# personal access token

A personal access token is a credential used to authenticate API, command-line, Git-over-HTTPS, and other developer-tool access to software platforms.

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## A single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft's software supply chain

DevFeed: [A single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft's software supply chain](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-single-pull-request-could-have-handed-attackers-the-keys-to-microsoft-s-software-supply-chain-145215.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4251130/a-single-pull-request-could-have-handed-attackers-the-keys-to-microsofts-software-supply-chain-2.html>)

Author: Taryn Plumb

Published: 2026-11-20T03:15:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [supply-chain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/supply-chain-security.md>), [software supply-chain attack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-supply-chain-attack.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [access-control-authentication-github-identity-and-access-management-security-software-developme](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control-authentication-github-identity-and-access-management-security-software-developme.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-personal-access-token.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [internal-tooling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internal-tooling.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [package-registries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/package-registries.md>), [powershell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/powershell.md>), [pull-request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pull-request.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-development.md>), [software-supply-chain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-supply-chain.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>), [version-control-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version-control-systems.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Cycode researchers found a now-patched WinGet vulnerability in a Microsoft moderator's PowerShell triage tool: it attached a moderator's full-identity GitHub Personal Access Token to requests without checking the destination host. A crafted pull request could trigger automated validation to fail, prompting a background triage script to send an authenticated request to an attacker-controlled server, exposing the token without moderator interaction. Exploitation required at least one moderator to have the tracker running in its designed continuous loop; the article reports no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation. Microsoft fixed the flaw by limiting token attachment to authorized GitHub hosts. The article says the corresponding C# tool did not share the flaw, while Cycode calls the broader credential model flawed and recommends destination-bound credentials, host validation, auditing internal tools, retiring classic PATs, and limiting token permissions and scope.

### Source excerpt

The most dangerous actor in a software supply chain may now be an automated script with powerful credentials and no idea where it's sending them. Researchers from pen-testing company Cycode have discovered a now patched critical zero-click supply chain vulnerability in the open-source Windows Package Manager (WinGet), which sits on billions of devices worldwide. A single pull request could have tricked Microsoft's internal tooling into freely handing over a moderator's GitHub access token, with no phishing, no malware, no moderator clicking or approval required. There is currently no evidence that the flaw has been exploited in the wild. But it serves as a cautionary tale for enterprises that the automation they trust is becoming an attacker entry point, and package repositories are particularly enticing targets. "Package registries have become the highest-profile target in the software supply chain," Moriel Harush, Cycode security research lead, wrote in a blog post. "Compromise a single maintainer, and you reach everyone who trusts them. Compromise the gatekeepers, and you reach the entire ecosystem." Whatever the employee can do, the attacker can do WinGet is Microsoft's free, open source command line tool that helps users discover, install, upgrade, configure, and remove apps. It exists on more than 1.4 billion active devices running Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2025. WinGet's catalog is a public GitHub repository, and its gatekeeper, so to speak, is a small, official group of Microsoft moderators who review a constant stream of community pull requests and proposed changes. By default, WinGet installations on every Windows machine trust the actions those keepers take. The hole is in the moderators' own internal triage tool. This PowerShell helper attached the moderator's secret GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) to any HTTP request, without checking who owned that address. This meant an attacker merely had to supply an address. Theoretically, if th

## Introducing CodePen Commander, a CLI tool (cdpn) to manage your CodePen 2.0 Pens

DevFeed: [Introducing CodePen Commander, a CLI tool (cdpn) to manage your CodePen 2.0 Pens](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/introducing-codepen-commander-a-cli-tool-cdpn-to-manage-your-codepen-2-0-pens-144562.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bram.us/2026/11/19/codepen-commander-cli-tool-cdpn/>)

Author: Bramus!

Published: 2026-11-19T22:51:03Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Bram.us](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bram-us.md>)

Topics: [Tool](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tool.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Terminal](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/terminal.md>)

Tags: [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [codepen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codepen.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [deploy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deploy.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [manage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manage.md>), [npm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/npm.md>), [original-content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/original-content.md>), [pens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pens.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [sync](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sync.md>), [terminal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/terminal.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>)

### AI overview

CodePen Commander (`cdpn`) syncs local folders with CodePen 2.0 Pens using API v2, and supports publishing, deployment, domain management, privacy settings, and other Pen operations from the terminal. It requires Node.js 20 or newer and a CodePen API key; named profiles are stored under `~/.cdpn` with owner-only permissions, and key selection can use a profile flag, environment variable, folder configuration, or Pen owner matching. The Git-like workflow supports cloning, checking status, pulling, and pushing text edits, binary assets, and deletions as one version; pushes wait for CodePen's build and may write compiler patches back to local files. Classic Pen conversion requires a manual browser step, and forking is limited to the user's own Pens. Data and state commands offer non-interactive JSON output for scripts and CI.

### Source excerpt

I scratched my own itch (again 😅) and built CodePen Commander -- a CLI cdpn command to sync local folders with CodePen 2.0 Pens, deploy them, and manage privacy rules right from the terminal.

## Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code

DevFeed: [Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rotate-a-leaked-gitlab-token-and-let-gitlab-duo-fix-the-code-144779.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://about.gitlab.com/blog/secret-detection-token-rotate-and-fix/>)

Author: Mark Mishaev

Published: 2026-11-19T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gitlab.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [gitlab-ci](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab-ci.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab.md>)

Tags: [acting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acting.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [beta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/beta.md>), [branch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/branch.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cd.md>), [chat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chat.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [duo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duo.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [let](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let.md>), [product](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

Starting with GitLab 19.6 beta for GitLab Ultimate, an active leaked GitLab PAT can be rotated from its vulnerability finding: GitLab revokes it, stores a replacement in Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo opens an MR to update CI/CD jobs. The replacement value is not shown to the user or agent; rotation happens before the agent starts. Review and merge the MR, then resolve the finding. Rotation is immediate and irreversible, and the replacement is scoped to the current project, so scripts outside GitLab CI/CD or jobs in other projects need another token. The feature supports GitLab PATs, including fine-grained PATs, but not other detected secret types. GitLab.com users can rotate their own tokens; Self-Managed administrators can also rotate others' tokens. If the Duo session fails, rotation and secret storage still occur, leaving code updates manual. A dependency-free CLI can batch-rotate group findings and eligible CI/CD variable tokens; it defaults to dry-run, caps runs at 10 rotations unless configured, and omits token values from reports.

### Source excerpt

Secret detection alerts you when an active personal access token (PAT) is exposed in your default branch. Acting on that finding is harder: revoking the token breaks dependent pipelines, and replacing it safely takes several manual steps. While the finding waits in your vulnerability report, the token stays live. Starting in GitLab 19.6 in beta for GitLab Ultimate, you can remediate a leaked GitLab PAT directly from the vulnerability page. Select Rotate and fix, and GitLab revokes the token, stores a replacement in GitLab Secrets Manager, and uses GitLab Duo Agent Platform to open a merge request (MR) to update your CI/CD jobs. You review and merge the MR. GitLab never exposes the new token value to you or your agents. Why leaked tokens stay active after detection Imagine that secret detection flags an active PAT in deploy.sh: export GITLAB_TOKEN="glpat-..." Fixing this manually requires tracking down the token's owner, revoking it, generating a replacement with matching scopes, storing it securely, and opening MRs to update your scripts and CI/CD jobs. Because this process is tedious, remediations often stall or go wrong: The finding ages: Nobody wants to break the pipeline, so the finding sits in the vulnerability report while the token remains active. The fix stops halfway: Someone revokes the token immediately, breaking the build. In a rush to recover, they paste a replacement into a less secure CI/CD variable. The new token leaks: Someone shares the replacement token in a chat thread so a teammate can configure it. In the gap between detected and rotated, the token still works for anyone who can read the repository. Rotate and fix in a snap The Rotate and fix function closes this gap by combining secret detection and validity checks, GitLab Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo Agent Platform. When you open an active PAT finding and select AI actions > Fix with AI > Rotate and fix, GitLab: Revokes the leaked token and creates a replacement with the same name, scopes,

## Microsoft agent-framework Compromised: Credential Stealer Targets Azure and CI Pipelines

DevFeed: [Microsoft agent-framework Compromised: Credential Stealer Targets Azure and CI Pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/microsoft-agent-framework-compromised-credential-stealer-targets-azure-and-ci-pipelines-141237.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.wiz.io/blog/malicious-version-of-microsofts-agent-framework-published-to-pypi>)

Author: Benjamin Read

Published: 2026-11-17T22:03:37Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/wiz-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [Microsoft Agent Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft-agent-framework.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Azure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/azure.md>), [Microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>)

Tags: [agent-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-framework.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [credential-stealer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-stealer.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [microsoft-agent-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft-agent-framework.md>), [pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pipelines.md>), [pypi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pypi.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [threat-intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intel.md>)

### AI overview

Malicious agent-framework versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 ran credential theft code at every Python interpreter start in an environment, via .pth files, even if the package was never imported. The stealer targeted Azure, Azure DevOps and, in 1.26.2, GitHub Actions OIDC credentials; both versions sent collected data to a hardcoded webhook.site URL without retries or a fallback. The excerpt says the versions were removed from PyPI and identifies 1.26.0 as the latest safe release. It reports that analysis of 50 captured webhook requests found three unique successful victim data exfiltrations. Suggested response steps include searching for affected versions and payload files, checking egress logs, rotating exposed credentials, and auditing reachable Azure identities and, for 1.26.2, federated credentials and GitHub workflows.

### Source excerpt

On November 17, 2026 at 20:35 UTC, versions 1.26.1 & 1.26.2 of the Microsoft PyPI package agent-framework were published with an added credential stealer. The package gets almost 200k downloads a month. The malicious versions have since been quarantined.

## Agent Authenticator: Passkey-Grade, Hardware-Bound Authentication for AI Agents

DevFeed: [Agent Authenticator: Passkey-Grade, Hardware-Bound Authentication for AI Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/agent-authenticator-passkey-grade-hardware-bound-authentication-for-ai-agents-137457.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.19536>)

Author: Harish Santhanalakshmi Ganesan

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Zero Trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zero-trust.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>)

Tags: [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-coding-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [autonomous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous.md>), [bearer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bearer.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [passkey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passkey.md>)

### AI overview

The Agent Authenticator proposes replacing AI agents' readable bearer secrets with per-service hardware-bound keys and runtime-enforced origin binding. Human-signed scoped mandates define permitted actions, with cross-device human approval for high-risk actions; normalized environment attestation and a signed, hash-chained action record provide additional checks and traceability. The same protocol is designed for developer laptops and cloud enclaves, and is framed as a profile over existing mechanisms--including MCP authorization, OAuth token exchange, git, and SSH--rather than a new identity system. The authors analyze it against prompt injection and same-host compromise, relate it to five incidents, and discuss limitations; the supplied excerpt does not provide implementation results or details of those limits.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.19536v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents now push code, publish packages, call model APIs and operate cloud resources on behalf of developers. They authenticate to these services with the same bearer secrets humans use, personal access tokens, API keys and package-registry tokens, stored where the model, its subprocesses and any co-resident malware can read them. Incidents in 2025 and 2026, including prompt-injection attacks on coding agents and self-propagating supply-chain worms, show that this arrangement fails in predictable ways. Passkeys solved the analogous problem for humans, but they require a human gesture on every use and cannot be operated by an autonomous process. We present the Agent Authenticator, a design that gives agents passkey-grade authentication properties: per-service hardware-bound keys, no shared secrets, origin binding enforced by the runtime rather than the model, normalized attestation of the execution environment, human-signed scoped mandates, and cross-device human approval for high-risk actions. The same protocol serves agents on developer laptops and in cloud enclaves, and it deploys as a profile over existing mechanisms, MCP authorization, OAuth token exchange including the Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant, git and SSH, rather than as a new identity system. The authenticator also produces a signed, hash-chained record of each action it authorizes. We analyze the design against a threat model centered on prompt injection and same-host compromise, map it onto five documented incidents, and discuss its limits.

## Microsoft agent-framework compromised on PyPI: 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 ship a credential stealer that runs on every Python start (November 2026)

DevFeed: [Microsoft agent-framework compromised on PyPI: 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 ship a credential stealer that runs on every Python start (November 2026)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/microsoft-agent-framework-compromised-on-pypi-1-26-1-and-1-26-2-ship-a-credential-stealer-that-runs-on-every-python-start-november-2026-140597.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.chainguard.dev/unchained/microsoft-agent-framework-compromised-on-pypi-november-2026>)

Published: 2026-11-17T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Chainguard: Unchained](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/chainguard-unchained.md>)

Topics: [Microsoft Agent Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft-agent-framework.md>), [PyPI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pypi.md>), [Python](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/python.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Azure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/azure.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [agent-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-framework.md>), [agent-runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-runtime.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-api-keys.md>), [ai-developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-developers.md>), [ai-ml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-ml.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [chainguard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chainguard.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [credential-stealer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-stealer.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [microsoft-agent-framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft-agent-framework.md>), [pypi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pypi.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>)

### AI overview

Two PyPI releases of Microsoft's agent-framework, versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2, contained a credential stealer attributed to a publisher account compromise; the GitHub source was not reported modified. Each release installed a .pth startup hook, causing the payload to run whenever Python starts in that environment, even if the package is never imported. It collected matching environment variables, local credential files and other processes' environment data, and requested GitHub Actions and Azure DevOps OIDC tokens plus Azure managed identity tokens before sending collected data to a webhook.site endpoint. The article advises searching manifests, caches, build logs and hosts with shell tools without starting Python in a suspected environment. If affected, isolate the host, remove payload files before running Python, rotate exposed credentials, revoke runtime identity sessions, review cloud activity and rebuild from a known-good dependency set. Chainguard says it blocked both versions within 48 seconds of publication and did not serve them to customers.

### Source excerpt

Two malicious versions of Microsoft's agent-framework targeted cloud credentials and AI API keys. Learn how Chainguard detected and blocked the attack.

## CVE-2026-86322 - Foreman: authorization flaw in the foreman::controller::useraware#find\_user handling used by api::v2::personalaccesstokenscontroller

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-86322 - Foreman: authorization flaw in the foreman::controller::useraware#find\_user handling used by api::v2::personalaccesstokenscontroller](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-86322-foreman-authorization-flaw-in-the-foreman-controller-useraware-find-user-handling-used-by-api-v2-personalaccesstokenscontroller-130960.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86322>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; redhat.com

Published: 2026-11-12T21:17:33Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [account takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/account-takeover.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [account-takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account-takeover.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-86322](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-86322.md>), [foreman](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/foreman.md>), [personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-token.md>), [personal-access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-tokens.md>), [post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post.md>), [redhat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/redhat.md>), [satellite](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/satellite.md>), [target](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/target.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>), [v2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/v2.md>)

### AI overview

Foreman's personal access token API can let a user with the create_personal_access_tokens permission mint a token for another account. In POST /api/v2/users/:user_id/personal_access_tokens, find_user loads the requested user without checking the required parent-user authorization; the post-save check verifies token creation permission but not edit_users permission on that account. The plaintext token is returned in the response and can be used to authenticate as the victim, potentially taking over accounts, including administrator accounts. The supplied excerpt rates the flaw 8.8 (HIGH) but does not specify affected versions or a fix.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-86322 Published : Nov. 12, 2026, 9:17 p.m. | 52 minutes ago Description :A flaw was found in Foreman's Api::V2::PersonalAccessTokensController, where Foreman::Controller::UserAware#find_user resolves the target account using User.find(params[:user_id]) without applying the required parent-user authorization check. An attacker with the create_personal_access_tokens permission can therefore invoke POST /api/v2/users/:user_id/personal_access_tokens with another user's ID and create a Personal Access Token on their behalf. The resulting plaintext token is returned in the API response, while PersonalAccessToken#check_permissions_after_save only validates create_personal_access_tokens on the token and does not enforce edit_users authorization on the target user. The attacker can then use the forged token to authenticate as the victim, potentially resulting in complete account takeover, including administrator accounts. Severity: 8.8 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Detecting credential-driven attacks on Databricks

DevFeed: [Detecting credential-driven attacks on Databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/detecting-credential-driven-attacks-on-databricks-129970.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.databricks.com/blog/detecting-credential-driven-attacks-databricks>)

Author: Solomon Boyd; Alexis Merritt; Arun Pamulapati; Sam Pezzino; David Veuve

Published: 2026-11-11T23:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/databricks.md>)

Topics: [databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/databricks.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [audit-logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit-logs.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [controls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/controls.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/databricks.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [security-and-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-and-trust.md>), [security-threat-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-threat-research.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt recommends investigating credential-driven attacks as linked, potentially non-linear activity across identities, rather than treating audit events in isolation. A stolen engineer token may first enumerate secrets, catalogs, or repositories, then expose a service-principal credential that is used for code execution, persistence, or targeted exports. Databricks' `system.access.audit` logs and the Detection App's Genie agent can help hunt these patterns, including unfamiliar IPs, bursts of discovery APIs, secret reads, new functions or jobs, permission changes, and exports. Tune detections to normal automation and follow actions by every identity involved. Audit logs may omit query results or old and new setting values; empty searches can reflect a narrow time window or disabled verbose logging. Response should revoke the original and derived credentials and remove grants, tokens, functions, and jobs that preserve access. Context-based ingress restrictions and least privilege limit the reach of stolen credentials.

### Source excerpt

At Databricks, we know your data is your most valuable asset. Databricks has worked...

## Handling a leaked credential with the Postman plugin

DevFeed: [Handling a leaked credential with the Postman plugin](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/handling-a-leaked-credential-with-the-postman-plugin-127567.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.postman.com/handling-a-leaked-credential-with-the-postman-plugin/>)

Author: Anthony Viard

Published: 2026-11-10T16:00:41Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Postman](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/postman-blog.md>)

Topics: [Postman](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman.md>), [Postman CLI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman-cli.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [API keys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-keys.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding.md>), [coding-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding-agent.md>), [general](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/general.md>), [handling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handling.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [plugin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/plugin.md>), [postman](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postman.md>), [postman-cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postman-cli.md>), [postman-plugin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postman-plugin.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

In the staged incident, the Postman plugin routed each step to the CLI when it had the needed command and to the MCP server when the CLI could not run or lacked that command. From a phone, the agent used MCP tools to locate the leaked token and identify its owner without exposing the full secret. At a terminal, it used Context Graph through the CLI to map 32 downstream consumers and identify one using the leaked token's scope. Rotation kept the new token out of the agent's context: the user entered it into a one-time browser form, and the agent stored it in Shared Vault. Cloud-only collection edits and collection-role changes used MCP; supported secret, variable-link, and test-run commands used the CLI. The author says Secret Scanner scans shared variable values, so the vault reference avoided a new alert. Closing the finding followed service-side revocation and user confirmation. Secret Scanner and audit logs require Enterprise; internal workspace scanning also requires Advanced Security Administration, Context Graph requires ingested team sources, and audit logs require Admin or Super Admin access.

### Source excerpt

A leaked patients-service token, handled by a coding agent without opening Postman. See how the Postman plugin picks the Postman CLI or MCP server. The post Handling a leaked credential with the Postman plugin appeared first on Postman Blog.

## CVE-2026-119446 - Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-119446 - Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-119446-session-fixation-in-the-cli-login-flow-allows-an-unauthenticated-attacker-to-obtain-a-user-s-api-token-125787.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119446>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-10T11:16:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [auth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [button](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/button.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [click](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/click.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [csrf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/csrf.md>), [csrf-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/csrf-token.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-119446](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-119446.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [form](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/form.md>), [hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hub.md>), [issue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/issue.md>), [login](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/login.md>), [nerves-hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub.md>), [nerves-hub-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub-web.md>), [nerveshub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerveshub.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>)

### AI overview

An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a signed-in NervesHub user's API token by persuading them to open a crafted CLI login confirmation link and click Confirm. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/cli_session returns a polling token and confirmation URL; confirmation creates and stores an API token for the user, which the login initiator can retrieve on the next poll. The displayed confirmation code is never checked, so it does not verify who initiated the login. CSRF protection and the page's framing restriction mean the user must open the link and click themselves. The excerpt says nerves_hub versions from 2.5.0 up to, but not including, 2.5.3 are affected.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-119446 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 11:16 a.m. | 1 hour, 14 minutes ago Description :Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/ returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3. Severity: 9.4 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## TanStack AI's Sandbox API

DevFeed: [TanStack AI's Sandbox API](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tanstack-ai-s-sandbox-api-125614.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.master.dev/tanstack-ai-sandbox-api/>)

Author: Adam Rackis

Published: 2026-11-09T12:56:45Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Master.dev Blog RSS Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/master-dev-blog-rss-feed.md>)

Topics: [AI Sandbox](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-sandbox.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [remote-development](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/remote-development.md>), [Claude](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>)

Tags: [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-features.md>), [ai-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-gateway.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [blog-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog-post.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [clone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clone.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [feature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [pull-request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pull-request.md>), [railway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/railway.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [repo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repo.md>), [request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/request.md>), [sandbox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sandbox.md>), [tanstack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tanstack.md>), [typescript](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/typescript.md>), [vercel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vercel.md>)

### AI overview

TanStack AI's Sandbox API lets a chat request run Claude Code in a remote Vercel or Railway sandbox, clone a GitHub repo, make changes, and open a pull request. Setup requires GitHub and Anthropic credentials plus provider-specific configuration; Vercel also needs Claude Code and GitHub CLI installed, while Railway's image includes them. Both examples reuse a sandbox by thread and add it through `withSandbox` middleware. The tradeoff is slower execution than running tools directly, with sandbox costs. Cleanup differs: the article says Vercel's destroy method only stops the sandbox and leaves disk snapshots, so an API cleanup script may be needed; Railway leaves disk checkpoints but does not charge for them.

### Source excerpt

Part 3 of this intro to TanStack AI covers the Sandbox API: spinning up a remote sandbox on Vercel or Railway, running Claude Code inside it with GitHub access, and having it clone your repo, add a feature, and open a pull request.

## Bitbucket API tokens and the username that causes a 401

DevFeed: [Bitbucket API tokens and the username that causes a 401](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/bitbucket-api-tokens-and-the-username-that-causes-a-401-109704.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/bitbucket-api-code-agents>)

Author: Swytchcode Team

Published: 2026-10-30T19:04:52Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [bitbucket](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/bitbucket.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [REST API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rest-api.md>), [API Governance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-governance.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [atlassian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atlassian.md>), [bitbucket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitbucket.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [scopes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scopes.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

For Bitbucket Cloud REST Basic auth, use the Atlassian account email as the username and the API token as the password; an API token paired with the old Bitbucket username can cause a 401. Tokens need endpoint-appropriate scopes, are set at creation and cannot be edited later, and can be limited to one workspace. Match that workspace to the API URL and grant write scope only when the agent must push. The text says app-password creation stopped on September 9, 2025, and existing passwords were disabled June 9, 2026; API tokens are the documented Basic-auth path from that date. Git over HTTPS has separate username examples, including `x-bitbucket-api-token-auth`, and requires repository read or write scopes as appropriate.

### Source excerpt

Bitbucket app passwords stopped being the supported path in 2026. API tokens use your Atlassian email, need scopes, and can be limited to one workspace.

## Publish Visual Studio Marketplace extensions securely with Trusted Publishing

DevFeed: [Publish Visual Studio Marketplace extensions securely with Trusted Publishing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/publish-visual-studio-marketplace-extensions-securely-with-trusted-publishing-105540.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://devblogs.microsoft.com/blog/trusted-publishing-visual-studio-marketplace/>)

Author: Lynn Dai

Published: 2026-10-28T16:59:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Developer Blogs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/developer-blogs.md>)

Topics: [VS Code Extension](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vscode-extension.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Visual Studio Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/visual-studio-code.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Visual Studio](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/visual-studio.md>)

Tags: [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [azure-devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-devops.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [command-line](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command-line.md>), [contributor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contributor.md>), [extensions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/extensions.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [github-discussions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-discussions.md>), [github-policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-policy.md>), [github-repository](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-repository.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [marketplace](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/marketplace.md>), [microsoft-for-developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft-for-developers.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-token.md>), [pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pipelines.md>), [publishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/publishing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [trusted-publishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trusted-publishing.md>), [visual-studio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/visual-studio.md>), [visual-studio-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/visual-studio-code.md>), [visual-studio-marketplace](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/visual-studio-marketplace.md>), [workload-identity-federation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workload-identity-federation.md>)

### AI overview

Trusted Publishing lets Visual Studio Code and Visual Studio extensions be released from GitHub Actions or Azure Pipelines without a long-lived Marketplace PAT. Marketplace verifies federated identity; GitHub Actions receives a temporary credential that expires after 15 minutes. GitHub setup requires a policy naming the repository and workflow, plus `id-token: write` and an OIDC publishing command. For private repositories, the policy must be used within 48 hours; a successful token exchange activates it permanently, while an unused policy expires and can be reopened. Azure Pipelines instead uses a Workload Identity Federation service connection backed by a Microsoft Entra app and service principal or managed identity, with that identity granted the publisher's Contributor role. Do not create a Marketplace policy for Azure Pipelines. Existing PAT publishing remains supported; remove the PAT only after verifying a successful federated publish.

### Source excerpt

Publish Visual Studio Code and Visual Studio extensions from GitHub Actions or Azure Pipelines without storing a long-lived personal access token. The post Publish Visual Studio Marketplace extensions securely with Trusted Publishing appeared first on Microsoft for Developers.

## Private repos still leak secrets to Gheist, a stolen GitHub token campaign

DevFeed: [Private repos still leak secrets to Gheist, a stolen GitHub token campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/private-repos-still-leak-secrets-to-gheist-a-stolen-github-token-campaign-102042.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/27/gheist-github-token-abuse/>)

Author: Mirko Zorz

Published: 2026-10-27T10:58:07Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [secret rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-rotation.md>), [self-hosted runner](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted-runner.md>), [AWS Security Token Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-security-token-service.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [audit-logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit-logs.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [downloads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/downloads.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-api.md>), [leak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leak.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [plants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/plants.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [repository](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repository.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>), [wiz](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wiz.md>), [workflow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workflow.md>)

### AI overview

Gheist uses stolen GitHub tokens to plant workflows across every reachable repository; in private repositories, those workflows encode secrets to evade log masking, then retrieve the logs through GitHub's API and delete the runs. Wiz reports more than 13,500 planted branches across 850+ compromised accounts. GitHub's approval hold for potentially malicious workflow runs applies to public repositories, while the excerpt says private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server are not covered. One variant also targets self-hosted runners. To investigate, check cloud audit logs for role assumptions tied to `ci-sync-` branches and GitHub audit logs for the `gheist` user agent. Wiz advises rotating accessible repository, organization and environment secrets and revoking tokens that pushed the commits.

### Source excerpt

Wiz Research has recovered more than 13,500 planted branches from 850+ compromised GitHub accounts, the work of a campaign it calls Gheist, after the user agent the tool sends with its GitHub API requests. The tool takes a stolen token, finds every repository that token can open, and plants a workflow in each one. The workflow prints the repository's secrets into a log, and the attacker downloads it. The exposure is in private repositories. A ... More -> The post Private repos still leak secrets to Gheist, a stolen GitHub token campaign appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Scope your Personal Access Tokens

DevFeed: [Scope your Personal Access Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/scope-your-personal-access-tokens-100997.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://supabase.com/blog/scope-your-personal-access-tokens>)

Author: Hieu Pham; Kemal Y; Gildas Garcia; Wen Bo Xie

Published: 2026-10-26T07:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Supabase](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/supabase-blog.md>)

Topics: [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [least privilege](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/least-privilege.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [403](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/403.md>), [ai-coding-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [bearer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bearer.md>), [blast-radius](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blast-radius.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [dashboard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dashboard.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [deprecation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deprecation.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-token.md>), [projects](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/projects.md>), [scope](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scope.md>)

### AI overview

Supabase Personal Access Tokens created in the Dashboard are now scoped by default, with full-account legacy tokens still available and existing tokens continuing to work until expiry or deletion. Scope each token to the resources, permissions, and expiry its tool needs; the Dashboard recommends project-level access and lets you review covered API endpoints and MCP tools before creation. A token cannot exceed your current user permissions, and its scope cannot be edited after creation, so changes require a replacement. Scoped tokens use bearer authentication across the Management API, MCP server, and CLI, but denial behavior differs: the API may identify missing permissions in a 403, MCP tools return tool errors (SQL writes produce Postgres permission errors), and out-of-scope project requests get a plain 403. The CLI browser login still creates full-account tokens for now; use a Dashboard-created token with `supabase login --token`. Database commands using `SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD` bypass token permissions.

### Source excerpt

Give each Personal Access Token only the organizations, projects, and permissions it needs.

## GitLab AI API and CI Agents

DevFeed: [GitLab AI API and CI Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gitlab-ai-api-and-ci-agents-98752.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/gitlab-ai-api>)

Author: Chaitrali Kakde

Published: 2026-10-24T10:33:19.077565Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [AI Bots](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-bots.md>), [gitlab-ci](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab-ci.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [human in the loop agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/human-in-the-loop-agent.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [403](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/403.md>), [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [accountability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accountability.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-api.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-token.md>), [project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/project.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

GitLab agent security depends first on token scope: a project access token limits exposure to one project, while a personal token carries the user's permissions across projects they can access. Use `read_api` for analysis because GitLab enforces it as read-only for most GET and HEAD endpoints; reserve `api` for a separate agent that needs to comment. The excerpt recommends allowing review comments while excluding merges, approvals, branch deletion, and CI variable access, which could expose deployment credentials. It also advises using the `PRIVATE-TOKEN` header, honoring `Retry-After` on rate limits, specifying whether an MR pipeline tests the source branch or merged result, and using idempotency keys plus existing-note checks to prevent duplicate comments. CI job tokens may suit pipeline agents if required endpoints are supported. The supplied text also describes Swytchcode setup and example review, pipeline-explanation, stale-MR, and release-note workflows.

### Source excerpt

A personal access token gives your agent your permissions across every project you can see. A project access token gives it one project. That choice is the whole security model.

## Using the Hugging Face API from an AI Agent

DevFeed: [Using the Hugging Face API from an AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/using-the-hugging-face-api-from-an-ai-agent-97560.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/hugging-face-api-ai-agent>)

Author: Chaitrali Kakde

Published: 2026-10-23T13:32:34.359184Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [hugging face](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hugging-face.md>), [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [API Governance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-governance.md>), [inference-endpoints](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/inference-endpoints.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>), [Local AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/local-ai.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hub.md>), [hugging-face](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hugging-face.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [lets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lets.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [scopes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scopes.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [using](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/using.md>), [vs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vs.md>), [write](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/write.md>)

### AI overview

Hugging Face access for agents covers three distinct operations: Hub reads, inference, and Hub writes. The article recommends a per-agent fine-grained token scoped to only the needed model or organization; broad read tokens can expose private and organizational repositories, while write tokens also permit edits and should not be given to agents. It describes storing credentials outside the project and allowlisting separate inference and read methods. For reliability, treat cold-model responses as retryable, validate results because an HTTP 200 can still contain an error or empty output, and cache inference by model and input hash to reduce repeated cost and quota use. It also recommends pinning approved models, limiting batch size, and reviewing model changes. Shared inference is cheaper for scheduled batch work but can have variable latency; a dedicated endpoint may suit user-facing requests. Sending customer text to shared inference raises a data-transfer review question.

### Source excerpt

"The Hugging Face API" is three different APIs, and a write token lets your agent edit your model cards. Token scopes, inference vs hub reads, and how to lock it down.

## Running Pulumi Neo in a Docker Sandbox: workshop recap

DevFeed: [Running Pulumi Neo in a Docker Sandbox: workshop recap](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/running-pulumi-neo-in-a-docker-sandbox-workshop-recap-92883.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.pulumi.com/blog/running-pulumi-neo-in-a-docker-sandbox/>)

Author: Mike Coleman

Published: 2026-10-21T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Pulumi](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/pulumi.md>)

Topics: [pulumi-neo](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pulumi-neo.md>), [Docker Sandboxes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/docker-sandboxes.md>), [pulumi](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pulumi.md>), [Docker](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/docker.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [World models](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/world-models.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [coding-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding-agent.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [docker-sandbox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker-sandbox.md>), [esc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esc.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [neo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neo.md>), [policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy.md>), [production](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/production.md>), [prompt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prompt.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [pulumi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pulumi.md>), [pulumi-neo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pulumi-neo.md>), [recap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recap.md>), [sandbox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sandbox.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [workshop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workshop.md>)

### AI overview

The workshop describes running Pulumi Neo in a Docker Sandbox with controls outside the agent's prompt. Neo runs in an isolated microVM with access limited to mounted files and permitted network hosts; a proxy injects the Pulumi token so Neo does not hold the real credential. Pulumi governs permissions and approvals: manual asks before each tool call, balanced before `pulumi up`, and auto never asks. Read-only blocks Pulumi Cloud writes but does not prevent access to ESC environments or their cloud accounts; role permissions must restrict environment access. Preventative Pulumi Policies can block violations, `protect: true` can stop deletion of protected resources, and ESC can issue short-lived AWS credentials, which limit leak damage but do not prevent it. Docker's network proxy can deny unapproved hosts, though allowed hosts still receive what Neo sends. The excerpt recommends starting with a locked-down network preset and balanced approvals near production. Centralized Docker sandbox controls are paid; local sandboxes and the `sbx` CLI are free. The final teardown demonstration was not completed.

### Source excerpt

The more an agent can do on its own, the more infrastructure work you can hand it, as long as its limits hold when it gets something wrong. In April, they didn't hold for PocketOS. A coding agent on a routine staging task deleted the company's production volume in 9 seconds. According to founder Jer Crane's account, it used an API token it found in an unrelated file. Its explanation afterward: "I guessed that deleting a staging volume via the API would be scoped to staging only. I didn't verify." Railway recovered the data two days later. The agent had been told not to. "System prompts are advisory, not enforcing," Crane wrote afterward. If the prompt can't stop an agent, the limits have to sit where the agent can't negotiate with them. That was the premise of Neo in a Docker Sandbox, the workshop Adam Gordon Bell and I ran with Mike Coleman from Docker. So we gave Pulumi Neo two layers. The first is a Docker Sandbox. Neo runs in its own microVM and reaches only the files and hosts we allow. The Pulumi token gets injected by a proxy on the way out, so Neo never holds the real credential. The second is Pulumi itself, which decides what Neo may change and when it has to ask. With both in place, you can let Neo work without approving every step. For why YOLO mode belongs in a sandbox at all, see my August post. Mike Coleman is a Principal Solutions Architect at Docker. His running joke is that agents "want to be helpful". It happens in his own demos: Mike Coleman I talk to people about agents a lot. They just really want to please you. I don't know how many times I've done a demo [of] governance for MCP servers, and I'll be like, "Can you write to my Notion page?" And there will be a policy applied to the sandbox that says it can't. But I have a connector enabled in Claude somewhere. And it's like, "Well, not with that MCP server, but I can use this thing over here to do it." Mike's answer is to close those doors before the agent finds them: Mike Coleman The more you c

## Workforce identity offboarding: A checklist to verify access removal

DevFeed: [Workforce identity offboarding: A checklist to verify access removal](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/workforce-identity-offboarding-a-checklist-to-verify-access-removal-91183.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/workforce-identity-offboarding-checklist>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-10-20T20:15:14Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [okta](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/okta.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Entra ID](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/entra-id.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passwords.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [app-permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app-permissions.md>), [apps](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apps.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [billing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/billing.md>), [business-automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business-automation.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [it](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/it.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [verify](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verify.md>), [workforce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workforce.md>), [workforce-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workforce-identity.md>)

### AI overview

Disabling an IdP account alone does not reliably end a former employee's access: app sessions, refresh tokens, personal API keys, delegated grants, local sign-ins, shared passwords, and resource ownership may persist. Repeat an inventory for every app, assign an owner to each action, and transfer business automation to service-owned credentials before a planned cutoff; for immediate departures, revoke access first. Sign out through the IdP and each app, revoke credentials, remove permissions, and record any sync or token-revocation delay. Behavior varies: Okta API tokens from deactivated users are rejected, while an untied personal access token may remain usable; Microsoft Entra session revocation can take minutes and does not cover external users' home-tenant sessions. Where an app lacks revocation controls, track an owner, review date, and compensating control. Keep timestamps, actors, logs, account-state records, and known or unknown remaining access windows. WorkOS SSO records show authentication attempts, not whether existing app sessions or API tokens stopped working. Offboarding also cannot erase data already copied to personal devices.

### Source excerpt

A workforce identity offboarding checklist for IT and security teams: what to disable, revoke, transfer, and rotate in each app, and the evidence to keep.

## How to Log Every API Call an AI Agent Makes

DevFeed: [How to Log Every API Call an AI Agent Makes](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-log-every-api-call-an-ai-agent-makes-90751.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/log-every-api-call-an-ai-agent-makes>)

Author: Swytchcode Team

Published: 2026-10-20T15:07:31.919507Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>), [API Governance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-governance.md>), [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [Publish-subscribe pattern](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pubsub.md>)

Tags: [agent-audit-log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-audit-log.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [idempotency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/idempotency.md>), [policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how to audit API calls made by AI agents. It recommends logging each call in the execution path, including its actor, tenant, operation, idempotency key, policy decision, status, outcome and duration. It also advises against storing credentials, full prompts or sensitive request bodies, and recommends recording denied and approval-held calls alongside allowed calls.

### Source excerpt

Log the call where it is sent, not where it is described. Record the operation, the actor, the idempotency key, the policy decision and the outcome. Never record the credential. If the agent writes its own log, the calls that were blocked quietly disappear.

## Your ZeroClaw agent can call any API: here's how to decide which calls run

DevFeed: [Your ZeroClaw agent can call any API: here's how to decide which calls run](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/your-zeroclaw-agent-can-call-any-api-here-s-how-to-decide-which-calls-run-90778.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/your-zeroclaw-agent-can-call-any-api-here-s-how-to-decide-which-calls-run>)

Author: Swytchcode Team

Published: 2026-10-20T07:17:48Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [Agent Harness](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agent-harness.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Postman Passport](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman-passport.md>), [token jacking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/token-jacking.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [audit-trail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit-trail.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [coding-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding-agent.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [docs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docs.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains how to connect a self-hosted ZeroClaw agent to Swytchcode for governed API access. Its setup guide configures separate approval for write calls, keeps credentials outside chat, and records requests and policy decisions, then walks through installation, agent permissions, and a sandbox Stripe example.

### Source excerpt

Give your self-hosted ZeroClaw agent governed API access: approvals for writes, keys kept out of the chat, and a full audit trail. Set up in about ten minutes.

## Some Git over HTTPS may temporarily require authentication

DevFeed: [Some Git over HTTPS may temporarily require authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/some-git-over-https-may-temporarily-require-authentication-90079.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-19-some-git-over-https-may-temporarily-require-authentication>)

Author: Allison

Published: 2026-10-19T10:37:30Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [Git](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/git.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>)

Tags: [account-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account-management.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [improvement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/improvement.md>), [personal-access-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/personal-access-token.md>)

### AI overview

During unusual traffic, GitHub may temporarily require authentication for some unauthenticated HTTPS clones and fetches of public repositories to protect availability. Authenticated HTTPS and SSH operations, pushes, and unrelated web and API traffic are unaffected. For automated clones and fetches, GitHub recommends using GITHUB_TOKEN in GitHub Actions or a GitHub App installation access token in other CI systems; retrying later is an option when authentication is unavailable.

### Source excerpt

During periods of unusual traffic, GitHub may temporarily require authentication for some clones and fetches of public repositories over HTTPS to help protect github.com's availability. If an operation is affected,... The post Some Git over HTTPS may temporarily require authentication appeared first on The GitHub Blog.

## What a Credential Vault Needs to Do for AI Agents

DevFeed: [What a Credential Vault Needs to Do for AI Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-a-credential-vault-needs-to-do-for-ai-agents-90726.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/credential-vault-ai-agents>)

Author: Swytchcode Team

Published: 2026-10-19T10:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [shadow AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/shadow-ai.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [coding-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding-agents.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains why AI agent credential vaults need to keep secrets out of model context by resolving credentials only after policy checks and attaching them directly to outbound API requests. It contrasts this execution-time handling with conventional secrets managers, which provide storage and rotation but leave call-specific attachment and redaction logic to teams. The article describes Swytchcode's local SQLite credential store and its resolution and redaction behavior.

### Source excerpt

Storing a secret safely is the easy half of a credential vault. Injecting it at call time without the secret ever entering the model's context is the hard half, and the one generic secrets managers weren't built for.

## Paxos API and Digital-Asset Infrastructure

DevFeed: [Paxos API and Digital-Asset Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/paxos-api-and-digital-asset-infrastructure-90762.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.swytchcode.com/content/paxos-api-digital-assets>)

Author: Swytchcode Team

Published: 2026-10-16T10:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Swytchcode](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/swytchcode.md>)

Topics: [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [Postman Agent Mode](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman-agent-mode.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Claude](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cursor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cursor.md>), [integrations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrations.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains how to connect Paxos to Swytchcode for AI-agent status checks and why a timeout should lead to a lookup rather than a repeated transfer request. It describes controls including allow lists, schema validation, policies, credential handling, idempotency-aware retries, response checks, and audit logging, then gives CLI setup steps and example agent prompts.

### Source excerpt

An assistant can tell you whether a transfer settled. Sending the transfer is a different job. Once value has moved, retrying does not rewind it.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTE2VDEwOjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjBhMDg4ODc0LTgzYjQtNDM2MS1iY2FkLTEwYjY1NTg4NDlmNyJd>)