# private key

A private key is the secret part of an asymmetric key pair, typically used to digitally sign or decrypt data.

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## CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-61798 - netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-61798-netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-boringssl-hpke-private-key-bytes-exposed-through-tostring-and-exception-messages-144620.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61798>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-19T22:18:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Netty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/netty.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [array](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/array.md>), [codec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codec.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-61798](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-61798.md>), [exception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exception.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [hpke](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hpke.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [log](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/log.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [messages](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/messages.md>), [netty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty.md>), [netty-incubator-codec-ohttp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [tostring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tostring.md>)

### AI overview

Before netty-incubator-codec-ohttp 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSL HPKE private-key bytes could be exposed through two paths: key-pair and private-key parameter toString() output, and exception messages containing rejected privateKeyBytes. Applications that log these objects or initialization exceptions may persist complete private keys in logs or telemetry. Readers of those records could recover a key and potentially compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity while it remains usable. The issue is fixed in 0.0.23.Final.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-61798 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 10:18 p.m. | 2 hours, 54 minutes ago Description :netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. Severity: 8.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-133185 - Elazarl goproxy before 1.9.4 Predictable MITM Leaf Certificate Private Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-133185-elazarl-goproxy-before-1-9-4-predictable-mitm-leaf-certificate-private-keys-143736.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133185>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-19T14:27:46Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-133185](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-133185.md>), [ed25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ed25519.md>), [elazarl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elazarl.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [goproxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy.md>), [goproxy-project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goproxy-project.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [mitm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mitm.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

Goproxy versions before 1.9.4 have a weak key generation flaw in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey: misuse of hash.Sum causes RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys to be derived from public data. An attacker who has the proxy CA certificate and has observed a leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate it to clients that trust the proxy CA.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-133185 Published : Nov. 19, 2026, 2:27 p.m. | 55 minutes ago Description :Goproxy before 1.9.4 contains a weak key generation vulnerability in NewCounterEncryptorRandFromKey that derives RSA and Ed25519 leaf certificate private keys from public data due to misuse of hash.Sum. Attackers with the CA certificate and one observed leaf certificate can regenerate that host's leaf private key and impersonate the host to clients trusting the proxy CA. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Analysis of Commit Signing on GitHub

DevFeed: [Analysis of Commit Signing on GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/analysis-of-commit-signing-on-github-142111.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14014>)

Author: Abubakar Sadiq Shittu, Parker Collier, John Sadik, Farzin Gholamrezae, Scott Ruoti

Published: 2026-11-19T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [commit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commit.md>), [commits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commits.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [everyday](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/everyday.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [sampling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sampling.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>)

### AI overview

The study examines end-to-end Git commit signing through a 2% stratified sample of GitHub accounts, focusing on key management as well as signing behavior. It analyzes 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories from 71,694 sampled accounts that had committed, and collects 208,546 public keys uploaded to sampled accounts. The authors compare their approach with earlier studies that mainly sampled repositories and paid less attention to key management, then outline a path toward more usable developer key management. The supplied abstract does not report the specific usage patterns found.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2604.14014v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Since 1999, the security community has known that managing cryptographic keys is hard for users of cryptographic systems. Git lets software developers use private keys they control to digitally sign the commits that record their code changes to a repository. This practice offers a rare opportunity to study how a large community manages cryptographic keys in everyday work. In this paper, we study end-to-end commit signing, using GitHub accounts as our sampling unit. Our 2% stratified sample of the GitHub population comprises 2,737,649 accounts, 71,694 of which have made at least one commit. For these accounts, we analyze 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories and collect 208,546 public keys uploaded to the sampled accounts. We examine developers' signing key usage patterns and compare our findings with those of prior commit signing studies, most of which used repository-based samples and paid less attention to key management. We then outline a path toward more usable key management for developers.

## Recent Android Remote Key Provisioning Attacks | Guardsquare

DevFeed: [Recent Android Remote Key Provisioning Attacks | Guardsquare](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/recent-android-remote-key-provisioning-attacks-guardsquare-139530.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.guardsquare.com/blog/android-remote-key-provisioning-attacks>)

Author: Sergio Castell - Security Researcher

Published: 2026-11-17T14:14:41Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Guardsquare](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/guardsquare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Android Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android-security.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>), [Android](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [App attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/app-attestation.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>)

Tags: [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [app-attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app-attestation.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [automated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [bootloader](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootloader.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [crl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crl.md>), [dexguard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dexguard.md>), [provisioning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/provisioning.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [technical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical.md>), [threat-monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-monitoring.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt describes two ways attackers can obtain Android Remote Key Provisioning keyboxes through weaknesses in Qualcomm and MediaTek device security. On vulnerable Qualcomm devices, root software can supply a custom attestation public key to KeyMint and use the device as an oracle to request Google-signed certificates; a firmware update can fix the flaw. MediaTek examples involve modifying the TEE to extract attestation keys or provisioning credentials, with the latter potentially enabling certificate requests without the original device. Short-lived certificates and revocation lists do not prevent repeated keybox generation. The excerpt recommends server-side monitoring for keys reused across devices, unusually high certificate issuance counts, and mismatches between attestation and account or transaction behavior, with rate limits or step-up checks in response. It also suggests supplementing Key Attestation with dynamic app attestation.

### Source excerpt

In a previous article, we described how advanced users and attackers are abusing leaked keyboxes and relaying attestation requests to remote devices in order to bypass the Key Attestation API. We also covered how Remote Key Provisioning (RKP) replaces factory-provisioned attestation credentials with regularly renewed certificates.

## A Re-Keying Game for Encrypted Multi-Agent Control under Persistent Threats

DevFeed: [A Re-Keying Game for Encrypted Multi-Agent Control under Persistent Threats](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-re-keying-game-for-encrypted-multi-agent-control-under-persistent-threats-139236.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12742>)

Author: Sai Sandeep Damera, John S. Baras

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Multi Agent Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-agent-systems.md>)

Tags: [advanced-persistent-threat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-persistent-threat.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-control.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [alarm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alarm.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [bootstrapping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrapping.md>), [bounded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bounded.md>), [budget](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/budget.md>), [choice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/choice.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [convoy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/convoy.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-gt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-gt.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [game](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/game.md>), [multi-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-agent.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>)

### AI overview

The paper models encrypted multi-agent control as a leader-follower game in which an operator chooses noise flooding and key lifetime while a persistent attacker listens and then spoofs sensors. For CKKS, the control loop's noise tolerance, expressed through the formation specification's H₂ norm, limits how many decryptions a key can support; re-keying renews that budget, whereas bootstrapping does not. Spoofing uses some of the same noise tolerance needed for flooding, so the coordination graph and alarm cost determine whether scanning alone, reduced flooding, or no deterrence is optimal. In a 196-agent convoy example at 128-bit security, five graphs with the same spectral radius yield key lifetimes differing by a factor of 18. Reduced flooding deters the attacker on a torus at one-twentieth of a key per day and reduces damage sevenfold on a ring. These results are from the abstract's described model and example.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.12742v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) lets a coordinator control a fleet on encrypted states, but CKKS, the approximate scheme for real-valued arithmetic, returns noisy decryptions from which an adversary can recover the secret key. Flooding each decryption with noise defends it, but a fleet must decrypt to act, so the count of decryptions grows every cycle while the loop tolerates only bounded noise. We formulate the choice of flooding and key lifetime as a leader-follower game between the fleet operator and an advanced persistent threat that listens first and then spoofs the agents' sensors. We show that the closed loop decides how long a key may be used: the formation's specification caps each key's decryption budget through the loop's $H_2$ norm, and only re-keying, not bootstrapping, renews it. A spoof consumes part of the specification that flooding needs, and the coordination graph and the cost of an alarm decide in closed form whether the scan alone, a lower flood or nothing deters it. On 196 agents escorting a convoy at 128-bit security, five graphs with the same spectral radius differ 18-fold in key lifetime, a lower flood deters the spoofer on the torus for a twentieth of a key a day, and on the ring it cuts the damage 7 times. More broadly, any system that must repeatedly decrypt to act has a key lifetime set by its tolerance to noise, making key management part of control design.

## Google Drafts Stricter Key-Management Rules for Web Certificates, Requiring Audits for All Subordinate CA Key Generation

DevFeed: [Google Drafts Stricter Key-Management Rules for Web Certificates, Requiring Audits for All Subordinate CA Key Generation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/google-drafts-stricter-key-management-rules-for-web-certificates-requiring-audits-for-all-subordinate-ca-key-generation-134010.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://joho-todai.com/en/google-web-certificate-key-management-stricter-rules/>)

Author: Toru Misaki

Published: 2026-11-14T01:54:44Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Joho no Todai](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/joho-no-todai.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/audit.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>)

Tags: [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [backup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backup.md>), [backups](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backups.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [forms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/forms.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [google](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/google.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>), [required](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/required.md>), [revision](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/revision.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [website](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/website.md>)

### AI overview

The proposed CA/Browser Forum revision would tighten how browser-trusted certificate authorities generate, protect, track, and transfer private keys. Outside validated cryptographic modules, keys could be protected only by encryption with a key-encryption key kept inside the module or by secret sharing; all covered CA key generation would require documented procedures and an auditor's presence or a full video recording. Records would link the generated public key to later certificates through hash comparisons and quality checks, addressing the eMudhra incident in which a different key went undetected for about 18 months. If transfer between devices cannot meet the rules, the CA must generate a new key at the destination. Phase one is scheduled for March 15, 2027, and phase two for September 15, 2027, subject to adoption; missing evidence of compliant protection could require subordinate certificate revocation. Published Japanese CA policies vary, but they cannot establish actual compliance effort because internal controls may differ.

### Source excerpt

A proposed revision to the common standards governing issuers of browser-trusted website certificates would uniformly require approved forms of private-key protection, audited key generation, transfer procedures, and key inventories. A CA that cannot demonstrate the existence and protection of its keys could be required to revoke certificates.

## eMudhra revokes 8 more CAs it previously declared unaffected by key compromise

DevFeed: [eMudhra revokes 8 more CAs it previously declared unaffected by key compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-revokes-8-more-cas-it-previously-declared-unaffected-by-key-compromise-130552.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.adafruit.com/2026/11/12/emudhra-revokes-8-more-cas-it-previously-declared-unaffected-by-key-compromise/>)

Author: Anne Barela

Published: 2026-11-12T16:20:06Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Adafruit Industries](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/adafruit-industries-makers-hackers-artists-designers-and-engineers.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Python](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/python.md>)

Tags: [audits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audits.md>), [certificate-authorities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authorities.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [hsm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hsm.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

eMudhra revoked eight additional intermediate CAs that it had previously said were unaffected by its October key compromise. The issue traces to an April 30, 2025 key ceremony: a Python script used to transfer keys between Utimaco and Crypto4A HSMs read private keys into the ceremony computer's memory. Unlike eight ECDSA keys previously affected by a bug that truncated their values, the eight RSA keys were not shortened; eMudhra says it cannot demonstrate they were handled under its own rules. Six were for TLS and two for code signing, covering 195 certificates. The excerpt says eMudhra is leaving the publicly trusted TLS business.

### Source excerpt

The Hacker News reports that eMudhra has revoked 8 more intermediate certificate authorities, the same ones it had called unaffected by its October key compromise. An intermediate CA has its own private key, used to sign the certificates the company issues. Both problems trace back to a key ceremony on April 30, 2025, where 16 [...]

## eMudhra revokes 8 more CA certificates after private key mishap

DevFeed: [eMudhra revokes 8 more CA certificates after private key mishap](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-revokes-8-more-ca-certificates-after-private-key-mishap-129652.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/emudhra-revokes-8-more-ca-certificates-after-private-key-mishap/>)

Author: Lawrence Abrams

Published: 2026-11-11T21:27:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>)

Tags: [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificate-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-management.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [early-warning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/early-warning.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [handling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handling.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [investigation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/investigation.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [process](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/process.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-incident.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

eMudhra revoked eight more intermediate CA certificates on November 7, bringing the total affected to 16. Its investigation traced both groups to a custom Python script used in April 2025 to move keys between HSM vendors: a bug reduced eight ECDSA keys to one byte, while eight RSA keys were handled in host memory, contrary to the company's certificate security policy. The RSA keys were not reported weakened, but eMudhra said it could not demonstrate compliant handling and revoked their certificates; affected customer certificates were replaced or migrated. An earlier mismatch in CRL signing in June 2025 was an uninvestigated warning, and the company also found it had not verified key strength or matched generated keys against those created in the HSM. Browser and OS vendors blocked the compromised certificates. eMudhra plans to exit publicly trusted TLS certificates, stop issuing under its G1 hierarchy by November 16, and obtain a KPMG review; it reported no evidence of malicious use.

### Source excerpt

Certificate authority eMudhra has revoked eight additional intermediate CA certificates after an investigation into its recent certificate security incident found improper handling of private keys during the certificate-generation process. [...]

## Hacking the Sidekick in 2026

DevFeed: [Hacking the Sidekick in 2026](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hacking-the-sidekick-in-2026-126637.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.adafruit.com/2026/11/10/hacking-the-sidekick-in-2026/>)

Author: Anne Barela

Published: 2026-11-10T14:34:04Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Adafruit Industries](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/adafruit-industries-makers-hackers-artists-designers-and-engineers.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [Embedded Software Dev](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-software-dev.md>)

Tags: [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [cado-nfs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cado-nfs.md>), [carrier](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/carrier.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [danger](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/danger.md>), [danger-hiptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/danger-hiptop.md>), [dangeros](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dangeros.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hacking.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [mobile](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mobile.md>), [reverse-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reverse-engineering.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [sdk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sdk.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sidekick](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sidekick.md>), [smartphone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smartphone.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [t-mobile](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/t-mobile.md>), [t-mobile-sidekick](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/t-mobile-sidekick.md>), [vintage-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vintage-computing.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [x86](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x86.md>)

### AI overview

The post describes restoring developer access to the Sidekick 3 by recovering a trusted DangerOS signing key. After finding a 512-bit RSA Developer Program root certificate in factory images, ashe factored its key with CADO-NFS using 220 CPU cores across seven machines. The rebuilt private key reproduced Danger's null-device-key.sq; signing an IMEI setting into a .jar and flashing it from recovery enabled developer mode. The post also mentions running DangerOS in a browser with a small Java interpreter written in JavaScript, and Re:Danger, a rebuild of Danger's servers from decompiled code.

### Source excerpt

The T-Mobile Sidekick, sold elsewhere as the Danger Hiptop, ran DangerOS, which only loads software signed by Danger or a carrier. Developers used to get a signed key from a web form, but that closed in 2010 and nobody issues keys anymore. ashe, writing at x86.cx, made one instead. The Danger SDK and a firmware [...]

## CVSS 10.0 LXD, MicroCloud Flaw Lets Attackers Impersonate Trusted Clients Without a Private Key

DevFeed: [CVSS 10.0 LXD, MicroCloud Flaw Lets Attackers Impersonate Trusted Clients Without a Private Key](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cvss-10-0-lxd-microcloud-flaw-lets-attackers-impersonate-trusted-clients-without-a-private-key-110721.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/critical-lxd-and-microcloud-flaw-cvss.html>)

Author: The Hacker News

Published: 2026-11-01T08:51:31Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [CVSS v4.0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cvss-v4-0.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [canonical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/canonical.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cvss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cvss.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [incus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incus.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [lxd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lxd.md>), [microcloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microcloud.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

CVE-2026-112816 lets an attacker impersonate a trusted LXD or MicroCloud client without its private key. The server checked every certificate presented, although mutual TLS proves possession only of the private key matching the first, leaf certificate; an attacker with network access to the HTTPS API and a trusted client's public certificate could attach that certificate behind their own and be accepted as the trusted client. Access could extend to the cluster and its virtual machines, and a privileged identity could lead to host root access. Standalone LXD exposes its API only when an administrator enables it; Canonical identifies capturing a member's public certificate during cluster joining as a MicroCloud exposure path. Update to fixed releases. For snap installs, Canonical advises `sudo snap refresh lxd` and `sudo snap refresh microcloud`, then checking the installed version because fixed LXD releases were still moving from candidate to stable. No LXD workaround is given; restricting API network access reduces exposure until updating. The excerpt reports no known exploitation or published working exploit.

### Source excerpt

CVSS 10.0 LXD, MicroCloud Flaw Lets Attackers Impersonate Trusted Clients Without a Private Key A critical flaw in Canonical's LXD and MicroCloud let an attacker log in as a trusted client without holding that client's private key. To do it, the attacker had to reach their HTTPS API over the net ... Read more Published Date: Nov 01, 2026 (7 hours, 31 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article. CVE-2026-112816

## Binance Lost $6.3 Billion to Its Own Signing Machine

DevFeed: [Binance Lost $6.3 Billion to Its Own Signing Machine](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/binance-lost-6-3-billion-to-its-own-signing-machine-110089.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/binance-lost-$63-billion-to-its-own-signing-machine?source=rss>)

Author: Sidra Zafar

Published: 2026-10-31T16:32:20Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Binance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/binance.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [software supply-chain attack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/software-supply-chain-attack.md>)

Tags: [binance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance.md>), [binance-hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hack.md>), [binance-hack-6-3-billion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hack-6-3-billion.md>), [binance-hot-wallet-signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance-hot-wallet-signing.md>), [bitcoin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bitcoin.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-security.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [eip7702-phishing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip7702-phishing.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [laptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptop.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>)

### AI overview

The article reports that an attacker moved about $6.36 billion from Binance wallets across ten blockchains while Binance said it found no evidence of a private-key leak. It attributes the loss to compromised access to internal signing infrastructure: on Ethereum, one of 50 pre-signed EIP-7702 authorizations delegated a hot wallet to a sweeper contract, and the delegation continued sweeping later deposits. The article stresses that valid signatures can be produced while keys remain inside an HSM or MPC system if an attacker controls the requests or bypasses policy checks. Issuers froze about $3 billion in assets, while the attacker converted other funds; no perpetrator had been officially identified as of 31 October, and Binance's root-cause findings were pending. Proposed controls include isolated developer devices and access, independent approval of large withdrawals, alerts or human review for EIP-7702 authorizations, and separate signing paths and outflow limits by chain and wallet.

### Source excerpt

Binance lost $6.3B with no private key leaked. How a DevOps laptop and EIP-7702 turned the exchange's own signer against it.

## CVE-2026-116794 - russh: Agent server never calls \`Agent::confirm\`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (\`ssh-add -c\`) sign without confirmation

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-116794 - russh: Agent server never calls \`Agent::confirm\`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (\`ssh-add -c\`) sign without confirmation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-116794-russh-agent-server-never-calls-agent-confirm-so-keys-added-with-the-confirm-constraint-ssh-add-c-sign-without-confirmation-105362.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116794>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-10-28T18:17:14Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [beta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/beta.md>), [constraint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/constraint.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-116794](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-116794.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [issue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/issue.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/library.md>), [override](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/override.md>), [policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policy.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [regression](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/regression.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [sign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sign.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>)

### AI overview

From russh 0.50.0-beta.12 up to, but not including, 0.65.0, the agent server recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but does not call Agent::confirm when signing. In applications that override this hook for approval or policy checks, a process with access to the agent socket--including a remote party using a forwarded agent--can sign or authenticate with a loaded ssh-add -c key without that check. Agent::confirm_request still runs for each signing request, so checks there remain effective; implementations using the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check. The issue is fixed in 0.65.0.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-116794 Published : Oct. 28, 2026, 6:17 p.m. | 57 minutes ago Description :russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0. Severity: 8.3 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Our Response To The eMudhra Key Disclosure Incident

DevFeed: [Our Response To The eMudhra Key Disclosure Incident](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/our-response-to-the-emudhra-key-disclosure-incident-101572.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://go.dev/blog/emudhra-incident>)

Author: Roland Shoemaker, on behalf of the Go Security team

Published: 2026-10-26T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Go](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-go-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [project release](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/project-release.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Post Mortem](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-mortem.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [advanced](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [go](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/go.md>), [incident](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incident.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/release.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [team](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/team.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

Weak eMudhra intermediate-certificate keys could let attackers issue trusted TLS certificates for arbitrary domains. Go responded by blocking certificates chained to the compromised intermediates in Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10, released about seven and a half hours after notification through its first URGENT security track. Go's verifier delegates to platform APIs on Windows and macOS, while Linux uses Go's verifier and lacks a uniform built-in revocation mechanism; this gap helped drive the expedited release. To check deployments, use `go version` for the toolchain, `go version -m <binary>` for a binary's build version, or `govulncheck -mode=binary`. The team says it is improving urgent-release efficiency and plans to prioritize Linux revocation support, including investigation of upki.

### Source excerpt

How the Go team responded to the eMudhra certificate compromise with our first-ever URGENT track security release.

## Bringing post-quantum cryptography to geographically fenced key management

DevFeed: [Bringing post-quantum cryptography to geographically fenced key management](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/bringing-post-quantum-cryptography-to-geographically-fenced-key-management-98272.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-geo-key-manager/>)

Author: Erik Engstrom

Published: 2026-10-23T18:06:56Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Cloudflare Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cloudflare-blog.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>), [digital sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-sovereignty.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [control-plane](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/control-plane.md>), [Quantum Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/quantum-computing.md>), [HashiCorp Vault](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hashicorp-vault.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2017](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2017.md>), [2022](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2022.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cloudflare-one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare-one.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-localization-suite](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-localization-suite.md>), [data-sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-sovereignty.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [geo-key-manager](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/geo-key-manager.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [manager](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manager.md>), [post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [sovereignty](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sovereignty.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [zero-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-trust.md>)

### AI overview

Cloudflare's post-quantum GeoKey Manager, launched in closed beta for Data Localization Suite customers, limits where customer private keys can be unwrapped while protecting them against harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks. It wraps keys for global distribution, but only authorized edge servers receive regional root keys. Authorization uses hardware identity, server inventory and regional configuration; keys are held in the Linux kernel keyring and loaded into process memory. Missing or mismatched configuration causes startup or requests to fail closed. The Cloudflare One design derives service- and region-specific HPKE keys from 256-bit regional roots and combines ML-KEM-768 with X25519, HKDF-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM. Soft rotation allows limited access to prior key epochs during transition; hard rotation rewraps affected keys before prior access is removed. This provides regional key-use boundaries, but key management, provisioning and authorized edge services remain within the trust boundary, and volatile key storage adds operational complexity. GeoKey Manager does not itself control traffic routing, tunnel termination or inspection. General availability is planned for Q1 2027; a

### Source excerpt

Cloudflare's new post-quantum GeoKey Manager protects geographically fenced decryption keys from harvest now, decrypt later attacks. Learn how we redesigned our cryptography stack to support strict data sovereignty in a post-quantum world.

## Compromised TLS Certificates

DevFeed: [Compromised TLS Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/compromised-tls-certificates-97564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/10/compromised-tls-certificates.html>)

Author: Bruce Schneier

Published: 2026-10-23T11:04:22Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Schneier on Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/schneier-on-security.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [elliptic-curve-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elliptic-curve-cryptography.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [encrypted-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted-traffic.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [india](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/india.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [uncategorized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/uncategorized.md>)

### AI overview

Eight TLS certificates issued by India's eMudhra had private keys with only 3 to 8 bits of entropy, far below the roughly 384 bits cited for a typical NIST P-384 key. The excerpt says the immediate concern may be VPN users, particularly where governments could intercept traffic. Exploitation still requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack to intercept and relay TLS traffic; local-network control makes that easier, while some attacks may demand well-resourced actors. Transparency logs help reveal unauthorized certificates, but require active monitoring and work only after issuance. The excerpt says end users may need to wait for assurances that updates are in place before using some non-browser TLS communications.

### Source excerpt

The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys: The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that's challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237...

## 1Claw Builds the Security Layer for the Day AI Agents Run Wallets and Sign Trades Autonomously

DevFeed: [1Claw Builds the Security Layer for the Day AI Agents Run Wallets and Sign Trades Autonomously](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/1claw-builds-the-security-layer-for-the-day-ai-agents-run-wallets-and-sign-trades-autonomously-97760.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/1claw-builds-the-security-layer-for-the-day-ai-agents-run-wallets-and-sign-trades-autonomously?source=rss>)

Author: Ishan Pandey

Published: 2026-10-23T10:38:16Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [1-5](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-5.md>), [1claw](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1claw.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [accessible](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accessible.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-and-ml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-and-ml.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [defi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defi.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [keep](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keep.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/layer.md>), [limits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/limits.md>), [master](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/master.md>), [run](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/run.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sign.md>), [stablecoins](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stablecoins.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>), [trades](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trades.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>)

### AI overview

1Claw places an access-control layer between AI agents and protected credentials, APIs, and signing tools. For each requested action, it verifies the agent and its permissions, applies configured policies, then facilitates the API call or transaction signing without giving the agent unrestricted access to the underlying secret. The described controls include per-agent limits, credential and action restrictions, monitoring, and revocation; high-risk actions can require human approval. The founder says revocation timing depends on configuration and operating environment, and it cannot undo actions already taken, making visibility and auditability important. The article distinguishes 1Claw's credential controls from transaction simulation by Tenderly and workspace isolation by Coder: those safeguards do not by themselves prevent access to inappropriate credentials or excessive permissions. 1Claw describes integrations with Bankr and Circle for agent wallet and money workflows, alongside Tenderly and Coder. The account is an interview with the company's founder and does not provide independent performance measurements.

### Source excerpt

1Claw founder Kevin Jones explains how HSM-backed vaults, spend limits and revocation keep AI agents from holding the master key to wallets and APIs.

## Passkeys vs. passwords: What's the difference?

DevFeed: [Passkeys vs. passwords: What's the difference?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/passkeys-vs-passwords-what-s-the-difference-99078.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/insights/best-practices/passkeys>)

Author: Twilio

Published: 2026-10-23T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Twilio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog.md>), [Twilio Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog-2.md>)

Topics: [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2fa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2fa.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [accessible](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accessible.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [adobe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adobe.md>), [advanced](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced.md>), [agencies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agencies.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [industry-insights](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry-insights.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learn.md>), [passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passkeys.md>), [passwordless](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwordless.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwords.md>), [twilio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/twilio.md>), [verify](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verify.md>), [vs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vs.md>)

### AI overview

Passkeys use WebAuthn public key cryptography: a service stores the public key, while the user's device keeps the private key, typically unlocked with a biometric or PIN. Since credentials do not pass between device and service, the excerpt says passkeys resist phishing and credential stuffing better than passwords, reduce password resets, and can make sign-ins faster. Passwords are simple to issue but reused, forgotten, and vulnerable to guessing and phishing. Passkeys require developer implementation, and syncing across operating systems can be challenging. The article describes SMS OTP, email, and WhatsApp as possible fallback channels through Twilio Verify; SMS can cost more and may be unavailable under a user's mobile plan, while OTP channels have their own attack risks.

### Source excerpt

Discover the key differences between passkeys and passwords. Learn how Twilio Verify can enable secure, seamless passwordless authentication for your business.

## Multi-User Multi-Key Image Steganography with Key Isolation

DevFeed: [Multi-User Multi-Key Image Steganography with Key Isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/multi-user-multi-key-image-steganography-with-key-isolation-94496.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23005>)

Author: Tzu-Ti Wei, Yu-Han Tseng, Jun-Yi Lin, Yu-Chee Tseng, Jen-Jee Chen

Published: 2026-10-22T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Image](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [image](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/image.md>), [isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isolation.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [steganography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/steganography.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>)

### AI overview

PUSNet-MK extends PUSNet, which supports only one user and one key pair, to multi-user image steganography. It adds a mismatched-key isolation loss intended to prevent secret recovery with the wrong key while retaining PUSNet's normal image-purification behavior and triggered steganographic embedding. The abstract reports high-quality stego images, accurate secret recovery, and prevention of unintended information leakage in experiments; it provides no specific metrics or experimental details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2603.23005v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Steganography conceals secret information within innocuous carriers while preserving visual fidelity and enabling reliable recovery. Recent unified networks operate normally under untriggered conditions but switch to hidden steganographic tasks when triggered. PUSNet follows this paradigm by performing image purification during normal operation and steganographic embedding when activated. However, it supports only a single user with one key pair, limiting its applicability in multi-user settings. We propose PUSNet-MK, a multi-key extension that enforces strict key isolation via a mismatched-key isolation loss, effectively preventing cross-key decoding when a wrong key is applied. This design preserves the intended steganographic behavior while addressing a critical security limitation of PUSNet. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PUSNet-MK produces high-quality stego images and accurate secret recovery, while preventing unintended information leakage. Code is available at https://gitlab.pairlab.ai.nycu.edu.tw/pairlab/ai.phd/pusnet-mk.

## CKKS -- Key Switching and Relinearization

DevFeed: [CKKS -- Key Switching and Relinearization](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ckks-key-switching-and-relinearization-93098.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.jeremykun.com/2026/10/21/ckks-key-switching-and-relinearization/>)

Published: 2026-10-21T18:27:41Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Jeremy Kun](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/jeremy-kun.md>)

Topics: [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [polynomials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/polynomials.md>), [Tutorial](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tutorial.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [public key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/public-key.md>), [test](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/test.md>)

Tags: [addition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/addition.md>), [ckks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks.md>), [ckks-tutorial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ckks-tutorial.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [homomorphic-encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [mathematics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mathematics.md>), [programming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/programming.md>), [python](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/python.md>), [switching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/switching.md>)

### AI overview

Relinearization converts CKKS multiplication's three-component ciphertext, which decrypts under (1, s, s²), back to two components under (1, s) by treating the s² component as a key-switching problem. Naive key switching homomorphically evaluates decryption using an encryption of the source key under the target key, but its added noise is multiplied by a potentially large ciphertext component and can overwhelm the message. Gadget decomposition splits that component into base-B digits and pairs them with encryptions of scaled source keys, reducing noise growth to roughly B log(Q) times the key-switch-key noise at the cost of more products for smaller bases. The article implements this approach and relinearization, while noting the need to generate a relinearization key first. It also explains that plaintext-ciphertext operations avoid encrypting public or static data per user; multiplication scales existing error and may require rescaling depending on the implementation. Rescaling itself is left to the next article, and the tutorial has not yet moved to RNS form.

### Source excerpt

Table of Contents This is part of a tutorial series on the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme. In the last article, we described the ciphertext-ciphertext addition and multiplication operations. We ended with two challenges, one to restore the squared scaling factor $\Delta^2$ back to $\Delta$, and the other to convert a three-tuple ciphertext (decrypting under $(1, s, s^2)$) back to a two-tuple ciphertext (decrypting under $(1, s)$). This article covers the latter challenge, which is called relinearization.

## Browsers Block eMudhra Intermediate CAs Over Recoverable Private Keys

DevFeed: [Browsers Block eMudhra Intermediate CAs Over Recoverable Private Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/browsers-block-emudhra-intermediate-cas-over-recoverable-private-keys-92721.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/browsers-block-emudhra-intermediate-cas-over-recoverable-private-keys/>)

Author: Ionut Arghire

Published: 2026-10-21T11:22:05Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>)

Tags: [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [intermediate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [risk-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk-management.md>)

### AI overview

Eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates issued in April 2025 were compromised after a key-generation script produced weak keys that were mistakenly used in certificate signing requests. Mozilla and Google blocked them on October 17, Apple on October 19, and Microsoft on October 20; eMudhra revoked them, Sectigo took revocation steps, and Cloudflare patched its services. Mozilla's Dennis Jackson said the keys could be recovered near instantly using the baby-step giant-step discrete log algorithm, and published a tool to check whether clients still trust the certificates. CT logs show no apparent evidence of malicious use before revocation, but not all clients enforce CT, and some may need software updates to remove trust. eMudhra said it was investigating process and code flaws and planned to reverify its key ceremonies.

### Source excerpt

The private keys associated with eight certificates were compromised, and root programs and trust stores are blocking them. The post Browsers Block eMudhra Intermediate CAs Over Recoverable Private Keys appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## eMudhra CA compromise fixes available

DevFeed: [eMudhra CA compromise fixes available](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/emudhra-ca-compromise-fixes-available-91357.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://ubuntu.com//blog/emudhra-ca-compromise-fixes-available>)

Author: Luci Stanescu (Luci Stanescu)

Published: 2026-10-20T23:45:09Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Ubuntu blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ubuntu-blog.md>)

Topics: [Ubuntu](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ubuntu.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [snap](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/snap.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [apt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apt.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [emudhra](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emudhra.md>), [esm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esm.md>), [impersonation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impersonation.md>), [lts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lts.md>), [package](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/package.md>), [pki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pki.md>), [private-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-keys.md>), [public-key-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key-infrastructure.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [ubuntu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ubuntu.md>), [updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/updates.md>)

### AI overview

The eMudhra CA's private keys were demonstrated compromised on 20 October 2026. Ubuntu removed the cross-signing roots emSign Root TLS CA - G3 and Comodo AAA Certificate Services from its trusted root store, so legitimate certificates ultimately chaining to either may stop working. The excerpt lists Ubuntu 26.10, 26.04 LTS, 24.04 LTS, and 22.04 LTS as receiving fixes through standard support; Ubuntu 20.04 LTS and older require Ubuntu Pro's Expanded Security Maintenance. Check the installed ca-certificates version with `dpkg -l 'ca-certificates' | grep ^ii`. Apply updates with `sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade`, or upgrade only ca-certificates with `sudo apt update && sudo apt install --only-upgrade ca-certificates`. Unattended upgrades are enabled by default from Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and apply updates within 24 hours. Ubuntu Desktop browsers commonly run as snaps and may not use the system trust store; snaps refresh four times daily by default, so users who disabled automatic updates should refresh them manually.

### Source excerpt

Introduction The private keys of the eMudhra Certificate Authority (CA) have been demonstrated on 20 October 2026 to have been compromised. The Ubuntu Security Team has released updates to the system PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) root CA store in the ca-certificates package. While the eMudhra CA is not directly trusted as a root on Ubuntu, [...]

## Don't let TEEs break your MPC

DevFeed: [Don't let TEEs break your MPC](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/don-t-let-tees-break-your-mpc-60057.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/09/25/dont-let-tees-break-your-mpc/>)

Author: "Paul Bottinelli"

Published: 2026-09-25T11:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [The Trail of Bits Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-trail-of-bits-blog-2.md>), [Trail of Bits](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-trail-of-bits-blog.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [trusted-execution-environment](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trusted-execution-environment.md>), [Confidential Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/confidential-computing.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>)

Tags: [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [defense-in-depth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense-in-depth.md>), [pitfalls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pitfalls.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [threshold-signatures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threshold-signatures.md>), [trusted-execution-environment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trusted-execution-environment.md>)

### AI overview

This article examines how trusted execution environments interact with multi-party computation and threshold signatures. It explains how an untrusted host can undermine protocol security through filesystem rollback and nonce reuse, and recommends treating TEEs as defense in depth with strong attestation tied to MPC participant identities.

### Source excerpt

Threshold signature schemes, a form of multi-party computation (MPC) that lets a set of parties sign together without any one of them holding the key, are increasingly deployed inside trusted execution environments (TEEs). The combination is intended to amplify security for sensitive computations: MPC distributes trust across multiple independent parties, while TEEs root trust in the hardware manufacturer and its attestation infrastructure. But subtle issues can arise when running an MPC protocol inside a TEE without accounting for the untrusted host: for example, a malicious host could roll back the filesystem state after a threshold signer deletes a used pre-signature, causing the signer to reuse their nonce share and disclose their private key share. So is this combination worth it? Provided you treat the TEE as a defense-in-depth layer rather than a substitute for a sound protocol, the answer is yes. This blog post discusses what TEE attestation can and can't fix in MPC deployments, explores the pitfalls we see most often in audits, and covers best practices, such as incorporating strong attestation processes and binding them to the MPC parties' identities. MPC: Security that depends on participant behavior Before diving into how TEEs and MPC interact, we need to understand what MPC means and what security guarantees it offers. MPC is a cryptographic technique that allows multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to each other. The security of MPC protocols depends critically on assumptions about participant behavior. The cryptographic literature uses two primary security models: Semi-honest (honest-but-curious) security: In this model, all participants follow the protocol exactly as specified, but they may try to learn additional information from the messages they receive during the protocol execution. Participants can try to learn more than they should, but they don't deviate from the protocol speci

## GitHub App keys can still enable takeovers long after they are forgotten

DevFeed: [GitHub App keys can still enable takeovers long after they are forgotten](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/github-app-keys-can-still-enable-takeovers-long-after-they-are-forgotten-58527.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4225630/github-app-keys-can-still-enable-takeovers-long-after-they-are-forgotten.html>)

Author: Shweta Sharma

Published: 2026-09-23T15:10:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [GitGuardian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitguardian.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [Repository](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/repository.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [Self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted.md>)

Tags: [code-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security.md>), [code-security-identity-and-access-management-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security-identity-and-access-management-security.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [identity-and-access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-and-access-management.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [secret-scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-scanning.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>)

### AI overview

The article reports that leaked GitHub App private keys can remain valid for years and may enable unauthorized access to repositories, workflows, self-hosted runners, and organization administration. It describes findings from GitGuardian and explains how attackers could use valid keys to inject malicious code or compromise production environments.

### Source excerpt

GitHub allows organizations to install GitHub Apps that automate and extend certain functionality on the platform and have access to selected repositories and permissions. But the private keys these applications use to authenticate themselves can remain valid for years unless manually revoked. If leaked, those keys can potentially give attackers administrative control over an organization's GitHub account, says GitGuardian, which found 474 still-valid GitHub App private keys among 4802 publicly exposed ones it has collected since 2019. In testing the keys for validity, it was also able to determine what access rights they provided, finding that "72% of the compromised Apps could read private repository content, and 207 could write to it, turning one leaked key into an organization takeover," GitGuardian researcher Gaetan Ferry said in a blog post. Among the GitHub Apps affected by the leaked keys was "Access Tokens for GitHub Actions," an application used to manage access for GitHub Actions workflows. Its private key was exposed in January 2024 after being accidentally committed to a repository, potentially affecting 300 organizations where the app was installed, including Civica and Sierra Nevada Corp. BuildBuddy, Crusher.dev, and a private application associated with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were among the other GitHub Apps for which GitGuardian found exposed keys. Agnidipta Sarkar, chief evangelist at security software vendor ColorTokens, said the initial abuse is "trivially straightforward" and an attacker can achieve that with a valid private key and the corresponding App ID. For maximum impact, he said, attackers could chain the abuse by "injecting malicious code into the repository and when the code is built or deployed, it can compromise downstream users or production environments." An attacker might also be able to modify CI/CD runner configurations to execute arbitrary code on the organization's internal network infrastructure, Sar

## How to Give an AI Agent a Wallet Without a Private Key

DevFeed: [How to Give an AI Agent a Wallet Without a Private Key](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-give-an-ai-agent-a-wallet-without-a-private-key-58715.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/how-to-give-an-ai-agent-a-wallet-without-a-private-key?source=rss>)

Author: Jon Stojan Journalist

Published: 2026-09-23T08:00:11Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [private key](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agent-private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-private-key.md>), [ai-agent-session-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-session-keys.md>), [ai-agent-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-wallet-security.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [autonomous-ai-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-ai-wallet-security.md>), [crypto-wallets-for-ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-wallets-for-ai-agents.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [namera-agent-wallets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/namera-agent-wallets.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [private-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private-key.md>), [scoped-authorization-ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scoped-authorization-ai-agents.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains why giving AI agents unrestricted private keys creates security and reliability risks, including excessive spending, repeated payments, leaked credentials, and malicious instructions in tool responses. It presents scoped authorization using smart accounts and revocable session keys as an alternative.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to give AI agents controlled wallet access without private keys using smart accounts, scoped session keys, transaction limits, & revocable permissions

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/private-key.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTA5LTIzVDA4OjAwOjExKzAwOjAwIiwgImVmMGE1YTRhLWU5N2YtNDBmZS1hMmM2LTM0YjYzYjIxOTdlMCJd>)