# Post-Quantum Post-quantum cryptography develops cryptographic systems secure against both quantum and classical computers that interoperate with existing protocols and networks. This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles. ## JDK 27 Security Enhancements DevFeed: [JDK 27 Security Enhancements]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Sean Mullan Published: 2026-09-16T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Inside Java]() Topics: [JDK 27](), [Security](), [Cryptography](), [Encryption](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Post-Quantum](), [Release notes]() Tags: [certificates](), [cryptographic](), [encryption](), [jdk-27](), [notes](), [password](), [post-quantum](), [private-key](), [release-notes](), [security](), [tls]() ### AI overview This article reviews selected security enhancements in JDK 27, released on September 15, 2026. It highlights TLS 1.3 support for post-quantum hybrid key exchange mechanisms and the third preview of the PEM API for encoding and decoding cryptographic objects. ### Source excerpt JDK 27 was released on September 15, 2026! As with my previous blogs, I have compiled a list of what I think are the most interesting and useful security enhancements in this release. I have also grouped them into appropriate categories (crypto, TLS, etc) which should make it easier to find out what has changed in each specific area. The JDK 27 release notes also contain further details on these and other enhancements. ## Java 27 Reaches GA With The G1 Garbage Collector By Default Everywhere DevFeed: [Java 27 Reaches GA With The G1 Garbage Collector By Default Everywhere]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Michael Larabel Published: 2026-09-15T13:39:00Z Content type: news Language: en Sources: [Phoronix]() Topics: [Java](), [openjdk](), [releases](), [Concurrency](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)]() Tags: [availability](), [concurrency](), [desktop-linux](), [java](), [linux-benchmarking](), [linux-hardware-benchmarks](), [linux-hardware-reviews](), [linux-how-to](), [linux-performance](), [linux-server-benchmarks](), [open-source-graphics](), [openjdk](), [phoronix](), [phoronix-test-suite](), [post-quantum](), [release](), [structured-concurrency](), [tls](), [ubuntu-benchmarks](), [ubuntu-hardware]() ### AI overview OpenJDK 27 has reached general availability. Its G1 garbage collector is now enabled by default across environments, replacing Serial as the default in constrained environments after improvements in throughput, latency, and memory usage. The release also includes post-quantum hybrid key exchange for TLS 1.3, preview features for lazy constants and structured concurrency, compact object headers by default, and an incubating Vector API. ### Source excerpt Oracle christened Java 27 today with the OpenJDK 27 release reaching general availability (GA) status... ## The Honest Migration Playbook - IPsec Series, Part 11 DevFeed: [The Honest Migration Playbook - IPsec Series, Part 11]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Julio Gomez Published: 2026-09-14T19:41:59Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Cisco Blogs]() Topics: [migration](), [Post-Quantum](), [Authentication](), [Networks]() Tags: [authentication](), [cisco](), [developer](), [migration](), [networks](), [post](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-authentication](), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc](), [rsa](), [series]() ### AI overview This article presents an operational playbook for migrating authentication in a live multi-router IPsec network from RSA certificates to ML-DSA. It contrasts authentication with key exchange, explains a mixed hub-and-spoke deployment using ML-KEM-768, and reports that changing signature algorithms cannot be performed without tunnel disruption. ### Source excerpt The final post in the IPsec series: a fully quantum-safe tunnel on Cisco 8000 routers, both pillars live on real hardware. Part 11 closes the arc with the migration playbook and what a healthy post-quantum tunnel actually looks like. ## EF Protocol: Current and Emerging Priorities DevFeed: [EF Protocol: Current and Emerging Priorities]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ethereum Foundation Protocol Cluster Published: 2026-09-07T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [Post-Quantum](), [Protocol (disambiguation)](), [migration](), [data](), [Cloudflare](), [Google](), [Microsoft]() Tags: [data](), [ethereum](), [migration](), [post-quantum](), [protocol](), [research-development]() ### AI overview The EF Protocol cluster outlines Ethereum Protocol priorities through 2029, including scoping the Hegotá upgrade and preparing Ethereum L1 to become quantum-resistant across the execution, consensus, and data layers by December 2029. The plan uses an intentionally aggressive assumption that Q-day could occur as early as 2030, with the deadline to be reassessed in January 2027. ### Source excerpt In May, the Protocol cluster welcomed a trio of new cluster coordinators and promised updates to follow. After months of settling in and aligning with contributors cluster-wide, across the EF and across the Ethereum ecosystem, we are now happy to share Protocol's priorities: what Protocol is for, the commitments... ## Acceleration of Curve25519 Field Operations with Java Software and Intrinsics DevFeed: [Acceleration of Curve25519 Field Operations with Java Software and Intrinsics]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Shawn Emery Published: 2026-09-03T00:00:00Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Inside Java]() Topics: [Java](), [JDK 27](), [JDK 28](), [Security](), [Post-Quantum]() Tags: [crypto](), [ed25519](), [java](), [jdk](), [jdk-27](), [jdk-28](), [performance](), [post-quantum](), [security](), [tls](), [x86]() ### AI overview JDK 27 and JDK 28 improve Curve25519 field-operation performance through software changes and architecture-specific intrinsics. The improvements benefit X25519, Ed25519, and X25519MLKEM768 operations, with gains varying by algorithm, JDK build, and x86_64 or AArch64 platform. ### Source excerpt Find out about the improved Curve25519 field performance in JDK 27 and JDK 28. ## Sites using PQC (September 2026) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (September 2026)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-09-01T14:49:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2026](), [cryptography](), [post](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [september-2026](), [sites](), [tls](), [top](), [using]() ### AI overview A periodic check examines which of the top 1 million domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ### Source excerpt One more periodic check of which of the top 1M domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Some thoughts about Anthropic's new cryptanalysis results DevFeed: [Some thoughts about Anthropic's new cryptanalysis results]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Green Published: 2026-07-29T14:23:30Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Matthew Green]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Claude](), [anthropic](), [Post-Quantum](), [Algorithm]() Tags: [academics](), [ai](), [algorithm](), [anthropic](), [artificial-intelligence](), [attacks](), [chatgpt](), [claude](), [llm](), [post-quantum](), [research](), [security](), [technology](), [thoughts]() ### AI overview The article offers commentary on two cryptanalysis results published by Anthropic and produced by Claude Mythos: an attack on the proposed HAWK post-quantum signature scheme and an improved attack on reduced-round AES. It emphasizes that the HAWK attack targets a non-deployed, non-standardized scheme and demonstrates a weakness using a weakened challenge instance. ### Source excerpt Yesterday Anthropic published two new cryptanalysis results, both outputs of Claude Mythos, their (still) unreleased advanced model. The first of these results attacks a signature scheme called HAWK, while the second is an improved attack against reduced-round AES. Anthropic also released a blog post describing the research process that produced these results. A few people ... Continue reading Some thoughts about Anthropic's new cryptanalysis results -> ## Production ML-DSA Verification in 350 Lines of Python DevFeed: [Production ML-DSA Verification in 350 Lines of Python]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Filippo Valsorda Published: 2026-07-26T11:45:08Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Filippo Valsorda]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Python](), [Cryptography](), [Testing](), [mutation-testing]() Tags: [cryptography](), [mutation-testing](), [post-quantum](), [python](), [testing](), [verification]() ### AI overview The article presents a production pure-Python ML-DSA signature verifier that supports all parameter sets, Python 3.8 and later, and an API modeled after pyca/cryptography. It describes the implementation's performance, portability rationale, and testing with Wycheproof vectors, accumulated vectors, pytest, mutation testing, and branch coverage. ### Source excerpt I am publishing a production, pure-Python ML-DSA verifier. It's just 350 lines, and pretty readable and robust. ## Post-Quantum Certificates DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Certificates]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-06-27T16:17:41Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [certificates](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Web]() Tags: [2026](), [certificates](), [post-quantum](), [tls](), [web]() ### AI overview A summary of post-quantum certificates and the TLS and web-PKI ecosystem as of June 2026. ### Source excerpt A summary of post-quantum certificates and the TLS / web-PKI ecosystem as of June 2026. ## Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys DevFeed: [Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Filippo Valsorda Published: 2026-04-20T15:21:12Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Filippo Valsorda]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Cryptography](), [Algorithms, Complexity](), [Security]() Tags: [algorithm](), [algorithms](), [cryptography](), [post-quantum](), [quantum](), [quantum-algorithms](), [security]() ### AI overview The article argues that quantum computers do not require larger symmetric key sizes during the post-quantum transition. It explains why Grover's algorithm does not reduce the practical security of AES-128 and SHA-256 enough to justify replacing 128-bit symmetric keys, while asymmetric cryptography remains affected by Shor's algorithm. ### Source excerpt There is no need to update symmetric key sizes as part of the post-quantum transition, due to the details of how Grover's algorithm scales. Most authorities agree. ## A Cryptography Engineer's Perspective on Quantum Computing Timelines DevFeed: [A Cryptography Engineer's Perspective on Quantum Computing Timelines]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Filippo Valsorda Published: 2026-04-06T15:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Filippo Valsorda]() Topics: [Quantum Computing](), [Cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention]() Tags: [attacks](), [cryptography](), [hardware](), [post-quantum](), [quantum](), [quantum-computing](), [research]() ### AI overview A cryptography engineer explains why recent research on quantum algorithms, hardware, qubits, and error correction has changed his assessment of the urgency of migrating to quantum-resistant cryptography. He argues that cryptographically relevant quantum computers may arrive within the next few years and could threaten elliptic-curve cryptography and WebPKI. ### Source excerpt The risk that cryptographically-relevant quantum computers materialize within the next few years is now high enough to be dispositive, unfortunately. ## Sites using PQC (February 2026) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (February 2026)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-02-28T19:42:26Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)]() Tags: [2026](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [tls]() ### AI overview A periodic check examines which of the top 1 million domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange, using February 2026 data. ### Source excerpt Another periodic check of which of the top 1M domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Ethereum Protocol Studies 2026 DevFeed: [Ethereum Protocol Studies 2026]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Josh Davis; Mario Havel Published: 2026-02-17T00:00:00Z Content type: release Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [Cryptography](), [Learning](), [Zero-knowledge proof](), [Post-Quantum](), [foss](), [Discord](), [Wiki]() Tags: [2026](), [cryptography](), [discord](), [ethereum](), [foss](), [learning](), [math](), [platform](), [post-quantum](), [q-a](), [real-time](), [research-development](), [video](), [zero-knowledge]() ### AI overview Ethereum Protocol Studies returns in 2026 with new cryptography and consensus content tracks, including material on zkEVMs, plus a self-paced learning platform built on Moodle. The program begins February 23. ### Source excerpt tl;dr: Ethereum Protocol Studies returns for 2026 with new content tracks in cryptography, lean consensus and zkEVM, plus a new self-paced learning platform. The program kicks off February 23rd. Visit epf.wiki to get started. Ethereum Protocol Studies (EPS) is back. Since launching as a 10-week study group ahead of... ## Use of PQC in SMTP STARTTLS DevFeed: [Use of PQC in SMTP STARTTLS]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2026-01-23T19:54:53Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [servers]() Tags: [cryptography](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [servers](), [smtp]() ### AI overview A quick summary of which SMTP servers among the Top 1M domains use post-quantum cryptography for STARTTLS. ### Source excerpt A quick summary of which SMTP servers amongst the Top1M domains uses post-quantum cryptography for STARTTLS. ## Preparing Java Systems for the European Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition DevFeed: [Preparing Java Systems for the European Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Ixchel Ruiz Published: 2025-12-10T03:03:48Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Java Advent Calendar]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [Java](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Resilience](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention]() Tags: [2025](), [compliance](), [cryptography](), [cybersecurity](), [java](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [resilience]() ### AI overview This article explains how European legislation, strategic planning, and emerging standards are driving a transition toward crypto-agile and post-quantum-ready systems. It provides guidance for Java practitioners and discusses KEM/KDF APIs, PEM support, hybrid TLS efforts, and PQC-related proposals. ### Source excerpt -- Preparing for the Quantum Shift Table of Contents The EU's Post-Quantum Plan: Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 What will upcoming EU cybersecurity legislation require? And how can Java help you prepare? Why this is significant for architects? Java advisory note NIS2 -- Cryptography as Organizational Governance Engineering Implications Java advisory note DORA -- Operational Resilience [...] The post Breaking keys and building trust: The JAVA way! appeared first on JVM Advent. ## The 2025 Go Cryptography State of the Union DevFeed: [The 2025 Go Cryptography State of the Union]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Filippo Valsorda Published: 2025-11-20T15:42:24Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Filippo Valsorda]() Topics: [Go Language](), [Cryptography](), [Security](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [OpenSSH]() Tags: [2025](), [cryptography](), [encryption](), [go](), [post-quantum](), [security](), [ssh](), [tls]() ### AI overview A transcript of the 2025 Go Cryptography State of the Union, covering developments in Go cryptography over the previous year. It highlights post-quantum key exchanges, FIPS 140 work, and the security track record of Go cryptography packages, including vulnerability trends. ### Source excerpt I delivered my traditional Go Cryptography State of the Union talk at GopherCon US 2025 in New York. It goes into everything that happened at the intersection of Go and cryptography over the last year. ## Sites using PQC (September 2025) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (September 2025)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-09-15T13:42:18Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Post-Quantum](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention]() Tags: [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [tls](), [updated]() ### AI overview An updated check examines which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ### Source excerpt An updated check of which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## Lean Ethereum: A vision for scaling, security, and decentralization DevFeed: [Lean Ethereum: A vision for scaling, security, and decentralization]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Justin Drake Published: 2025-07-31T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Ethereum Foundation Blog]() Topics: [Ethereum](), [Cryptography](), [Security](), [Post-Quantum](), [RISC-V]() Tags: [cryptography](), [ethereum](), [post-quantum](), [research-development](), [risc-v](), [security](), [upgrades]() ### AI overview The article presents "lean Ethereum" as a vision for Ethereum's next decade, focused on combining higher performance with security and decentralization. It proposes upgrades to consensus, data availability, and execution, including post-quantum cryptography, real-time zkVMs, data availability sampling, and a possible SNARK-friendly RISC-V-based instruction set. ### Source excerpt Yesterday Ethereum turned 10. Today, lean Ethereum is unveiled as a vision--and personal mission--for the next 10 years. We stand at the dawn of a new era. Millions of TPS. Quantum adversaries. How does Ethereum marry extreme performance with uncompromising security and decentralization? TLDR: next-generation cryptography is central... ## Post-Quantum Cryptography Proof of Concept Implementations DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography Proof of Concept Implementations]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-07-20T21:35:33Z Content type: tutorial Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-Quantum](), [Post-quantum cryptography](), [QUIC](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Server](), [client]() Tags: [client](), [cryptography](), [language](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [quantum](), [quic](), [server](), [tls]() ### AI overview The article presents a few QUIC post-quantum cryptography TLS server implementations intended to help verify client and language capabilities. ### Source excerpt A few quic PQC TLS server implekentations to help you verify client and language capabilities. ## Sites using PQC (March 2025) DevFeed: [Sites using PQC (March 2025)]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-03-24T06:57:11Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2025](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography](), [sites](), [tls]() ### AI overview The article describes a check of the top 100,000 domains to identify which support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. The supplied evidence does not include the check's results. ### Source excerpt A quick look to check which of the top 100K domains support post-quantum cryptography in their TLS key exchange. ## The case for adding disappearing messages to Apple iMessage DevFeed: [The case for adding disappearing messages to Apple iMessage]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Matthew Green Published: 2025-03-01T16:53:30Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [Matthew Green]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Encryption](), [Messaging](), [Post-Quantum](), [iphone]() Tags: [apple](), [cryptography](), [cybersecurity](), [encryption](), [iphone](), [messaging](), [post-quantum](), [security]() ### AI overview This opinion piece examines whether Apple iMessage is secure despite its end-to-end encryption and post-quantum security. It argues that message persistence creates privacy risks and makes the case for adding disappearing messages. ### Source excerpt This is a cryptography blog and I always feel the need to apologize for any post that isn't "straight cryptography." I'm actually getting a little tired of apologizing for it (though if you want some hard-core cryptography content, there's plenty here and here.) Sometimes I have to remind my colleagues that out in the real ... Continue reading Dear Apple: add "Disappearing Messages" to iMessage right now -> ## Post-Quantum Cryptography in February 2025 DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography in February 2025]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2025-02-19T16:12:46Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Signs of Triviality]() Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](), [implementation](), [Post-Quantum](), [Cryptography]() Tags: [2025](), [cryptography](), [implementation](), [industry](), [post-quantum](), [post-quantum-cryptography]() ### AI overview An updated summary of how post-quantum cryptography implementation has advanced in the industry over the last year, as of February 2025. ### Source excerpt An updated summary of how the implementation of post-quantum cryptography has advanced in the industry in the last year. ## Real World Crypto 2024 DevFeed: [Real World Crypto 2024]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Published: 2024-05-07T11:00:17Z Content type: article Language: en Sources: [Latacora]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Certificate Transparency](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](), [Post-Quantum]() Tags: [browsers](), [certificate-transparency](), [cryptography](), [internet](), [post-quantum](), [privacy](), [public-key](), [security]() ### AI overview A blog post records notes from Real World Crypto 2024 in Toronto, discussing applied cryptography trends including post-quantum messaging, key transparency, and privacy-enhancing technologies. It also describes Certificate Transparency's Levchin Prize recognition and its role in improving accountability for the Web Public Key Infrastructure. ### Source excerpt We traveled to Toronto this year to attend RWC 2024. The conference was held in TIFF Lightbox located in the city's downtown; the venue is the headquarters for the Toronto Film Festival and contains five cinema rooms. RWC is a single-tracked conference and there's no hard requirement that talks are backed by papers. Each RWC includes the Levchin prize ceremony for major achievements in applied cryptography, several invited talks and the lightning talks session. ## A symmetric-key approach to post-quantum Web PKI DevFeed: [A symmetric-key approach to post-quantum Web PKI]() Original publisher: [Read original article]() Author: Adam Langley Published: 2024-04-07T00:00:00Z Content type: opinion Language: en Sources: [ImperialViolet]() Topics: [Cryptography](), [Post-Quantum](), [Encryption](), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](), [public key](), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](), [kerberos]() Tags: [cryptography](), [dns](), [don-t](), [kerberos](), [post-quantum](), [public](), [public-key](), [tls]() ### AI overview The article proposes using DNS records and shared symmetric keys with multiple certificate authorities to help authenticate a Kyber key agreement between a client and server. It notes that initial public-key connections to the authorities would still require large post-quantum signatures and raises privacy and policy concerns because authorities could observe which servers clients contact. ### Source excerpt (I think this is worth pondering, but I don't mean it too seriously--don't panic.) Are the sizes of post-quantum signatures getting you down? Are you despairing of deploying a post-quantum Web PKI? Don't fret! Symmetric cryptography is post-quantum too! When you connect to a site, also fetch a record from DNS that contains a handful of "CA" records. Each contains: a UUID that identifies a CA ECA-key(server-CA-key, AAD=server-hostname) A key ID so that the CA can find "CA-key" from the previous field. "CA-key" is a symmetric key known only to the CA, and "server-CA-key" is a symmetric key known to the server and the CA. The client finds three of these CA records where the UUID matches a CA that the client trusts. It then sends a message to each CA containing: ECA-key'(client-CA-key) -- i.e. a key that the client and CA share, encrypted to a key that only the CA knows. We'll get to how the client has such a value later. A key ID for CA-key'. Eclient-CA-key(client-server-key) -- the client randomly generates a client-server key for each CA. The CA record from the server's DNS. The hostname that the client is connecting to. The CA can decrypt "client-CA-key" and then it can decrypt "server-CA-key" (from the DNS information that the client sent) using an AAD that's either the client's specified hostname, or else that hostname with the first label replaced with *, for wildcard records. The CA replies with Eserver-CA-key(client-server-key), i.e. the client's chosen key, encrypted to the server. The client can then start a TLS connection with the server, send it the three encrypted client-server keys, and the client and server can authenticate a Kyber key-agreement using the three shared keys concatenated. Both the client and server need symmetric keys established with each CA for this to work. To do this, they'll need to establish a public-key authenticated connection to the CA. So these connections will need large post-quantum signatures, but that cost can be amortised over [Next page]()