# homomorphic encryption

An encryption scheme that enables computing functions over encrypted data, with decryption yielding the function applied to the data.

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## Retained Encrypted Search with Certified Split Joins

DevFeed: [Retained Encrypted Search with Certified Split Joins](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/retained-encrypted-search-with-certified-split-joins-143149.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24265>)

Author: Yavor Litchev, Liwen Ouyang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>)

Tags: [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [adaptive-queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive-queries.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [edits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edits.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [hamming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hamming.md>), [interface](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interface.md>), [invariant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/invariant.md>), [join](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/join.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [learning-with-errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning-with-errors.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [reduce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reduce.md>), [ring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring.md>), [ring-learning-with-errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring-learning-with-errors.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [split](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/split.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents retained encrypted Hamming search that remains usable after data edits or worker replacement while limiting each query preparation to one authorized decryption and decoding attempt. Its privacy reduction to Ring-LWE assumes authenticated prescribed execution, exclusive nonrollback owner state, an ideal public seed-expansion interface, and a stated observation model. Query-independent expanded components enable a retained split join with a smaller-modulus encrypted database; a simultaneous circuit bound covers a finite honest reservation family, including adaptive queries and slot selection, with explicit statistical losses. In three post-calibration local CPU comparisons on 32,768 512-bit vectors, the 60-bit-join construction had a 9.825-second median for an end-to-end two-query workload, versus 12.159 seconds for an optimized full-source-modulus baseline. These local results are not deployment or concrete-security claims.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24265v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retaining encrypted search across data edits and worker replacement requires separating computational validity from current release authority. We give exact Hamming search with at most one authorized decryption and decoding attempt per query preparation. Under authenticated prescribed execution, exclusive nonrollback owner state, an ideal public seed-expansion interface and a stated observation model, we reduce bounded adaptive privacy to ordinary ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE). Expanded second components depend only on public masks and fixed maps, independently of queries and the fresh database key. This compiler invariant permits a retained split join against a smaller-modulus encrypted database. A simultaneous bound on the completed circuit covers a finite honest reservation family, including adaptive queries and slot selection, with explicit statistical correctness and privacy losses. In three post-calibration local CPU comparisons on 32,768 vectors of 512 bits, the 60-bit-join construction takes a median 9.825 s for an end-to-end two-query workload, versus 12.159 s for the optimized full-source-modulus baseline. These times include setup, transfers, preparation and private completion. They are local implementation results, not deployment or concrete-security claims.

## PMKPIR: Parallel Multi-Keyword PIR with Interleaved Batching for Private Boolean Retrieval

DevFeed: [PMKPIR: Parallel Multi-Keyword PIR with Interleaved Batching for Private Boolean Retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pmkpir-parallel-multi-keyword-pir-with-interleaved-batching-for-private-boolean-retrieval-143148.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24248>)

Author: Rongxi Wang, Guanxiong Ha, Chunfu Jia, Minfen Gao, Hanmiaomiao Wang

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [information retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/information-retrieval.md>), [vectorization techniques](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vectorization-techniques.md>)

Tags: [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [boolean](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boolean.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [pir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pir.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [query-processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/query-processing.md>), [retrieval](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/retrieval.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-analysis.md>), [simd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simd.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [traversal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traversal.md>)

### AI overview

PMKPIR combines interleaved batching with BFV homomorphic encryption to support parallel multi-keyword matching and universal Boolean computation while preserving the core security guarantees of classic PIR, according to the authors' analysis. Its IBPIR component matches multiple keywords in one database traversal; a Boolean query method extends that parallelism to Boolean operations. Against state-of-the-art schemes, the authors report reductions of up to 79.06% in query time, 75.00% in communication overhead, 97.92% in storage overhead, and 80.26% in peak memory. These are maximum reported reductions; the excerpt gives no benchmark conditions or per-scheme results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24248v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Keyword Private Information Retrieval (Keyword PIR) allows users to retrieve data associated with specific keywords from a database while protecting query privacy. However, existing Keyword PIR schemes supporting boolean retrieval either incur high computational overhead due to multiple database traversals, or fail to support universal boolean computation. We propose PMKPIR, a novel keyword PIR scheme supporting both parallel multi-keyword queries and universal boolean computation. We utilize the single instruction multiple data (SIMD) capability of BFV homomorphic encryption to propose an interleaved batching method, and design IBPIR based on this method, achieving the private matching of multiple keywords in a single database traversal. Furthermore, we design a boolean query processing method, extending the parallel capability of interleaved batching from keyword querying to boolean query computation, to support universal boolean computation and accelerate boolean operations. Building upon IBPIR, we integrate this method to further design PMKPIR. To the best of our knowledge, PMKPIR is the first Keyword PIR scheme to support multi-keyword batch matching within boolean queries. Security analysis demonstrates that, consistent with existing PIR schemes supporting boolean retrieval, PMKPIR preserves the core security guarantees of classic PIR. Compared with state-of-the-art schemes, PMKPIR reduces query time, communication overhead, storage overhead, and peak memory by up to 79.06%, 75.00%, 97.92%, and 80.26%, respectively.

## Robust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout Attacks

DevFeed: [Robust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/robust-lightweight-locally-differentially-private-histogram-estimation-and-the-role-of-dropout-attacks-143159.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24623>)

Author: Haochen Sun, Jacob Imola, Xi He

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/consistency.md>)

Tags: [announce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announce.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consistency.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [differential-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/differential-privacy.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [lightweight](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lightweight.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [manipulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manipulation.md>), [proofs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proofs.md>), [robust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robust.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>), [zero-knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a three-message verification framework for robust locally differentially private histogram estimation. Proofs of plaintext evaluation limit malicious clients to selective dropout rather than output manipulation; in evaluated PI-RAPPOR and Hadamard Response settings, mean per-client online latency is under 500 ms. Tight bounds show that this restriction reduces attack-dependent error for RAPPOR, PI-RAPPOR, and Hadamard Response by a factor proportional to the square root of the domain size. For deployments where client protocols cannot change, server-side consistency checks for RAPPOR and Hadamard Response need no client-side cryptography and can be applied after reports are collected. Experiments find that both approaches reduce attack error for some mechanisms; consistency checks yield errors between verification and unrestricted output manipulation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.24623v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Local differential privacy (LDP) is vulnerable to output manipulation by malicious clients. Zero-knowledge proofs can enforce correct report computation, but clients may still selectively drop out after inspecting their outputs. Prior work combines zero-knowledge proofs with homomorphic encryption to hide reports from clients and prevent selective dropout, but incurs substantial computational cost. We instead develop a three-message lightweight verification framework for robust histogram estimation that uses proofs of plaintext evaluation to restrict output manipulation to selective dropout. Across the evaluated settings for PI-RAPPOR and Hadamard Response, mean per-client online latency remains below 500 milliseconds. We further establish tight error bounds showing that, for RAPPOR, PI-RAPPOR, and Hadamard Response, restricting malicious clients to selective dropout reduces attack-dependent error by a factor proportional to the square root of the domain size compared with output manipulation. Additionally, when client protocols cannot be modified, we propose server-side consistency checks for RAPPOR and Hadamard Response. These checks improve robustness without client-side cryptography and can be applied post-hoc to collected reports, offering an alternative under different deployment constraints. Experiments demonstrate that both verification and consistency checks substantially reduce attack error for certain mechanisms, with consistency checks yielding errors intermediate between those obtained with verification and those under unrestricted output manipulation.

## HE-LRM: Encrypted Deep Learning Recommendation Models using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

DevFeed: [HE-LRM: Encrypted Deep Learning Recommendation Models using Fully Homomorphic Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/he-lrm-encrypted-deep-learning-recommendation-models-using-fully-homomorphic-encryption-141438.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18150>)

Author: Akshath Mahajan, Karthik Garimella, Austin Ebel, Gabrielle De Micheli, Brandon Reagen

Published: 2026-11-18T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Deep learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/deep-learning.md>), [Embeddings](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embeddings.md>)

Tags: [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [criteo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/criteo.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [deep-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep-learning.md>), [embedding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedding.md>), [embedding-tables](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedding-tables.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-memory.md>), [high-performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/high-performance.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [lookup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lookup.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [orion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/orion.md>), [recommendation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recommendation.md>), [throughput](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/throughput.md>)

### AI overview

HE-LRM presents an end-to-end fully homomorphic encryption system for private deep learning recommendation inference, including sparse embedding lookups. Its deterministic compositional embedding compression uses client-side digit decomposition to avoid costly homomorphic selector construction and consumes one multiplicative level. A block-diagonal packing strategy applies optimized BSGS transformations across embedding tables and outputs encrypted embeddings for downstream inference. An extended Orion GPU backend performs a single-inference lookup in 9 ms. On Criteo, complete encrypted inference takes 154-247 ms server-side on one GPU; GPU memory capacity limits batching and thus latency-bound throughput.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2506.18150v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: FHE inference systems primarily target models with dense inputs, while Deep Learning Recommendation Models (DLRMs) contain sparse categorical features that require lookups into embedding tables. Encrypted lookups are challenging because indexing is not natively supported and must be expressed using SIMD arithmetic. A direct one-hot formulation does not scale. Prior work addresses parts of this problem through embedding compression or compact encrypted queries. However, it does not address complete DLRM inference, leaving open how private lookup interacts with downstream computation and memory constraints. We present HE-LRM, the first end-to-end FHE system for private DLRM inference. We use deterministic compositional embedding compression with client-side digit decomposition, avoiding expensive homomorphic selector construction while consuming only one multiplicative level. We further develop a block-diagonal packing strategy that performs lookups across multiple embedding tables using optimized BSGS linear transformations and produces encrypted embeddings directly compatible with downstream inference. We extend Orion with a high-performance GPU backend and achieve 9 ms for single-inference embedding lookup. We also show that GPU memory capacity limits batching and therefore the latency-bound throughput in such systems. On Criteo, HE-LRM achieves complete encrypted inference with server-side latencies of 154-247 ms on a single GPU. We open-source HE-LRM at https://github.com/baahl-nyu/orion

## A Re-Keying Game for Encrypted Multi-Agent Control under Persistent Threats

DevFeed: [A Re-Keying Game for Encrypted Multi-Agent Control under Persistent Threats](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-re-keying-game-for-encrypted-multi-agent-control-under-persistent-threats-139236.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12742>)

Author: Sai Sandeep Damera, John S. Baras

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Multi Agent Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-agent-systems.md>)

Tags: [advanced-persistent-threat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-persistent-threat.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-control.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [alarm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alarm.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [bounded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bounded.md>), [budget](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/budget.md>), [choice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/choice.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [convoy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/convoy.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-gt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-gt.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [game](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/game.md>), [multi-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-agent.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>)

### AI overview

The paper models encrypted multi-agent control as a leader-follower game in which an operator chooses noise flooding and key lifetime while a persistent attacker listens and then spoofs sensors. For CKKS, the control loop's noise tolerance, expressed through the formation specification's H₂ norm, limits how many decryptions a key can support; re-keying renews that budget, whereas bootstrapping does not. Spoofing uses some of the same noise tolerance needed for flooding, so the coordination graph and alarm cost determine whether scanning alone, reduced flooding, or no deterrence is optimal. In a 196-agent convoy example at 128-bit security, five graphs with the same spectral radius yield key lifetimes differing by a factor of 18. Reduced flooding deters the attacker on a torus at one-twentieth of a key per day and reduces damage sevenfold on a ring. These results are from the abstract's described model and example.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.12742v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) lets a coordinator control a fleet on encrypted states, but CKKS, the approximate scheme for real-valued arithmetic, returns noisy decryptions from which an adversary can recover the secret key. Flooding each decryption with noise defends it, but a fleet must decrypt to act, so the count of decryptions grows every cycle while the loop tolerates only bounded noise. We formulate the choice of flooding and key lifetime as a leader-follower game between the fleet operator and an advanced persistent threat that listens first and then spoofs the agents' sensors. We show that the closed loop decides how long a key may be used: the formation's specification caps each key's decryption budget through the loop's $H_2$ norm, and only re-keying, not bootstrapping, renews it. A spoof consumes part of the specification that flooding needs, and the coordination graph and the cost of an alarm decide in closed form whether the scan alone, a lower flood or nothing deters it. On 196 agents escorting a convoy at 128-bit security, five graphs with the same spectral radius differ 18-fold in key lifetime, a lower flood deters the spoofer on the torus for a twentieth of a key a day, and on the ring it cuts the damage 7 times. More broadly, any system that must repeatedly decrypt to act has a key lifetime set by its tolerance to noise, making key management part of control design.

## Signed Dyadic Path Encoding for Efficient Non-Interactive Private Decision Tree Evaluation over TFHE

DevFeed: [Signed Dyadic Path Encoding for Efficient Non-Interactive Private Decision Tree Evaluation over TFHE](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/signed-dyadic-path-encoding-for-efficient-non-interactive-private-decision-tree-evaluation-over-tfhe-133333.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16818>)

Author: Xintong Song, Yiqiang Zhao, Qizhi Zhang, Yao Li, Jiaji He, Fei Zhao

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [catboost](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/catboost.md>)

Tags: [bootstrap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrap.md>), [computer-science](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-science.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decision](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decision.md>), [encoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encoding.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [faster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/faster.md>), [gradient](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gradient.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed signed dyadic path-sum encoding reduces programmable bootstraps (PBS) in non-interactive TFHE decision-tree evaluation by packing the two leaf children of each leaf-parent into one test polynomial. This changes the PBS count from one per leaf to one per leaf-parent. The authors prove the labeling is range-minimal and its signed form magnitude-optimal, tightening the comparison-stage noise bound at fixed parameters. They report exact predictions under two derived conditions, with instantiated parameters giving per-inference failure below 2⁻⁶⁴ at 128-bit security. Because ring degree grows linearly with consumed plaintext range, the profitable regime is limited to depths of 4 or less. On standard UCI benchmarks at depths 1-4, latency falls by 1.51x-1.92x for single trees and 2x for ensembles, with no accuracy loss; the method is also reported faster when each scheme uses its own cost-optimal parameters.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.16818v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Private decision-tree evaluation lets a server classify a client's encrypted query without learning the input. In the non-interactive, path-based setting over TFHE, the server returns a single encrypted prediction by aggregating per-path comparison outcomes, and the standard per-leaf formulation pays one programmable bootstrap (PBS) per leaf, which dominates the cost. We propose a signed dyadic path-sum encoding that nearly halves this cost: each internal node receives a signed dyadic label so that every root-to-leaf path accumulates a distinct integer sum, which lets the two children of a leaf-parent be packed into a single test polynomial and resolved by one PBS, reducing the PBS count from the number of leaves to the number of leaf-parents. We formalize the distinct-sum property and prove that the dyadic labeling is the range-minimal encoding satisfying it, and its half-symmetric signed form is magnitude-optimal, tightening the comparison-stage noise bound at fixed parameters. We derive the two conditions under which the encrypted evaluation returns the exact prediction and instantiate parameters with per-inference failure below $2^{-64}$ at 128-bit security. We show that the ring degree grows linearly with the consumed plaintext range, which confines the profitable regime to depths $\leq 4$, where our method stays faster even when each scheme runs at its own cost-optimal parameters. We further extend the encoding to gradient-boosted ensembles. On standard UCI benchmarks at depths 1-4, our method reduces single-tree latency by $1.51\times$-$1.92\times$ and ensemble latency by $2\times$, without accuracy loss, while preserving the compact, non-interactive response.

## Batch, Pack, and Prove: More Efficient Verifiable Computation for CKKS

DevFeed: [Batch, Pack, and Prove: More Efficient Verifiable Computation for CKKS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/batch-pack-and-prove-more-efficient-verifiable-computation-for-ckks-133335.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16922>)

Author: Ignacio Cascudo, Anamaria Costache, Daniele Cozzo, Dario Fiore, Antonio Guimar\\~aes, Eduardo Soria-Vazquez

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [Automated reasoning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automated-reasoning.md>)

Tags: [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [arguments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arguments.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [batch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batch.md>), [circuits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/circuits.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [efficiency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiency.md>), [efficiently](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiently.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [neural-network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neural-network.md>), [novel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/novel.md>), [orders](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/orders.md>), [packing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packing.md>), [polynomials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/polynomials.md>), [proofs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proofs.md>)

### AI overview

The paper targets scalability bottlenecks in verifiable computation for CKKS: large polynomial commitment proofs, an O(N) range-proof overhead, and no explicit sublinear verification method. It combines more efficient CKKS arithmetization with BatchFold, a polynomial commitment for R_q supporting batched evaluations and shorter proofs; packing, which avoids commitments to massive polynomials and removes the stated range-proof overhead; and SparsePack, for proving evaluations of sparse, circuit-dependent polynomials. On a generic neural network architecture, the authors report proofs several orders of magnitude smaller and faster than prior approaches. The supplied text gives no benchmark figures or further evaluation details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.16922v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An important challenge in homomorphic encryption (HE) is ensuring the integrity of the encrypted computations. Although verifiable computation can address this in theory, making it practical is far from trivial. [Cascudo et al. CRYPTO 2025] recently proposed a solution to this problem for the CKKS scheme. In particular, they propose new succinct arguments that efficiently prove arithmetic circuits and range checks over the ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[Y]/(Y^N+1)$, and combine them to prove computations on CKKS ciphertexts. Despite the important progress, their work faces scalability challenges: the size of the polynomial commitment proofs, a large $O(N)$ overhead in range proofs, and the lack of an explicit method for efficient -- sublinear in circuit size -- verification. In this paper we present new techniques that remove all these bottlenecks. First, we provide a more efficient arithmetization of CKKS computations. Second, we introduce BatchFold, a new polynomial commitment for $R_q$ that supports batched evaluations and achieves shorter proofs. Third, we design packing, a novel algebraic technique that eliminates the need to commit to massive polynomials and removes the $O(N)$ overhead in range proofs. Finally, we introduce SparsePack, an efficient protocol for proving the evaluations of sparse, circuit-dependent polynomials, leveraging both packing and batched evaluations. We evaluate the efficiency of our solution on a generic neural network architecture, achieving proofs several orders of magnitude smaller and faster than prior approaches.

## CKKS -- Rescaling

DevFeed: [CKKS -- Rescaling](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ckks-rescaling-129642.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.jeremykun.com/2026/11/11/ckks-rescaling/>)

Published: 2026-11-11T23:27:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Jeremy Kun](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/jeremy-kun.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Error Propagation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/error-propagation.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [primes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/primes.md>)

Tags: [64-bit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/64-bit.md>), [acceleration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceleration.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [array](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/array.md>), [bits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bits.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [budget](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/budget.md>), [canonical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/canonical.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [ckks-tutorial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks-tutorial.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [delta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delta.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [mathematics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mathematics.md>), [programming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/programming.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [scale](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scale.md>), [scaling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scaling.md>), [switching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/switching.md>), [tutorial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tutorial.md>)

### AI overview

Rescaling in CKKS reduces a multiplied ciphertext's scale from Δ² to Δ and manages its noise by dividing rounded ciphertext coefficients by a factor close to Δ while reducing the modulus from Q to Q′. This requires Q to be divisible by the rescaling factor in the mathematical formulation; direct multiplication by Δ⁻¹ in the original ring can fail or make noise too large. Rounding introduces new error, while rescaling reduces prior multiplication and relinearization errors. In the code example, Q/Q′ is used instead of exactly Δ, so the tracked scale is approximate and decoding incurs a small additional error. Each multiplication and rescaling also consumes modulus budget. The article explains that representing a large modulus as a product of prime limbs in an RNS representation makes operations parallelizable; rescaling then drops a limb, and remaining limbs define a ciphertext's level.

### Source excerpt

Table of Contents This is part of a tutorial series on the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme. In the last article, we described the key switching and relinearization algorithms. Relinearization allowed us to restore the natural "two tuple" ciphertext structure after a homomorphic multiplication, but we did not address two more problems produced by multiplication. The first is that, because CKKS uses fixed-point arithmetic on its underlying plaintexts, multiplication produces a ciphertext encoded with a squared scaling factor $\Delta^2$ relative to the operands which have scale $\Delta$.

## MOAI: Module-Optimizing Architecture for non-interactive secure transformer Inference

DevFeed: [MOAI: Module-Optimizing Architecture for non-interactive secure transformer Inference](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/moai-module-optimizing-architecture-for-non-interactive-secure-transformer-inference-128337.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13641>)

Author: Linru Zhang, Xiangning Wang, Jun Jie Sim, Zhicong Huang, Jiahao Zhong, Huaxiong Wang, Pu Duan, Kwok-Yan Lam

Published: 2026-11-11T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [LLM optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-optimization.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>)

Tags: [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [batching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/batching.md>), [bert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bert.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [fewer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fewer.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [large-language-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large-language-models.md>), [llama](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llama.md>), [llm-inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm-inference.md>), [module](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/module.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [optimizing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optimizing.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [transformer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transformer.md>)

### AI overview

MOAI is a non-interactive homomorphic-encryption framework for transformer inference that reduces costly HE rotations through a consistent column-and-diagonal packing flow, rotation-free Softmax and LayerNorm algorithms, and interleaved batching. For BERT-base, it removes 2,448 rotations in inference and uses at least 1.7x fewer rotations across matrix multiplications than prior work. The authors report 52.8% lower evaluation time than THOR and, when applying MOAI to Powerformer's framework, 55.7% lower time than Powerformer. They report 2.36 minutes amortized per input on a single GPU and demonstrate extension to LLaMA-3-8B. These are abstract-reported results; no further experimental details are supplied here.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.13641v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Privacy concerns have been raised in Large Language Models (LLM) inference when models are deployed in Cloud Service Providers (CSP). Homomorphic encryption (HE) offers a promising solution by enabling secure inference directly over encrypted inputs. However, the high computational overhead of HE remains a major bottleneck. To address this challenge, we propose MOAI, an efficient HE-based, non-interactive framework for secure transformer inference. MOAI gains significant efficiency improvement from: (1) a novel evaluation flow that combines column and diagonal packing with consistent strategies across all layers, eliminating expensive format conversions. (2) rotation-free algorithms for Softmax and LayerNorm that significantly reduce the number of costly HE rotations, removing 2,448 HE rotations in BERT-base inference. (3) Column packing removes rotations in plaintext-ciphertext matrix multiplications and interleaved batching further reduces the rotations in ciphertext-ciphertext matrix multiplications. MOAI uses at least 1.7x fewer HE rotations compared to the state-of-the-art works across all matrix multiplications of BERT-base. As a result, we achieve a $52.8 \%$ reduction in evaluation time compared to the state-of-the-art HE-based non-interactive secure transformer inference, THOR (Moon et al., CCS 25). We then apply MOAI on the Powerformer's framework and achieve a $55.7 \%$ reduction in evaluation time compared to Powerformer (Park et al., ACL 25), which approximates Softmax and LayerNorm with simpler functions in transformer and proposes HE-based non-interactive transformer inference. We report an amortized time of 2.36 minutes per input on a single GPU environment. We show the extendibility by applying MOAI in LLaMA-3-8B. Our implementation is publicly available as open source.

## A Privacy-Preserving UAV-Assisted Secure Wireless Communication and Computing System Based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption

DevFeed: [A Privacy-Preserving UAV-Assisted Secure Wireless Communication and Computing System Based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-privacy-preserving-uav-assisted-secure-wireless-communication-and-computing-system-based-on-fully-homomorphic-encryption-126975.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12064>)

Author: Quanxi Zhou, Wencan Mao, Ye Tao, Manabu Tsukada, Kensuke Fukuda, Yusheng Ji

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Security & Privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy.md>)

Tags: [5g](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/5g.md>), [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-transmission](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-transmission.md>), [decision](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decision.md>), [distribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distribution.md>), [efficiency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiency.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [experimental](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experimental.md>), [fan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fan.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [flexibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flexibility.md>), [floating-point](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/floating-point.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [wireless](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wireless.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed UAV-assisted framework combines CKKS fully homomorphic encryption with multi-party secure computation to protect computation as well as wireless data transmission. It separates key distribution from encrypted computation and supports encrypted weighted aggregation, matrix multiplication, and decision-tree inference. The abstract reports that decision-tree inference supports floating-point operations and is faster than BFV; matrix multiplication has better time and space efficiency than BGV and SHE; and weighted aggregation maintains high numerical precision and robustness across varying data lengths. These are abstract-level reported results; no detailed measurements are supplied here.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12064v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the advancement of beyond-5G networks, privacy-preserving communication and secure computation face critical challenges due to the openness of wireless channels. Existing security mechanisms protect data transmission but fail to secure the computation process itself. In this paper, we propose a UAV-assisted secure computing framework that integrates Cheon Kim Kim Song (CKKS) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) with multi-party secure computation (MPC). Leveraging UAV flexibility, our framework decouples key distribution from encrypted computation, enabling secure encrypted weighted aggregation (EWA), encrypted matrix multiplication (EMM), and encrypted decision tree (EDT) inference. Experimental results show that our framework outperforms existing schemes: for EDT, it supports floating-point operations and achieves better time efficiency than Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV); for EMM, it demonstrates superior time and space efficiency compared to Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) and Somewhat Homo- morphic Encryption (SHE); while for EWA, it ensures high numerical precision and robustness across varying data length.

## Expanding Codes with Polynomial Stretch

DevFeed: [Expanding Codes with Polynomial Stretch](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/expanding-codes-with-polynomial-stretch-126879.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.10479>)

Author: Isaac M Hair, Amit Sahai

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [polynomials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/polynomials.md>)

Tags: [2016](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2016.md>), [2018](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2018.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [dimension](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dimension.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [generator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generator.md>), [graphs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graphs.md>), [locality](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/locality.md>), [lower-bounds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lower-bounds.md>), [matrix](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matrix.md>), [noise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/noise.md>), [public-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key.md>), [stretch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stretch.md>), [test](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/test.md>), [vector](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vector.md>), [weight](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/weight.md>), [xor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xor.md>)

### AI overview

For each constant ε in (0, 1/2), the authors construct binary matrices with n columns, polynomially many rows, and row weight k = O(ε⁻⁶). Any set of at most n^(1−ε) rows has supports whose union covers at least (1−ε)k times the number of rows. Despite this expansion, a polynomial-time test accepts codewords corrupted on up to a 1/2−ε fraction of coordinates and rejects a uniformly random vector with high probability. Applications include distinguishing Goldreich's XOR-MAJ generator from uniform on nearly lossless constant-locality expanders, and public-key encryption based on stated kXOR, Goldreich, or planted-hypergraph conjectures. The authors also report low-degree and Schur-product dimension-test lower bounds; the planting lower bounds provide evidence for subexponential hardness.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2604.10479v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We give a polynomial-stretch, constant-arity counterpart to the expanding-code construction of Blasiok, Lou, Rosen, and Sudan (FOCS 2026). For every constant $\varepsilon\in(0,1/2)$, we construct binary matrices with $n$ columns and polynomially many rows, each of weight $k=O(\varepsilon^{-6})$, such that the union of the supports of any set of at most $n^{1-\varepsilon}$ rows has size at least $(1-\varepsilon)k$ times the number of rows. Nevertheless, a polynomial-time test accepts every codeword (generated by the columns of this matrix) corrupted in at most a $1/2-\varepsilon$ fraction of its coordinates, while rejecting a uniformly random vector with high probability. We give two applications. First, we obtain a family of (nearly lossless) constant locality expanders on which Goldreich's pseudorandom generator with the XOR-MAJ predicate can be distinguished from uniform in polynomial time, well within the small-bias parameter regime and the hard regime for known algebraic-immunity/annihilator attacks and algebraic-degree linearization attacks described by Applebaum and Lovett (STOC 2016, SICOMP 2018). Second, we obtain public key encryption from either the constant-noise $k$XOR conjecture over random graphs or the Goldreich conjecture with XOR-MAJ over random graphs, together with a new planted-hypergraph conjecture. We prove low-degree lower bounds for the planting conjecture, providing evidence for subexponential hardness, and give lower bounds against dimension tests based on coordinatewise products (Schur products) of public-code vectors. The PKE schemes and lower bounds were discovered by the authors. The code construction was discovered by Codex / ChatGPT 6 Astra Ultra using harness components from the UCLA Moonshot Harness Project, in response to a general strategy suggested by the authors. See the end of the introduction for a discussion.

## zk-DEAP: A Zero-Knowledge Decentralized Encrypted Aggregation Protocol

DevFeed: [zk-DEAP: A Zero-Knowledge Decentralized Encrypted Aggregation Protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/zk-deap-a-zero-knowledge-decentralized-encrypted-aggregation-protocol-126910.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10020>)

Author: Jude Ramanan, Georgiana Haldeman, Noah Apthorpe

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [bind](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bind.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [circuit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/circuit.md>), [constraint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/constraint.md>), [contribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contribution.md>), [core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/core.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/knowledge.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [zero](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero.md>), [zero-knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge.md>)

### AI overview

zk-DEAP combines lifted ElGamal homomorphic encryption, FROST threshold cryptography, and zero-knowledge proofs to aggregate private inputs while checking constraints without a trusted party. Its key mechanism prevents a valid proof for one value from being paired with a ciphertext containing another: Bulletproofs use ciphertext-derived randomness modification, while zk-SNARKs and zk-STARKs use a blinded arithmetic hash commitment with an embedded Schnorr constraint. The authors say these methods bind the proof's private witness to the encrypted value, so verified constraints apply to the ciphertext. Three Rust variants were evaluated with 5-500 participants; the abstract reports modest overhead versus unverified aggregation and cryptographic protection against input manipulation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10020v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Secure aggregation in domains such as federated learning, Internet of Things, and voting requires operating on private inputs while preserving confidentiality, verifying that each input satisfies constraints, and avoiding trusted parties. Existing protocols achieve at most two of these requirements. We present zk-DEAP, a protocol combining lifted ElGamal homomorphic encryption, FROST threshold cryptography, and zero-knowledge proofs (Bulletproofs, zk-SNARKs, or zk-STARKs) for fully decentralized, verifiable, privacy-preserving aggregation. Our core technical contribution is a cryptographic binding mechanism preventing substitution attacks, where a valid proof for one input is paired with a ciphertext encrypting a different, malicious value. For Bulletproofs, we bind via ciphertext-derived randomness modification. For zk-SNARKs/zk-STARKs, to bind across algebraic structures (a well-known challenge in practical cryptography), we introduce a novel blinded arithmetic hash commitment with an embedded Schnorr constraint. These binding techniques force the ZKP's private witness to equal the encrypted value, ensuring any circuit-verified constraint applies to the ciphertext. We implement three production-ready, defense-in-depth variants in Rust and evaluate across 5-500 participants. Compared to unverified aggregation, zk-DEAP adds modest overhead while providing cryptographic guarantees against input manipulation that statistical defenses cannot match.

## An Agile Homomorphic Encryption and ML-KEM Scheme for Privacy-Preserving Health Data Processing

DevFeed: [An Agile Homomorphic Encryption and ML-KEM Scheme for Privacy-Preserving Health Data Processing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/an-agile-homomorphic-encryption-and-ml-kem-scheme-for-privacy-preserving-health-data-processing-126983.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12367>)

Author: Daniel Resende (SAS-ENSMSE), Nadia El Mrabet (SAS-ENSMSE), Ulrich K{\\"u}hne (IP Paris,LTCI)

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>)

Tags: [agile](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agile.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-processing.md>), [efficiency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiency.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [health](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/health.md>), [health-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/health-data.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [lattice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lattice.md>), [learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning.md>), [learning-with-errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning-with-errors.md>), [lwe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lwe.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processing.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes an agile scheme combining ML-KEM with BGV fully homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving health data processing in an embedded use case. It describes parameter selection and reports feasibility through a proof-of-concept implementation. The abstract notes that FHE supports computation on encrypted data but remains complex; it does not provide implementation details or quantitative performance results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12367v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The storage and processing of health data raise serious privacy concerns; therefore, the data must be encrypted. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows computations on encrypted data, which makes it a very promising technology in this context. However, although the efficiency of FHE algorithms has improved in recent years, they remain very complex. The security of several prominent FHE schemes is based on variants of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, which is also the basis of Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), the new post-quantum standard for asymmetric encryption. In this paper, we propose an agile cryptographic scheme -combining ML-KEM and BGV -that allows efficient implementations in an embedded use case. We describe the parameter selection for the proposed scheme and show its feasibility with a proof-of-concept implementation.

## CAROUSEL: GPU-Accelerated Private Vector Search via Homomorphic Sketching

DevFeed: [CAROUSEL: GPU-Accelerated Private Vector Search via Homomorphic Sketching](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/carousel-gpu-accelerated-private-vector-search-via-homomorphic-sketching-126933.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10622>)

Author: Sohaib, Divyakant Agrawal, Amr El Abbadi, Soamar Homsi

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [Multi-GPU](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-gpu.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-privacy.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-accelerated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-accelerated.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [vector](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vector.md>), [vector-search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vector-search.md>)

### AI overview

Carousel hides query embeddings by scoring every vector under homomorphic encryption, then raises scores to a power that preserves their order by magnitude while suppressing all but a handful. Homomorphic additions compress the sparse result into logarithmically many ciphertexts for client-side ranking. Scoring the full corpus avoids recall loss from candidate discarding; clients need no database-dependent state, so each insertion or deletion takes effect immediately with one vector write. The abstract reports recall@100 of 0.9715 on 1 billion BIGANN SIFT1B vectors across multiple GPUs, and recall@100 of 0.9845 with 3.735-second query latency on 100 million vectors using one GPU.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10622v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vector search on untrusted infrastructure exposes the \emph{query embedding}, a faithful summary of the user's intent. Fully homomorphic encryption can hide the query, but existing approaches still require a full scan followed by ranking of encrypted scores. Scalable private systems avoid encrypted ranking by either sending scores from a single cluster to the client or moving the search to the client, which must first stream the entire vector index for preprocessing. We present \textsc{Carousel}, which instead scores the full corpus under encryption and compresses the results for client-side ranking. The server scores every vector under encryption, raises the scores to a power that preserves their order by magnitude while suppressing all but a handful, and compresses the resulting sparse vector into a logarithmic number of ciphertexts using homomorphic additions alone. Because every vector is scored, \textsc{Carousel} incurs no recall loss from discarding candidates. Since clients hold no database-dependent state, insertions and deletions take effect immediately at the cost of a single vector write. \textsc{Carousel} searches $1$ billion vectors of BIGANN SIFT1B across multiple GPUs and achieves recall@100 of $0.9715$. At $100$ million SIFT vectors, it achieves recall@100 of $0.9845$ with a query latency of $3.735$ seconds on a single GPU.

## GPU-Accelerated Non-Interactive Encrypted Neural Network Training with Batched Diagonal Packing

DevFeed: [GPU-Accelerated Non-Interactive Encrypted Neural Network Training with Batched Diagonal Packing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gpu-accelerated-non-interactive-encrypted-neural-network-training-with-batched-diagonal-packing-125523.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12161>)

Author: Kentaro Mihara

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [Neural Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/neural-network.md>), [rust-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rust-ai.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>)

Tags: [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [cuda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cuda.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpu-accelerated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu-accelerated.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [neural-network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neural-network.md>), [packing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packing.md>), [simd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simd.md>), [training](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/training.md>)

### AI overview

The Rust CKKS implementation combines rectangular diagonal packing, feature-major SIMD mini-batch lanes, baby-step giant-step evaluation, and compact optimizer state. Its CUDA path keeps training and bootstrapping ciphertext arithmetic on the GPU, while key generation and client operations remain on the host. In a matched 100-update MNIST experiment, GPU bootstrapping reduced training time from 14,268.295 to 293.075 seconds (48.68x), with exactly equal decoded parameters and predictions; including setup and evaluation, the ratio was 40.67x. A separate GPU run completed ten passes over 4,800 images in 2,967.095 seconds and reached 90.35% test accuracy versus 90.41% for the plaintext twin. Results use a single initialization, and CPU/GPU parameter agreement was checked only at 100 updates, not across the full 1,000-update run. The released ReBoot baseline misses the stated common security-estimator threshold, and its full-setting CPU time is unmeasured, so the results do not establish unconditional superiority over it.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12161v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Training a neural network under homomorphic encryption requires transposes, batch reductions, optimizer updates, and repeated refreshes in addition to forward matrix products. We combine rectangular diagonal packing, feature-major SIMD mini-batch lanes, baby-step giant-step evaluation, and compact optimizer state in an MIT-licensed Rust CKKS implementation. Its CUDA path keeps training and bootstrap ciphertext arithmetic on the GPU, while retaining host key generation and client operations. In a matched 100-update experiment on the main non-interactive MNIST model, device-resident bootstrapping reduces training time from 14,268.295 to 293.075 seconds, a $48.68\times$ ratio against our CPU implementation, with exactly equal decoded parameters and predictions. Including setup and final evaluation gives a $40.67\times$ ratio. A separate GPU run completes ten passes over 4,800 images in 2,967.095 seconds and achieves 90.35% test accuracy versus 90.41% for its plaintext twin. These are single-initialization results; exact CPU/GPU parameter agreement is verified at 100 updates, not for the full 1,000-update run. Earlier completed CPU runs support a larger-batch key-switch advantage and baseline-batch accuracy within the registered tolerance, but the baseline-batch normalized key-switch target is missed. The released ReBoot baseline does not meet the common security-estimator threshold, and its full-setting CPU time is unmeasured. We therefore distinguish measured acceleration of our implementation from conditional layout comparisons and do not claim unconditional superiority over ReBoot.

## Jaguar: Fast Private Neural Network Inference with Power-of-Two Homomorphic Arithmetic

DevFeed: [Jaguar: Fast Private Neural Network Inference with Power-of-Two Homomorphic Arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/jaguar-fast-private-neural-network-inference-with-power-of-two-homomorphic-arithmetic-116111.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11827>)

Author: Yewon Jeong, Nayoung Jung, Hyeri Roh, Woo-Seok Choi

Published: 2026-11-04T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [2pc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2pc.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [avx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/avx.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [convolution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/convolution.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [fast](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fast.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [jaguar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jaguar.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [neural](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neural.md>), [neural-network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neural-network.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>)

### AI overview

Jaguar targets two bottlenecks in hybrid homomorphic encryption/two-party computation inference: prime-modulus convolution and doubled-precision ReLU followed by separate truncation. Its power-of-two ciphertext ring enables SPA-Conv, which uses Scalar-Polynomial Accumulation in the coefficient domain, and exact ciphertext-side truncation by local right shifts, allowing ReLU at target fixed-point precision without a post-ReLU truncation protocol. For client-side decryption, Jaguar uses an auxiliary NTT prime for the single polynomial multiplication, retaining O(N log N) decryption. On ImageNet-scale ResNet-18, ResNet-50, and MobileNetV2 with AVX disabled, the abstract reports 2.07-3.72x lower end-to-end latency than Cheetah and 2.16-3.36x lower than Rhombus, plus 1.16-1.76x lower communication than Cheetah.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2606.11827v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Hybrid HE/2PC private neural network inference remains bottlenecked by prime-modulus homomorphic arithmetic in convolution and by a precision flow that runs ReLU at doubled bitwidth before invoking a separate truncation protocol. We present Jaguar, a system built on a single design choice--a power-of-two ciphertext ring--that addresses both. The choice enables SPA-Conv, a coefficient-domain convolution kernel that replaces NTT-centric polynomial multiplication with Scalar-Polynomial Accumulation, and an exact ciphertext-side truncation by local right shifts that lets ReLU run directly at the target fixed-point precision and eliminates the post-ReLU truncation protocol. Where NTT remains genuinely useful--at the client, for the single polynomial multiplication during decryption--we recover it through an auxiliary NTT prime, preserving the power-of-two protocol substrate while keeping decryption O(N log N). On ImageNet-scale ResNet-18, ResNet-50, and MobileNetV2 with AVX disabled, Jaguar achieves 2.07-3.72x lower end-to-end latency than Cheetah and 2.16-3.36x lower than Rhombus, with 1.16-1.76x lower communication than Cheetah.

## General Linear-Layer Algorithms for Privacy-Preserving Transformer Inference

DevFeed: [General Linear-Layer Algorithms for Privacy-Preserving Transformer Inference](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/general-linear-layer-algorithms-for-privacy-preserving-transformer-inference-113998.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.25349>)

Author: Wenshao Yang, Zhenhua Liu, Dongdong Yao

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/algorithms.md>), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>)

Tags: [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/layer.md>), [linear](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linear.md>), [mpc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mpc.md>), [online](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/online.md>), [pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pipelines.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [ring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ring.md>), [rlwe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rlwe.md>), [rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rotation.md>), [secret-sharing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-sharing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [transformer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transformer.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes general linear-layer algorithms for two-party privacy-preserving Transformer inference using FHE and additive secret sharing. The authors say the algorithms work with compatible RLWE-based schemes and integrate with both non-interactive FHE and hybrid FHE-MPC pipelines, with output interfaces designed for composition with different nonlinear layers. Compared with existing linear-layer schemes, they remove online key switching, ciphertext transmission, and ring-field conversion. A fused RNS-CKKS technique also reduces the computational cost of multiplication followed by rotation. The authors prove correctness and semi-honest security and quantify savings analytically; the supplied excerpt does not provide numerical results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2606.25349v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Two-party privacy-preserving Transformer inference today mainly follows one of two paradigms: non-interactive computation over fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), or a hybrid of FHE and secure multi-party computation (MPC). Either way, linear layers account for a large share of the compute and communication budget. Most existing systems attack this cost by designing bespoke plaintext encodings and ciphertext matrix algorithms that minimize the expensive key-switching operations. The price is tight coupling: each scheme only works with its own packing/encoding strategy, and moving data between linear and nonlinear layers still triggers online ciphertext transmission and ring-field conversion. We take a different route. Instead of optimizing within a chosen encoding, we design a series of general algorithms for linear layers that can be readily integrated into existing inference systems, based on FHE and additive secret sharing. Our algorithms work with any compatible RLWE-based scheme and plug into both non-interactive FHE and hybrid FHE-MPC pipelines. Output interfaces in proposed algorithms allow them to be composed with different downstream nonlinear layers. Relative to existing linear layer schemes, our construction removes online key switching, ciphertext transmission, and online ring-field conversion. As a complement, we further propose a fused RNS-CKKS technique that reduces the computational cost of multiplication followed by rotation. We prove correctness and semi-honest security of the proposed algorithms and quantify the resulting savings analytically.

## End-to-End NTT on FPGA for FHE Acceleration

DevFeed: [End-to-End NTT on FPGA for FHE Acceleration](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/end-to-end-ntt-on-fpga-for-fhe-acceleration-114096.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03325>)

Author: Mohamed Allam, Thomas Spendlhofer, Hugo Sanz-Gonz\\'alez, Antonio J. Pe\\~na

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Neural Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/neural-network.md>), [polynomials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/polynomials.md>), [computational complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/computational-complexity.md>)

Tags: [acceleration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceleration.md>), [cs-ar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ar.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [fpga](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fpga.md>), [ntt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ntt.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents an end-to-end FPGA acceleration of the number theoretic transform (NTT) and its inverse for fully homomorphic encryption. Its fully unrolled, delay-commutator streaming kernel is floorplanned across the three dies of an AMD Alveo V80 and, at 400 MHz, transforms 2^16 coefficients every 5.12 μs. With transfer and offload included, it is up to 22x faster than the CPU per transform. Integrated into the Lattigo library, it accelerates core FHE operations by 1.8-2.2x and neural-network inference by 1.8-2.1x under 128-bit secure parameters. The abstract reports these results but provides no implementation details or evaluation beyond the stated setup and metrics.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.03325v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables privacy-preserving computation on encrypted data without decryption. Despite its strong security guarantees, FHE incurs substantial computational and memory overhead. In FHE-based deep learning inference, on average 63% of the CPU time is spent on the number theoretic transform (NTT) and its inverse (INTT), which reduce the complexity of polynomial multiplication from $O(N^2)$ to $O(N \log N)$. Prior FPGA works follow two approaches: accelerating entire FHE schemes, which yields significant speedups but ties them to specific parameters and algorithms, or accelerating only the NTT, which applies across schemes, algorithms, and libraries. Most FPGA NTT designs require interconnects that grow with parallelism and utilize significant resources, which complicates routing on multi-die FPGAs. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, end-to-end NTT acceleration within an FHE context has so far been left unexplored. We design a fully unrolled, delay-commutator streaming NTT/INTT kernel, and floorplan it across the three dies of an AMD Alveo V80. At 400 MHz, the kernel transforms a polynomial of $2^{16}$ coefficients every 5.12 $\mu$s, the highest throughput among FPGA designs at this size. Offloaded end to end, it is up to 22x faster than the CPU per transform. We integrate the kernel into the Lattigo FHE library and evaluate it end to end. With 128-bit secure parameters, it accelerates core FHE operations, such as key switching and bootstrapping, by 1.8-2.2x, and neural network inference by 1.8-2.1x.

## BRASP: Hiding Where You Look in Encrypted Spatial Keyword Search

DevFeed: [BRASP: Hiding Where You Look in Encrypted Spatial Keyword Search](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/brasp-hiding-where-you-look-in-encrypted-spatial-keyword-search-113987.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.07797>)

Author: Jing Zhang, Ganxuan Yang, Yifei Yang, Siqi Wen, Baiyan Li, Zhengyang Qiu, Hasan Ahmed, Muhammad Bilal

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [search-engines](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/search-engines.md>)

Tags: [boolean](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boolean.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [source-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/source-code.md>), [spatial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spatial.md>), [updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/updates.md>)

### AI overview

BRASP supports Boolean spatial range queries combined with conjunctive keyword matching over encrypted data. It uses Hilbert-curve prefix encoding and encrypted prefix-ID and keyword-ID indexes; under a dual-server setting, index shuffling and redistribution of ID fields across two non-colluding servers are intended to hide search and access patterns. The scheme also supports dynamic updates and forward security. The abstract reports formal analyses of confidentiality, shuffle indistinguishability, query unforgeability, and forward security, plus experiments on a real-world dataset with relatively low computation and communication overhead. No quantitative performance results are provided in the supplied text.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2604.07797v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Searchable Encryption (SE) enables users to query outsourced encrypted data while preserving data confidentiality. However, most efficient schemes still leak the search pattern and access pattern, which may allow an honest-but-curious cloud server to infer query contents, user interests, or returned records from repeated searches and observed results. Existing pattern-hiding solutions mainly target keyword queries and do not naturally support Boolean range queries over encrypted spatial data. This paper presents BRASP, a searchable encryption scheme for Boolean range queries over encrypted spatial data. BRASP combines Hilbert-curve-based prefix encoding with encrypted prefix--ID and keyword--ID inverted indexes to support efficient spatial range filtering and conjunctive keyword matching. To hide the search pattern and access pattern under a dual-server setting, BRASP integrates index shuffling for encrypted keyword and prefix entries with ID-field redistribution across two non-colluding cloud servers. BRASP also supports dynamic updates and achieves forward security. We formalize the security of BRASP through confidentiality, shuffle indistinguishability, query unforgeability, and forward-security analyses, and we evaluate its performance experimentally on a real-world dataset. The results show that BRASP effectively protects query privacy while incurring relatively low computation and communication overhead. To facilitate reproducibility and further research, the source code of BRASP is publicly available at https://github.com/Egbert-Lannister/BRASP

## Rosemary: Efficient and Adaptable In-Storage Acceleration for Fully Homomorphic Encryption

DevFeed: [Rosemary: Efficient and Adaptable In-Storage Acceleration for Fully Homomorphic Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rosemary-efficient-and-adaptable-in-storage-acceleration-for-fully-homomorphic-encryption-109035.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38262>)

Author: Xuan Wang, Tianqi Zhang, Gabrielle De Micheli, Yujin Nam, Keming Fan, Augusto Vega, Minxuan Zhou, Tajana Rosing

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>)

Tags: [acceleration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceleration.md>), [accelerators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerators.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [compiler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compiler.md>), [compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compute.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-ar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ar.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data-movement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-movement.md>), [deep-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deep-learning.md>), [delay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delay.md>), [efficiency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/efficiency.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [exploits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploits.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [flash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flash.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>)

### AI overview

Rosemary targets storage I/O, which the authors report consumes 71%-85% of execution time in state-of-the-art FHE systems. It combines a hardware-aware FHE engine inside a NAND flash SSD with a Throughput-Data-Aware Program Allocator (TDAP) that partitions workloads across heterogeneous programs and a Compiler-Level Ciphertext-Aware Optimizer (CLCAO) that selects ISP-friendly kernels. Across workloads including encrypted deep learning inference and cloud database queries, the abstract reports geometric-mean speedups of 185.7x over CPU/GPU implementations and 3.7x over prior FHE accelerators, plus up to 3.9x better energy efficiency and 16.5x better Energy-Delay-Area-Product. These are abstract-level reported results; no evaluation details are supplied here.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.38262v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data and is promising for privacy-preserving computing. However, FHE deployment remains constrained due to massive computational, memory, and data-movement overheads. Existing acceleration strategies often overlook the storage I/O bottleneck caused by the enormous size of FHE data in large-scale applications, as most prior works focus on small benchmarks that fit in main memory. Our studies show that state-of-the-art FHE systems spend 71\% to 85\% of their execution time moving data between storage and compute units rather than performing useful computation. To address the I/O bottleneck, we present Rosemary, a heterogeneous FHE acceleration system that incorporates a novel in-storage processing (ISP) architecture with compiler-level and algorithmic optimizations. Our key innovations include 1) an adaptable hardware-aware FHE engine inside a NAND flash-based solid-state drive (SSD) for efficient and cost-effective in-storage FHE processing, 2) a Throughput-Data-Aware Program Allocator (TDAP) that partitions FHE workloads into heterogeneous programs, and 3) a Compiler-Level Ciphertext-Aware Optimizer (CLCAO) that exploits ISP-friendly FHE kernels for low-cost ISP execution. Across a diverse set of FHE workloads, including encrypted deep learning inference and cloud database queries, Rosemary achieves geometric-mean speedups of $185.7\times$ over state-of-the-art CPU/GPU implementations and $3.7\times$ over prior FHE accelerators, while improving energy efficiency by up to $3.9\times$ and Energy-Delay-Area-Product (EDAP) by up to $16.5\times$.

## GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis

DevFeed: [GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gks-fully-homomorphic-encryption-security-analysis-103375.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37061>)

Author: John Graham, Soundes Marzougui, Milo\\v{s} Pavlovi\\'c, Vladimir Shpilrain

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [math-ra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/math-ra.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The abstract says GKS supports computation on encrypted data without bootstrapping or de-linearization, offers bit-exact decryption and native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth. The supplied text does not provide the analysis or its security findings, so those cannot be summarized here.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.37061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: All traditional encryption schemes share a fundamental operational vulnerability: encrypted data must be decrypted before it can be used. Fully homomorphic encryption eliminates this vulnerability by enabling computation directly on encrypted data, but existing FHE schemes impose substantial practical constraints that limit deployment. This paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key FHE scheme. GKS requires no bootstrapping or de-linearization, produces bit-exact decryption, supports native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth.

## BioZKFHE: Scalable Encrypted Biometric Identification via Verifiable Homomorphic Similarity Evaluation

DevFeed: [BioZKFHE: Scalable Encrypted Biometric Identification via Verifiable Homomorphic Similarity Evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/biozkfhe-scalable-encrypted-biometric-identification-via-verifiable-homomorphic-similarity-evaluation-103324.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.22065>)

Author: Rundong Xin, Taotao Wang, Xiaoxiao Wu, Weizhi Meng, Shengli Zhang, Shui Yu

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>), [Facial recognition](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/facial-recognition.md>), [Embeddings](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embeddings.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [embedding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedding.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [packing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packing.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [similarity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/similarity.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [templates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/templates.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

BioZKFHE aims to protect biometric data during outsourced 1:N identification while verifying encrypted similarity results before release. It combines BGV homomorphic computation with committee-based threshold opening, verification, and decryption, with smart contracts enforcing verification attestations. SCMV packing uses base-T expansion to store multiple quantized embedding values per plaintext entry, reducing encrypted storage and avoiding rotation-heavy matching. PVSC uses BGV's Double-CRT structure to split blockwise similarity traces into parallel proof instances that are checked before results are released. The authors analyze security and integrity under standard lattice assumptions and explicit committee/verifier assumptions. FaceNet and MobileFaceNet experiments report near-lossless utility, up to 67% lower encrypted storage, and 22-44 seconds of end-to-end proof-verified runtime for 10,000-40,000 templates.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.22065v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large-scale biometric identification in outsourced settings requires two properties simultaneously: biometric templates and queries must remain protected during computation, and the encrypted similarity outputs produced by an untrusted compute node must be verifiably correct before any application result is released. Existing FHE-based biometric systems primarily address confidentiality, while practical verifiability introduces two bottlenecks in the underlying encrypted 1:N matching layer: rotation- and bandwidth-heavy similarity evaluation and the high cost of proving repeated homomorphic similarity traces. We present BioZKFHE, a framework for scalable encrypted biometric identification via verifiable homomorphic similarity evaluation that combines BGV homomorphic computation with committee-based threshold opening, verification, and decryption, and smart-contract enforcement of the committee's verification attestations. To reduce encrypted storage and avoid rotation-heavy encrypted 1:N matching, we propose Single-Coefficient Multi-Value (SCMV) packing, which binds multiple quantized embedding values into each plaintext entry through base-T expansion. To make proof generation practical, we propose Parallelizable and Verifiable Similarity Computation (PVSC), which exploits the Double-CRT execution structure of BGV to decompose each blockwise similarity trace into parallel proof instances that are opened and checked before result release. Under standard lattice assumptions and explicit committee/verifier assumptions, we analyze recoverability, noise growth, confidentiality, encrypted-output integrity, and finalized-result integrity. Experiments on FaceNet and MobileFaceNet show near-lossless biometric utility, up to 67% encrypted-storage reduction, and about 22-44 s end-to-end proof-verified runtime for 10k-40k templates.

## Homomorphic Quantum Error Correction

DevFeed: [Homomorphic Quantum Error Correction](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/homomorphic-quantum-error-correction-101346.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25692>)

Author: Kornikar Sen, Miguel A. Martin-Delgado

Published: 2026-10-27T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-it](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-it.md>), [error-correction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error-correction.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [math-it](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/math-it.md>), [quant-ph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quant-ph.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [quantum-error-correction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-error-correction.md>)

### AI overview

For the transversal block-Pauli mask \((X^aZ^b)^{\otimes n}\), an [[n,1,d]] stabilizer code remains compatible exactly when the transversal X and Z each commute with every stabilizer generator. Each operator can be incompatible, compatible but logically trivial, or compatible with a nontrivial logical Pauli action; their classes may differ. Exact computations find all three classes in surface-code families, but only compatible classes in color codes, with outcomes depending on lattice size and boundary presentation. The Shor code does not implement logical T through transversal \(T^{\otimes 9}\), while suitable triorthogonal codes do so with a Clifford correction. When the mask preserves the code space, syndrome extraction and recovery are key-independent, and decryption requires the block size and code class.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2605.25692v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the algebraic compatibility between quantum homomorphic encryption and stabilizer quantum error correction in an honest-but-curious model, restricting the encryption to the transversal block-Pauli mask $(X^aZ^b)^{\otimes n}$ controlled by two secret key bits $a$ and $b$. We prove a necessary and sufficient criterion for an $[[n,1,d]]$ stabilizer code to remain compatible with this mask, namely that the transversal $X$ and $Z$ operators commute with every stabilizer generator, and we specialize it to a classical-code criterion for Calderbank--Shor--Steane codes. Combining code-space preservation with the logical action of the mask, every stabilizer code falls, with respect to each of the two transversal mask operators, into exactly one of three classes: incompatible, compatible but trivially acting, or compatible with a nontrivial logical Pauli action; the two operators need not fall into the same class. We verify this classification by exact symplectic computation for rotated and planar surface codes, toric codes, triangular and toric color codes, the $[[15,1,3]]$ code and several small codes, and find that the class is fixed by the lattice size and the boundary presentation rather than by the topological phase: the surface-code family realizes all three classes, whereas color codes realize only the two compatible ones. For encrypted computation we show that the Shor code does not implement the logical $T$ gate by a transversal $T^{\otimes 9}$, whereas suitable triorthogonal codes do so up to a Clifford correction. We formulate logical-Pauli masking as a code-independent algebraic template. Syndrome extraction and recovery are key-independent whenever the mask preserves the code space, so that the client only needs the block size and the class of the code to decrypt.

## Holo-NN: Holographic Nearest Neighbor Search via Compressive Sensing

DevFeed: [Holo-NN: Holographic Nearest Neighbor Search via Compressive Sensing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/holo-nn-holographic-nearest-neighbor-search-via-compressive-sensing-101390.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.33224>)

Author: Bryant Gipson

Published: 2026-10-27T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>)

Topics: [ann](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ann.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-privacy.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [ann](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ann.md>), [approximate-nearest-neighbor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/approximate-nearest-neighbor.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [comparison](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/comparison.md>), [cpus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpus.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [cs-ir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ir.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [embeddings](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embeddings.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [feature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature.md>), [fhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fhe.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [nearest-neighbor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nearest-neighbor.md>), [search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/search.md>), [sensing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensing.md>)

### AI overview

Holo-NN replaces branching-based ANN indexes with a linear projection for privacy-preserving nearest-neighbor search. It combines locality-preserving feature transforms with compressive sensing to fold the database offline into a compact sensing matrix; encrypted queries then use one non-interactive matrix-vector multiplication. The abstract says this requires no FHE bootstrapping, multi-round interaction, or client-side index state, and can run on CPUs and GPUs with tunable accuracy. These are claims from the abstract; the supplied excerpt gives no benchmark results or details of its comparison with other private ANN methods.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.33224v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In the age of AI, privacy-preserving approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) search over high-dimensional embeddings has emerged as a critical yet frustratingly challenging domain, dominated by tradeoffs between speed, privacy, and accuracy. Traditional tree and graph-based indexing structures (e.g., HNSW, ScaNN) rely fundamentally on non-linear operations that are computationally intractable under Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) or blind server-side constraints. In this paper, we introduce Holo-NN (Holographic Nearest Neighbor Search), an algebraic framework that replaces data-dependent branching with a single linear projection. Our key observation is that while distances across a database are dense, neighborhood membership is inherently sparse: only a handful of points ever lie close to a query. By pairing locality-preserving feature transforms with Compressive Sensing, Holo-NN folds the entire database offline into a compact holographic sensing matrix. At query time, encrypted search reduces to a single, non-interactive matrix-vector multiplication---requiring no FHE bootstrapping, no multi-round interaction, and no client-side index state. This turns private retrieval into an embarrassingly parallel, accuracy-tunable computation that runs out of the box on both CPUs and GPUs, scaling efficiently to production databases. We offer a comparison against other state-of-the-art Private ANN algorithms to help situate the method in the broader context of production-grade private retrieval.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTI3VDA0OjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjg0N2I3ZDRmLTIyNzQtNDc4NC1hODY1LTJhNTI5ZTNkNzFkMiJd>)