/09/21/apnic-62-updates-in-dns-dhcp-certificate-security-and-bgp-routing-resilience/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-09-20T22:52:43Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DHCP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dhcp.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [Grafana](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/grafana.md>), [Monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/monitoring.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [Availability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/availability.md>), [Prometheus](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/prometheus.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>)

Tags: [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [bgp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bgp.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [dashboards](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dashboards.md>), [dhcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dhcp.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [grafana](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/grafana.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [internet-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-infrastructure.md>), [ksk-roll](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk-roll.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [operations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operations.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [root-servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-servers.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

A report from APNIC 62's Internet Operations session covers ISC Stork, a management platform for Kea DHCP and BIND 9 DNS. It also discusses the DNSSEC root KSK rollover, certificate revocation limitations, and BGP evolution.

### Source excerpt

APNIC 62 Technical Session 1 -- Internet Operations highlighted major developments across Internet infrastructure, including new management capabilities for Kea DHCP and BIND DNS, preparations for the DNSSEC root KSK rollover, and ongoing challenges in certificate revocation.

## You Don't Need a Locksmith: Preparing for the Root Zone Key-Signing Key (KSK) Rollover in October 2026

DevFeed: [You Don't Need a Locksmith: Preparing for the Root Zone Key-Signing Key (KSK) Rollover in October 2026](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/you-don-t-need-a-locksmith-preparing-for-the-root-zone-key-signing-key-ksk-rollover-in-october-2026-52704.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/company/you-dont-need-a-locksmith-preparing-for-the-root-zone-key-signing-key-ksk-rollover-in-october-2026/>)

Author: Ross Gibson

Published: 2026-09-17T13:00:38Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/integrity.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [Server](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/server.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/company.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-security.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [ksk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ksk.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [root-zone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-zone.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains the DNSSEC root zone key-signing key rollover scheduled for October 11, 2026. It introduces the roles of zone-signing keys and key-signing keys, explains trust anchors and the DNSSEC chain of trust, and discusses preparation for organizations operating validating recursive DNS infrastructure.

### Source excerpt

Introduction If your outbound recursive DNS infrastructure is performing DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation (and if it isn't, it probably should be), then you need to be aware of the upcoming rollover of the DNSSEC key-signing key (KSK) for the root zone on October 11, 2026. If this is new information to you, then you [...] The post You Don't Need a Locksmith: Preparing for the Root Zone Key-Signing Key (KSK) Rollover in October 2026 appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

## Why Agent Commerce Needs DNS-AID for Domain and Agent Authentication

DevFeed: [Why Agent Commerce Needs DNS-AID for Domain and Agent Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-the-world-needs-dns-aid-52703.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/company/why-the-world-needs-dns-aid/>)

Author: Wei Chen

Published: 2026-09-09T15:00:29Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [digital signature](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-signature.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/domain.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-identity.md>), [agent-to-agent-communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-to-agent-communication.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agentic-commerce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-commerce.md>), [ai-agent-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-trust.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [autonomous-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-agents.md>), [company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/company.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [dns-aid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-aid.md>), [dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-security.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [secure-ai-transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secure-ai-transactions.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

This article uses a hypothetical procurement exchange between AI agents to examine the risks of agentic commerce, including spoofed AI traffic and uncertainty about whether an automated procurement address is authentic. It presents DNSSEC and digitally signed domains as ways to verify agent addresses.

### Source excerpt

A Hypothetical: Beacon Got an RFP from AI Late on a Friday afternoon, Beacon, an industrial pump manufacturer, finds itself reluctantly dragged into agentic commerce. They receive an RFP from Acme, a major customer. If booked, this would be Beacon's largest order of the year, but the party initiating the RFP is an AI agent, [...] The post Why the World Needs DNS-AID appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

## Welcome to APNIC 62

DevFeed: [Welcome to APNIC 62](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/welcome-to-apnic-62-10861.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/09/08/welcome-to-apnic-62/>)

Author: Timothy Hildred

Published: 2026-09-08T03:33:07Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Threat Research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-research.md>), [FIRST](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/first.md>)

Tags: [apnic-62](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apnic-62.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [conference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conference.md>), [conferences](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/conferences.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [event](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [ipv4](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv4.md>), [ipv6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipv6.md>), [nixi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nixi.md>), [nro](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nro.md>), [policy-sig](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy-sig.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [threat-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-detection.md>)

### AI overview

APNIC 62 in Mumbai previews technical, security, IPv6 deployment, DNSSEC, threat-detection, community, and policy sessions, alongside keynote talks, social events, newcomer activities, and NRO NC voting information.

### Source excerpt

APNIC welcomes you to Mumbai, India for APNIC 62. Here is what you can look forward to over the coming days.

## \[Podcast\] Measuring the impact of locally served root zone

DevFeed: [\[Podcast\] Measuring the impact of locally served root zone](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/podcast-measuring-the-impact-of-locally-served-root-zone-10857.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/09/03/podcast-measuring-the-impact-of-locally-served-root-zone/>)

Author: George Michaelson

Published: 2026-09-03T01:05:09Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ietf.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bug.md>)

Tags: [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [ietf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ietf.md>), [measurement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/measurement.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [podcast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/podcast.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [standards](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standards.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>)

### AI overview

This podcast discusses research into locally served root zones, a DNS resolver model that pre-fetches and stores the root zone. The study examined BIND, Unbound, and Knot Resolver across multiple configurations, including in-band retrieval and HTTPS fetching. It identified an Unbound bug and found that root zone updates can generate substantial network traffic, potentially exceeding traffic from more frequent queries for uncached data.

### Source excerpt

An analysis of the traffic impacts of locally served root zones, by Ilyas Rahimi at UvA.

## DNS at IETF 126

DevFeed: [DNS at IETF 126](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/dns-at-ietf-126-52697.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoblox.com/blog/community/dns-at-ietf-126/>)

Author: Jim Mozley

Published: 2026-08-28T15:00:33Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Infoblox](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoblox-blog.md>)

Topics: [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ietf.md>), [Internet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [DNS security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-security.md>), [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>)

Tags: [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dns-at-ietf-126](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-at-ietf-126.md>), [dns-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns-security.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [ietf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ietf.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-vulnerabilities.md>), [synchronization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/synchronization.md>)

### AI overview

This article reviews DNS-related discussions from the IETF 126 hybrid meeting, including work on DNS operations, delegated domain management, and automating synchronization between parent and child zones. It describes a proposed DDNS-based mechanism secured with SIG(0) and related DNSSEC operational considerations.

### Source excerpt

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the organization where development of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol takes place. Work takes place within Working Groups that each have a mailing list, and you can see archives on the IETF Datatracker, along with the agenda and presentations from meetings that take place three times a [...] The post DNS at IETF 126 appeared first on Infoblox Blog.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTA4LTI4VDE1OjAwOjMzKzAwOjAwIiwgImQzMGRlZmU4LWFjY2EtNDI1NS05MmE0LWU3MTUwY2RkNDg0NCJd>)