# Ethereum

Ethereum is a global, open network whose public code and smart-contract infrastructure support decentralized applications and development.

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## Court clears brothers of $25 million Ethereum crypto heist charges

DevFeed: [Court clears brothers of $25 million Ethereum crypto heist charges](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/court-clears-brothers-of-25-million-ethereum-crypto-heist-charges-136881.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/court-clears-brothers-of-25-million-ethereum-crypto-heist-charges/>)

Author: Sergiu Gatlan

Published: 2026-11-17T09:44:22Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>)

Tags: [2022](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2022.md>), [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [analyze](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analyze.md>), [arrested](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arrested.md>), [assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assets.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [charges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charges.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [court](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/court.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [crypto-heist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-heist.md>), [cryptochameleon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptochameleon.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [exploited](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploited.md>), [heist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/heist.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [mit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mit.md>), [scheme](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scheme.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/us.md>), [usa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/usa.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

A federal judge acquitted Anton and James Peraire-Bueno of wire fraud and related charges over an alleged $25 million Ethereum exploit, ruling that prosecutors had not proved material misrepresentations needed to support the convictions. The ruling followed a mistrial in which jurors could not agree. Prosecutors alleged the brothers exploited a vulnerability in MEV-Boost relay code to expose pending transactions, reorder a proposed block, and take cryptocurrency from traders, then moved funds through multiple transactions to obscure their source and ownership. The excerpt reports the acquittal and allegations; it does not establish that the alleged conduct occurred.

### Source excerpt

US District Judge Jessica Clarke has acquitted two brothers accused of stealing $25 million in cryptocurrency in about 12 seconds through a scheme that exploited a bug in the Ethereum blockchain. [...]

## CuEVM: Scaling Smart Contract Execution on GPUs

DevFeed: [CuEVM: Scaling Smart Contract Execution on GPUs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cuevm-scaling-smart-contract-execution-on-gpus-131526.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14916>)

Author: Nhut-Minh Ho, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Quang Trung Ta, Fredrik Svantes, Xiaokui Xiao, Beng Chin Ooi

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [GPU optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gpu-optimization.md>), [GPU](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gpu.md>)

Tags: [accelerate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerate.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [data-processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-processing.md>), [data-structures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-structures.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evm.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpus.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [scaling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scaling.md>), [security-testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-testing.md>), [semantics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semantics.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

CuEVM treats EVM transaction execution as massively parallel GPU data processing, using GPU-aware scheduling and novel data structures to support EVM semantics natively rather than relying on host CPU operations for many tasks. The abstract reports 100% pass rates on Ethereum VMTests and 96.2% on the full execution-test suite. On one commodity GPU it executes over 8 million ERC-20 transfers per second, up to two orders of magnitude faster than existing baselines. Its CuEVM-fuzz tool achieves over a million end-to-end executions per second, reported as up to 23x faster than CPU-based and 4.8x faster than GPU-based baselines. These results are abstract-level claims; the supplied excerpt does not provide benchmark setup or limitations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.14916v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts on Ethereum blockchain process transactions worth billions of US dollars daily. They run on top of Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) which executes transactions sequentially. This execution model creates a performance bottleneck, especially for new blockchain workloads with large numbers of transactions, such as security testing. We present CuEVM, a GPU-native and semantically complete EVM execution engine that treats transaction execution as a massively parallel data processing problem. It employs novel data structures and GPU-aware scheduling to accelerate execution. Unlike prior works that transpile the contract and rely on a host CPU for many operations, CuEVM supports complete EVM semantics natively on the GPU. It passes 100% of the Ethereum VMTests and 96.2% of the full execution-test suite. On a single commodity GPU, CuEVM executes over 8 million ERC-20 transfers per second, outperforming existing baselines by up to two orders of magnitude. We build a smart contract fuzzer, called CuEVM-fuzz, on top of CuEVM. The fuzzer achieves over a million end-to-end executions per second, up to 23x and 4.8x higher than the state-of-the-art CPU-based and GPU-based baselines, respectively.

## BioBind: Binding Biometric Deduplication to Zero-Knowledge Authentication

DevFeed: [BioBind: Binding Biometric Deduplication to Zero-Knowledge Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/biobind-binding-biometric-deduplication-to-zero-knowledge-authentication-126994.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12636>)

Author: Taotao Wang, Xiaoxiao Wu, Shengli Zhang

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Facial recognition](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/facial-recognition.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [deduplication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deduplication.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [gallery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gallery.md>), [gas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gas.md>), [integration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integration.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [prototype](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prototype.md>), [query](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/query.md>), [snapshot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/snapshot.md>), [state](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/state.md>), [template](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/template.md>), [zero-knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge.md>)

### AI overview

BioBind aims to prevent duplicate biometric credentials and substituted-input attacks across off-chain deduplication and smart-contract issuance. It binds the deduplication query, gallery insertion, and issued commitment to one captured vector, authenticates gallery transitions, and requires a sound uniqueness verdict still valid at finalization. Its encrypted design adds bound requests, stale-session rejection, and committee-confirmed migration; zero-knowledge authentication links credential use to the enrolled template and a fresh device-originated probe bound to the challenge. In a prototype, tested composition attacks were rejected, and the authentication circuit used 31,445 constraints and about 305,000 gas. Verifiable matching had a 1.989-second median for witness generation and proving, versus 1.119 seconds with device-trusted matching. On Bosphorus, cooperative subjects changing appearance evaded deduplication in 1.8% of re-enrollment attempts at the tested threshold. The security argument is conditional on explicit assumptions, and full backend integration remains open.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12636v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Biometric identity systems for decentralized applications need credentials that resist repeated enrollment and support private, publicly verifiable authentication. Capture and large-scale private deduplication run off chain while smart contracts authorize issuance and use; these stages span distinct trust domains, and a correct verdict covers only the checked inputs and gallery snapshot. Without binding and state checks, concurrent enrollments can issue duplicate credentials from correct verdicts, while substituted inputs can authorize unrelated credentials. We present BioBind, a protocol whose four backend interface conditions bind the deduplication query, gallery insertion and issued commitment to one captured vector, authenticate gallery transitions, and require a sound uniqueness verdict valid at finalization. Its encrypted instance uses bound requests, stale-session rejection and committee-confirmed migration. Capture-bound zero-knowledge authentication links credential use to the enrolled template and a fresh device-originated probe bound to the challenge. We give a conditional multi-session composition argument under explicit capture, backend and cryptographic assumptions. A prototype using LFW face features rejects the tested composition attacks; its unlinkable authentication circuit uses 31,445 constraints and about 305,000 gas. An equal-public-field baseline quantifies the cost of verifiable matching: witness-plus-proving medians are 1.989 s versus 1.119 s with device-trusted matching. Separate tests of encrypted enrollment complete three histories of 16,384 registrations without decoding errors at the tested checkpoints. Biometric accuracy bounds person-level uniqueness: on the Bosphorus database, cooperative subjects who change appearance evade deduplication in 1.8% of re-enrollment attempts at the operating threshold. Full backend integration remains open.

## Beyond Node Attributes: A Controlled Evaluation and Ablation of Local Interaction Statistics for Ethereum Phishing Detection

DevFeed: [Beyond Node Attributes: A Controlled Evaluation and Ablation of Local Interaction Statistics for Ethereum Phishing Detection](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/beyond-node-attributes-a-controlled-evaluation-and-ablation-of-local-interaction-statistics-for-ethereum-phishing-detection-125350.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11263>)

Author: Thanh Dat Tran, Duy Loi Duong, Duy Luu Hoang, Minh Huy Tran, Vo Minh Thu Le, Nhat Tung Le

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Feature Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/feature-engineering.md>), [Statistics](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/statistics.md>), [Data science and engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-science-and-engineering.md>)

Tags: [ablation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ablation.md>), [confidence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/confidence.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [false-positive-rate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/false-positive-rate.md>), [graph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graph.md>), [interaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interaction.md>), [phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/phishing.md>), [phishing-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/phishing-detection.md>), [static](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/static.md>), [statistics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/statistics.md>), [temporal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/temporal.md>)

### AI overview

On one static, transductive benchmark of 2,763 labeled Ethereum accounts, adding 12 unlabeled local interaction statistics to HEIG-Phish's 14 source features improved test Macro-F1 across six model families. The controlled comparison held partitions, configurations, seeds, thresholds, and sampled neighborhoods constant; all model pairs improved on each of 20 partitions, with lower false-positive rates and corrected 95% confidence intervals above zero. A Random Forest ablation attributed most of the gain to the incoming transfer-edge sum; it did not establish an added benefit from the other 11 statistics once that feature was included. The findings show stability across re-partitions of this benchmark, not temporal or cross-dataset generalization.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11263v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Methods for detecting phishing accounts on Ethereum are usually evaluated as complete pipelines that differ in features, architecture, and training protocol, which makes the contribution of interaction information hard to isolate. This paper evaluates the Unlabeled Feature Extension (UFE), a block of 12 local interaction statistics computed from each account's incoming and outgoing call and transfer edges without reading class labels. UFE is appended to the 14 source features of HEIG-Phish and tested with six model families: Logistic Regression, Random Forest, LightGBM, Graph Attention Network, GraphSAGE, and Meta-IFD. Within each pair of Baseline and Plus variants, the data partition, model configuration, random seed, decision threshold, and sampled neighborhoods are identical; only the input feature block changes. Across 20 predetermined stratified partitions of the same 2,763 labeled externally owned accounts, UFE increased test Macro-F1 by 1.0 to 9.1 percentage points across the six models. Every pair improved on all 20 partitions, all Nadeau-Bengio corrected 95% confidence intervals lie above zero, and the false-positive rate decreased for all six models. An exact-edge Random Forest ablation over 10 predetermined partitions associates most of the gain with the incoming transfer-edge sum attribute; once this feature is present, an incremental contribution of the remaining 11 UFE columns was not established. The results support reporting feature-augmented baselines alongside graph models, but they show stability under re-partitioning of one static, transductive benchmark rather than temporal or cross-dataset generalization.

## MetaMask says recent attack didn't affect wallet infrastructure

DevFeed: [MetaMask says recent attack didn't affect wallet infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/metamask-says-recent-attack-didn-t-affect-wallet-infrastructure-120906.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/metamask-says-recent-attack-didnt-affect-wallet-infrastructure/>)

Author: Sergiu Gatlan

Published: 2026-11-06T09:22:28Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [digital wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-wallet.md>)

Tags: [actor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actor.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-security.md>), [business-email-compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business-email-compromise.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [crypto-wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-wallet.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [customers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customers.md>), [cyberattack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberattack.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [lido](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lido.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [metamask](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/metamask.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-incident.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wallet.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

MetaMask says an attacker accessed systems storing staking reward recipient addresses and diverted about 0.385 ETH in execution-layer rewards. The incident was identified and addressed the same day, and the affected systems were secured. MetaMask reports no evidence that customers' staked principal, withdrawal keys, Secret Recovery Phrases, or private keys were compromised; the diverted rewards were separate from staked ETH. It is working with affected customers on refunds. Precautionary validator exits caused temporary withdrawal delays and may have led to missed rewards during exits or reactivation. MetaMask wallet users need take no action; affected staking customers should follow guidance from MetaMask or their staking provider.

### Source excerpt

Cryptocurrency wallet provider MetaMask said a recent security incident has not affected MetaMask wallets or its wallet infrastructure. [...]

## Post-Quantum Authentication of IoT Data on Ethereum: Signatures, the Calldata Floor, and Device-Signed Merkle Roots

DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Authentication of IoT Data on Ethereum: Signatures, the Calldata Floor, and Device-Signed Merkle Roots](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-authentication-of-iot-data-on-ethereum-signatures-the-calldata-floor-and-device-signed-merkle-roots-121277.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08108>)

Author: Ming-Fong Sie

Published: 2026-11-06T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [availability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/availability.md>), [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evm.md>), [falcon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/falcon.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [ml-dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-dsa.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-authentication.md>), [pq](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pq.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [sha-256](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sha-256.md>), [solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solidity.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

The abstract reports that post-quantum IoT authentication can be deployed on Ethereum without protocol changes, provided batching latency and data availability suit the application. Signing each record remains costly: even with a proposed ML-DSA precompile, it costs 8.7 times as much as ECDSA because the calldata floor, rather than signature verification, drives the price. Batching 100 records under a device-signed Merkle root reduces the per-record cost: the standard LMS verifier costs about 3,350 gas versus 245 for ECDSA, and avoids the scheduled calldata repricing that raises floor-bound designs by up to 1.9 times. With proposed precompiles, ML-DSA-44 costs 1,031 gas per record, while adding ML-DSA to ECDSA in a hybrid signature increases cost by 2.5%. The reported estimates combine device measurements, Solidity verifier costs, and complete Osaka-rule EVM transactions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.08108v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Field devices deployed today will still be producing records when quantum computers may break their signatures, so systems that anchor IoT data on blockchains need a post-quantum (PQ) authentication path now. We measure its cost on Ethereum under the current execution rules, including the EIP-7623 calldata floor and the EIP-7825 transaction cap, and under the calldata repricing scheduled for the Glamsterdam upgrade. We combine device-side measurements of ML-DSA, Falcon, SLH-DSA, LMS and XMSS, reproduced costs of open-source Solidity verifiers, a new standard-compliant LMS/HSS verifier for SHA-256 and SHA-256/192, and complete transactions on an Osaka-rule EVM, priced with today's verifiers and with proposed precompiles. Three results stand out. Signing every record costs 8.7 times as much as ECDSA even with an ML-DSA precompile, because the calldata floor rather than verification sets the price. When each device signs a Merkle root over 100 records, a standard LMS verifier available today costs about 3,350 gas per record, against 245 gas for ECDSA in the same design, and it is unaffected by the scheduled repricing, which raises floor-bound designs by up to 1.9 times. With the proposed precompiles, ML-DSA-44 costs 1,031 gas per record, and a hybrid ECDSA and ML-DSA signature adds only 2.5%. Post-quantum device authentication is therefore deployable on Ethereum without protocol changes, provided that the latency of batching and the data-availability properties of the chosen variant fit the application.

## EIP-8037/EIP-8038 Glamsterdam

DevFeed: [EIP-8037/EIP-8038 Glamsterdam](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/eip-8037-eip-8038-glamsterdam-121543.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.ethereum.org/en/2026/11/06/glamsterdam-8037-8038>)

Author: Marius van der Wijden

Published: 2026-11-06T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ethereum-foundation-blog.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Test-driven development](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tdd.md>)

Tags: [auditing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auditing.md>), [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [charged](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charged.md>), [delay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delay.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [invariants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/invariants.md>), [projects](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/projects.md>), [research-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research-development.md>), [rework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rework.md>), [tests](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tests.md>)

### AI overview

During Glamsterdam testnet testing, Chainsecurity found projects that may break because they rely on invariants changed by EIP-8037 and EIP-8038, which alter gas charges for certain operations and state. ACD delayed the hardfork process and Hoodi fork until the issues are resolved; Hegota work continues in parallel. Contract developers and auditors are asked to review the eight documented invariants using the repository's explanations, examples, and verification prompts, and contact the Glamsterdam team if their projects are affected. The text notes that audits cannot cover every project or its on- and off-chain code.

### Source excerpt

Glamsterdam, the next update for Ethereum, is currently being tested on testnets. During these tests Chainsecurity has found a few projects that would be vulnerable after Glamsterdam since they rely on certain invariants. These invariants will be broken by EIP-8037 and EIP-8038 which rework how much gas is charged for...

## PolinRider Returns: Hijacked npm Packages Use Ethereum Blockchain to Conceal Malware Infrastructure

DevFeed: [PolinRider Returns: Hijacked npm Packages Use Ethereum Blockchain to Conceal Malware Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/polinrider-returns-hijacked-npm-packages-use-ethereum-blockchain-to-conceal-malware-infrastructure-119016.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.ox.security/blog/polinrider-returns-hijacked-npm-packages-use-ethereum-blockchain-to-conceal-malware-infrastructure/>)

Author: Moshe Siman Tov Bustan

Published: 2026-11-04T20:59:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [OX Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ox-security.md>)

Topics: [npm security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm-security.md>), [Malware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/malware.md>), [npm packages](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm-packages.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [malicious packages](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/malicious-packages.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/npm.md>), [infection chain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/infection-chain.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>)

Tags: [appsec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/appsec.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [c2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2.md>), [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [command-and-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-and-control.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [family](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/family.md>), [hidden](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hidden.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [ip](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ip.md>), [loader](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/loader.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm.md>), [npm-packages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm-packages.md>), [overview](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overview.md>), [ox-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ox-security.md>), [packages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packages.md>), [polinrider](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/polinrider.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>)

### AI overview

OX Security reports compromised releases of legitimate npm packages linked to PolinRider. On import, an obfuscated loader queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints for a transaction containing a C2 IP, downloads an XOR-obfuscated JavaScript payload over HTTP, and executes it through an interactive Node.js process, potentially keeping activity in memory. Updating the blockchain reference can redirect affected installations without changing the published package. The affected packages total about 1,400 weekly downloads, a measure of download activity rather than confirmed infections. Recommended steps are to check dependencies and lockfiles against the affected versions, consider accessible wallets and credentials potentially compromised if the code executed, and pin dependencies to verified clean versions or apply a minimum package-age policy.

### Source excerpt

Overview OX Security researchers identified malicious releases of legitimate npm packages compromised in a campaign linked to the PolinRider malware family. The injected code uses the Ethereum blockchain as a dead drop for command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. When an affected package is imported, a hidden loader queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints to retrieve a C2 IP [...] The post PolinRider Returns: Hijacked npm Packages Use Ethereum Blockchain to Conceal Malware Infrastructure appeared first on OX Security.

## Exploring the Power Consumption of ERC-4337 Bundling on Server Infrastructure

DevFeed: [Exploring the Power Consumption of ERC-4337 Bundling on Server Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/exploring-the-power-consumption-of-erc-4337-bundling-on-server-infrastructure-116519.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04033>)

Author: Claudiu-Nicu B\\u{a}rbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Emanuel Onica, Valerio Schiavoni, Cosmin-Nicolae V\\^arlan, Boris Verdecia Echarte

Published: 2026-11-04T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Sustainable Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sustainable-computing.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [costs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/costs.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [cs-pf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-pf.md>), [deployments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployments.md>), [ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecosystem.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evm.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [operational](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operational.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [power-consumption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power-consumption.md>), [production-environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/production-environments.md>), [ram](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ram.md>), [requires](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/requires.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>)

### AI overview

ERC-4337 requires a bundler to aggregate user requests and submit them to an EVM network, adding an operational component to account abstraction infrastructure. The paper evaluates the power-consumption aspect of running bundlers on server-grade infrastructure, including CPU and RAM use and the overhead of container-based production deployments. The abstract frames these costs as relevant to expanding bundler availability, but provides no measurement results or deployment recommendations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.04033v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Ethereum ecosystem offers the most widespread support for Decentralised Applications (DApps), with over 120 networks currently documented as using variants of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) for core execution logic. The ERC-4337 standard provides convenient access to DApps for users who do not possess the required cryptocurrency or prefer flexible authorisation of DApp actions. The infrastructure for ERC-4337 implementation can be deployed on any EVM network. However, to aggregate user requests and submit them to the EVM network, ERC-4337 requires operating a bundler, an additional component. Recently, the potential use of ERC-4337 was boosted by another standard, EIP-7702, which can enable ERC-4337 utility for any existing user account. However, the use of the combined EIP-7702/ERC-4337 pattern remains considerably low at less than 6% of EIP-7702 activity. We believe that this underutilisation is at least partly caused by the low number of existing bundling services and their popularity, currently fewer than 15 publicly documented. Expanding the number of bundler nodes would benefit the ecosystem but would introduce operational costs, part of which is represented by the added nodes' power consumption. In this paper, we provide a thorough view of the bundling power consumption aspect using server-grade infrastructure, evaluating both CPU and RAM consumption, as well as the overhead of container-based deployments specific to production environments.

## Designing for sovereignty: Ethereum for digital public infrastructure

DevFeed: [Designing for sovereignty: Ethereum for digital public infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/designing-for-sovereignty-ethereum-for-digital-public-infrastructure-114930.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.ethereum.org/en/2026/11/03/digital-pub-infra>)

Author: Ethereum for Public Infrastructure; Commons team

Published: 2026-11-03T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ethereum-foundation-blog.md>)

Topics: [digital sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-sovereignty.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [digital wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-wallet.md>), [Digital Public Good](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-public-goods.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>), [online privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/online-privacy.md>)

Tags: [agencies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agencies.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [approach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/approach.md>), [articles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/articles.md>), [case-studies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/case-studies.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [ecosystem-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecosystem-development.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [government](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/government.md>), [information](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/information.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [institutions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/institutions.md>), [interoperability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interoperability.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [personal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal.md>), [personal-information](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-information.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sovereignty.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [technical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical.md>)

### AI overview

Ethereum is presented as open, shared infrastructure that lets public-interest institutions cooperate without giving one organization control of the underlying network. Institutions can independently verify records, choose how to access Ethereum, and retain authority over their own policies and systems. In Bhutan, people hold credentials in NDI Wallets and choose what to share; a registry on Ethereum lets services verify credential authenticity without publishing the credentials on the network. In a humanitarian aid proof of concept, decentralized identity and private payments support coordination without exchanging personal records or relying on a single network operator. The text describes these as ways to balance institutional independence with individual control over personal information.

### Source excerpt

Public services increasingly rely on digital systems that enable institutions to collaborate across organizational and national boundaries. Such cooperation may involve government agencies verifying documents issued by other authorities, or humanitarian organizations coordinating assistance while safeguarding sensitive personal information. Yet technical interoperability alone does not resolve a more fundamental question:...

## After Bybit's $1.5B Hack, Ambire Releases Hardware Wallet to Stop Blind Signing

DevFeed: [After Bybit's $1.5B Hack, Ambire Releases Hardware Wallet to Stop Blind Signing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/after-bybit-s-1-5b-hack-ambire-releases-hardware-wallet-to-stop-blind-signing-112252.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/after-bybits-$15b-hack-ambire-releases-hardware-wallet-to-stop-blind-signing?source=rss>)

Author: ruth\_hasson

Published: 2026-11-02T05:21:42Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [User interface design](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ui-design.md>)

Tags: [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-technology.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [crypto-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-exchange.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cryptocurrency-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency-news.md>), [data-breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-breach.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hack.md>), [hardware-wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-wallet.md>), [offline](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/offline.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [open-source-hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source-hardware.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [screen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/screen.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>), [transparent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transparent.md>), [verify](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verify.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>)

### AI overview

Ambire Ice is an open-source hardware wallet designed for Ambire and Safe smart accounts. It independently decodes Safe transactions on the device and displays transfers, approvals, batched actions, and warnings about changes to owners, signature thresholds, or modules, helping signers inspect what they approve even if a connected browser is compromised. Two secure elements protect key generation; an airgap switch disconnects USB data and Bluetooth power for offline QR signing, while USB and Bluetooth remain options. Its stated focus is Safe's complex multisig operations; the excerpt says other hardware wallets also address blind signing but does not compare their features. Ice cannot prevent every exploit, and clear signing depends on accurate decoding and careful review. Post-quantum signing is only a planned approach, dependent on development and network support. The article says preorders were expected shortly after October 30, with a 200-device initial batch, $150 retail price, and a $119 first-round offer including a $10 deposit; shipping was expected in early 2027.

### Source excerpt

Hardware wallets are an essential security tool for crypto users, keeping private keys isolated from internet-connected devices. They protect the keys themselves, but understanding what a transaction does before signing it remains challenging, particularly when dealing with complex smart contracts. Ambire is addressing that problem with Ambire Ice, a new open-source hardware wallet designed specifically for Ambire and Safe smart accounts. The device aims to make multisig transactions more transparent by allowing users to inspect individual on-chain actions directly on the hardware wallet's screen before approving them. The product targets a growing challenge in Ethereum's smart account ecosystem, where transactions can involve multiple operations, contract interactions, and administrative permissions that aren't always easy to interpret. The scale of that ecosystem is considerable. According to Safe's Q2 2026 report, its smart accounts processed nearly 130 million transactions during the quarter, while monthly active accounts reached 2.73 million in June. Making Sense of Complex Transactions Traditional hardware wallets are built around one security model: keep private keys offline and require physical confirmation before signing transactions. However, the information presented during that confirmation is not always understandable. This is particularly relevant for Safe smart accounts, which allow multiple parties to control a wallet through predefined signature requirements. They also support transaction batching, enabling several operations to be executed together. A single transaction might involve transferring assets, approving a smart contract to spend tokens, or modifying permissions. Efficient, but these operations become difficult to verify when a hardware wallet only displays technical data or a transaction hash. The practice of approving transactions without being able to understand their full contents is commonly known as 'blind signing.' The issue attrac

## On-Chain Behavioral Signatures for Classifying Centralized Exchange Addresses on Ethereum Using Proof-of-Reserves

DevFeed: [On-Chain Behavioral Signatures for Classifying Centralized Exchange Addresses on Ethereum Using Proof-of-Reserves](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/on-chain-behavioral-signatures-for-classifying-centralized-exchange-addresses-on-ethereum-using-proof-of-reserves-111234.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41888>)

Author: Seongchan Park, Hyunho Jeon, Byungsoo Kang, Gaeun Kim, Minseob So, Seongyong Kim

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Detection engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/detection-engineering.md>)

Tags: [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [classification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classification.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-cy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cy.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [feature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature.md>), [feature-selection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature-selection.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [finance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/finance.md>), [hyperparameter-optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hyperparameter-optimization.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [regression](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/regression.md>), [robustness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robustness.md>), [selection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/selection.md>), [shap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/shap.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transactions.md>)

### AI overview

The study uses Proof-of-Reserves disclosures to build and test a method for identifying Ethereum addresses belonging to centralized exchanges, including exchanges held out during evaluation. Across 3,033,857 addresses from 15 exchanges and five non-exchange categories, it derives 58 behavioral features and compares LightGBM with logistic regression using leave-one-exchange-out evaluation over five lookback windows. LightGBM outperformed logistic regression; with 17 selected features, its macro PR-AUC rose from 0.6611 at 30 days to 0.9594 at 730 days, versus 0.7697 for logistic regression at 730 days. Exchange-balanced reweighting improved macro PR-AUC. SHAP analysis and feature ablation highlighted gas behavior, ERC-20 activity, and internal transactions as predictive signals in this dataset. The reported results support address screening, while remaining tied to the study's constructed dataset.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41888v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Centralized exchanges (CEXs) are key gateways between traditional finance and digital asset markets, yet identifying their blockchain addresses remains challenging. Existing approaches often rely on opaque attribution labels or treat exchanges as secondary classification targets, leaving generalization to unseen exchanges insufficiently examined. This study develops a classification framework using Proof-of-Reserves (PoR) disclosures, with 3,033,857 Ethereum addresses from 15 CEXs and five Non-CEX categories. We derive 58 on-chain behavioral features and evaluate LightGBM against logistic regression (LR) under a leave-one-exchange-out protocol. Across five lookback windows (30-730 days), LightGBM consistently outperformed LR, with macro PR-AUC increasing from 0.6611 to 0.9594 using the selected 17 features, compared with 0.7697 for LR at 730 days. Robustness checks showed comparable performance when feature selection and hyperparameter optimization were repeated across splits and held-out exchanges, while exchange-balanced reweighting improved macro PR-AUC. SHAP analysis and feature-group ablation identified gas behavior, ERC-20 token activity, and internal transactions as key predictive signals in the constructed dataset. These findings support interpretable CEX address screening for blockchain monitoring, while the released feature dataset enables reproducible follow-up research.

## Who Swept My ETH? Uncovering EIP-7702-Based Ether Redirection Attacks on Ethereum

DevFeed: [Who Swept My ETH? Uncovering EIP-7702-Based Ether Redirection Attacks on Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/who-swept-my-eth-uncovering-eip-7702-based-ether-redirection-attacks-on-ethereum-111213.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41153>)

Author: Ziwei Li, Tianwei Chen, Jiajing Wu, Zigui Jiang, Yuhong Nan, Yaobo Huang, Bowen Song, Zibin Zheng

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [eth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eth.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [redirection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/redirection.md>)

### AI overview

EIP-7702-based Ether Redirection Attacks (EERA) exploit temporary delegation: a victim's account is delegated to a malicious sweeper contract that redirects incoming ETH to an attacker-controlled address. The paper formalizes the attack model and introduces SweeperHunter, which detects attacks through transaction analysis. Its analysis of Ethereum mainnet transactions from the first ten months after EIP-7702's introduction identifies 4,668,209 malicious delegations, 20,443 attack transactions, and 508 sweeper contracts; about 70% of observed delegations point to sweepers. More than 600,000 accounts had not promptly revoked or updated malicious delegations and remained vulnerable. The abstract says the authors propose mitigation strategies but does not specify them.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: EIP-7702 introduces a new transaction type that allows Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) on major EVM-compatible chains to delegate execution to arbitrary contract codes temporarily. While enhancing functionality, this mechanism facilitates a novel threat: the \underline{E}IP-7702-Based \underline{E}ther \underline{R}edirection \underline{A}ttack (EERA). In such an attack, a victim is delegated to a malicious sweeper contract, which automatically redirects incoming ETH transfers to an address controlled by the attacker. As a nascent attack paradigm arising from protocol evolution, the underlying mechanisms and security implications of EERA remain systematically unexplored. To bridge this gap, we provide the first formal analysis of the EERA attack model and propose SweeperHunter, a framework that detects these attacks through transaction analysis. By evaluating transactions from the first ten months following the introduction of EIP-7702 on Ethereum mainnet, we have identified 4,668,209 malicious delegations, 20,443 attack transactions and 508 ETH sweeper contracts, forming the first EERA dataset. Finally, we analyze this attack from both attacker and victim perspectives, derive key insights, and propose corresponding mitigation strategies. We reveal the prevalence of EERA, as approximately 70\% of the observed delegations point toward ETH sweeper contracts. Furthermore, we observe a notable lack of effective responses from victims; specifically, over 600,000 accounts failed to revoke or update their malicious delegations promptly, thereby remaining in a state of vulnerability. Our research is expected to facilitate understanding and mitigation of this emerging threat posed by EIP-7702.

## An Empirical Study of Gas Optimization Practices in Solidity Smart Contracts

DevFeed: [An Empirical Study of Gas Optimization Practices in Solidity Smart Contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/an-empirical-study-of-gas-optimization-practices-in-solidity-smart-contracts-112667.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40885>)

Author: Francesco Salzano, Paolo Martino, Simone Scalabrino, Rocco Oliveto, Remo Pareschi

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Architecture & optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/architecture-optimization.md>)

Tags: [bytecode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bytecode.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [efficiency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiency.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [logic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logic.md>), [mining](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mining.md>), [optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optimization.md>), [reduction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reduction.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solidity.md>), [strategies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/strategies.md>)

### AI overview

The study analyzes 400 representative gas-related commits from open-source Solidity repositories on GitHub (2018-2025), selected through NLP filtering and manual review. It classifies observed optimization practices into 8 macro-categories and 36 subcategories, ranging from arithmetic refinements and bytecode-size reduction to internalizing logic and reducing external calls. The findings show that developers balance execution frequency, safety checks, and gas costs, so optimization depends on the contract context. The abstract presents the taxonomy as a knowledge base for future developer-support tools.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.40885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In the Ethereum ecosystem, smart contract execution is governed by a gas model where every computational operation incurs a direct economic cost. Consequently, gas efficiency is a critical requirement for the economic sustainability and widespread adoption of decentralized applications. Despite the importance of cost-effective development, there remains a significant gap between theoretical optimization patterns and the actual practices applied by developers in real-world projects. This paper presents an empirical study investigating gas optimization practices in open-source Solidity repositories created on GitHub between 2018 and 2025. Adopting a Mining Software Repositories approach, we analyzed a dataset of gas-related commits identified through a multi-stage pipeline involving NLP-based filtering and manual qualitative inspection. Based on the analysis of 400 representative commits, we derive an empirical taxonomy of gas optimization strategies consisting of 8 macro-categories and 36 subcategories. Our findings reveal that optimization efforts span multiple levels of abstraction, from low-level arithmetic refinements and bytecode-size reductions to broader architectural changes such as logic internalization and external call reduction. Furthermore, we observe that developers often manage complex trade-offs between execution frequency, safety checks, and computational costs, highlighting that effective optimization is inherently context-dependent. This study provides a practical knowledge base for the design of future developer support tools and advances the understanding of cost-aware software engineering in the blockchain domain.

## AuditFL: A Contract-Backed Clearing Layer for Open Federated Learning

DevFeed: [AuditFL: A Contract-Backed Clearing Layer for Open Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/auditfl-a-contract-backed-clearing-layer-for-open-federated-learning-111564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41278>)

Author: Alexandros Balla, Spyros Lalis

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [federated-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated-learning.md>), [open](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open.md>)

### AI overview

AuditFL makes federated learning round decisions auditable through a contract-backed clearing layer while leaving training and aggregation off chain. Clients reserve update tickets with deposits and publish update identifiers; coordinators publish checkpoints and finalize rounds using deterministic settlement rules. The chain records content identifiers and economic state, while model artifacts reside in an assumed reliable off-chain store. The aggregator remains, but its round decisions become attributable, replayable, and economically constrained. In a 12-round MNIST evaluation with non-IID splits and up to 200 clients, learning tracked Plain FL. At 200 clients, the contract run used 5,026 transactions and 829.7M gas, mostly for per-client reserve and publish calls, alongside 2,413 off-chain artifacts totaling 144.9 MiB. Injected dropouts, invalid updates, and unavailable artifacts reduced inclusion nearly linearly, but rounds still finalized and final accuracy shifted by only a few tenths of a percentage point even at high failure rates.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41278v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) keeps raw data local, but most deployments still rely on a trusted coordinator for client admission, checkpoint distribution, update collection, aggregation, and rewards. This paper presents AuditFL, a contract-backed clearing layer for auditable FL in open settings. AuditFL keeps training and aggregation off chain, stores model artifacts in an assumed reliable off-chain artifact store, and records only content identifiers and economic state on chain. Clients reserve update tickets with deposits, publish update identifiers, and later claim refunds or rewards; the task coordinator publishes global checkpoints and finalizes rounds through deterministic settlement rules. The design does not remove the aggregator, but makes its on-chain round decisions attributable, replayable, auditable, and economically constrained. We implement AuditFL as both a deterministic state-machine prototype and a Solidity contract on a local Ethereum-compatible Anvil chain. On full MNIST with Dirichlet non-IID splits, 12 rounds, and up to 200 clients, AuditFL preserves the Plain FL learning trajectory while its overhead follows closed-form control-plane models. At 200 clients, the contract run issues 5,026 transactions, stores 2,413 off-chain artifacts (144.9 MiB), and consumes 829.7M EVM gas, dominated by per-client reserve and publish calls. Controlled dropout, invalid-update, and artifact-unavailability stress tests reduce inclusion nearly linearly but still finalize rounds, with final-accuracy changes remaining within a few tenths of an accuracy percentage point even under high injected failure rates.

## A Failure Mode Taxonomy and Severity Model for Ethereum Smart Contracts

DevFeed: [A Failure Mode Taxonomy and Severity Model for Ethereum Smart Contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-failure-mode-taxonomy-and-severity-model-for-ethereum-smart-contracts-112681.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41685>)

Author: Fernando Richter Vidal, Naghmeh Ivaki, Nuno Laranjeiro

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [failure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/failure.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [taxonomy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/taxonomy.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a taxonomy of observable Ethereum smart contract failures and CIPER, a five-level model that ranks them by observable impact. Each failure mode is named for the malfunction and described by root cause, violated security property, impact, affected component, and nature. The authors developed the taxonomy from literature and tested it against a systematic review, the OpenSCV catalog, and later reported incidents; that saturation exercise yielded no additional failure modes or dimensions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41685v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts are a core component of blockchain systems, but their immutability makes failures in deployed code catastrophic and irreversible. Existing work classifies vulnerabilities, defects, and attacks, yet the observable failures of smart contracts, the deviations from intended behavior or the expected ledger state seen once a contract is deployed, have been largely disregarded. In this paper, we design and validate a failure mode taxonomy for Ethereum smart contracts, together with a severity model that ranks failures by their observable impact. Using a literature review as input, we follow the taxonomy development method of Nickerson et al. to derive the failure modes and their dimensions, and we subject the resulting taxonomy to a saturation exercise over a systematic literature review, the OpenSCV vulnerability catalog, and smart contract incidents reported after the search cutoff. Each failure mode is characterized along five dimensions, namely root cause, violated security property, impact (recorded as primary, secondary, and other), affected component, and nature, and is given a standardized name targeting the observable malfunction rather than the underlying vulnerability. From the taxonomy, we derive CIPER, a five-level severity model that groups failure modes by their observable impact. The saturation exercise produced no new failure modes or dimensions. The taxonomy offers a shared vocabulary for describing what smart contracts do wrong when they fail, and CIPER links that vocabulary to the severity of each observable outcome.

## Bastion: A Hardened Bank Template, and Crypto Wallets in Core

DevFeed: [Bastion: A Hardened Bank Template, and Crypto Wallets in Core](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/bastion-a-hardened-bank-template-and-crypto-wallets-in-core-111251.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.codenameone.com/blog/bastion-hardened-bank-template/>)

Author: Shai Almog

Published: 2026-11-02T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [CodeName One](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/codename-one.md>)

Topics: [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>), [Bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bitcoin.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Solana](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solana.md>), [Template](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/template.md>)

Tags: [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [bank](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bank.md>), [bastion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bastion.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/core.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [financial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/financial.md>), [hardening](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardening.md>), [reference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reference.md>), [solana](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solana.md>), [template](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/template.md>), [virtual](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virtual.md>), [wallet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wallet.md>)

### AI overview

Bastion is a Java reference project for hardening a virtual bank and exchange, pairing layered app protections with ledger and audit tools. It uses PKCE sign-in, second factors, device-key signatures for money-moving requests, replay protection, host allowlists and certificate pinning; its Security Center marks cloud-build protections as inactive when unavailable. The text also describes core wallet APIs for Ethereum, Bitcoin and Solana, with shared recovery phrases, signing and network-specific transaction handling. The exchange backend scans deposits, waits for confirmations, audits deep reorganizations, checks reserves before withdrawals and restricts withdrawals to preapproved addresses. Bastion is explicitly a simulation rather than a licensed bank: it lacks KYC, sanctions screening, payment rails, HSMs and regulatory reporting; Bitcoin remains a ledger balance in the sample, and node calls are blocking.

### Source excerpt

Bastion is a virtual bank and exchange built as a reference for hardening a financial app, and Codename One now has wallet APIs for Ethereum, Bitcoin and Solana.

## What Is EIP-7702? Ethereum's Smart Account Feature Explained, and How to Stay Safe

DevFeed: [What Is EIP-7702? Ethereum's Smart Account Feature Explained, and How to Stay Safe](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-is-eip-7702-ethereum-s-smart-account-feature-explained-and-how-to-stay-safe-109866.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/what-is-eip-7702-ethereums-smart-account-feature-explained-and-how-to-stay-safe?source=rss>)

Author: MEXC Learn

Published: 2026-10-31T06:00:06Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Post Mortem](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-mortem.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [abstraction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstraction.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [crypto-exchanges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-exchanges.md>), [crypto-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-wallet-security.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [ethereum-smart-accounts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum-smart-accounts.md>), [feature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [mexc-learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mexc-learn.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [smart](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart.md>), [what-is](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-is.md>), [works](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/works.md>)

### AI overview

EIP-7702 lets an existing Ethereum wallet delegate its account logic to a contract through a signed authorization; unlike a token approval, that can affect every asset in the account until revoked. The excerpt says Binance's October 29, 2026 hot-wallet drain used valid signed authorizations, while no flaw in EIP-7702 had been reported and Binance had not yet published a root cause. To check personal exposure, look up the wallet's Delegated Address on Etherscan; reset an unrecognized delegation through the wallet app, then check other EVM chains. A chain ID of zero can make an authorization valid on every supporting EVM chain. If you do not remember signing a delegation, the article advises treating the wallet as compromised and moving funds to a new wallet. Exchanges and their signing systems should decode authorizations and reject unapproved contracts.

### Source excerpt

What is EIP-7702? Learn how Ethereum smart account delegation works, its security risks, and how to check and revoke permissions.

## How Do Solidity Versions Affect Vulnerability Detection Tools? An Empirical Study

DevFeed: [How Do Solidity Versions Affect Vulnerability Detection Tools? An Empirical Study](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-do-solidity-versions-affect-vulnerability-detection-tools-an-empirical-study-107324.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.05515>)

Author: Gerardo Iuliano, Davide Corradini, Michele Pasqua, Matteo Cicalese, Mariano Ceccato, Dario Di Nucci

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Static code analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/static-code-analysis.md>), [Tool](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tool.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [compatibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compatibility.md>), [compilation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compilation.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [crash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crash.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [effectiveness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/effectiveness.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solidity.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>), [tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tools.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [vulnerability-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-detection.md>)

### AI overview

The study finds that Solidity version changes can affect vulnerability detection tools' compatibility, effectiveness, and runtime. The researchers evaluated tools on 2,500 real-world contracts and a separate set of 270 contracts with injected vulnerabilities, extending SmartBugs with 11 tools. Most tools were crash-resilient on Solidity 0.4, while 20% had been updated to remain compatible. Performance varied across Solidity versions, and execution time was higher on version 0.4.x. The abstract does not provide tool-by-tool results or quantify detection effectiveness.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2504.05515v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Smart contract vulnerabilities pose significant security risks to the Ethereum ecosystem, driving the development of automated tools for detection and mitigation. Smart contracts are written in Solidity, a rapidly evolving programming language that continues to add features and improvements to enhance smart contract security. New versions of Solidity change the compilation process, potentially affecting how tools interpret and analyze smart contract code. We use Solidity as a case study to investigate a broader problem in software analysis: whether tool effectiveness remains stable as the underlying programming language and execution environment evolve. In this continuously evolving landscape, we investigated the compatibility of detection tools with different Solidity versions. More specifically, we analyzed detection tools by empirically assessing (i) their crash resilience, (ii) their detection effectiveness, and (iii) their execution time across different versions of Solidity. We collected 2,500 real-world smart contracts to construct a balanced wild dataset and created a separate injected-vulnerability dataset comprising 270 contracts. We extended SmartBugs, a framework that enables the execution of vulnerability detection tools for Solidity, adding 11 new tools. Results indicate that most tools are crash-resilient to version 0.4. However, 20% of the evaluated tools have been updated to remain compatible. Tool performance varies across Solidity versions and is affected by Solidity changes; execution time is higher in version 0.4.x, which was used for evaluation. We present a list of Solidity changes that affect tool performance and offer actionable takeaways for both researchers and practitioners.

## Merkle-Tree-Based Verifiable Public Data Auditing for Cloud Object Storage Using Smart Contracts

DevFeed: [Merkle-Tree-Based Verifiable Public Data Auditing for Cloud Object Storage Using Smart Contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/merkle-tree-based-verifiable-public-data-auditing-for-cloud-object-storage-using-smart-contracts-103342.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36001>)

Author: Siri Reddy Tadi, K. Gangadhara Rao, M. Venu Gopalachari, C. Chetann Reddy, Jaswanth Bhimireddy

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Data integrity in software engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-integrity-in-software-engineering.md>), [sha256](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sha256.md>), [Amazon S3](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-s3.md>)

Tags: [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [auditing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auditing.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [downloads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/downloads.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [files](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/files.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [object](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/object.md>), [object-storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/object-storage.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [third-party](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/third-party.md>)

### AI overview

The system audits cloud objects against a public Ethereum smart-contract record: each object's name and SHA-256 hash forms a Merkle-tree leaf, and an auditor checks a downloaded object against the stored root using a short proof. In five experiments using S3-compatible storage and a local Hardhat blockchain, it detected all tested modifications and deletions without false alarms. A proof for 10,000 objects used 14 hashes; auditing one object took about 10 ms and a 100-object sample about 150 ms, largely independent of dataset size. A full audit of 10,000 objects took 14.3 seconds, about as long as downloading them, so the reported time savings come mainly from sampling. Storing the root cost 91,863 gas, 252 times less than storing 1,000 hashes on-chain.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.36001v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Owners of data in cloud object storage cannot directly check whether the provider still keeps every object unchanged. Existing research mostly checks blocks inside files or relies on third-party auditors, and less attention has been given to checking each object against a public blockchain reference while measuring the cost. A full-data audit downloads every object and compares it with a saved hash list, which is slow and only as reliable as that list. We propose a public auditing system in which the SHA-256 hash of each object and its name forms a leaf of a Merkle tree, so the whole dataset is represented by one Merkle root. This root is stored in an Ethereum smart contract as a trusted public record, while the objects stay with the provider. An auditor downloads an object, rebuilds the root using a short Merkle proof and compares it with the stored root, marking the object as intact, modified or missing. In five experiments on an S3-compatible store and a local Hardhat blockchain (normal audit, single- and multiple-object tampering, deletion and scalability), the system detected 15 of 15 single modifications, 2,205 of 2,205 modified objects and 830 of 830 deleted objects with no false alarms. The proof needed only 14 hashes for 10,000 objects, so checking one object took about 10 ms and a 100-object sample about 150 ms regardless of dataset size, while a full audit of 10,000 objects (14.3 s) took about as long as downloading them (13.5 s). Storing the root cost 91,863 gas, 252 times less than storing 1,000 hashes on-chain. The system thus shows exactly which objects were modified or are missing, with its main savings coming from checking selected objects.

## An Empirical Study of Undisclosed Charges in Hook-Based Decentralized Exchanges

DevFeed: [An Empirical Study of Undisclosed Charges in Hook-Based Decentralized Exchanges](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/an-empirical-study-of-undisclosed-charges-in-hook-based-decentralized-exchanges-103363.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36682>)

Author: Kai Ma, Tianle Sun, Shun Zhou, Boyao Yang, Ningyu He, Haoyu Wang

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [adjustment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adjustment.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assets.md>), [automated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated.md>), [bytecode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bytecode.md>), [charges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charges.md>), [charging](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charging.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [costs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/costs.md>), [covers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/covers.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [deployments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployments.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecosystem.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [fees](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fees.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>)

### AI overview

The study finds that Hooks in Uniswap v4 and PancakeSwap Infinity can add deductions that standard pool fee displays do not itemize. It analyzes 7,873 Hook deployments, 50,011 pools, and 296 million pool events across Ethereum and BSC through August 1, 2026, using bytecode analysis and reconstructed settlements. Direct settlement adjustment is supported by 71.37% of registered Hooks; 24.30% can impose undisclosed deductions, which occurred in 59.23% of accounted swaps involving those Hooks. The authors record $3.97 million in charges for Hooks with available token prices. They argue these deductions should be disclosed alongside standard fees.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.36682v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many decentralized exchanges use automated market makers (AMMs) to trade assets against liquidity pools. Modern AMMs allow third-party contracts, called Hooks, to customize this process. However, Hooks can impose additional deductions that fee breakdowns based on standard pool parameters do not itemize. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first large-scale empirical study of the production Hook ecosystem, focusing on these undisclosed settlement charges. Our study covers 7,873 Hook deployments, 50,011 pools, and 296M pool events on Uniswap v4 and PancakeSwap Infinity across Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain (BSC) through August 1, 2026. We develop a bytecode analysis that reconstructs how Hooks change traders' payments and receipts, separating charges from exchanged assets and standard fees. We then reconstruct historical settlements to measure charging frequency and economic burden. We find that direct settlement adjustment is the dominant Hook capability, supported by 71.37% of registered Hooks. Charging capability is widespread and often exercised: 24.30% of Hooks can impose undisclosed deductions, and these deductions occur in 59.23% of accounted swaps involving such Hooks. These charges generate millions of dollars in revenue, with $3.97M recorded across Hooks with available token prices. These findings reveal a gap between standard fee displays and actual trading costs, motivating explicit disclosure of Hook deductions alongside standard fees.

## Tracing Money Laundering Across DeFi, Bridges, and Mixers on Ethereum

DevFeed: [Tracing Money Laundering Across DeFi, Bridges, and Mixers on Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tracing-money-laundering-across-defi-bridges-and-mixers-on-ethereum-100283.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32210>)

Author: Huan Xing, Gaohe Jin, Bang Fu, Yue Li, Baoning Niu, Xing Fan

Published: 2026-10-26T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [DeFi](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/defi.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>), [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>), [tracing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tracing.md>)

Tags: [bridges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bridges.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [defi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defi.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [money-laundering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/money-laundering.md>), [tracing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tracing.md>)

### AI overview

FPTracer traces illicit asset flows across Ethereum DeFi services, bridges, and mixers by addressing three gaps in prior methods. Its Context-Aware Transfer Tree (CATT) recovers asset-flow paths within complex transactions; a classifier uses asset-flow and execution evidence to detect cross-chain intent without pre-collected bridge information; and upstream network evidence helps identify potential post-mixer activity. In 20 laundering cases, it reported 98.6% recall for known laundering addresses and 94.2% for destinations, identified all known bridge uses, and found 30 previously unreported uses. For 18 cases involving Tornado Cash, it identified potential withdrawal-side activity, corroborated by public reports where available.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.32210v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Illicit actors exploit Ethereum's deep liquidity and diverse on-chain services to launder criminal proceeds by combining decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols, cross-chain bridges, and mixers in multi-stage processes. Existing anti-money laundering tracing methods fail to disentangle the underlying asset-flow paths in complex transactions, potentially misdirecting subsequent tracing; cannot identify cross-chain intent without pre-collected bridge information; and treat mixers as generic exit services, overlooking post-mixer laundering flows. We present FPTracer, a framework for tracing illicit assets across Ethereum services. First, we propose a method based on the Context-Aware Transfer Tree (CATT) to recover intra-transaction asset-flow paths, which guide accurate tracing and service analysis. Second, we extract discriminative features from asset-flow and execution-evidence perspectives and train a classifier to identify transactions with cross-chain intent. Third, we leverage evidence from the upstream laundering network to analyze potential post-mixer laundering activities. Evaluation on 20 real-world laundering cases demonstrates FPTracer's effectiveness. It achieves the highest recall for both known laundering addresses (98.6%) and destinations (94.2%). It identifies all known uses of bridges in these cases and uncovers 30 previously unreported ones. Among 18 cases with identified Tornado Cash usage, FPTracer can identify potential withdrawal-side activities, which are corroborated by public reports where available.

## ChainSEED: A Scalable, High-Fidelity Blockchain Emulator

DevFeed: [ChainSEED: A Scalable, High-Fidelity Blockchain Emulator](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/chainseed-a-scalable-high-fidelity-blockchain-emulator-97341.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31188>)

Author: Qishu Jin, Wenliang Du, Kairui Feng

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [Solana](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solana.md>), [Distributed Systems & Parallel Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/distributed-systems-parallel-computing.md>), [CIDR and subnets](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cidr-and-subnets.md>)

Tags: [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [consensus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consensus.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [discovery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/discovery.md>), [eclipse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eclipse.md>), [emulator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emulator.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [genesis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/genesis.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitoring.md>), [multiplexing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multiplexing.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [pow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pow.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [solana](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solana.md>)

### AI overview

ChainSEED combines real blockchain clients with a configurable routed network, separating blockchain setup from client placement to enable controlled experiments. For Ethereum PoS it configures execution, consensus, and validator clients separately, with APIs for genesis state, peer connections, and client software; it also supports Monero and Solana. To fit larger experiments within limited hardware, the authors describe reducing beacon-node memory, allocating execution-client memory, and multiplexing validator clients. On one server with about 1 TiB of memory and 384 logical CPU cores, it deploys 400 beacon nodes, 400 execution nodes, and 60,000 validator identities at about 20 TPS. The abstract also reports emulation of a 1,200-node Monero network and a 200-node Solana network, plus case studies of routing and amplification attacks, Monero eclipse attacks, topology discovery, and network configuration.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.31188v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Researchers need blockchain experimental environments with configurable workloads, controllable network conditions, and observable outcomes. Public blockchains and testnets limit experimental control, model-based simulators omit real client implementations, and real-client environments face challenges in combining network control with resource-efficient deployment. We present ChainSEED, a scalable, high-fidelity blockchain emulator built on the SEED Internet Emulator. It separates blockchain configuration from client placement on a configurable routed network. For Ethereum PoS, it organizes separately configured execution, consensus, and validator clients and provides APIs for customizing genesis state, peer connections, and client software. A transaction generator informed by Ethereum mainnet activity, application interfaces, and chain- and node-level monitoring support experiments. ChainSEED also supports Monero and Solana. We examine beacon-node memory reduction, execution-client memory allocation, and validator-client multiplexing to support larger experiments within limited hardware budgets. On a single server with approximately 1 TiB of memory and 384 logical CPU cores, ChainSEED deploys 400 beacon nodes, 400 execution nodes, and 60,000 validator identities while sustaining approximately 20 TPS. It also emulates a 1,200-node Monero network with up to 200 active single-threaded PoW miners and a 200-node Solana network with sustained finalization. Case studies demonstrate routing attacks, blockchain amplification attacks, Monero eclipse attacks, topology-discovery benchmarking against known peer graphs, and network-configuration experiments.

## What Ethereum Developers Ask For, and Whether They Get It: Ten Years of Ethereum Stack Exchange

DevFeed: [What Ethereum Developers Ask For, and Whether They Get It: Ten Years of Ethereum Stack Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-ethereum-developers-ask-for-and-whether-they-get-it-ten-years-of-ethereum-stack-exchange-96652.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30829>)

Author: Tamer Abdelaziz

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [coding-community](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/coding-community.md>), [developer-relations](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-relations.md>), [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>)

Tags: [acceptance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceptance.md>), [consensus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consensus.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [debugging](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/debugging.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [newcomers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/newcomers.md>), [scaling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scaling.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [stack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stack.md>), [toolchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/toolchain.md>), [writing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/writing.md>)

### AI overview

The study analyzes all 54,637 Ethereum Stack Exchange questions posted from 2016 through 2025. Questions concentrate on writing, deploying, and debugging contracts; toolchain questions are the second-largest topic and growing, while security, consensus, and scaling are less common. Across five estimators, the share receiving any answer fell by 9.5-18.6 percentage points, and acceptance among answered questions fell by 16.2-24.5 points. Topic mix does little to explain the acceptance decline. Outcomes vary more by asker reputation than by topic: acceptance ranges from 19.8% below 10 reputation to 66.8% at 10,000 or more; a shift toward newer askers accounts for up to 59% of the fall. Topic labels came from a prompt-based pipeline reviewed by a three-provider language-model committee, with manual adjudication of disputed cases yielding 87.9-93.5% accuracy.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.30829v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Ethereum community learns where developers struggle through surveys and interviews, which record what developers say when asked about a chosen theme. Ethereum Stack Exchange (ESE) records what they ask for unprompted, and whether anyone resolves it. We study every question posted to ESE from Jan 2016 to Dec 2025, 54,637 in all, and label each with a prompt-based topic pipeline seeded with eight Ethereum-specific topics and open to new ones (22 topics in all). A three-provider committee of language models screens the labels, and manual adjudication of every disputed case puts their accuracy at 87.9 to 93.5%. Because the corpus is the complete record, no rate carries sampling error. We ask what developers ask for help with, whether the venue still resolves it, and, where it does not, whether the questions changed or their resolution did. Demand is concentrated on writing, deploying, and debugging contracts; the toolchain is the second-largest topic and growing, while security, consensus, and scaling are thin. Supply has weakened, and unevenly: answers still arrive, closure falls further. Across five estimators of the decade, the share of questions drawing any answer fell by 9.5 to 18.6 percentage points, but among answered questions the share reaching an accepted answer fell by 16.2 to 24.5. Rebuilding the later acceptance rate at the earlier topic mix moves the fall only from 9.40 to 9.32 points, so the topic mix does not explain it. Who asks separates outcomes far more sharply than what is asked: acceptance runs from 19.8% for askers below 10 reputation to 66.8% at 10k and above, a 47- point spread with a gradient in every year, against 17 across topics, and a shift toward newer askers accounts for up to 59% of the acceptance fall. The largest of seven properties an asker controls accompanies 5 points. The record places the support gap in the toolchain and among newcomers.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTIzVDA0OjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjRjNGU2ZWI3LTU1YjMtNGNjNC05MWIzLTQyNjk4MThmZGY0MCJd>)