# JSON Web Tokens

JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe format for representing claims between parties, using JSON Web Signature or JSON Web Encryption structures.

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## CVE-2026-77338 - Sprout Track: Authentication bypass via default JWT signing secret

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-77338 - Sprout Track: Authentication bypass via default JWT signing secret](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-77338-sprout-track-authentication-bypass-via-default-jwt-signing-secret-143945.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77338>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-19T17:18:59Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve-2026-77338](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-77338.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [oak-and-sprout](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oak-and-sprout.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [sprout](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sprout.md>), [sprout-track](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sprout-track.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 1.3.5, Sprout Track may use a publicly known JWT signing secret if JWT_SECRET is unset; standard setup does not create a unique one. On a network-reachable affected deployment, an unauthenticated attacker can forge tokens with arbitrary claims, including administrator claims, to access administrative functions and read or modify family, child activity, account, and email data. Deployments configured with a strong unique JWT_SECRET are not affected. The issue is fixed in version 1.3.5; managed and hosted instances were reported remediated.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-77338 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 5:18 p.m. | 26 minutes ago Description :Sprout Track is a self-hosted baby tracking application. Prior to 1.3.5, Sprout Track uses a publicly known hardcoded signing secret when JWT_SECRET is unset, and standard setup does not generate a unique secret. On a network-reachable affected deployment, an unauthenticated attacker can sign JWTs with arbitrary claims, including system-administrator claims, to access administrative functionality and read or modify family, child activity, account, and email data. Deployments with a strong unique JWT_SECRET are not affected. Managed and hosted instances were reported remediated. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.5. Severity: 9.3 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-120753 - Eclipse Ditto gateway accepts \`x-ditto-pre-authenticated\` from a URL query parameter, allowing unauthenticated subject impersonation (default Helm chart)

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-120753 - Eclipse Ditto gateway accepts \`x-ditto-pre-authenticated\` from a URL query parameter, allowing unauthenticated subject impersonation (default Helm chart)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-120753-eclipse-ditto-gateway-accepts-x-ditto-pre-authenticated-from-a-url-query-parameter-allowing-unauthenticated-subject-impersonation-default-helm-chart-143721.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120753>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; eclipse.org

Published: 2026-11-19T14:48:18Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gateway.md>), [Query (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/query.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-120753](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-120753.md>), [ditto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ditto.md>), [eclipse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eclipse.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [helm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/helm.md>), [helm-chart](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/helm-chart.md>), [impersonation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impersonation.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [parameter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parameter.md>), [policies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policies.md>), [policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [query](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/query.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [things](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/things.md>), [url](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/url.md>)

### AI overview

Eclipse Ditto 1.1.0-3.9.8 can allow unauthenticated impersonation when pre-authentication is enabled: the gateway accepts a client-controlled `x-ditto-pre-authenticated` URL query parameter in addition to the trusted proxy header. In the default Helm chart configuration (`global.jwtOnly: false`), nginx skips Basic authentication for requests with a Bearer authorization header; an attacker can pair an invalid token with the query parameter, and pre-authentication occurs before JWT validation. The attacker may then read or modify Things and Policies permitted to the chosen subject. Disable gateway pre-authentication with `ENABLE_PRE_AUTHENTICATION=false`, or set Helm `global.jwtOnly: true`. The excerpt does not provide patch or fixed-version details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-120753 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 2:48 p.m. | 34 minutes ago Description :In Eclipse Ditto versions 1.1.0 to 3.9.8, when pre-authentication is enabled, the gateway service accepts the pre-authenticated subject not only from the `x-ditto-pre-authenticated` HTTP header set by a trusted reverse proxy, but also from an undocumented `x-ditto-pre-authenticated` URL query parameter that a client can set. A reverse proxy that only overwrites the header therefore does not stop clients from supplying their own subject. With the default configuration of the Ditto Helm chart (`global.jwtOnly: false`, which implicitly enables pre-authentication), the bundled nginx skips HTTP Basic authentication for any request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header and forwards it without the pre-authentication header. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send an invalid Bearer token together with the query parameter to authenticate as any chosen policy subject. Pre-authentication succeeds before the JWT is validated, so the attacker can read and modify Things and Policies with that subject's permissions. As a mitigation, disable pre-authentication in the gateway (`ENABLE_PRE_AUTHENTICATION=false`) or, when using the Helm chart, configure `global.jwtOnly: true`. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-73969 - AnsibleForms: Authentication bypass via hard-coded default JWT signing secret

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-73969 - AnsibleForms: Authentication bypass via hard-coded default JWT signing secret](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-73969-ansibleforms-authentication-bypass-via-hard-coded-default-jwt-signing-secret-141189.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73969>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-18T20:14:51Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [ansibleforms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ansibleforms.md>), [ansibleguy76](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ansibleguy76.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-73969](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-73969.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [full](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/full.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>), [self-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-service.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 6.2.1, AnsibleForms could accept forged administrator JWTs when ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET was unset: a public fallback signing secret let unauthenticated attackers create tokens with privileged claims, which the application trusted for authorization without reloading the user from the database. This enabled authentication bypass and privileged API access. The issue is fixed in version 6.2.1.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-73969 Published : Nov. 18, 2026, 8:14 p.m. | 39 minutes ago Description :AnsibleForms is a self-hosted web application that turns automation into self-service forms. Prior to 6.2.1, AnsibleForms uses a public hard-coded fallback JWT signing secret from server/config/auth.config.js when ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET is unset. An unauthenticated attacker can sign a self-contained token with privileged claims because server/src/auth/auth_jwt.js verifies the signature without reloading the user from the database, and server/src/lib/middleware.js trusts the token's roles and options for authorization. A forged token can therefore be accepted as an administrator session, resulting in authentication bypass and full privileged API access. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.1. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Securing REST APIs with JWT authorizers in Amazon API Gateway

DevFeed: [Securing REST APIs with JWT authorizers in Amazon API Gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/securing-rest-apis-with-jwt-authorizers-in-amazon-api-gateway-139433.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/compute/securing-rest-apis-with-jwt-authorizers-in-amazon-api-gateway/>)

Author: Giedrius Praspaliauskas

Published: 2026-11-17T18:39:16Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Compute Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-compute-blog.md>)

Topics: [Amazon API Gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-api-gateway.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Amazon Cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-cognito.md>), [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>)

Tags: [amazon-api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-api-gateway.md>), [amazon-cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cognito.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [authorizer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorizer.md>), [identity-provider](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-provider.md>), [intermediate-200](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate-200.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [lambda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lambda.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [rest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest.md>), [rest-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest-api.md>), [scopes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scopes.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

Amazon API Gateway REST API JWT authorizers validate OIDC tokens in the request path without a Lambda invocation. Configure trusted issuers, audiences, signing algorithms and optional claim rules; API Gateway checks signatures, expiry, not-before time and method scopes, then passes validated claims to the integration. The walkthrough applies separate `orders:read` and `orders:write` scopes to GET and POST methods and adds a Cognito user pool as a second issuer. Missing, malformed, expired or untrusted tokens receive 401; valid tokens failing scope or claim checks receive 403. Lambda authorizers remain useful for custom logic, token introspection or non-JWT credentials. Limits include 1-10 issuers, cached signing keys, no revocation checks, and public issuer URLs. Scope checks use `scope` or `scp`; the article notes Entra ID client-credentials permissions in `roles` require a dedicated audience per caller or a Lambda authorizer for role checks.

### Source excerpt

Amazon API Gateway REST APIs now support JWT authorizers, which validate tokens from any OIDC-compatible identity provider in API Gateway itself, with no Lambda authorizer required. Learn how JWT authorizers work, then build a REST API that accepts machine-to-machine tokens with per-method scopes and adds an Amazon Cognito user pool as a second issuer.

## CVE-2026-120387 - CIRCUTOR PowerStudio SCADA WAVE JWT Signature Validation Authentication Bypass

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-120387 - CIRCUTOR PowerStudio SCADA WAVE JWT Signature Validation Authentication Bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-120387-circutor-powerstudio-scada-wave-jwt-signature-validation-authentication-bypass-136590.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120387>)

Author: CVEFEED.io

Published: 2026-11-17T05:18:33Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [component](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/component.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-120387](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-120387.md>), [desktop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/desktop.md>), [functionality](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/functionality.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [jwt-signature-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-signature-verification.md>), [none](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/none.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [scada](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scada.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

CVE-2026-120387 is reported as a critical (10.0) remotely exploitable authentication bypass in the desktop version of CIRCUTOR PowerStudio SCADA WAVE. An unauthenticated attacker can submit an unsigned JWT using the "none" algorithm; the shared validation component reportedly accepts it without checking a cryptographic signature, enabling impersonation and access to protected functionality with the impersonated user's privileges. The excerpt lists no affected product versions, so it does not establish the precise scope.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-120387 Published : Nov. 17, 2026, 5:18 a.m. | 1 hour, 4 minutes ago Description :An improper JWT signature verification vulnerability in CIRCUTOR PowerStudio SCADA WAVE desktop version allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication by submitting an unsigned JWT with the algorithm set to "none". The shared JWT validation component accepts the token without verifying a cryptographic signature, allowing the attacker to impersonate another user and access protected functionality with that user's privileges. Severity: 10.0 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## How your MCP server should call your API on the user's behalf

DevFeed: [How your MCP server should call your API on the user's behalf](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-your-mcp-server-should-call-your-api-on-the-user-s-behalf-140650.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/mcp-server-call-api-on-behalf-of-user>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-11-17T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [A Minimal View for Token Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/a-minimal-view-for-token-exchange.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/act.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [bearer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bearer.md>), [cimd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cimd.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [consent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consent.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [dashboard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dashboard.md>), [error](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [token-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token-exchange.md>), [workos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workos.md>)

### AI overview

An MCP server should exchange the user's MCP access token for a token scoped to the API, rather than forward the original: its audience is the MCP server, so the API should reject it. In WorkOS Connect, the server needs a first-party application with a client secret, both services registered as Resource Indicators, and token exchange enabled. It posts the user's eligible access token to `/oauth2/token`, naming the API URL as `resource`; it may request narrower scopes, which cannot be widened. The returned token keeps the user and organization, sets the API as `aud`, and records the exchanging app in `act`. The API should verify the signature, issuer, audience, actor and required scopes. The response includes no refresh or ID token and expires no later than the source token, so the server must exchange again when needed. Introspection can check current token status, but does not validate audience or return `act`; those claims still require separate checks. This overview reflects the supplied body text.

### Source excerpt

Use WorkOS Connect token exchange to swap the user's MCP token for one scoped to your API, then check the claims your API needs to trust it.

## CVE-2026-129552 - Tensei through 0.11.5 Authentication Bypass via Hard-Coded JWT Secret in @tensei/auth

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-129552 - Tensei through 0.11.5 Authentication Bypass via Hard-Coded JWT Secret in @tensei/auth](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-129552-tensei-through-0-11-5-authentication-bypass-via-hard-coded-jwt-secret-in-tensei-auth-135346.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129552>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-16T12:17:53Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [auth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-129552](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-129552.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>)

### AI overview

Tensei through 0.11.5 has an authentication bypass in @tensei/auth when JWT_SECRET is unset: the package falls back to the hard-coded signing key `auth-secret-key`. The supplied description says unauthenticated attackers can sign tokens with arbitrary user IDs that `populateContextFromToken` accepts, allowing impersonation of any user, including administrators. The source rates the issue 9.8 (critical); it does not provide mitigation or remediation steps.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-129552 Published : Nov. 16, 2026, 12:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 20 minutes ago Description :Tensei through 0.11.5 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in @tensei/auth that falls back to the hard-coded JWT signing key 'auth-secret-key' when JWT_SECRET is unset. Unauthenticated attackers can sign tokens with arbitrary user ids accepted by populateContextFromToken to impersonate any user, including administrators. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis

DevFeed: [Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/securing-fastapi-applications-jwt-authentication-and-rate-limiting-with-redis-134136.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.sitepoint.com/securing-fastapi-applications-jwt-authentication-and-rate-limiting-with-redis/>)

Author: Christian chimeremeze ezenwa

Published: 2026-11-14T13:51:10Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [SitePoint](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sitepoint.md>)

Topics: [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Redis](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/redis.md>), [FastAPI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fastapi.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [fastapi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fastapi.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rate-limiting.md>), [redis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/redis.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt describes a FastAPI design that combines JWT authentication with Redis-backed revocation and rate limiting. FastAPI uses asynchronous Redis as shared state so token blacklists and request counts stay synchronized across server instances; python-jose signs and verifies JWTs, passlib[bcrypt] hashes passwords, and slowapi limits requests by client IP, returning 429 when a limit is exceeded. Protected routes reject missing, invalid, expired, or blacklisted tokens with 401. The described login stores a token in Redis with a TTL matching its expiration, while the sample credential check is hardcoded. The text says production deployment would need token refresh, per-user limits, highly available Redis, and secure secret management. It outlines conceptual validation scenarios rather than reporting test results.

### Source excerpt

null Continue reading Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis on SitePoint.

## CVE-2026-95613 - Zenitel Connect pREST API adopts arbitrary PostgreSQL role from unvalidated JWT sub claim

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-95613 - Zenitel Connect pREST API adopts arbitrary PostgreSQL role from unvalidated JWT sub claim](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-95613-zenitel-connect-prest-api-adopts-arbitrary-postgresql-role-from-unvalidated-jwt-sub-claim-132487.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95613>)

Author: CVEFEED.io

Published: 2026-11-13T16:19:38Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [PostgreSQL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postgresql.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [containers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/containers.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-95613](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-95613.md>), [data-volume](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-volume.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [filesystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/filesystem.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [password](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/password.md>), [postgres](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgres.md>), [postgresql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgresql.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [rest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest.md>), [rest-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest-api.md>)

### AI overview

In Zenitel Connect firmware before 1.11.0, the pREST API sets the PostgreSQL session role from an unvalidated JWT `sub` claim while connected as the `postgres` superuser. The API signs and verifies tokens using a platform CA private key stored on a data volume shared between containers. A local attacker who can read that key can forge a JWT with `sub=postgres` and use the API to perform database operations as the superuser, including reading the master encryption key and password hashes. The excerpt reports no affected products in its product table, so it does not identify specific product versions beyond the firmware range in the description.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-95613 Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 4:19 p.m. | 1 hour ago Description :The pREST database REST API in Zenitel Connect firmware before 1.11.0 signs and verifies JWTs with the platform CA private key, which is stored on a data volume shared between containers, and sets the PostgreSQL session role from the unvalidated sub claim of each request while connected to the database as the "postgres" superuser, which allows local attackers who can read the platform CA private key from the container filesystem to execute database operations as the PostgreSQL superuser, including reading the master encryption key and password hashes, via a forged JWT with sub=postgres sent to the pREST API. Severity: 8.6 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Why JWT Signature Verification Alone Can't Prevent Token Replay

DevFeed: [Why JWT Signature Verification Alone Can't Prevent Token Replay](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-jwt-signature-verification-alone-can-t-prevent-token-replay-118812.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/why-jwt-signature-verification-alone-cant-prevent-token-replay?source=rss>)

Author: Sai Pavan Kumar Mandapaka

Published: 2026-11-05T07:05:57Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [api-authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-authorization.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [cross-api-token-replay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-api-token-replay.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [jwt-audience-validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-audience-validation.md>), [jwt-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-security.md>), [jwt-signature-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-signature-verification.md>), [oauth-2-0-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-2-0-security.md>), [oauth-access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-access-tokens.md>), [oauth-audience-restriction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-audience-restriction.md>)

### AI overview

Signature verification proves a JWT is authentic; it does not prove the token was issued for the API receiving it. In a hypothetical shared-issuer setup, an API that checks signature, issuer, and expiry but skips `aud` may accept a token intended for another service, though resulting access still depends on its other authorization checks. The document recommends each resource server enforce an expected audience, alongside issuer, signature, expiry, token type, scopes, and endpoint or object permissions. RFC 8707 supports requesting resource-specific tokens; RFC 9068 requires audience validation for its JWT access-token profile; RFC 9700 recommends limiting tokens to one resource server where feasible, or a small set. Sender-constrained methods such as mutual TLS or DPoP can further limit who can present a token. The example Python correction is explicitly not a complete RFC 9068 validator. The scenario is illustrative, not a confirmed product vulnerability or tested finding.

### Source excerpt

A valid JWT isn't always authorized. Discover how missing audience checks expose APIs to token replay and how to prevent it.

## CVE-2026-93389 - LiteSpeed Cache \<= 7.9.1 - Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Disclosure (WooCommerce Store API Cart/Checkout PII + Cart-Token) via Public REST Caching

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-93389 - LiteSpeed Cache \<= 7.9.1 - Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Disclosure (WooCommerce Store API Cart/Checkout PII + Cart-Token) via Public REST Caching](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-93389-litespeed-cache-7-9-1-unauthenticated-sensitive-information-disclosure-woocommerce-store-api-cart-checkout-pii-cart-token-via-public-rest-caching-118154.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93389>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; wordfence.com

Published: 2026-11-05T05:18:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cache.md>), [pii](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pii.md>), [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [billing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/billing.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [caching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/caching.md>), [checkout](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/checkout.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-93389](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-93389.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [information](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/information.md>), [litespeed-cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/litespeed-cache.md>), [litespeedtech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/litespeedtech.md>), [pii](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pii.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [rest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [woocommerce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/woocommerce.md>)

### AI overview

LiteSpeed Cache versions up to and including 7.9.1 can expose WooCommerce customer data when the shipped default `cache-rest=1` setting is enabled. The excerpt says Store API cart and checkout GET responses are cached publicly without varying by Cart-Token or WooCommerce session, so a later unauthenticated client may receive a shopper's personalized response. Disclosed data may include billing and shipping details, cart contents and totals, a live Cart-Token JWT and nonce, and checkout `order_key`; the source says the token and nonce can enable cart or checkout session hijacking. The excerpt gives a CVSS severity of 8.2 (HIGH) but provides no remediation steps.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-93389 Published : Nov. 5, 2026, 5:18 a.m. | 2 hours, 9 minutes ago Description :The LiteSpeed Cache plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated disclosure of sensitive WooCommerce customer data in all versions up to, and including, 7.9.1 With Cache REST enabled (the shipped default cache-rest=1), LiteSpeed stores WooCommerce Store API GET responses (/wc/store/v1/cart and /wc/store/v1/checkout) as PUBLIC cache objects and does not vary the cache on the Cart-Token or WooCommerce session. A shopper's personalized cart/checkout response is therefore served to any later, cookie-less and token-less client as an LSCache HIT. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read another shopper's billing and shipping details (name, company, street address, email, phone), cart contents and totals, and the shopper's live Cart-Token session JWT and nonce (enabling cart/checkout-session hijack), plus order_key on the checkout endpoint. Severity: 8.2 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## ServiceNow on-behalf-of token exchange with Bedrock AgentCore Gateway

DevFeed: [ServiceNow on-behalf-of token exchange with Bedrock AgentCore Gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/servicenow-on-behalf-of-token-exchange-with-bedrock-agentcore-gateway-115501.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/machine-learning/servicenow-on-behalf-of-token-exchange-with-bedrock-agentcore-gateway/>)

Author: Greg Biegel

Published: 2026-11-03T16:47:40Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/artificial-intelligence.md>)

Topics: [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-bedrock-agentcore.md>), [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [AI Bots](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-bots.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>)

Tags: [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentcore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentcore.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [amazon-bedrock](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock.md>), [amazon-bedrock-agentcore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock-agentcore.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [bedrock](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bedrock.md>), [bedrock-agentcore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bedrock-agentcore.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [configure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configure.md>), [entra-id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entra-id.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [microsoft-entra-id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft-entra-id.md>), [rest-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rest-api.md>), [servicenow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/servicenow.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [token-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token-exchange.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>)

### AI overview

Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway can exchange an agent's Microsoft Entra ID token for a ServiceNow API token while preserving the calling user's identity, so ServiceNow can apply that user's permissions. Configure Entra app registrations for the agent and API connector, set up ServiceNow's inbound OAuth integration and OIDC claim mapping, then create an AgentCore outbound OAuth configuration using JWT authorization grant. Native OBO requires a gateway created with MCP version 2025-11-25; on its ServiceNow target, select Token exchange grant, request the API connector's `user_impersonation` scope, and set `requested_token_use:on_behalf_of`. The gateway performs the exchange per request without an interceptor Lambda or custom exchange code. Troubleshooting focuses on matching `preferred_username` to a ServiceNow user, allowing the needed API scope, and granting the agent app API permissions.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to configure Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway for an on-behalf-of (OBO) token exchange with Microsoft Entra ID, so an AI agent can call the ServiceNow REST API while preserving the calling user's identity. AgentCore Gateway performs the exchange natively, with no interceptor Lambda or custom code.

## How to Validate Token Audience in an MCP Server

DevFeed: [How to Validate Token Audience in an MCP Server](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-validate-token-audience-in-an-mcp-server-139489.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://upstash.com/blog/mcp-oauth-token-audience>)

Author: Ramazan Onur Acar

Published: 2026-11-02T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Upstash](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/upstash.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [API Governance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-governance.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [avoid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/avoid.md>), [context7](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context7.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/log.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [parameter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parameter.md>), [problems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/problems.md>), [resource](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resource.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [send](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/send.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [spec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spec.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [users](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/users.md>)

### AI overview

The MCP authorization spec requires clients to identify the target server with `resource` and servers to reject tokens intended for another audience. The guide recommends locally verifying signed JWT access tokens, including `aud`, the `at+jwt` type, and an allowed signing algorithm; configure the authorization server to copy `resource` into `aud`. Roll out enforcement by logging mismatches, rejecting other servers' tokens, then rejecting tokens without an audience by a chosen date. During outages, return 503 when token validity cannot be determined, reserving 401 for known-invalid tokens. The excerpt also covers sign-in requests missing `resource`, legacy refresh tokens without `aud`, canonical server URLs, gateway-issued tokens, and avoiding forwarding client tokens to downstream APIs. Clients should send the same `resource` at sign-in, token request, and refresh.

### Source excerpt

A short guide to the audience rules in the MCP authorization spec. Send the resource parameter, put it in the token's aud claim, check it in your MCP server, and avoid the problems that log users out.

## CVE-2026-120209 - AJ-Report through 1.7.1 Authentication Bypass leading to RCE via Share-Token

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-120209 - AJ-Report through 1.7.1 Authentication Bypass leading to RCE via Share-Token](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-120209-aj-report-through-1-7-1-authentication-bypass-leading-to-rce-via-share-token-110011.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120209>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-10-31T17:25:56Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>)

Tags: [1-7](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-7.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [aj-report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aj-report.md>), [anji-plus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anji-plus.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-execution.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-120209](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-120209.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [forge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forge.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [offline](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/offline.md>), [rce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rce.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [remote-code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote-code-execution.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [scripts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scripts.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [share](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/share.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

AJ-Report through 1.7.1 reportedly uses a hard-coded JWT secret to sign share tokens, allowing attackers to forge valid tokens offline. A forged token with reportCode 'dataSet' can access the testTransform endpoint, which sends scripts to GroovyClassLoader and enables unauthenticated remote code execution. The excerpt gives a severity of 9.8 (critical) but does not specify remediation or exact affected versions.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-120209 Published : Oct. 31, 2026, 5:25 p.m. | 1 hour, 3 minutes ago Description :AJ-Report through 1.7.1 signs share tokens with a hard-coded JWT secret, allowing attackers to forge valid Share-Tokens offline. Attackers can mint a token with reportCode 'dataSet' to access the testTransform endpoint, which passes scripts to GroovyClassLoader for unauthenticated remote code execution. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-61737 - ng-antd-admin: Hardcoded JWT Secret allows Authentication Bypass in ng-antd-admin

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61737 - ng-antd-admin: Hardcoded JWT Secret allows Authentication Bypass in ng-antd-admin](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-61737-ng-antd-admin-hardcoded-jwt-secret-allows-authentication-bypass-in-ng-antd-admin-108969.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61737>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-10-30T15:16:53Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [account takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/account-takeover.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [22](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/22.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [account-takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account-takeover.md>), [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [administration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administration.md>), [angular](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/angular.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-61737](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-61737.md>), [data-leakage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-leakage.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [forgery](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forgery.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [nestjs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nestjs.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 22.0, ng-antd-admin used a hardcoded default JWT secret without warning at startup if it had not been replaced. An attacker could forge tokens to bypass authentication and authorization, impersonate users including administrators, and access protected APIs, potentially enabling account takeover, data leakage, and unauthorized operations. Version 22.0 rejects the shipped secret in production and allows it with a warning in non-production environments. The supplied text does not identify affected product records or exact affected versions.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-61737 Published : Oct. 30, 2026, 3:16 p.m. | 1 hour, 11 minutes ago Description :ng-antd-admin is an Angular and NestJS administration system template. Prior to 22.0, a hardcoded default `JWT` secret permits token forgery when a deployment has not replaced the default secret, without a startup warning. An attacker can bypass authentication and authorization, impersonate any user including administrators, and access protected API endpoints, leading to account takeover, data leakage and unauthorized operations. Version 22.0 rejects the shipped secret in production but permits it with a warning in non-production environments. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Session length vs. access token duration vs. inactivity timeout

DevFeed: [Session length vs. access token duration vs. inactivity timeout](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/session-length-vs-access-token-duration-vs-inactivity-timeout-107078.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/session-length-access-token-duration-inactivity-timeout>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-10-29T15:42:18Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [background](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/background.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [buffer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/buffer.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [clock](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clock.md>), [clocks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clocks.md>), [concurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/concurrency.md>), [dashboard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dashboard.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [docs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docs.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [timeout](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/timeout.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [vs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vs.md>)

### AI overview

AuthKit's three session settings run separate clocks. Maximum session length is a hard limit from sign-in; inactivity timeout ends a session when no token refresh occurs; access token duration controls how long each JWT remains valid and should not cause a visible sign-out. Shorter token lifetimes make role or permission changes and session revocation take effect sooner, but increase refresh traffic and possible refresh races. Inactivity measures refreshes rather than human activity, so background refreshes can keep a session alive; a true idle-person timeout needs an app-side activity signal. The Dashboard requires inactivity timeout to exceed token duration, with both below maximum session length. Already-issued tokens remain valid until expiry after revocation, which stops further refreshes. Settings apply per application, while clocks run per session.

### Source excerpt

Maximum session length, access token duration, and inactivity timeout each run a different clock in AuthKit. What each one controls, and how to choose it.

## Temporal JWT token authentication

DevFeed: [Temporal JWT token authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/temporal-jwt-token-authentication-102710.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://temporal.io/blog/temporal-jwt-token-authentication>)

Author: Adam Quan

Published: 2026-10-27T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Temporal](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/temporal-blog.md>)

Topics: [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Keycloak](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/keycloak.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [gRPC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/grpc.md>), [client library](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/client-library.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [configure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configure.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [keycloak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keycloak.md>), [mapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mapping.md>), [refresh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/refresh.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>), [sso](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sso.md>), [temporal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/temporal.md>), [temporal-voices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/temporal-voices.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [token-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token-authentication.md>), [worker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/worker.md>)

### AI overview

The article outlines JWT authentication for self-hosted Temporal using Keycloak. It assigns machine clients such as Workers a client-credentials flow and human UI or CLI users an interactive login, with Keycloak roles mapped to Temporal's `permissions` claim (for example, `temporal-system:admin`). Temporal's default ClaimMapper reads those claims and its Authorizer checks permissions; the frontend needs JWT verification keys, while the internal frontend remains available for internal cluster traffic. The UI is configured with Keycloak discovery, client credentials, callback URL, and scopes. CLI requests pass a bearer token through `TEMPORAL_GRPC_META_AUTHORIZATION`; SDK clients pass it in `rpc_metadata`. Since tokens expire, the Python example refreshes them in the background by updating client metadata before expiry, avoiding a token request on every API call. The demonstration omits TLS, so tokens sent over the network are vulnerable to interception.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to configure JWT authentication for self-hosted Temporal with Keycloak, including SSO, Worker access, role mapping, and token refresh.

## Token Exchange

DevFeed: [Token Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/token-exchange-96430.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://fusionauth.io/blog/token-exchange-thoughts>)

Author: Dan Moore

Published: 2026-10-22T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [FusionAuth](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/fusionauth-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [agent to agent communication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agent-to-agent-communication.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [audit-trail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit-trail.md>), [billing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/billing.md>), [calendar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/calendar.md>), [compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compliance.md>), [component](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/component.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [crm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crm.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [dependency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dependency.md>), [education](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/education.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [example](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/example.md>), [impersonation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impersonation.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [microservices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microservices.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [rfc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rfc.md>), [standards](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/standards.md>), [token-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token-exchange.md>)

### AI overview

Token exchange trades a token for a service-specific token with limited permissions, reducing the damage a stolen credential can cause while adding latency and reliance on the authorization server. In the delegation flow, the server checks that the subject token is valid, the requesting API may obtain a token for the target service, and requested permissions do not exceed the subject's. The issued token retains the user as `sub`, targets one service through `aud`, limits permissions, and records the acting party in `act`. RFC 8693 also covers impersonation, where the token represents the user without an `act` claim, and cross-domain translation, which requires deciding how much to trust the external identity provider. The excerpt says a monolith with a few APIs may gain little; systems with service-to-service calls can benefit from tighter access and clearer request flows. It identifies gaps implementers must address: trust among subject, actor, and exchanger; policy decisions (deny, allow, or allow with changed attributes); and high-volume audit records. Collapsing exchanger and actor can simplify trust policy, but requires each actor to have its own OAuth client identity.

### Source excerpt

Delegation, impersonation, and what RFC 8693 leaves Out.

## Securing AI Agents with Auth0 CIMD and Token Exchange

DevFeed: [Securing AI Agents with Auth0 CIMD and Token Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/securing-ai-agents-with-auth0-cimd-and-token-exchange-91173.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://auth0.com/blog/securing-ai-agents-with-auth0-cimd-token-exchange/>)

Author: Andre Hochstein

Published: 2026-10-20T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Auth0 Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/auth0-blog.md>)

Topics: [Auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/auth0.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [actor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actor.md>), [agent-context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-context.md>), [agent-delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-delegation.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-security.md>), [agentic-workflow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-workflow.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth0.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [permission](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permission.md>), [securing-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/securing-ai.md>), [securing-ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/securing-ai-agents.md>), [static](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/static.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>)

### AI overview

The article describes how Auth0 can preserve a third-party agent's permission ceiling and show who it acts for across downstream calls. Strict Mode requires PKCE and an explicit Client Grant, so permissive API policies cannot bypass the grant. CIMD uses an agent's metadata at a stable HTTPS URL to establish a client identity; the text says Auth0 currently supports pre-registration through the Management API or Dashboard, with dynamic CIMD registration planned for a future release. In the described flow, default permissions set the ceiling and user consent binds access to the user. RFC 8693 Token Exchange then combines the user's subject token with the agent's credentials to issue a delegated token carrying the user as `sub` and the agent as `act`. Client Grants limit permitted scopes, but not access to particular records; the article points to Auth0 FGA for relationship-based, record-level decisions.

### Source excerpt

AI agents break static authorization. Learn how Auth0 Strict Mode, CIMD, and Token Exchange keep a permission ceiling and a verifiable user-to-agent delegation chain.

## ID-JAG, Explained: The New OAuth Grant for Cross-App Access

DevFeed: [ID-JAG, Explained: The New OAuth Grant for Cross-App Access](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/id-jag-explained-the-new-oauth-grant-for-cross-app-access-91174.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://auth0.com/blog/what-is-id-jag/>)

Author: Carla Urrea Stabile

Published: 2026-10-20T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Auth0 Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/auth0-blog.md>)

Topics: [cross-app-access](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cross-app-access.md>), [OAuth](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oauth.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [Auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/auth0.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [saml](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/saml.md>), [okta](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/okta.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth0.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [calendar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/calendar.md>), [company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/company.md>), [consent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consent.md>), [console](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/console.md>), [cross-app-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-app-access.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [idp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/idp.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [resource](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resource.md>)

### AI overview

An ID-JAG (Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant) is a short-lived, signed token an enterprise IdP issues after checking policy to authorize one app to access another app's API on a user's behalf. In the described OIDC flow, the user signs in once; the requesting app exchanges its ID token for an ID-JAG, then presents the grant to the resource app's authorization server to obtain an access token for API calls. This requires an existing trust relationship between that server and the enterprise IdP. The grant itself cannot call the API, and the exchange does not issue a refresh token. The article describes this as a non-interactive alternative to repeated consent prompts, with enterprise policy governing access. ID-JAG builds on OAuth Token Exchange (RFC 8693) and JWT Bearer grant (RFC 7523). The IETF specification is a working draft, and Auth0 Cross App Access is described as Early Access.

### Source excerpt

Learn what an ID-JAG (Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant) is, the cross-app access problem it solves, and how the flow works between a requesting app, resource app, and enterprise IdP.

## C2PA exclusion range flaw: Why signature verification must check coverage

DevFeed: [C2PA exclusion range flaw: Why signature verification must check coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/c2pa-exclusion-range-flaw-why-signature-verification-must-check-coverage-90300.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/c2pa-exclusion-range-signature-verification>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-10-19T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [saml](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/saml.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [c2pa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c2pa.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploit.md>), [federated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [saml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/saml.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

C2PA permits byte ranges to be excluded from a signature hash. The article describes a proof of concept that excludes an entire image, allowing its signature and timestamp to verify without covering the image content. It compares this coverage gap with SAML and JWT verification failures, then recommends pinning algorithms and issuers, checking allowed coverage, reading claims only from signed bytes, and testing rejection cases.

### Source excerpt

C2PA's exclusion range flaw let a signature verify while covering zero bytes. The same bug hits SAML and JWT. A checklist for verifying what a signature covers.

## Article: Server-Side DPoP and Token Exchange in Spring Security 7

DevFeed: [Article: Server-Side DPoP and Token Exchange in Spring Security 7](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/article-server-side-dpop-and-token-exchange-in-spring-security-7-87657.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/articles/spring-security-7-server-side-dpop-token-exchange/>)

Author: Dhruv Agnihotri

Published: 2026-10-15T09:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [Spring Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/spring-framework.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [article](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/article.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [java](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/java.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spring.md>), [spring-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spring-security.md>), [spring-security-7-server-side-dpop-token-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spring-security-7-server-side-dpop-token-exchange.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

This server-side guide explains how Spring Security 7 incorporates Spring Authorization Server and how to enable DPoP and RFC 8693 Token Exchange. It highlights that Spring Security 7.1 resource servers require an explicit `.dPoP()` call, and describes combining DPoP with token exchange to issue narrowed, sender-constrained tokens for service-to-service calls.

### Source excerpt

Spring Authorization Server now lives inside Spring Security 7 under the same Maven coordinates, so the upgrade is a version bump. This server-side guide covers enabling DPoP and RFC 8693 Token Exchange, explains why 7.1 apps can silently stop enforcing DPoP until they call .dPoP(), and shows how to combine both into narrowed, sender-constrained tokens for service-to-service and agentic calls. By Dhruv Agnihotri

## Supabase Middleware: composable, reusable middleware for Web Fetch handlers

DevFeed: [Supabase Middleware: composable, reusable middleware for Web Fetch handlers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/supabase-middleware-composable-reusable-middleware-for-web-fetch-handlers-88789.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://supabase.com/blog/supabase-middleware>)

Author: Tomás Pozo; Katerina Skroumpelou

Published: 2026-10-15T07:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Supabase](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/supabase-blog.md>)

Topics: [middleware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/middleware.md>), [Supabase](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/supabase.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [WebSocket](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/websocket.md>)

Tags: [middleware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/middleware.md>), [supabase](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supabase.md>), [type-safe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/type-safe.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>)

### AI overview

Supabase introduces @supabase/middleware, a TypeScript library for composing reusable, type-safe middleware for Web Fetch handlers. Pipelines can run across fetch-compatible runtimes and integrate with frameworks through small bridge files. The article shows middleware for CORS, JWT claims, scoped Supabase clients, OAuth discovery for MCP servers, and custom request logic.

### Source excerpt

Type-safe, composable middleware for Web Fetch handlers. Write it once, use it on any fetch runtime or inside a framework.

## Express React Refresh Token Setup: Diagnosing Missing Cookies and 401s

DevFeed: [Express React Refresh Token Setup: Diagnosing Missing Cookies and 401s](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/express-react-refresh-token-setup-diagnosing-missing-cookies-and-401s-84084.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.sitepoint.com/express-react-refresh-token-cookie-diagnosis/>)

Author: SitePoint Team

Published: 2026-10-09T15:45:24Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [SitePoint](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sitepoint.md>)

Topics: [Express](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/express.md>), [React](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/react.md>), [Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cors.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [async](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/async.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [axios](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/axios.md>), [concurrent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/concurrent.md>), [cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cookies.md>), [cors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cors.md>), [express](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/express.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [implement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implement.md>), [javascript](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/javascript.md>), [programming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/programming.md>), [react](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/react.md>), [retry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/retry.md>), [rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rotation.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how to diagnose missing HTTP-only refresh cookies in an Express 5 and React application. It covers credentialed requests, CORS and cookie settings, token rotation, and a single-flight retry guard for concurrent 401 responses. It also describes production hardening, including refresh-token reuse detection.

### Source excerpt

Fix missing HTTP-only refresh cookies in Express 5 and React, configure CORS and cookie options, and implement silent token rotation with single-flight retry on 401s. Continue reading Express React Refresh Token Setup: Diagnosing Missing Cookies and 401s on SitePoint.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTA5VDE1OjQ1OjI0KzAwOjAwIiwgIjJkN2RiYjZlLTU5M2EtNDg4MS1iOGQyLTZjYzY5Y2ZhN2UzNiJd>)