# End-to-End Encryption A communications encryption method in which data is encrypted between endpoints while routing information remains visible. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## \[Webinar\] Elevating customer engagement with WhatsApp DevFeed: [\[Webinar\] Elevating customer engagement with WhatsApp]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Twilio Published: 2026-09-11T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Twilio Blog]() Topics: [Messaging](), [Authentication](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Artificial Intelligence]() Tags: [ai](), [authentication](), [customer-engagement](), [encryption](), [enterprise](), [events-community](), [fraud](), [messaging](), [operational](), [webinar](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview This webinar explains how businesses can use WhatsApp for secure account verification, operational alerts, two-way customer conversations, and interactive workflows. It also discusses end-to-end encryption, reducing SMS toll fraud risk, and examples of AI-powered HR messaging workflows. ### Source excerpt Stop losing critical messages in the noise. Discover how to deliver secure account verifications and operational updates via WhatsApp. ## How AI Could Affect Law Enforcement Access to Encrypted Data DevFeed: [How AI Could Affect Law Enforcement Access to Encrypted Data]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Green Published: 2026-08-14T20:17:59Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Matthew Green]() Topics: [Artificial Intelligence](), [Security](), [Encryption](), [End-to-End Encryption]() Tags: [ai](), [encryption](), [security](), [uncategorized]() ### AI overview The author argues that AI could make software sufficiently secure that U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies lose substantial access to data. The post places this concern in the context of smartphones and the adoption of encrypted storage and end-to-end encrypted messaging. ### Source excerpt I'm coming down from spending a few days at Usenix Security, right here in my hometown of Baltimore. This means that my days have been taken up with two kinds of conversation: first, explaining to colleagues why Baltimore isn't actually like The Wire. And second, trying not to talk about AI. Here I'm going to ... Continue reading Everything is about to "go dark" -> ## How We're Building Scam Alert on WhatsApp With End-to-End Encryption and Verifiability Guarantees DevFeed: [How We're Building Scam Alert on WhatsApp With End-to-End Encryption and Verifiability Guarantees]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Chris Wiltz Published: 2026-08-12T13:00:28Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Engineering at Meta]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Machine Learning & Artificial Intelligence](), [Inference](), [Security](), [Bug Bounty](), [Social engineering]() Tags: [bug-bounty](), [encryption](), [machine-learning](), [privacy](), [scam](), [security](), [security-privacy](), [social-engineering](), [user-control](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview An early technical overview of WhatsApp's optional Scam Alert feature, which uses a small on-device machine learning model to classify potential scam messages while keeping message content on the device. The article explains how the design preserves end-to-end encryption through local processing, avoids automatic reporting, gives users control, and supports independent security review during a limited Beta rollout. ### Source excerpt WhatsApp is committed to helping people stay safe while protecting the privacy of their messages. As scam tactics evolve -- from impersonation to social engineering to AI-generated lures -- we're always evolving as well, so that our protections stay ahead of scammers while protecting people's personal messages with end-to-end encryption. Today, we're sharing an early [...] Read More... The post How We're Building Scam Alert on WhatsApp With End-to-End Encryption and Verifiability Guarantees appeared first on Engineering at Meta. ## Worth Reading 080126 DevFeed: [Worth Reading 080126]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Russ Published: 2026-08-01T13:09:17Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [rule 11 reader]() Topics: [DevOps](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [BGP](), [Encryption](), [Internet](), [Latency](), [Cloud](), [cloud-infrastructure](), [Databases](), [event driven](), [Artificial Intelligence]() Tags: [ai](), [article](), [bgp](), [cloud](), [databases](), [devops](), [encryption](), [event-driven](), [internet](), [latency](), [software](), [storage](), [systems](), [worth-reading]() ### AI overview A curated "Worth Reading" roundup covering goodput and latency targets, the efficiency costs of Big AI, internet infrastructure and BGP's ORIGIN attribute, and current debates over end-to-end encryption. ### Source excerpt The honest target is goodput, meaning requests per second that actually met your latency targets. Count anything else and you are counting cold plates. I find it strange that as a software industry, we put in so much effort to make our systems efficient to design, build, and scale with DevOps practices, cloud native architectures, event-driven functions, optimized databases and storage, and resource-sipping Lean IT -- then we threw it all out the window when Big AI came along. If there is one universal law in internet infrastructure, it is that no good intention goes unpunished by the practical realities of legacy software maintenance. This Article updates and expands on 2012 research on encryption and globalization, analyzing what the authors call "Round 3" of the Going Dark Debate: the current controversies over end-to-end encryption (E2EE). Using our unique position on the Internet, we took an investigative look at one of the well-known mandatory attributes in BGP, the ORIGIN attribute. ## Wallys Gas Station Pumps and Payment Security DevFeed: [Wallys Gas Station Pumps and Payment Security]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: j2sw Published: 2026-07-24T04:15:24Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Justin Wilson (j2sw)]() Topics: [Security](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Hardware]() Tags: [e2ee](), [encryption](), [gas-pump](), [gas-stations](), [hardware](), [payment-processing](), [security](), [technology-industry-commentary]() ### AI overview A brief examination of the technology and payment security of new Wawa gas pumps in Whitestown, Indiana. The article speculates that the pumps may use customized Windows CE IoT Core or Linux and describes a separate payment-reader hardware stack using end-to-end encryption. ### Source excerpt Indiana, specifically Whitestown, has a new WaWa gas station. They have these bright new gas pumps. Of course, I had to know more about the technology behind them. This is most likely using a highly customized Windows CE iOT core or a linux kernel. I am betting Windows. Security on the PumpsThis security framework is ... Read more The post Wallys Gas station Pumps appeared first on Justin Wilson (j2sw). ## Every Voice and Video Call on Discord Is Now End-to-End Encrypted DevFeed: [Every Voice and Video Call on Discord Is Now End-to-End Encrypted]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Mark Smith Published: 2026-05-18T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Discord Blog]() Topics: [Discord](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [migration](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [SDKs](), [web browsers]() Tags: [apps](), [browsers](), [discord](), [encryption](), [engineering](), [gaming](), [migration](), [mobile](), [scale](), [video](), [voice]() ### AI overview Discord has completed a multi-year migration to make end-to-end encryption standard for every voice and video call, except stage channels. The rollout extended the DAVE protocol across desktop, mobile, web browsers, gaming consoles, bots/apps, and the Social SDK. ### Source excerpt As of March 2026, E2EE is now enforced for every voice and video call on Discord. This represents a multi-year commitment, and Discord's VP of Engineering is here to talk about why it matters. ## Trustworthy JavaScript for the Open Web DevFeed: [Trustworthy JavaScript for the Open Web]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Firefox Security Team Published: 2026-05-05T15:49:11Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Mozilla Hacks - the Web developer blog]() Topics: [JavaScript](), [Web platform](), [web applications](), [browsers](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Security](), [Firefox Nightly](), [Cloudflare]() Tags: [applications](), [browsers](), [cloudflare](), [encryption](), [firefox](), [firefox-nightly](), [javascript](), [meta](), [open](), [security](), [web](), [web-platform]() ### AI overview Mozilla presents WAICT, a web platform proposal for making client-side JavaScript more trustworthy when servers may be malicious or compromised. It binds delivered code to a developer-supplied manifest, records manifests in a publicly auditable log, and enables browsers to reject code that has not been logged. An early prototype is available behind a preference in Firefox Nightly. ### Source excerpt The open web is a critical platform for applications that handle highly sensitive data, from private communications to financial transactions and medical records. Traditionally, servers are trusted to deliver the appropriate code and resources for their web applications to browsers, who then provide a secure and isolated environment for their execution. In some circumstances, this [...] The post Trustworthy JavaScript for the Open Web appeared first on Mozilla Hacks - the Web developer blog. ## End-to-end encryption for Vercel Workflow DevFeed: [End-to-end encryption for Vercel Workflow]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Nate Rajlich Published: 2026-03-17T14:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Vercel News]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Vercel](), [Cryptography](), [API keys](), [browser](), [Command-line interface]() Tags: [api](), [api-keys](), [browser](), [cli](), [crypto](), [encryption](), [tokens](), [vercel](), [web]() ### AI overview Vercel Workflow now provides end-to-end encryption for workflow data without requiring code changes. Inputs, step data, return values, hook payloads, and stream data are encrypted before being stored in the event log, while authorized users can decrypt data in the dashboard or CLI. ### Source excerpt Vercel Workflow now encrypts all user data end-to-end without requiring any code changes. Workflow inputs, step arguments, return values, hook payloads, and stream data are automatically encrypted before being written to the event log. This makes it safe to pass sensitive data, such as API keys, tokens, or user credentials, across boundaries. The event log only ever stores ciphertext, while your step functions work exactly as before. Your workflow and step functions work exactly as before; all data flowing through the event log is encrypted automatically. Each Vercel deployment receives a unique encryption key. The key derivation and encryption stack works as follows: Each workflow run derives its own key via HKDF-SHA256 Data is encrypted with AES-256-GCM to ensure confidentiality and integrity Encrypted fields display as locked placeholders in the dashboard until decrypted You can access encrypted data through two methods: Web dashboard: Click the Decrypt button in the run detail panel. Decryption happens entirely in the browser via the Web Crypto API, so the observability server never sees your plaintext data. CLI: Add the --decrypt flag to the inspect command. Decryption follows the same permissions model as project environment variables, meaning you cannot access workflow data if you lack permission to view environment variables. Each decryption request is recorded in your Vercel audit log, providing your team with full visibility into access events. While end-to-end encryption is built into the Vercel platform, custom World implementations can opt into this feature. You can provide your own getEncryptionKeyForRun() method, which the core runtime uses automatically. Learn more in the Workflow DevKit documentation. Read more ## WhatsApp Encryption, a Lawsuit, and a Lot of Noise DevFeed: [WhatsApp Encryption, a Lawsuit, and a Lot of Noise]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Green Published: 2026-02-02T18:25:32Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Matthew Green]() Topics: [Encryption](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Messaging](), [Meta](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Internet]() Tags: [ai](), [digital-marketing](), [encryption](), [lawsuit](), [messaging](), [meta](), [news](), [protocol](), [security](), [signal](), [technology](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview This explainer examines allegations in a class action lawsuit that WhatsApp can read users' messages despite advertising end-to-end encryption through the Signal protocol. It notes that the complaint provides little solid evidence, while the allegations have been amplified online and reportedly prompted a US investigation into Meta. ### Source excerpt It's not every day that we see mainstream media get excited about encryption apps! For that reason, the past several days have been fascinating, since we've been given not one but several unusual stories about the encryption used in WhatsApp. Or more accurately, if you read the story, a pretty wild allegation that the widely-used ... Continue reading WhatsApp Encryption, a Lawsuit, and a Lot of Noise -> ## European Commission Seeks Experts on Lawful Access to Data and Encryption DevFeed: [European Commission Seeks Experts on Lawful Access to Data and Encryption]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-07-05T11:30:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Bert Hubert's writings]() Topics: [Encryption](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Cryptography](), [communications](), [intelligence]() Tags: [announcement](), [communications](), [encryption](), [intelligence](), [law](), [surveillance](), [technical]() ### AI overview The article discusses the European Commission's roadmap for effective and lawful access to data for law enforcement and urges technologists and civil society representatives to apply to its expert group. It argues that the initiative raises surveillance and encryption concerns while acknowledging the tension between privacy and access to digital evidence. ### Source excerpt tl;dr: The European Commission is honestly asking for experts to advise them on ways to institute "effective and lawful access to data for law enforcement". If you are an expert, I urge you to apply to join this group. You have until September 1st. Do read on for more details! The never-ending battle where police and intelligence services demand more/total access to communications shows no sign of stopping, even in the face of mathematical and practical impossibilities. ## A bit more on Twitter/X's new encrypted messaging DevFeed: [A bit more on Twitter/X's new encrypted messaging]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Green Published: 2025-06-09T18:22:31Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Matthew Green]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [X (Twitter)](), [Encryption](), [Security](), [vulnerability](), [public key](), [Ratchet](), [Server](), [passwords](), [Meta]() Tags: [e2e](), [encryption](), [instagram](), [messaging](), [messenger](), [protocol](), [protocols](), [public-key](), [secret-storage](), [security](), [signal](), [technology](), [vulnerability]() ### AI overview This article examines XChat, X's end-to-end encrypted messaging protocol, focusing on its lack of forward secrecy and its server-side storage of user private keys. It explains the Juicebox key-storage design and argues that the security of the system depends heavily on its deployment and server protections. ### Source excerpt Update 6/10: Based on a short conversation with an engineering lead at X, some of the devices used at X are claimed to be using HSMs. See more further below. Matthew Garrett has a nice post about Twitter (uh, X)'s new end-to-end encryption messaging protocol, which is now called XChat. The TL;DR of Matthew's post ... Continue reading A bit more on Twitter/X's new encrypted messaging -> ## Best Pastebin Alternatives for Secure Text (or Code) Sharing in 2025 DevFeed: [Best Pastebin Alternatives for Secure Text (or Code) Sharing in 2025]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-25T20:57:16Z Content type: comparison Language: en Sources: [Learn on Tailscale]() Topics: [Security](), [Encryption](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [passwords](), [web applications](), [tailscale]() Tags: [alternatives](), [article](), [code-sharing](), [encryption](), [running](), [security](), [syntax-highlighting]() ### AI overview This comparison examines Pastebin's use for sharing text and code, along with concerns about privacy, spam, malicious content, and feature limitations. It presents more secure alternatives that may offer encryption, password protection, or private sharing. ### Source excerpt Pastebin is an online platform for sharing, storing and managing text-based content, but has grown into a general-purpose tool or sharing plain text securely. The article addresses some concerns and alternative options to this service. ## A Synchronized Start for Linked Devices DevFeed: [A Synchronized Start for Linked Devices]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-01-27T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Android](), [iOS](), [Encryption](), [App](), [data](), [Large Screen]() Tags: [android](), [app](), [communication](), [devices](), [encryption](), [feature](), [ios](), [media](), [privacy](), [production](), [releases](), [video]() ### AI overview Signal describes synchronized message and media transfer for linked Desktop and iPad devices. The feature preserves end-to-end encryption and privacy while allowing users to transfer chats and the last 45 days of media to a new linked device. ### Source excerpt With Signal on Desktop and iPad, you can link your primary Android or iOS account with another device, letting you check and respond to messages in both places or conduct video meetings and calls from the comfort of a bigger screen. Signal's upcoming beta releases will also introduce the option to transfer your messages and media when you link your primary Signal device to a new Desktop or iPad. Instead of starting fresh, and having only new messages show up, you can choose to bring your chats and your last 45 days of media with you. Or, you can choose not to. Read more... ## CSAM Regulation Update: Dutch Intelligence agency weighs in DevFeed: [CSAM Regulation Update: Dutch Intelligence agency weighs in]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-10-01T17:52:22Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Bert Hubert's writings]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Security](), [Cryptography](), [Mobile](), [Artificial Intelligence](), [communications]() Tags: [aivd](), [apple](), [civil-rights](), [csam](), [encryption](), [eu](), [politics](), [privacy](), [security](), [signal](), [telegram](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview The article discusses a proposed EU CSAM regulation that could require scanning private messages and images on encrypted communication services. It reports that the Dutch government consulted the AIVD, which regarded detection orders and the associated scanning infrastructure as too large a security risk for digital resilience. ### Source excerpt A quick update - The European Commission and EU member states have been pondering, for years now, if they should force WhatsApp/Apple/Signal/Telegram to scan all our private messages for suspected child sexual abuse material (CSAM). For various reasons it is a horrendous idea to break end to end encryption in this likely highly ineffective way. Variations of the proposal have also included a mandate to perform such scanning of images using AI, and even to also read our text messages to see if we aren't "grooming" children. ## Privacy is Priceless, but Signal is Expensive DevFeed: [Privacy is Priceless, but Signal is Expensive]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2023-11-16T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [Messaging](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Cryptography](), [Open Source](), [App](), [JSON Web Tokens](), [Google]() Tags: [code](), [communication](), [cryptographic](), [dark-patterns](), [encryption](), [free](), [hacking](), [messaging](), [open-source](), [privacy](), [quantum](), [surveillance](), [sustainability]() ### AI overview The article explains Signal's privacy-focused mission and funding model. It describes the Signal Protocol's end-to-end encryption, metadata protection, open-source development, quantum-resistance work, and nonprofit, donation-supported structure. It contrasts this approach with consumer technology models based on surveillance, growth hacking, and dark patterns. ### Source excerpt Signal is the world's most widely used truly private messaging app, and our cryptographic technologies provide extra layers of privacy beyond the Signal app itself. Since launching in 2013, the Signal Protocol--our end-to-end encryption technology--has become the de facto standard for private communication, protecting the contents of billions of conversations in WhatsApp, Google Messages, and many others. Signal also continues to invest in research and development in the pursuit of extending communications privacy. This commitment underlies our recent work to add a layer of quantum resistance to the Signal Protocol, and our previous work on metadata protection technologies that help keep personal details like your contact list, group membership, profile name, and other intimate information secure. This singular focus on preserving the ability to communicate privately is one reason that we work in the open, documenting our thinking and making our code open source and open to scrutiny--so you don't have to take our word for it. Read more... ## End-to-End Encryption: A Modern Implementation Approach Using Shared Keys DevFeed: [End-to-End Encryption: A Modern Implementation Approach Using Shared Keys]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Allison Poppe Published: 2023-03-07T14:07:27Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [QuickBird Studios Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Application Security](), [implementation](), [App](), [data]() Tags: [app](), [application-security](), [data](), [encryption](), [general](), [how-to](), [implementation](), [post]() ### AI overview This tutorial introduces end-to-end encryption and explains how encrypted data can travel between endpoints without being decrypted in transit. It uses a shopping-list app example to discuss protecting synchronized data across devices. ### Source excerpt End-to-end encryption, otherwise known as E2EE, is an incredibly important aspect of modern application security. It's not only necessary to make sure that the data in our application is secure, but also to make sure that the data we send and receive is as well. Users rightfully expect that the data they are entrusting you with is kept safe with you and protected from anyone who shouldn't see it as much as possible. End-to-end encryption is one of the best tools in our toolbox to make sure that this happens. In this article, we give you a head start on how to implement a modern way of end-to-end encryption into your app. The post End-to-End Encryption: A Modern Implementation Approach Using Shared Keys appeared first on QuickBird Studios. ## How to build large-scale end-to-end encrypted group video calls DevFeed: [How to build large-scale end-to-end encrypted group video calls]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2021-12-15T00:00:00Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Open Source](), [Rust](), [Server](), [Internet](), [cpu]() Tags: [architectures](), [audio](), [communication](), [cpu](), [encryption](), [flow](), [how-to](), [implementation](), [internet](), [media](), [open-source](), [rust](), [scale](), [server](), [video]() ### AI overview This article explains how Signal scaled end-to-end encrypted group video calls from five to 40 participants by building its own open source Signal Calling Service. It compares full-mesh, server-mixing, and selective-forwarding architectures, then describes the use of a Selective Forwarding Unit (SFU) that forwards encrypted media without viewing or altering it. Signal ultimately implemented a new SFU in Rust after an earlier solution could not scale reliably because of high server CPU usage. ### Source excerpt Signal released end-to-end encrypted group calls a year ago, and since then we've scaled from support for 5 participants all the way to 40. There is no off the shelf software that would allow us to support calls of that size while ensuring that all communication is end-to-end encrypted, so we built our own open source Signal Calling Service to do the job. This post will describe how it works in more detail. Read more... ## End to End Encryption: Talk for the European Internet Forum at the European Parliament DevFeed: [End to End Encryption: Talk for the European Internet Forum at the European Parliament]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2020-11-09T10:03:55Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Bert Hubert's writings]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Cryptography](), [Internet](), [Protocol (disambiguation)]() Tags: [encryption](), [europe](), [internet](), [national-security](), [open-source-software](), [privacy](), [talk](), [transcription](), [video]() ### AI overview A transcript of a talk at the European Internet Forum examines end-to-end encryption and argues that backdoored or deliberately weakened encryption has historically created lasting security problems. It also mentions a February 2024 European Court of Human Rights ruling concerning forced decryption by providers. ### Source excerpt Around a million years ago (it feels like) but actually 9 months ago I delivered a brief talk on end to end encryption for the European Internet Forum at the European Parliament. Update: in February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in rather strong words that forcing providers to break end to end encryption violates human rights. Sorry, your browser doesn't support embedded videos. If you can spare 9 minutes, I recommend watching the video. ## Looking back at how Signal works, as the world moves forward DevFeed: [Looking back at how Signal works, as the world moves forward]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2020-06-05T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [Messaging](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Security](), [Encryption](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [communication](), [data](), [encryption](), [messaging](), [privacy](), [security](), [signal](), [trust]() ### AI overview Signal explains how its privacy-focused design limits the data it stores and can disclose. It uses end-to-end encryption for messages and avoids retaining contacts, social graph data, group information, profile details, location data, trackers, ads, and analytics. The article also discusses what a 2016 US government subpoena revealed about the limited Signal account data available. ### Source excerpt In the midst of world-wide protests against racism and police brutality, a lot of people are becoming more immediately aware and concerned about the security of their data and online communication. We've gotten a lot of questions at Signal over the past week, so we wanted to briefly recap how it is that we've designed Signal, and how we think about concepts like privacy, security, and trust. Read more... ## 230, or not 230? That is the EARN IT question. DevFeed: [230, or not 230? That is the EARN IT question.]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2020-04-08T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [Encryption](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [Security](), [Internet]() Tags: [covid-19](), [encryption](), [legal](), [privacy](), [security](), [us]() ### AI overview Signal argues that the proposed EARN IT bill could threaten end-to-end encryption and undermine the privacy and security protections its users rely on. The article explains that conditioning Section 230 protection on prescribed practices could make it difficult for Signal and other smaller organizations to operate in the United States. ### Source excerpt Over the past several weeks, Signal traffic has gone through the roof. New users are signing up at unprecedented rates, and we've expanded our server capacity faster than we ever anticipated. It means a lot to us that so many people are relying on Signal during this difficult time. When users check in on their families, share moments of solace, smile with their friends, or discuss sensitive health issues with their doctors, Signal's end-to-end encryption and privacy-preserving technology helps keep this information secure. At a time when more people than ever are benefiting from these protections, the EARN IT bill proposed by the Senate Judiciary Committee threatens to put them at risk. COVID-19 has us sheltering in place, but we cannot quarantine our concerns. Read more... ## Setback in the outback DevFeed: [Setback in the outback]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2018-12-13T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Security](), [Open Source](), [backdoor](), [Messaging](), [App]() Tags: [australia](), [backdoor](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [messaging](), [open-source](), [security](), [verify]() ### AI overview Signal argues that Australia's Assistance and Access bill threatens the security benefits of strong cryptography and end-to-end encryption. The article explains that Signal cannot add a backdoor, access encrypted message content, or provide extensive user metadata, while its open-source code and reproducible builds enable public verification. ### Source excerpt Like many others, we have been following the latest developments in Australia related to the "Assistance and Access" bill with a growing sense of frustration. The widespread adoption of strong cryptography and end-to-end encryption has given people around the world the ability to protect their personal information and communicate securely. Life is increasingly lived online, and the everyday actions of billions of people depend on this foundation remaining strong. Attempting to roll back the clock on security improvements which have massively benefited Australia and the entire global community is a disappointing development. Read more... ## There's No Backdoor in WhatsApp. Just a Weakness That Could Be Exploited DevFeed: [There's No Backdoor in WhatsApp. Just a Weakness That Could Be Exploited]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: umer Published: 2017-01-17T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Code Ahoy - Articles]() Topics: [Messaging](), [End-to-End Encryption](), [vulnerability](), [Encryption](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [App]() Tags: [encryption](), [messaging](), [privacy](), [private-key](), [protocol](), [public-key](), [server](), [signal](), [vulnerability](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview The article examines claims that WhatsApp contains a backdoor and explains a potential weakness in its end-to-end encryption implementation. It describes how a server could substitute a contact's public key, potentially enabling a third party to intercept messages, while also presenting a defense of WhatsApp from the creators of the Signal protocol. ### Source excerpt Last week, Guardian ran a story claiming that a backdoor built into WhatsApp can allows its parent company, Facebook, to read user messages despite advertising end-to-end encryption and complete privacy: Facebook claims that no one can intercept WhatsApp messages, not even the company and its staff, ensuring privacy for its billion-plus users. But new research shows that the company could in fact read messages due to the way WhatsApp has implemented its end-to-end encryption protocol. Open Whisper Systems, the nonprofit behind Signal protocol that powers WhatsApp's end-to-end message encryption, came to WhatsApp's defense and fired back at the Guardian story: Today, the Guardian published a story falsely claiming that WhatsApp's end to end encryption contains a "backdoor." ... The way this story has been reported has been disappointing. There are many quotes in the article, but it seems that the Guardian put very little effort into verifying the original technical claims they've made. So what really happened? Tobias Boelter, who "discovered the vulnerability", followed up to further explain and support the backdoor/vulnerability theory and why it matters: ... [WhatsApp] encrypted messaging works using secret and public keys. Every user has both a secret key known only to them, and a public key. A user's public key can be used to encrypt messages which can then only be made readable again with the associated secret key. Okay, so public key encrypts and private key decrypts. Public key is publicly available to anyone, while private key stays private. Let's continue. A difficult problem in secure communication is getting your friend's public keys. Apps such as WhatsApp and Signal make the process of getting those [public] keys easy for you by storing them on their central servers and allowing your app to download the public keys of your contacts automatically. The problem here is that the WhatsApp server could potentially lie about the public keys. Instead of giving you yo ## There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor' DevFeed: [There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor']() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2017-01-13T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Cryptography](), [Security](), [client](), [Server]() Tags: [cryptography](), [encryption](), [privacy](), [security](), [server](), [verification](), [whatsapp]() ### AI overview The article disputes a claim that WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption contains a backdoor. It explains how Signal Protocol uses public and private identity keys, how safety numbers help users verify encrypted communications, and how key changes after device changes or app reinstalls are handled. It also describes the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks if public keys are misrepresented. ### Source excerpt Today, The Guardian published a story falsely claiming that WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption contains a "backdoor." Read more... ## Facebook Messenger deploys Signal Protocol for end-to-end encryption DevFeed: [Facebook Messenger deploys Signal Protocol for end-to-end encryption]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2016-07-08T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signal Blog]() Topics: [End-to-End Encryption](), [Encryption](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [Messaging](), [Open Source](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [asynchronous](), [communication](), [encryption](), [facebook](), [integration](), [libraries](), [messaging](), [messenger](), [open-source](), [protocol](), [signal]() ### AI overview Facebook Messenger is rolling out Secret Conversations, which use the open source Signal Protocol to provide end-to-end encryption for conversations. The article describes Signal Protocol's use in asynchronous messaging systems and its integration into other messaging products. ### Source excerpt Facebook Messenger has started rolling out Secret Conversations, a feature that enables end-to-end encryption for conversations within Messenger. Secret Conversations is built on Signal Protocol, a modern, open source, strong encryption protocol we developed for asynchronous messaging systems. Read more... [Next page]()