# Post-quantum cryptography

Post-quantum cryptography uses cryptographic algorithms designed to protect electronic information against future quantum-computer threats.

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## Correctable Enrollment and One-Transaction Seed Proofs for Ethereum's Post-Quantum Transition

DevFeed: [Correctable Enrollment and One-Transaction Seed Proofs for Ethereum's Post-Quantum Transition](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/correctable-enrollment-and-one-transaction-seed-proofs-for-ethereum-s-post-quantum-transition-146042.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25663>)

Author: Xin Jin, Maximillian Liao, Handong Chen, Yi Nancy Li, Junyu Liu

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [consensus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consensus.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [legacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/legacy.md>), [machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [proofs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proofs.md>), [quant-ph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quant-ph.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [simulation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/simulation.md>), [space](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/space.md>), [sponsor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sponsor.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

The proposal lets Ethereum account owners enroll post-quantum keys with existing signatures before ECDSA retirement, then correct enrollments by a shared post-retirement deadline using a zero-knowledge proof of the wallet's BIP-39 seed. Accounts never enrolled remain frozen but recoverable by seed proof without a deadline. Proofs bind the new key, nonce, and fee cap; validators switch to hash-based keys at a finalized checkpoint under a stated bound on attacker voting power. The authors report formal guarantees under explicit assumptions, model checking, and implementations in go-ethereum and a Lean consensus client. Their recursive hash-based STARK seed proof is about 190 KB, verifies in 38 ms, and takes a median 111 seconds to generate on a laptop; four proofs can be aggregated. In a ten-node simulation, block space constrained migration: 4.45 million accounts with at least 0.1 ETH took an estimated 29.4 days to enroll before retirement or 235 days to recover afterward in batches of four. During mass enrollment, public-mempool waiting had a 19.1-minute median, exceeding published estimates for a fast quantum computer to extract a key.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25663v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can extract the private key of every Ethereum account whose public key is published, and accounts exposed by their own transactions hold 54.6% of execution-layer ETH. As the first such machine may stay secret, a migration cannot wait for visible thefts, and once keys are extractable, legacy signatures no longer tell owners from attackers. We design a migration in which owners enroll post-quantum keys cheaply with their existing signatures before ECDSA is retired at a scheduled time, while a zero-knowledge proof of the wallet's BIP-39 seed can correct any such enrollment until a common deadline afterward; an account nobody enrolled stays frozen and recoverable by seed proof without a deadline. Each proof binds the new key, a nonce and a fee cap, so neither a paying sponsor nor a reordering block builder can redirect or replay it. Validators switch to hash-based keys first, at a finalized checkpoint and under a stated bound on the attacker's voting power. We prove the account guarantees under explicit assumptions, model-check the rules, and implement the design in go-ethereum and a Lean consensus client. A three-layer recursive hash-based STARK yields a seed proof of about 190 KB that fits one transaction, verifies in 38 ms and takes a median of 111 s to generate on a laptop; four proofs aggregate into one. In a ten-node simulation with mainnet-derived accounts and fee demand, block space rather than proving sets the duration: the 4.45 million accounts with at least 0.1 ETH would migrate in 29.4 days if all enroll before ECDSA is retired and in 235 days if all recover after it in batches of four. In a mass enrollment, an enrollment waits a median of 19.1 minutes in the public mempool, longer than published estimates for a fast quantum computer to extract its key, so owners with a seed and an unexposed key should migrate by seed proof.

## Post-Quantum Cryptography Education for Software Developers: A Multivocal Literature Review

DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Cryptography Education for Software Developers: A Multivocal Literature Review](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-cryptography-education-for-software-developers-a-multivocal-literature-review-142171.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23311>)

Author: R. D. N. Shakya, C. P. Wijesiriwardana, S. M. Vidanagamachchi, Nalin A. G. Arachchilage

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/learning.md>), [Developer skills](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-skills.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [alignment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alignment.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing.md>), [coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coverage.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [education](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/education.md>), [literature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/literature.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [software-developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-developers.md>)

### AI overview

The review examines whether existing education prepares software developers to implement and migrate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) securely. It analyzes 8 research publications and 15 professional training offerings across competencies, practical tasks, teaching, learner support, and evaluation. All 23 sources cover PQC foundations and algorithms, but coverage of practical software engineering tasks is uneven. The review identifies gaps in developer-focused evaluation, authentic tasks and competency alignment, pedagogy and learner support, security-focused assessment, and long-term validation of learning and transfer. It recommends strengthening PQC education, though the supplied abstract does not detail the recommendations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.23311v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptography, making post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption a software engineering challenge. However, it remains unclear how well existing educational provision prepares software developers for secure PQC implementation and migration. We conducted a multivocal literature review of 8 research publications and 15 professional training offerings, examining competency coverage, practical software engineering tasks, pedagogical approaches, learner support, and evaluation. All 23 sources covered PQC foundations and algorithms, but coverage of practical software-engineering tasks was uneven. Our analysis identifies six gaps concerning developer focused evaluation, authentic software engineering tasks, task competency alignment, pedagogical design and learner support, security-focused assessment, and long term validation of learning outcomes and transfer. We derive recommendations for strengthening PQC education and better preparing software developers to implement and migrate cryptographic systems securely.

## Deutsche Telekom IoT's CEO on securing devices that run for 20 years

DevFeed: [Deutsche Telekom IoT's CEO on securing devices that run for 20 years](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/deutsche-telekom-iot-s-ceo-on-securing-devices-that-run-for-20-years-140161.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/18/christian-schwalbe-deutsche-telekom-iot-security/>)

Author: Mirko Zorz

Published: 2026-11-18T07:30:25Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [cyber resilience act](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resilience-act.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>)

Tags: [ceo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ceo.md>), [connectivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connectivity.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cyber-resilience-act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience-act.md>), [deutsche-telekom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deutsche-telekom.md>), [don-t-miss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t-miss.md>), [eu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eu.md>), [europe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/europe.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [hot-stuff](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hot-stuff.md>), [internet-of-things](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet-of-things.md>), [interview](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interview.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [manufacturers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manufacturers.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [opinion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opinion.md>), [patterns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patterns.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [risk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [strategy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/strategy.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [tips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tips.md>)

### AI overview

Schwalbe says the most overlooked IoT risks often come from old, unmonitored devices, so security needs to continue throughout a product's lifecycle. The EU Cyber Resilience Act makes manufacturers responsible for cybersecurity and vulnerability handling during the support period, raising practical challenges for products that may remain deployed for 10-20 years. Network monitoring can flag unusual communication patterns without inspecting payloads, though metadata still needs responsible handling and encrypted traffic may require device-level protections. Post-quantum planning should reflect how long data must remain confidential; constrained devices face limits in processing, memory, energy and data rates. A research proof of concept splits security-critical information across terrestrial and satellite paths, with further optimization and validation needed before broad deployment. Schwalbe describes digital sovereignty as understanding dependencies and retaining meaningful control, alongside global technology ecosystems and shared standards.

### Source excerpt

In this Help Net Security interview, Christian Schwalbe, CEO of Deutsche Telekom IoT, talks about the forgotten devices that create the most risk in IoT deployments. He explains what the EU Cyber Resilience Act means for manufacturers whose products stay in the field for 15 or 20 years, and how threats can be spotted through communication patterns without inspecting payloads. Schwalbe also discusses post-quantum cryptography for constrained devices, including research on splitting secrets across terrestrial ... More -> The post Deutsche Telekom IoT's CEO on securing devices that run for 20 years appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Why your software needs a CBOM

DevFeed: [Why your software needs a CBOM](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-your-software-needs-a-cbom-143652.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/why-you-need-a-cbom/>)

Author: Manish Kapur

Published: 2026-11-17T14:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Sonar Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sonar-blog.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [spdx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/spdx.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-coding-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-agents.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [alice-bob](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alice-bob.md>), [asset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asset.md>), [assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assets.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [australia](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/australia.md>), [bill-of-materials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bill-of-materials.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptographic-inventory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic-inventory.md>), [inventory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inventory.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-migration.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [sbom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sbom.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>)

### AI overview

A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is a machine-readable inventory of cryptographic assets and where software uses them, giving teams a starting point for post-quantum migration. The text describes CycloneDX CBOMs as covering algorithms, protocols, certificates, and related material such as keys and nonces, with file-and-line evidence; they describe types of cryptographic material, not secret values. An SBOM identifies software components, while a CBOM can identify a specific algorithm and its location in code. The inventory can help teams identify vulnerable or already weak cryptography, prioritize migration, create actionable developer tasks, show progress, and plan algorithm changes. It does not itself establish compliance. The text recommends generating CBOMs from code analysis, keeping them current, making findings traceable, and using an open standard. Sonar says CBOM generation and cryptographic posture management are in early access on SonarQube Cloud with select customers.

### Source excerpt

Learn what a CBOM is, how it differs from an SBOM, and why a cryptographic inventory is the first step in post-quantum migration. Read the guide.

## PQC Migration: End-to-End Performance Profiling of Post Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms in mTLS

DevFeed: [PQC Migration: End-to-End Performance Profiling of Post Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms in mTLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pqc-migration-end-to-end-performance-profiling-of-post-quantum-cryptographic-algorithms-in-mtls-139318.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21206>)

Author: Rahul, Manjesh K. Hanawal, Sameer G. Kulkarni, Saravanan V, K. Tirumaleswar Reddy

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>)

Tags: [1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-3.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [nist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nist.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [profiling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/profiling.md>), [setup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/setup.md>), [speed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed.md>), [throughput](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/throughput.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>), [transport-layer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transport-layer-security.md>)

### AI overview

The reported tests found no measurable TLS 1.3 performance degradation from standardized post-quantum algorithms, despite their larger keys. Hybrid algorithms did degrade performance, with the impact becoming more pronounced under adverse network conditions. The authors therefore suggest making hybrid migration sensitive to network conditions. Their setup measured throughput, connection time, energy, and CPU cycles across client-server connections; the supplied excerpt gives no detailed measurements or algorithm-by-algorithm results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.21206v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Emerging quantum computers threaten to break the classical key exchange algorithms. To safeguard against these threats, migration to new quantum-safe algorithms is underway and expected to be expedited. Though resistant to attacks, the quantum safe algorithms may impact the real-world performance due to their large key lengths. In this work, we analyze the end-to-end performance of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol with the post-quantum (PQ) and hybrid cryptographic algorithms standardized by NIST. We develop a test setup to evaluate the performance of TLS connections between a client and a server under various network conditions. We focus on the impact of the new algorithms on the speed (throughput, connection time) and sustainability (energy, CPU cycles) of TLS 1.3. Our analysis demonstrates that the standardized post-quantum algorithms do not introduce any measurable performance degradations in TLS 1.3, despite their larger key lengths. However, hybrid algorithms introduce noticeable performance degradation, which becomes increasingly pronounced under adverse network conditions. Our analysis suggests that migration to hybrid algorithms should be ``network condition aware'' as poor network conditions can severely degrade performance in TLS 1.3. We provide anonymised link to the code and a web interface to analyse performance of various combination of algorithms.

## Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd

DevFeed: [Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-migration-of-wi-fi-key-establishment-a-hybrid-ml-kem-design-for-owe-and-fils-validated-on-owe-with-hostapd-137038.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21528>)

Author: Jes\\'us R. Abascal, Ana I. G\\'omez, Domingo G\\'omez-P\\'erez

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Wi-Fi](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/wi-fi.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-migration.md>), [wi-fi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wi-fi.md>), [wpa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wpa.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed Wi-Fi key exchange combines classical elliptic-curve agreement with ML-KEM (FIPS 203), deriving the master key from both secrets so protection holds if either remains secure. It reuses OWE and FILS setup frames without another round trip; stations configured to require the hybrid mode refuse association unless the post-quantum exchange completes. A hostapd and wpa_supplicant prototype validated on OWE produced matching keys in every measured connection. The two smaller ML-KEM parameter sets fit in one enlarged association frame under a conservative 1500-byte threshold, and added connection time and computation stayed below 0.5 ms. Capability binding to the derived key is specified but not implemented. FILS carries over by design, but its frame budget was not measured; the intermediate parameter set is reported to balance security level and size.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.21528v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The key agreements that protect a Wi-Fi connection rely on Diffie-Hellman, which a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break; an adversary can therefore record an association today and decrypt its traffic years later. Key establishment is thus the part of IEEE 802.11 that has to be migrated first. This work targets the two protocols that perform that agreement inside the frames used to set up the link: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE), which encrypts otherwise open networks, and Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS), designed for fast connection in dense and mobile deployments. We propose replacing their Diffie-Hellman exchange with a hybrid one that runs the classical elliptic-curve agreement alongside ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and derives the master key from both secrets, so the connection stays protected as long as either component remains unbroken. The exchange reuses the frames each protocol already sends and adds no extra round trip; an access point can advertise the hybrid mode alongside classical OWE, and a station configured to require it refuses to associate without a completed post-quantum exchange. Binding the advertised capabilities to the derived key is specified as a design extension and is not part of the prototype. We validate the design with a working implementation on hostapd and wpa_supplicant: both endpoints derive the same key in every measured connection, with the two smaller parameter sets each enlarged association frame fits in a single frame even under a conservative 1500-byte fragmentation threshold, and the added connection time and computation stay below half a millisecond. The measurements are obtained on OWE; the design carries over to FILS, whose frame budget is left for specific measurement. Of the three ML-KEM parameter sets, the intermediate one offers the best balance between security level and size.

## Information-Theoretic Threshold Designated-Verifier Digital Signatures for Resource-Constrained Devices

DevFeed: [Information-Theoretic Threshold Designated-Verifier Digital Signatures for Resource-Constrained Devices](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/information-theoretic-threshold-designated-verifier-digital-signatures-for-resource-constrained-devices-136049.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18355>)

Author: Andrew Wright, Aydin Abadi, Ittoop Vergheese Puthoor

Published: 2026-11-16T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [raspberry-pi-4](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/raspberry-pi-4.md>)

### AI overview

The authors present three information-theoretic threshold designated-verifier signature schemes: an n-of-n multisignature and t-of-n schemes with or without a dealer. They claim security against any adversary under the standard criterion. On a Raspberry Pi 4, signature computation took about 80 ms or less and verification about 150 ms or less. The authors also report performance equivalent to or up to twice that of a comparable post-quantum threshold signature scheme on resource-constrained devices and a 2025 M5 MacBook Pro. These are abstract-level claims; the supplied text does not include the security proof or evaluation details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.18355v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Digital signatures are synonymous with data integrity and authenticity. Among applications such as e-commerce, software distribution, and instruction processing they play a vital role in the secure communication of data. Within this context and in preparation for quantum adversarial tactics we present three new information-theoretic threshold designated verifier digital signature schemes and prove them secure against \textit{any} adversary under the standard security criterion. The $n$-of-$n$ multi-signature, $t$-of-$n$ threshold with dealer, and $t$-of-$n$ threshold without dealer designated verifier signature schemes can be implemented with simple mathematical constructs and we demonstrate the efficiency of these with evaluation of signature computation ($\lessapprox$ 80\,ms) and verification times ($\lessapprox$ 150\,ms) on the resource constrained platform of Raspberry Pi 4. We find our scheme also has equivalent or improved (2$\times$) performance than a comparable state-of-the-art post-quantum threshold digital signature scheme on both resource constrained devices and the more capable consumer-grade 2025 M5 MacBook Pro.

## GITEX GLOBAL 2026 Puts AI Security, Cyber Resilience and Post-Quantum Readiness in Focus

DevFeed: [GITEX GLOBAL 2026 Puts AI Security, Cyber Resilience and Post-Quantum Readiness in Focus](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gitex-global-2026-puts-ai-security-cyber-resilience-and-post-quantum-readiness-in-focus-131609.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/gitex-global-2026-puts-ai-security-cyber-resilience-and-post-quantum-readiness-in-focus?source=rss>)

Author: Hacker and Technology Events

Published: 2026-11-13T08:07:19Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [cyber resiliency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cyber-resiliency.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Sovereign AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sovereign-ai.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [Endpoint security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/endpoint-security.md>), [kaspersky](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kaspersky.md>), [proofpoint](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proofpoint.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [acronis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acronis.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-powered](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered.md>), [ai-powered-applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered-applications.md>), [ai-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security.md>), [ai-security-and-sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-security-and-sovereignty.md>), [ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-systems.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyber-resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [gitex-cyber-valey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-cyber-valey.md>), [gitex-global-2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-2026.md>), [gitex-global-2026-dubai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-2026-dubai.md>), [gitex-global-cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitex-global-cybersecurity.md>), [hackernoon-media-partnerships](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackernoon-media-partnerships.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-security.md>), [quantum-readiness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-readiness.md>), [resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resilience.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [uae-cybersecurity-council](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uae-cybersecurity-council.md>)

### AI overview

GITEX GLOBAL 2026 will spotlight cybersecurity challenges as AI agents, interconnected systems and data sovereignty concerns reshape digital security. Its GITEX Cyber Valley program will focus on AI security, dual-use cyber technologies and post-quantum readiness, with tailored business meetings and private briefings for cybersecurity leaders. The article says organizations must consider AI accountability, access control and operational security, alongside the resilience of encryption and data protection strategies as quantum computing emerges. Exhibitors span data protection, endpoint security, network defense, threat detection and enterprise resilience; the UAE Cybersecurity Council will also participate. The event runs December 7-11, 2026, across Dubai World Trade Centre and Dubai Exhibition Centre at Expo City Dubai.

### Source excerpt

Explore GITEX GLOBAL 2026's cybersecurity highlights, including AI security, post-quantum readiness, cyber resilience, and leading global security exhibitors.

## Maturity$^2$: Assessing the Maturity of Crypto Agility Maturity Models

DevFeed: [Maturity$^2$: Assessing the Maturity of Crypto Agility Maturity Models](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/maturity-2-assessing-the-maturity-of-crypto-agility-maturity-models-133337.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17003>)

Author: Leonie Wolf, Robin Leander Schr\\"oder, Sebastian Schinzel, Fabian Ising

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>)

Tags: [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [crypto-agility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-agility.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [design-principles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design-principles.md>), [governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/governance.md>), [guidance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guidance.md>), [industry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry.md>), [maturity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/maturity.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [nist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nist.md>), [organizational](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizational.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [planning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/planning.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [principles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/principles.md>), [recommendations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/recommendations.md>)

### AI overview

The study evaluates three industry-driven crypto agility maturity models against established design principles. It reports recurring weaknesses: assessment criteria are often neither measurable nor reproducible, and guidance for improving crypto agility is limited. It also identifies strengths across the models to help practitioners choose among them and offers recommendations for improving future models. The supplied abstract does not specify the individual models or their comparative strengths.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.17003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Crypto agility maturity models aim to support organizations in preparing for cryptographic transitions, such as migrating to post-quantum cryptography. Recognizing the importance of measurable maturity, NIST references several such models in its guidance. Given NIST's influence on cybersecurity practice, these models may shape organizational planning and governance mechanisms. However, their design quality has not been systematically evaluated. In this work, we assess three industry-driven maturity models against established design principles. Our analysis reveals recurring weaknesses, particularly the lack of measurable, reproducible assessment criteria and limited prescriptive guidance for improving crypto agility. At the same time, we highlight individual strengths that can assist practitioners in choosing among the models and derive concrete recommendations for strengthening future crypto agility maturity models.

## PQC Readiness with Cyera: Start with the Data That Matters

DevFeed: [PQC Readiness with Cyera: Start with the Data That Matters](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pqc-readiness-with-cyera-start-with-the-data-that-matters-131598.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.cyera.com/blog/pqc-readiness-with-cyera-start-with-the-data-that-matters>)

Author: Rick Holland

Published: 2026-11-12T20:42:58Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cyera Blogs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyera-blogs.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Data Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-management.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>)

Tags: [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [aes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aes.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cyera](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyera.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [plan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/plan.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [pqc-migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc-migration.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remediation.md>), [risks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risks.md>), [sensitive-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensitive-data.md>)

### AI overview

PQC migration planning should start by identifying data whose confidentiality must last, removing unnecessary copies where retention and legal requirements allow, and tracing the remaining data through its protections, identities, applications, and providers. Cyera contributes sensitive-data, exposure, identity, access, and ownership insights to help prioritize work and build a readiness backlog; teams must combine these findings with business decisions and cryptographic evidence from cloud services, KMS, PKI, and discovery tools. Engineering teams validate which mechanisms need changing: upgrading key establishment, changing key protection, rewrapping data-encryption keys, and re-encrypting data address different needs, and key rotation alone does not fix a vulnerable mechanism. The guidance also calls for supplier evidence, signed-artifact integrity planning, and testing interoperability, performance, recovery, and fallback before deployment. The text cites NIST's 2035 phase-out target and NCSC milestones of discovery and an initial plan by 2028, highest-priority migration by 2031, and completion by 2035.

### Source excerpt

Prepare for post-quantum cryptography with Cyera. Discover sensitive data, assess encryption risks, prioritize remediation, and plan your PQC migration.

## IBM Quantum and the race to make scientific advantage useful to industry

DevFeed: [IBM Quantum and the race to make scientific advantage useful to industry](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ibm-quantum-and-the-race-to-make-scientific-advantage-useful-to-industry-130743.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://siliconangle.com/2026/11/12/ibm-quantum-and-the-race-to-make-scientific-advantage-useful-to-industry/>)

Author: Dave Vellante

Published: 2026-11-12T18:01:06Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [SiliconANGLE](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/siliconangle.md>)

Topics: [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [High-Performance Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/high-performance-computing.md>), [AI Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-infrastructure.md>), [ibm](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ibm.md>)

Tags: [acquisition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acquisition.md>), [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-for-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-for-quantum.md>), [anderon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anderon.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [breaking-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breaking-analysis.md>), [chemistry-applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chemistry-applications.md>), [david-vellante](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/david-vellante.md>), [emerging-tech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emerging-tech.md>), [enterprise-quantum-adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise-quantum-adoption.md>), [error-correction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error-correction.md>), [fault-tolerance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fault-tolerance.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [homepage-wikibon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homepage-wikibon.md>), [hrl-laboratories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hrl-laboratories.md>), [hybrid-quantum-classical-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid-quantum-classical-computing.md>), [ibm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ibm.md>), [ibm-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ibm-quantum.md>), [infra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infra.md>), [jay-gambetta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jay-gambetta.md>), [materials-science](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/materials-science.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [qdc26](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/qdc26.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [quantum-advantage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-advantage.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [quantum-impact](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-impact.md>), [quantum-manufacturing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-manufacturing.md>), [quantum-software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-software.md>), [quantum-workflows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-workflows.md>), [scientific-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scientific-computing.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [special-breaking-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/special-breaking-analysis.md>), [the-latest](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/the-latest.md>), [thecube-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/thecube-research.md>), [tooling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tooling.md>), [top-story-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/top-story-3.md>), [top-story-6](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/top-story-6.md>), [wikibon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wikibon.md>)

### AI overview

IBM says it met its 2026 quantum advantage goal and is targeting demonstrable industry impact by 2028, but the article argues that customers still need evidence of repeatable, validated outcomes that outperform practical classical methods. IBM's QDC26 announcements combine processor progress with software, AI skills, managed workflows and classical computing to help researchers prepare, run and validate experiments. The article highlights chemistry and materials as plausible early application areas, while stressing that the full cost, time, reliability and specialist effort must be counted. It also cautions that an advantage may be temporary as classical methods improve, and that AI-assisted workflows need to remain understandable and scientifically accountable. Enterprise quantum activity described in Qualitate data centers mainly on post-quantum cryptography, not workloads on quantum computers. IBM's integrated platform may ease operations while increasing dependence on its ecosystem; portability and manufacturing reliability remain open questions.

### Source excerpt

QDC26 shows progress in the hardware, software and tooling around quantum computing as customers look for evidence of better outcomes. IBM Corp.'s Quantum Developer Conference in Chicago this week marked a change in emphasis. IBM claims that researchers have demonstrated quantum advantage in 2026 by working with the classical computing community. Its public presentations showed [...] The post IBM Quantum and the race to make scientific advantage useful to industry appeared first on SiliconANGLE.

## Safeguard Your WAN from Quantum Threats, Part 2: The CNSA 2.0 Blueprint

DevFeed: [Safeguard Your WAN from Quantum Threats, Part 2: The CNSA 2.0 Blueprint](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/safeguard-your-wan-from-quantum-threats-part-2-the-cnsa-2-0-blueprint-127105.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blogs.cisco.com/networking/safeguard-your-wan-from-quantum-threats-part-2-the-cnsa-2-0-blueprint>)

Author: Sumant Mali

Published: 2026-11-10T16:00:19Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Cisco Blogs](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cisco-blogs.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [network security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network-security.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Resilience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/resilience.md>), [SD-WAN](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sd-wan.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [blueprint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blueprint.md>), [boot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boot.md>), [bootloader](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootloader.md>), [catalyst-sd-wan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/catalyst-sd-wan.md>), [cisco](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cisco.md>), [cnsa-2-0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cnsa-2-0.md>), [compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compliance.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [crypto-agility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-agility.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [routers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routers.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [wan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wan.md>)

### AI overview

The article presents Cisco's CNSA 2.0 migration blueprint for 8000 Series Secure Routers, targeting HNDL exposure with post-quantum protections across WAN encryption, authentication, and device boot. IOS XE 26.1 and 26.2 add ML-KEM key exchange for IKEv2 IPsec, DMVPN, FlexVPN, Catalyst SD-WAN IPsec, MACsec, SSH, and TLS 1.3; IOS XE 26.2 also adds ML-DSA authentication for PKI-based site-to-site VPNs. Secure boot uses LMS-signed ROMMON and ML-DSA-signed IOS XE. Hybrid key exchange combines classical Diffie-Hellman/ECDH with ML-KEM under RFC 9370 to support phased migration and backward compatibility while retaining FIPS 140-3 compliance. The proposed steps are to inventory cryptography, prioritize WAN-edge transit encryption, and enable hybrid PQC and secure boot on supported routers through software configuration. The article describes Cisco's offering and roadmap; it does not provide independent performance or interoperability results.

### Source excerpt

The quantum threat is here. Discover how Cisco 8000 Series Secure Routers deliver the industry's first end-to-end CNSA 2.0 blueprint, securing your WAN with zero disruption to existing operations.

## QUASI: Post-Quantum Quorum Attestation of Pre-Validated Statements

DevFeed: [QUASI: Post-Quantum Quorum Attestation of Pre-Validated Statements](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/quasi-post-quantum-quorum-attestation-of-pre-validated-statements-126926.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10403>)

Author: Maksym Ioffe, Dahlia Malkhi

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [hashing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hashing.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>)

Tags: [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [consensus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consensus.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [error-correction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error-correction.md>), [generic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generic.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [hashing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hashing.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [quorum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quorum.md>), [statement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/statement.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

QUASI lets a quorum publicly attest that a pre-validated statement is valid without requiring every party to authenticate the entire statement: each party authenticates only a small subset of symbols. The protocols use hashing and error correction, without SNARKs for aggregation. The abstract reports that its randomized construction reduces per-party contribution size and hash computations for generation and verification by more than 10x compared with full hash-based signatures. Proposed uses include external attestation for signature-free consensus and preprocessing before SNARK-based aggregation. The supplied text does not detail the constructions or evaluation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10403v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present QUASI, a newly conceived class of protocols that enable a group of parties to produce a publicly verifiable attestation about a pre-validated statement. Designed for quorum-based systems, QUASI enables parties to attest to external entities that the statement is valid. Surprisingly, each party need not sign the entire statement: authenticating only a small subset of symbols suffices for the quorum to attest to the whole. A simple deterministic construction illustrates this possibility. Built purely from hashing and error correction, QUASI achieves small per-party contributions and low attestation generation and verification costs, without relying on SNARKs for aggregation. Our main contribution is a randomized construction achieving reductions of more than $10\times$ in per-party contribution size and hash computations for generation and verification, compared with full hash-based signatures. QUASI is a generic primitive supporting diverse applications. Two principal use cases are external attestation for signature-free consensus, enabling clients to verify statements about committed state; and preprocessing for SNARK-based aggregation, compounding QUASI's savings with succinct-proof compression.

## Brief introduction to post-quantum cryptography in industrial applications

DevFeed: [Brief introduction to post-quantum cryptography in industrial applications](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/brief-introduction-to-post-quantum-cryptography-in-industrial-applications-126986.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12479>)

Author: Mateusz \\.Zarski, Jaros{\\l}aw Miszczak, C\\'edric Crettaz, Adela Georgescu, Deepak V. Katkoria, Ruxandra F. Olimid, Mihai Prunescu, Maria Slim, Silviu Laurentiu Vasile, Stella Wohnig

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [classes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classes.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-sensitivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-sensitivity.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [healthcare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/healthcare.md>), [industrial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industrial.md>), [introduction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/introduction.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>)

### AI overview

The paper surveys post-quantum cryptography adoption in IoT, healthcare, civil and infrastructure engineering, and defense. It reports implementation experiments on selected quantum-safe methods, including estimates of the quantum resources needed to break common cryptographic schemes and performance evaluations of prominent PQC algorithms. It also reviews the quantum-attack resistance of different PQC classes and implementation status across programming languages. Benchmark results for KEMs and signature algorithms are presented to inform algorithm selection by performance, data lifetime, and data sensitivity. The supplied excerpt does not include specific benchmark values or recommendations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12479v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is directly motivated by the necessity to secure information in the face of the quantum threat. This paper provides an overview of recent developments relevant to PQC adoption across several industrial applications, including IoT, healthcare, civil and infrastructure engineering, and defense. We present a brief, self-contained overview of PQC and its market positioning. We perform implementation experiments on selected quantum-safe methods and quantify several aspects, such as the quantum resources required to break common cryptographic schemes, as well as the performance of the most well-known PQC algorithms. We also discuss the resistance of different PQC classes to quantum attacks and the status of PQC implementations in different programming languages. Finally, we present benchmark results on KEMs and signature algorithms to help select the appropriate algorithm for a specific application based on criteria such as algorithm performance, data lifetime, and level of data sensitivity.

## How To Track Qubits Through Space and Time (Or: Sailing in a Quantum Boat)

DevFeed: [How To Track Qubits Through Space and Time (Or: Sailing in a Quantum Boat)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-track-qubits-through-space-and-time-or-sailing-in-a-quantum-boat-126888.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.30732>)

Author: James Bartusek, Zikuan Huang, Leo Orshansky, Henry Yuen

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [anchor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anchor.md>), [capabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capabilities.md>), [compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compute.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [distributed-team](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed-team.md>), [function](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/function.md>), [functionality](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/functionality.md>), [information](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/information.md>), [link](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/link.md>), [localization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/localization.md>), [location](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/location.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [obfuscation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/obfuscation.md>), [oracle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oracle.md>), [quant-ph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quant-ph.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [space](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/space.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes quantum localization to strengthen position verification: a specified unclonable state must exist at the verified spacetime point and nowhere else, addressing the possibility that distributed adversaries could jointly simulate a prover. It uses quantum anchor states, which generalize coset states, to construct localization and trajectory verification protocols that track quantum information through space and time. Security is proven in the classical oracle (ideal obfuscation) model; the authors say this can be heuristically instantiated in the plain model using post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation. The work also defines functionality localization, requiring a secret function to be computable at the verified point but nowhere else. These are abstract-level claims; the supplied text gives no protocol details or quantitative performance results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2605.30732v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While quantum position verification aims to certify a prover's location using quantum information, existing security definitions only guarantee that part of the successful adversarial party is in the claimed location. This leaves open the possibility that a distributed team of adversaries can jointly simulate a prover in a way that defeats the intended meaning of `being at a location' in position-based cryptography. We introduce stronger notions of position verification that we call quantum localization, which requires that there is a specified, unclonable state at the verified spacetime point-and that this state can be found nowhere else. We show that quantum localization leads naturally to a meaningful notion of trajectory verification, in which quantum information is verifiably tracked through space and time. We construct quantum localization and trajectory verification protocols using quantum anchor states, which generalize coset states from unclonable cryptography. The security of our schemes is proven in the classical oracle (i.e. ideal obfuscation) model, which can be heuristically instantiated in the plain model using post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation. We also introduce and instantiate the concept of functionality localization, which guarantees that the adversary has the ability to compute a secret function at the verified spacetime point, and this function cannot be computed anywhere else. This raises the intriguing possibility of localizing computational capabilities in space and time. More broadly, we believe our notions of quantum localization and subsequent feasibility results provide stronger foundations for position-based cryptography. At a conceptual level, our results also explore the tight link between two fundamental notions in physics-location and information-thus serving as a natural foundation for cryptographic capabilities tied to physical spacetime.

## A Decentralized Quantum-Resistant Notary Scheme for Blockchain Interoperability with a Novel Dynamic Trust Model

DevFeed: [A Decentralized Quantum-Resistant Notary Scheme for Blockchain Interoperability with a Novel Dynamic Trust Model](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-decentralized-quantum-resistant-notary-scheme-for-blockchain-interoperability-with-a-novel-dynamic-trust-model-126730.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11682>)

Author: Koosha Esmaeilzadeh Khorasani, Saeed Moradi, Sara Rouhani

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [aes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aes.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-interoperability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-interoperability.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [inequality](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inequality.md>), [interoperability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interoperability.md>), [mechanism](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mechanism.md>), [ml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml.md>), [ml-dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-dsa.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [quantum-resistant-blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-resistant-blockchain.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a decentralized blockchain notary scheme combining ML-KEM and ML-DSA with AES-256: asymmetric cryptography handles authentication and non-repudiation, while symmetric encryption handles bulk data. In tests up to 270 transactions per second, its end-to-end performance gap versus elliptic-curve approaches averaged under 6% and narrowed to 0.2% at peak load. For trust management, Popoviciu's inequality sets an adaptive discount factor α from variance in verifier behavior, avoiding fixed thresholds and multi-stage configuration; a tunable factor k controls sensitivity. Across 200 adversarial epochs, the authors report that this model detected and responded to misbehavior that the baseline did not penalize adequately.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11682v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Blockchain interoperability is essential for enabling secure and reliable interactions across heterogeneous networks. However, existing notary schemes face two key issues: quantum vulnerability and rigid trust management. To address the first issue, this paper proposes a decentralized, quantum-resistant framework integrating post-quantum primitives ML-KEM and ML-DSA alongside AES-256, optimizing performance by using asymmetric cryptography for authentication and non-repudiation, and delegating bulk encryption to symmetric schemes. Under parallel loads of up to 270 transactions per second, this hybrid design reduces the end-to-end performance gap between the post-quantum and elliptic-curve approaches to under 6% on average, converging to within 0.2% at peak load. The second issue is handled by a dynamic trust model that uses Popoviciu's inequality to derive an adaptive discount factor $\alpha$ based on variance in a Verifier's behavior, removing the need for fixed thresholds or multi-stage configuration, while a tunable dynamicity factor $k$ enables control over system sensitivity. We evaluated the trust model over 200 epochs under adversarial conditions, where the proposed model detects and responds to misbehavior that the baseline model fails to penalize adequately. These results demonstrate that quantum-resistant blockchain interoperability is practically achievable, with the proposed trust mechanism offering greater adaptability and resilience than existing approaches.

## PQC-Corpus: A Dataset of Linked Development Histories for Post-Quantum Cryptography

DevFeed: [PQC-Corpus: A Dataset of Linked Development Histories for Post-Quantum Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pqc-corpus-a-dataset-of-linked-development-histories-for-post-quantum-cryptography-126945.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10966>)

Author: Souhardya Saha Dip, Moshood A. Fakorede, Umar Farooq

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [cryptographic audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptographic-audit.md>), [Data Quality](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-quality.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [versioning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/versioning.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>)

### AI overview

PQC-Corpus links development discussions to code changes across 179 public GitHub repositories, covering cryptographic libraries and general-purpose projects. It connects issues and closing pull requests with commits, patches, comments, and reviews; the authors also reconstructed 23 pull-request commit lists that had been truncated at 250 entries and checked file integrity, schemas, and links. In sampled commits and issues, annotators labeled about seven in ten commits and two in three issues as PQC-related, with reported κ values of 0.86 and 0.93. The dataset offers full and filtered views with removal ledgers, a patch-free view for inspection before downloading patches, and scripts to trace issues to code changes. The abstract says filtering reduces issue-to-commit links but gives no magnitude.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10966v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards evolve, developers must adapt implementations, tests, and protocols. Studying this work requires connecting code changes to problem reports and developer reviews. We present PQC-Corpus, a dataset of linked development histories from 179 public GitHub repositories, spanning cryptographic libraries and general-purpose projects. It connects issues and closing pull requests to commits and full patches, with comments and reviews. We combine Git histories with GitHub threads, reconstruct 23 pull-request commit lists truncated at 250 entries, and check file integrity, schemas, and links. Two annotators independently assessed sampled commits and issues ($\kappa=0.86$ and $0.93$), labeling about seven in ten commits and two in three issues PQC-related within these samples. We provide full and filtered views with removal ledgers, and quantify how filtering reduces links from issues to commits. A patch-free view supports inspection before downloading patches, while traversal scripts follow issues to code changes. We make the dataset and collector publicly available for studies of specification changes, hybrid interoperability, cryptographic review, and migration assistance.

## Cloudflare Develops Public Certificate Authority for Post-Quantum Web Security

DevFeed: [Cloudflare Develops Public Certificate Authority for Post-Quantum Web Security](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cloudflare-develops-public-certificate-authority-for-post-quantum-web-security-123777.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/11/cloudflare-merkle-certificates/>)

Author: Leela Kumili

Published: 2026-11-09T14:35:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Google Chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/google-chrome.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-ml-data-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-ml-data-engineering.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browser-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser-support.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [chrome](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chrome.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cloudflare-merkle-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-merkle-certificates.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [digital-identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-identity.md>), [digital-signature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signature.md>), [experiment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiment.md>), [faster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/faster.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [median](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/median.md>), [merkle-tree-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree-certificates.md>), [ml-data-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-data-engineering.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [production](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/production.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transparency.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [web-browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-browser.md>)

### AI overview

Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) reduce certificate-chain data by recording certificates in an append-only Merkle tree and letting clients verify inclusion with compact proofs. Cloudflare says landmark-based verification can bring the common TLS handshake to one public key, one signature, and an inclusion proof under 1 KB; servers still prove private-key possession and must retain standalone MTCs for clients without a relevant landmark. A Chrome Beta 146 experiment served billions of MTCs to 50% of the beta for selected Cloudflare domains and reported 9% faster median performance, mostly from eliminating intermediate certificates. It used classical signatures, so it did not establish performance with larger post-quantum signatures. Cloudflare is developing a public CA for MTC issuance, with planned evaluation for possible inclusion in Chrome's quantum-resistant Root Store in early 2027. Wider deployment still requires browser support, independent monitoring at production volume, and a diverse CA and cosigner ecosystem; revocation and incident handling were also raised as open questions.

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare is developing a public certificate authority for Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) to reduce the bandwidth overhead of post-quantum cryptography. A Chrome experiment served billions of MTCs to 50% of Chrome Beta 146 for selected domains, reporting 9% faster median performance. Wider deployment depends on browser support, transparency, and production-scale validation. By Leela Kumili

## The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC

DevFeed: [The DOs and don'ts of post-quantum DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-dos-and-don-ts-of-post-quantum-dnssec-123783.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.apnic.net/2026/11/09/the-dos-and-donts-of-post-quantum-dnssec/>)

Author: Geoff Huston

Published: 2026-11-09T05:34:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [APNIC Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/apnic-blog.md>)

Topics: [DNSSEC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dnssec.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Domain Name System (DNS)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dns-resolution-process.md>), [TCP/IP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tcp-ip.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [dnssec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnssec.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [queries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/queries.md>), [resolvers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/resolvers.md>), [responses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/responses.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tech-matters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-matters.md>), [udp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/udp.md>)

### AI overview

The example shows ML-DSA-44 DNSSEC responses can exceed the recommended UDP payload size: one measured response was 2,551 bytes versus 191 bytes with ECDSA P-256, triggering UDP truncation and a TCP retry. The text explains that IP fragmentation is unreliable, while TCP is already part of DNS, and that the DO bit requests DNSSEC records rather than validation. An Internet draft proposes that non-validating resolvers clear DO and cache responses by DO setting, fetching signatures only when later requested; this could reduce unnecessary large responses and TCP load but adds resolver complexity and queries. The authors present the proposal as an unresolved idea. Measurements cited show 60% of users' queries set DO, while 48% are behind resolvers expected to validate; caching and the small share of queried names in signed zones temper the infrastructure impact.

### Source excerpt

Post-quantum signatures could dramatically enlarge DNSSEC responses, shifting many queries from UDP to TCP. Should resolvers limit unnecessary DNSSEC data, or is greater TCP use inevitable?

## A Practical Post-Quantum Distributed Ledger Protocol for Financial Institutions

DevFeed: [A Practical Post-Quantum Distributed Ledger Protocol for Financial Institutions](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-practical-post-quantum-distributed-ledger-protocol-for-financial-institutions-122763.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.05005>)

Author: Yeoh Wei Zhu, Naresh Goud Boddu, Yao Ma, Shaltiel Eloul, Giulio Golinelli, Yash Satsangi, Rob Otter, Kaushik Chakraborty

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Zero-knowledge proof](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/zkp.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [cryptographic audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptographic-audit.md>)

Tags: [assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assets.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [financial-institutions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/financial-institutions.md>), [lattice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lattice.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>), [zero-knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-knowledge.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a post-quantum, lattice-based transaction scheme for encrypted ledgers, aiming to meet financial institutions' confidentiality and auditability needs. It combines zero-knowledge proofs with a method for equating commitment messages during re-commitment without opening one of them, then builds a publicly verifiable scheme for single- or multi-asset transactions using a compact range proof. The abstract says the authors provide a security analysis; it does not give implementation details or quantitative performance results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2603.05005v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Traditional financial institutions face inefficiencies that can be addressed by distributed ledger technology. However, a primary barrier to adoption is the privacy concerns surrounding publicly available transaction data. Existing private protocols for distributed ledger that focus on the Ring-CT model are not suitable for adoption for financial institutions. We propose a post-quantum, lattice-based transaction scheme for encrypted ledgers which better aligns with institutions' requirements for confidentiality and audit-ability. The construction leverages various zero-knowledge proof techniques, and introduces a new method for equating two commitment messages, without the capability to open one of the commitment during the re-commitment. Subsequently, we build a publicly verifiable transaction scheme that is efficient for single or multi-assets, by introducing a new compact range-proof. We then provide a security analysis of it. The techniques used and the proofs constructed could be of independent interest.

## Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS

DevFeed: [Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/empirical-assessment-of-post-quantum-cryptography-adoption-status-in-tls-122810.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09707>)

Author: Md Ariful Haque, Sander Vinberg, Ben Edwards, Jo\\~ao Cruz

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Across seven TLS-based protocols, the study reports PQC support concentrated in HTTPS and LDAPS: at the origin-server level, 9.1% of HTTPS and 7.39% of LDAPS servers supported PQC, while each other protocol was below 1%. At the entity level, support was 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, with all other protocols below 5%. The assessment used 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol and also examined adoption by organizational footprint and industry, plus Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. The supplied text is an abstract and does not provide details of those comparisons.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.09707v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).

## Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs

DevFeed: [Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/optimizing-credential-blast-radius-through-trust-boundaries-and-delegation-under-post-quantum-authentication-costs-122778.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04566>)

Author: Pauli Taipale, Harri Lainio

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [blast-radius](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blast-radius.md>), [budget](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/budget.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [candidate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/candidate.md>), [cases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cases.md>), [comparisons](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/comparisons.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [costs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/costs.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [designs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/designs.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [optimizing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/optimizing.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-authentication.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>), [trust-boundaries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust-boundaries.md>), [under](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/under.md>)

### AI overview

The framework jointly selects trust-domain boundaries and credential-derivation structures to limit weighted service impact after compromise while meeting policy and latency constraints. Partitioning reduces how far issuer compromise can reach but adds cross-boundary calls, whose latency may rise with post-quantum authentication on constrained or lossy paths. A linear upper bound supports optimization; a joint event model computes exact expected impact. The general problem is NP-hard, though restricted cases are efficiently solvable exactly. In exhaustive synthetic comparisons, joint optimization produced lower blast radius than choosing boundaries first in 195 of 230 cases, especially with chained delegation. A trace-derived replay with measured post-quantum costs, synthetic risk inputs, a fixed derivation family, and one to six domains found mean expected impact up to 36% lower than a single domain under independent compromise events, within the latency budget. These results depend on the stated replay assumptions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2609.04566v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Partitioning interacting services into independently rooted trust domains limits issuer-compromise reach while increasing calls across trust boundaries. Post-quantum replacements for public-key authentication and key-establishment mechanisms can increase crossing latency on constrained or lossy paths. We formulate the joint selection of trust domains and credential-derivation structures under policy and latency constraints, linking separate service-interaction and credential-derivation graphs through domain assignment. Credential blast radius measures weighted service impact after compromise. A linear upper bound supports optimization, while a joint event model gives exact expected impact. We identify when risk from issuers trusted across domains can be incorporated into this linear score, avoiding separate issuer-propagation calculations for each candidate. Although the general problem is NP-hard, we identify restricted cases that can be solved efficiently and exactly. Joint optimization yields lower blast radius than choosing boundaries first in 195 of 230 exhaustive synthetic comparisons, especially under chained delegation. A trace-derived replay used measured post-quantum costs, synthetic risk inputs, a fixed derivation family, and one to six trust domains. Under independent compromise events, mean expected impact was up to 36% lower than with one domain within the latency budget. The framework turns risk assumptions and measured crossing costs into candidate trust-domain and credential-derivation designs.

## Empirical Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in SSH Infrastructure

DevFeed: [Empirical Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in SSH Infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/empirical-study-of-post-quantum-cryptography-adoption-status-in-ssh-infrastructure-122809.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09703>)

Author: Md Ariful Haque, Sander Vinberg, Ben Edwards, Jo\\~ao Cruz

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [content-delivery-networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content-delivery-networks.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [digital-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-signatures.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [geography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/geography.md>), [implementing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementing.md>), [industry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry.md>), [infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infrastructure.md>), [large](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [operational](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operational.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [status](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/status.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>)

### AI overview

Using SSH fingerprints from a proprietary scanning tool, the study assessed PQC support across 1.52 million port-22 hosts and 27,012 entities. Adoption is uneven: 45.2% of hosts support PQC, while 54.8% remain classical-only; 39.9% of entities have at least one PQC-enabled host, while 60.1% have none. The abstract says adoption was also examined by industry, geography, and organizational size, but gives no results for those comparisons.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.09703v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the anticipated arrival of Q-day, quantum computers threaten current cryptographic schemes for encryption and digital signatures. In response, major content delivery networks and cloud service providers are already adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The current state-of-the-art focuses on benchmarking the operational performance of implementing PQC, but the real-world adoption status remains under-researched. This work utilizes large-scale SSH fingerprint data from a proprietary scanning tool to analyze PQC adoption across 1.52 million hosts and 27,012 entities. Our study shows that the PQC transition in the SSH protocol is underway but highly polarized: 45.2% of SSH hosts on port 22 support PQC, while 54.8% remain classical-only. At the entity level, 39.9% have enabled PQC on at least one host, whereas 60.1% have no PQC support. By correlating PQC adoption with industry, geography, and organizational size (digital and financial), this study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of PQC adoption status in SSH infrastructure.

## The Countdown to Q-Day Has Begun

DevFeed: [The Countdown to Q-Day Has Begun](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/the-countdown-to-q-day-has-begun-121688.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.eetimes.com/the-countdown-to-q-day-has-begun/>)

Author: Rebecca Pool

Published: 2026-11-06T21:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [EE Times](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ee-times.md>)

Topics: [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [computational complexity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/computational-complexity.md>), [quantum mechanics](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-mechanics.md>)

Tags: [2015](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2015.md>), [2020s](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2020s.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [alarm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alarm.md>), [analog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analog.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cyberscurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyberscurity.md>), [designline](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/designline.md>), [digital](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital.md>), [education](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/education.md>), [ee](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ee.md>), [ee-times](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ee-times.md>), [ee-times-university](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ee-times-university.md>), [eelife](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eelife.md>), [eelive-electronic-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eelive-electronic-design.md>), [eet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eet.md>), [electrical-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electrical-engineering.md>), [electronic-components](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronic-components.md>), [electronic-engineering-times](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronic-engineering-times.md>), [electronics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronics.md>), [embedded-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded-systems.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [fundamentals-courses](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fundamentals-courses.md>), [just](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/just.md>), [learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning.md>), [mixed-signal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mixed-signal.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [opinion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opinion.md>), [part-search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/part-search.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [product-search](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product-search.md>), [q-day](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/q-day.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [quantum-computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computer.md>), [quantum-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum-computing.md>), [semiconductors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semiconductors.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [tech-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-papers.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [times](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/times.md>), [video](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/video.md>)

### AI overview

IonQ researchers describe an end-to-end trapped-ion design that they estimate could use 20,000 physical qubits and Shor's algorithm to recover a 256-bit elliptic-curve key in under 26 days. They attribute the reduced resource estimate to coordinated algorithm, compiler, hardware, and error-correction optimizations, including reusing helper and cat-state qubits. IonQ's roadmap targets a 10,000-qubit fault-tolerant system in 2027 and 20,000 qubits in 2028, but those milestones do not establish when a cryptographically relevant machine will exist. Other estimates differ: Oratomic and Caltech describe a neutral-atom route with 10,000 qubits in days, while Google and collaborators estimate a superconducting approach with fewer than 500,000 qubits in about nine minutes. Researchers quoted say substantial engineering remains and the late-2020s risk is uncertain. They urge migration to post-quantum cryptography, a process expected to take years; cited government and company targets range from 2028 to 2035.

### Source excerpt

Will a quantum computer break blockchain cryptography in just two years' time? The post The Countdown to Q-Day Has Begun appeared first on EE Times.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTExLTA2VDIxOjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjBkN2M0MGZhLTdlMzAtNDNiYy05ZWY2LWRmNjQwYmI2YTcyYiJd>)