# Secret Scanning

Secret scanning is a security technology that automatically detects exposed credentials, including API keys, passwords, and tokens, in code repositories and Git history.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## AI incidents of 2026: Rogue agents, stolen keys, and other familiar stories

DevFeed: [AI incidents of 2026: Rogue agents, stolen keys, and other familiar stories](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ai-incidents-of-2026-rogue-agents-stolen-keys-and-other-familiar-stories-143870.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.aikido.dev/blog/ai-incidents-root-causes-patterns>)

Author: Oscar Sanchez Jr.

Published: 2026-11-19T16:04:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Aikido Security's Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aikido-security-s-blog.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [account takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/account-takeover.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [incidents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/incidents.md>), [isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isolation.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-incidents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-incidents.md>)

### AI overview

A review of 50 publicly reported AI-related security incidents through November 19, 2026 found that familiar weaknesses dominated: exposed secrets, excessive permissions, weak isolation and compromised vendors. AI agents sometimes accelerated attacks or acted beyond intended boundaries, but only three incidents involved a reported previously unknown vulnerability. Of 44 incidents with a stated cause, 35 had multiple failure points; six reports gave no specific cause and 17 lacked at least one detail. The review recommends limiting agents' access, protecting credentials, enforcing boundaries and requiring approval for irreversible actions. Its counts are based on disclosed cases, categories can overlap, and the sample is not a complete picture of incidents that year.

### Source excerpt

We reviewed 50 AI-related security incidents from 2026. Most came down to exposed secrets, over-scoped access, weak isolation and compromised vendors. Category: News

## Give developers and agents API access with Postman Passport

DevFeed: [Give developers and agents API access with Postman Passport](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/give-developers-and-agents-api-access-with-postman-passport-143814.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.postman.com/give-developers-and-agents-api-access-with-postman-passport/>)

Author: Harsh Vardhan

Published: 2026-11-19T16:00:01Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Postman](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/postman-blog.md>)

Topics: [Postman Passport](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman-passport.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Postman](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postman.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-management.md>), [access-requests](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-requests.md>), [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai-agent-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-security.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [general](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/general.md>), [passport](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passport.md>), [postman](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postman.md>), [postman-passport](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postman-passport.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>)

### AI overview

Postman Passport lets developers and agents use APIs without receiving the underlying API key. A proxy in your infrastructure authenticates the consumer, checks approved method, host, and path scope, resolves the secret from your secret store, injects it into the request, and records the identity. Consumers use secret references; approved requests reach the API with its usual credential, while out-of-scope requests are denied. Its CLI Community Edition traffic inspector can flag secrets in routed HTTP and HTTPS traffic, showing destination, client, time, and secret type with values masked; body scanning is optional. Teams can import endpoints, map references, approve grants, set their duration, and revoke a consumer's access without rotating the shared key for everyone. Proxy routing and certificate trust must be configured, and scope checks apply only to requests reaching the proxy. API authorization and business rules still matter; an allowed read endpoint can expose sensitive data. The article recommends evaluating with a sandbox API by checking approved and denied requests, identity records, and revocation timing.

### Source excerpt

Learn how Postman Passport gives developers and agents scoped API access with secret references, so nobody has to share the underlying API key. The post Give developers and agents API access with Postman Passport appeared first on Postman Blog.

## Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code

DevFeed: [Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rotate-a-leaked-gitlab-token-and-let-gitlab-duo-fix-the-code-144779.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://about.gitlab.com/blog/secret-detection-token-rotate-and-fix/>)

Author: Mark Mishaev

Published: 2026-11-19T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gitlab.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [gitlab-ci](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab-ci.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab.md>)

Tags: [acting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acting.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [beta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/beta.md>), [branch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/branch.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cd.md>), [chat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chat.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [duo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duo.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [let](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let.md>), [product](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

Starting with GitLab 19.6 beta for GitLab Ultimate, an active leaked GitLab PAT can be rotated from its vulnerability finding: GitLab revokes it, stores a replacement in Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo opens an MR to update CI/CD jobs. The replacement value is not shown to the user or agent; rotation happens before the agent starts. Review and merge the MR, then resolve the finding. Rotation is immediate and irreversible, and the replacement is scoped to the current project, so scripts outside GitLab CI/CD or jobs in other projects need another token. The feature supports GitLab PATs, including fine-grained PATs, but not other detected secret types. GitLab.com users can rotate their own tokens; Self-Managed administrators can also rotate others' tokens. If the Duo session fails, rotation and secret storage still occur, leaving code updates manual. A dependency-free CLI can batch-rotate group findings and eligible CI/CD variable tokens; it defaults to dry-run, caps runs at 10 rotations unless configured, and omits token values from reports.

### Source excerpt

Secret detection alerts you when an active personal access token (PAT) is exposed in your default branch. Acting on that finding is harder: revoking the token breaks dependent pipelines, and replacing it safely takes several manual steps. While the finding waits in your vulnerability report, the token stays live. Starting in GitLab 19.6 in beta for GitLab Ultimate, you can remediate a leaked GitLab PAT directly from the vulnerability page. Select Rotate and fix, and GitLab revokes the token, stores a replacement in GitLab Secrets Manager, and uses GitLab Duo Agent Platform to open a merge request (MR) to update your CI/CD jobs. You review and merge the MR. GitLab never exposes the new token value to you or your agents. Why leaked tokens stay active after detection Imagine that secret detection flags an active PAT in deploy.sh: export GITLAB_TOKEN="glpat-..." Fixing this manually requires tracking down the token's owner, revoking it, generating a replacement with matching scopes, storing it securely, and opening MRs to update your scripts and CI/CD jobs. Because this process is tedious, remediations often stall or go wrong: The finding ages: Nobody wants to break the pipeline, so the finding sits in the vulnerability report while the token remains active. The fix stops halfway: Someone revokes the token immediately, breaking the build. In a rush to recover, they paste a replacement into a less secure CI/CD variable. The new token leaks: Someone shares the replacement token in a chat thread so a teammate can configure it. In the gap between detected and rotated, the token still works for anyone who can read the repository. Rotate and fix in a snap The Rotate and fix function closes this gap by combining secret detection and validity checks, GitLab Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo Agent Platform. When you open an active PAT finding and select AI actions > Fix with AI > Rotate and fix, GitLab: Revokes the leaked token and creates a replacement with the same name, scopes,

## GitLab 19.6 released

DevFeed: [GitLab 19.6 released](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/gitlab-19-6-released-144780.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/19/gitlab-19-6-released/>)

Author: GitLab

Published: 2026-11-19T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gitlab.md>)

Topics: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>), [Loop Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/loop-engineering.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [Slack](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/slack.md>)

Tags: [1-5](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-5.md>), [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [advanced](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [availability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/availability.md>), [duo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duo.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [slack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/slack.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

GitLab 19.6 adds governance, agent workflows, faster merge request reviews, and security controls. MCP server tool calls now create audit events, while group Owners can deny tools, require approval, or allow them (the control is in beta). Duo in Slack is in limited availability on GitLab.com; `/goal` starts long-running Developer Flow sessions that can commit, push, and create merge requests without per-action approval, and scheduled automations are in beta. Rapid Diffs is generally available, streaming server-rendered diffs; the first file is reported to appear in about 1.5 seconds versus 4.5 seconds previously. Security updates include Rust scanning in Advanced SAST (added in 19.5 and still beta), malware rules for merge request approvals requiring SBOM-based dependency scanning, and configurable pipeline-variable limits. Web search in Agentic Chat is off by default and requires group or instance enablement; searches create audit events. The notes also flag upgrade guidance, including potential custom NGINX configuration breaks after the bundled version update.

### Source excerpt

GitLab 19.6 released with GitLab Duo in Slack in limited availability on GitLab.com

## Security risk assessments run automatically on GitHub Team

DevFeed: [Security risk assessments run automatically on GitHub Team](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/security-risk-assessments-run-automatically-on-github-team-141001.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-18-security-risk-assessments-run-automatically-on-github-team>)

Author: Allison

Published: 2026-11-18T16:54:26Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>)

Tags: [application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-security.md>), [automatically](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automatically.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [code-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [improvement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/improvement.md>), [organizations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/organizations.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [risk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [team](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/team.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

GitHub Team organizations now receive automatic security risk assessments. Organization admins and security managers can review the free assessments to identify exposed credentials and code vulnerabilities, understand current organizational risk, and prioritize next steps. The excerpt points to separate code security and secret risk assessments but does not describe their methods or findings.

### Source excerpt

GitHub security risk assessments now run automatically for organizations on GitHub Team. Organization admins and security managers can review findings from the free assessments to identify exposed credentials and code... The post Security risk assessments run automatically on GitHub Team appeared first on The GitHub Blog.

## How to stop AI coding agents from committing secrets to git

DevFeed: [How to stop AI coding agents from committing secrets to git](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-stop-ai-coding-agents-from-committing-secrets-to-git-139213.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://nirmata.com/2026/11/18/how-to-stop-ai-coding-agents-from-committing-secrets-to-git/>)

Author: Ritesh Patel

Published: 2026-11-18T01:14:41.413057Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Nirmata](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/nirmata.md>)

Topics: [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [Git](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/git.md>), [hooks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hooks.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding.md>), [ai-coding-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-agents.md>), [ai-governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-governance.md>), [coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding.md>), [commit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commit.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [git-hooks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git-hooks.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [hooks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hooks.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [pretooluse-hook](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pretooluse-hook.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>), [push-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/push-protection.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [secrets-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets-management.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

No single layer fully prevents an AI coding agent from committing or pushing secrets. A Claude Code deny rule blocks common `git push` command forms but can miss variants; a PreToolUse hook can inspect the full command and refuse bypass flags such as `--no-verify`. A committed, executable Git pre-commit hook can inspect staged changes, though Git allows it to be skipped with that flag. GitHub push protection checks pushes server-side, including command-line pushes, but requires GitHub Secret Protection for repositories, is disabled by default, supports specific secret patterns, and permits write-access users to bypass by default. Together, these controls cover different gaps; the excerpt also notes limits involving other tools, wrapped commands, and secrets already in local history.

### Source excerpt

Block git push and commit from an AI coding agent with deny rules, a PreToolUse hook, git hooks and GitHub push protection, and see where each layer fails.

## After the harvest: Find and secure developer secrets without slowing developers down

DevFeed: [After the harvest: Find and secure developer secrets without slowing developers down](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/after-the-harvest-find-and-secure-developer-secrets-without-slowing-developers-down-138315.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://1password.com/blog/secure-developer-secrets>)

Author: info@1password.com (Baksheesh Singh Ghuman)

Published: 2026-11-17T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [1Password](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/blog-on-1password-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [Developer experience](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/developer-experience.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>)

Tags: [1password](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1password.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-coding-assistants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-assistants.md>), [ai-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-services.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [coding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding.md>), [coding-assistants](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/coding-assistants.md>), [commands](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commands.md>), [commits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commits.md>), [copy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/copy.md>), [created](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/created.md>), [credential-harvesting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-harvesting.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [developers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developers.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [unified-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/unified-access.md>)

### AI overview

Developer Watchtower finds plaintext credentials, including SSH keys and .env files, on local devices. Its alerts let developers import .env secrets into 1Password Environments, while admins can review a Local disk exposure report showing affected users and devices without seeing secret values. Environments stores and supplies app variables on demand, avoiding a standing plaintext .env file. Developers can import or add variables, use the CLI and SDKs, connect service accounts for automation, and use supported AI coding workflows through 1Password's MCP Server. Teams and Business customers can share environments with groups, with organization-wide availability controlled by admins. The article recommends enabling Watchtower, reviewing the report, treating found credentials as potentially exposed, revoking or rotating them, and storing replacements in Environments. It says Developer Watchtower is available at no extra cost to existing 1Password users.

### Source excerpt

In our first post on credential harvesting, we looked at what happens after an attacker gets inside an environment. The credentials they find can determine how fast and how far they move into other systems. AI is compressing that timeline, and developer machines are where many of those credentials sit. Finding exposed credentials is only half of the job. The harder part is fixing them without disrupting the way developers work. In this post we'll cover how 1Password Developer Watchtower and 1Password Environments help teams find, replace, and manage developer secrets. The riskiest copy of a secret is usually the one on disk For many developers, the fastest place to put a secret is a local .env file. It is familiar, supported by the tools they already use, and usually stored in plaintext. Even when teams provide dedicated secrets tooling, it can feel slow and disconnected from the workflow, so the familiar path wins. That habit feeds secret sprawl, and the numbers are moving the wrong way. GitGuardian's 2026 State of Secrets Sprawl report found 28.65 million new secrets in public GitHub commits in 2025, up 34% from the previous year. Leaked secrets for AI services grew 81% in a single year. For security teams, the bigger problem is visibility. A plaintext credential on a laptop is harder to monitor, rotate, revoke, or trace to the systems that depend on it. And now that AI coding assistants can access project files and run terminal commands, those credentials may be readable by more than the developer who created them. Secure developer secrets with 1Password That is the gap 1Password is closing with 1Password Environments and Developer Watchtower. They help teams find improperly stored developer credentials, secure them where employees already trust, and let developers keep using them without slowing down work. Developer Watchtower finds plaintext developer credentials on local devices, including .env files, and guides users to import them into 1Password Developer cr

## Leaked Credentials Are an Enterprise Problem: GitGuardian Extends Its Good Samaritan Program

DevFeed: [Leaked Credentials Are an Enterprise Problem: GitGuardian Extends Its Good Samaritan Program](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/leaked-credentials-are-an-enterprise-problem-gitguardian-extends-its-good-samaritan-program-136336.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/leaked-credentials-are-an-enterprise-problem-gitguardian-extends-its-good-samaritan-program?source=rss>)

Author: CyberNewswire

Published: 2026-11-16T19:12:05Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [GitGuardian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitguardian.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-assisted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assisted.md>), [ai-powered](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-powered.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [attribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attribution.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cyber-threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-threats.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [cybernewswire](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybernewswire.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [gitguardian-announcement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian-announcement.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [impact](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impact.md>), [leaks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leaks.md>), [press-release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/press-release.md>), [program](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/program.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-analysis.md>)

### AI overview

GitGuardian's Enterprise Good Samaritan Program combines public-source monitoring, AI-assisted analysis and human review to identify serious exposed credentials and warn affected organizations, including noncustomers. It monitors sources such as GitHub and Docker Hub; AI agents screen over 1 million incidents monthly and investigate more than 100,000 in depth. Experts review high-impact findings, contact multiple people at each organization and manually escalate when outreach fails. GitGuardian says it has linked 3,913-plus leaks to 1,532 companies, but only 35% of contacted organizations respond. A May 2026 case was resolved within 26 hours of human escalation after nine automated alerts failed. The company urges organizations to provide a monitored security inbox or security.txt channel. Its reported figures and examples are attributed to GitGuardian and the article.

### Source excerpt

Combining AI-powered attribution with expert security analysis, the program identifies high-impact credential leaks that could give attackers a path

## Amazon Uncovers AI Agent Campaign Targeting LiteLLM, Dify, and Other Apps for API Keys

DevFeed: [Amazon Uncovers AI Agent Campaign Targeting LiteLLM, Dify, and Other Apps for API Keys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/amazon-uncovers-ai-agent-campaign-targeting-litellm-dify-and-other-apps-for-api-keys-136007.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/amazon-uncovers-ai-agent-campaign.html>)

Author: The Hacker News

Published: 2026-11-16T07:34:21Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [token jacking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/token-jacking.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [litellm](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/litellm.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-harness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-harness.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-apps](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-apps.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [apps](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apps.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [credential-theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-theft.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cyber-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-attacks.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [litellm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/litellm.md>), [stored](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stored.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

Amazon's MadPot decoys captured records showing AI agents targeting internet-exposed AI gateways and app builders--including LiteLLM, One API, Dify, Langflow and RAGFlow--to find provider keys, test them and pool working credentials. The agents' records describe techniques such as default credentials, unfinished installs, unauthenticated settings endpoints, known flaws, exposed files and SSRF to cloud metadata. Amazon could not verify the agents' reported outcomes; it assessed with moderate confidence that the operators were separate China-linked groups and that the agents used ARTEX. A separate Cloudflare investigation found ARTEX activity after an account-level CI/CD token was compromised; the token lacked IP restrictions and rate limits, but data returned by database dump requests and persistence success were not disclosed. Amazon advises changing defaults, patching software, scanning and rotating exposed secrets, and monitoring unusual usage or spending. Cloudflare recommends expiring API tokens and restricting client IPs; defenders can also check for named ARTEX Workers and published indicators. The excerpt also describes agent attempts to bypass crypto-exchange identity checks,

### Source excerpt

Amazon Uncovers AI Agent Campaign Targeting LiteLLM, Dify, and Other Apps for API Keys Attackers' AI agents have been hunting for weak spots in internet-exposed AI apps such as LiteLLM, One API, and Dify to steal the AI provider keys stored inside, according to the agents' own records. ... Read more Published Date: Nov 16, 2026 (11 hours, 18 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article. CVE-2026-118383 CVE-2026-28797 CVE-2025-3248

## Week in review: Secret stealer hits GitHub repos, Claude Code turned into remote-controlled implant

DevFeed: [Week in review: Secret stealer hits GitHub repos, Claude Code turned into remote-controlled implant](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/week-in-review-secret-stealer-hits-github-repos-claude-code-turned-into-remote-controlled-implant-134287.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/15/week-in-review-secret-stealer-hits-github-repos-claude-code-turned-into-remote-controlled-implant/>)

Author: Help Net Security

Published: 2026-11-15T09:00:37Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [Claude](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/anthropic.md>)

Tags: [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [articles](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/articles.md>), [ceo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ceo.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/help.md>), [here-s](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/here-s.md>), [heres](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/heres.md>), [implant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implant.md>), [net](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [stealer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stealer.md>), [week-in-review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/week-in-review.md>)

### AI overview

This week's roundup reports active credential theft and exploitation alongside research on AI agents and security operations. A campaign dubbed wfx-loot planted credential-stealing payloads in tens of thousands of GitHub repositories; in more than 1,800 cases it ran and exfiltrated GitHub Actions secrets and cloud credentials. Darktrace researchers demonstrated in a lab that stolen Claude API keys could let them steer Claude Code through Claude's memory stores and use the Files API to extract a 1 GB file. Separately, attackers using the open-source Cairn AI penetration-testing framework gained access or retrieved data at 10 of 19 organizations targeted in August and September 2026. Other findings point to operational gaps: nearly half of surveyed large-company security teams deprioritized unverified vulnerability findings due to time, while 45% of surveyed EU IT service providers took more than three months to patch critical systems. SonicWall issued a fix for an exploited SSL-VPN flaw that may bypass SAML-enforced MFA for attackers with valid credentials; no workaround was listed.

### Source excerpt

Here's an overview of some of last week's most interesting news, articles, interviews and videos: What a security leader should tell the CEO about leaked credentials In this Help Net Security interview, Eric Fourrier, CEO of GitGuardian, talks about leaked credentials and personal liability for security leaders and boards. He explains how fear of blame pushes mistakes out of sight, and what a security leader should be ready to tell a CEO about exposed keys. ... More -> The post Week in review: Secret stealer hits GitHub repos, Claude Code turned into remote-controlled implant appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Secret scanning detects Cloudflare service tokens

DevFeed: [Secret scanning detects Cloudflare service tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/secret-scanning-detects-cloudflare-service-tokens-131158.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-12-secret-scanning-adds-a-detector-for-cloudflare>)

Author: Allison

Published: 2026-11-12T14:38:25Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cloudflare.md>)

Tags: [application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-security.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [improvement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/improvement.md>), [secret-scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-scanning.md>)

### AI overview

GitHub secret scanning now detects Cloudflare Access service tokens (`cloudflare_access_service_token`). Partner secrets found in public repositories are automatically reported to the secret issuer through the secret scanning partnership program. User secrets found in public or private repositories generate secret scanning alerts.

### Source excerpt

Secret scanning now detects Cloudflare service tokens. Detectors added Secret scanning now automatically detects the following new secret type in your repositories. Provider Secret type Cloudflare cloudflare_access_service_token Partner secrets are... The post Secret scanning detects Cloudflare service tokens appeared first on The GitHub Blog.

## Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them

DevFeed: [Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/check-your-github-repos-a-secret-stealer-hit-tens-of-thousands-of-them-130128.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/12/wfx-loot-github-actions-secret-stealer/>)

Author: Mirko Zorz

Published: 2026-11-12T09:24:32Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>)

Tags: [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [devsecops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devsecops.md>), [don-t-miss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t-miss.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [github-credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-credentials.md>), [hot-stuff](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hot-stuff.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [supply-chain-compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chain-compromise.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [wfx-loot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wfx-loot.md>)

### AI overview

A stolen GitHub token can expose every repository its owner can write to: Aikido counted probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories, with more than 1,800 cases where the wfx-loot payload ran and sent credentials to the attacker. The malware injects a workflow script, then removes it and its logs within about a minute. It targets GitHub Actions secrets, cloud and SSH credentials, shell histories, and AI tool tokens, and can establish cloud access that survives secret rotation through changed AWS trust policies or Azure federated credentials. Check for a wfx-docs branch, the probe pull request, or commits titled "ci: refresh build cache," "chore: add ci helper," or "chore: add dependency audit workflow." If the payload ran, treat reachable secrets and cloud roles as compromised; also locate and remove persistent cloud trust changes. Missing artifacts do not establish safety because data was sent directly to attacker servers.

### Source excerpt

A threat actor using stolen GitHub credentials has pushed a credential-stealing payload into tens of thousands of repositories since November 10. In more than 1,800 of them, the malware ran and shipped GitHub Actions secrets and cloud credentials to the attacker. Aikido spotted the campaign and named it wfx-loot. The name comes from the attacker's own labels, "wfx" for the malware and "loot" for what it steals. Aikido counted 4,837 compromised accounts opening probe pull ... More -> The post Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them appeared first on Help Net Security.

## wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories

DevFeed: [wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/wfx-loot-campaign-pushes-ci-secret-stealer-to-tens-of-thousands-of-repositories-130862.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.aikido.dev/blog/compromised-github-accounts-push-ci-secret-stealer-to-tens-of-thousands-of-repositories>)

Author: Oliver Smith

Published: 2026-11-12T01:45:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Aikido Security's Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aikido-security-s-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [HashiCorp Vault](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hashicorp-vault.md>)

Tags: [campaign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/campaign.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [stealer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stealer.md>), [threats](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threats.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [wfx-loot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wfx-loot.md>)

### AI overview

The wfx-loot campaign uses stolen GitHub credentials to probe repositories, inject a roughly 1,500-line shell stealer through one of three CI or install-hook variants, then revert changes and delete workflow runs and logs. The payload collects GitHub, cloud, AI-tool and other runner credentials; can exchange tokens for deeper cloud access and establish persistence through AWS or Azure trust changes; and in this campaign sends data to two HTTP callback servers. At least 1,835 repositories reportedly ran it, though impact may be higher and missing artifacts do not rule out theft. Check for the listed branch names, pull request title, commit messages and affected package versions. If it ran, assume workflow-accessible secrets and cloud roles are compromised. The identified Go module versions contain the payload only in workflow files; the document says Go builds do not run those files, so module consumers may not have been affected.

### Source excerpt

A wave of compromised accounts are pushing a CI secret stealer. See if you're affected, what it steals, and what to rotate. Category: Vulnerabilities & Threats

## Claude Code's 'don't ask again' button has a secrets-spilling problem

DevFeed: [Claude Code's 'don't ask again' button has a secrets-spilling problem](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/claude-code-s-don-t-ask-again-button-has-a-secrets-spilling-problem-129005.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoworld.com/article/4247344/claude-codes-dont-ask-again-button-has-a-secrets-spilling-problem-2.html>)

Author: Shweta Sharma

Published: 2026-11-11T12:03:25Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoWorld](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoworld.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [GitGuardian](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitguardian.md>), [secret rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-rotation.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>)

Tags: [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [code-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security.md>), [code-security-development-tools-security-software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-security-development-tools-security-software-development.md>), [commands](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commands.md>), [commit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commit.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [curl-command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/curl-command.md>), [development-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development-tools.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [git](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/git.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwords.md>), [permission](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permission.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [software-development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-development.md>), [storytype-news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-news.md>)

### AI overview

Claude Code's "Yes, and don't ask again" approval can save an entire shell command, including embedded credentials, in .claude/settings.local.json. GitGuardian found 31,088 distinct secrets in the file across 23,276 public GitHub repositories; 5,343 were valid when detected. It also found 613 distinct secrets in public Docker Hub images, 99 valid. Claude Code adds the file to local Git ignore settings, but that protection may not transfer across clones, and Docker does not automatically respect .gitignore, so a broad COPY can include the file unless .dockerignore excludes it. GitGuardian recommends rotating exposed credentials, removing the file from Git and Docker build contexts, checking published images, scanning assistant configuration files, and using environment variables instead of hardcoding credentials. The excerpt says Anthropic was exploring safeguards; it does not establish whether they were implemented.

### Source excerpt

A configuration file meant to store local command permissions on Anthropic's Claude Code is exposing thousands of API keys, database credentials and other secrets, according to findings by GitGuardian. The code security firm identified 31,088 distinct secrets in Claude Code's ".claude/settings.local.json" files across 23,276 public GitHub repositories. Of those, 5343 were still valid when GitGuardian detected them. The exposed credentials include database connection strings, cloud provider tokens, SSH passwords, Google API keys, and AU service credentials. "Monthly leaks in settings.local.json peaked at 12,535 occurrences in April 2026, then fell to 959 by October, and we do not yet know what changed," GitGuardian researcher Guillaume Valadon said in a blog post. Apart from source code repositories, the exposure included secrets embedded in publicly accessible Docker Hub images. The problem, Valadon explained, lies with how Claude Code handles command approvals. Command approvals turn into credential storage Claude Code asks developers for permission before executing certain shell commands. When a developer selects the "Yes, and don't ask again" option, the tool saves an allow rule in .claude/settings.local.json, a project-level configuration file. The catch is that the saved rule contains the actual command string, including any credentials embedded in it. For instance, a developer asking Claude Code to interact with an API might approve a curl command containing an API key in its HTTP header. Claude Code then stores that entire command as an approved rule, leaving the credential in the configuration file. Although Claude Code automatically adds the file to its local Git ignore settings, that protection does not necessarily carry over to other machines or repositories, Valadon said. Developers can accidentally commit the file, particularly when working across different clones or when the file has already been tracked. Git Guardian found that 67% of the occurrences

## How to prevent leaks from Claude Code's 'Don't ask again' file

DevFeed: [How to prevent leaks from Claude Code's 'Don't ask again' file](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-to-prevent-leaks-from-claude-code-s-don-t-ask-again-file-130216.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://about.gitlab.com/blog/prevent-leaks-from-claude-code-dont-ask-again-file/>)

Author: Daniel Abeles

Published: 2026-11-11T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gitlab.md>)

Topics: [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [AI Chat](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-chat.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>)

Tags: [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [leaks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leaks.md>), [prevent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prevent.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-labs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-labs.md>), [security-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-research.md>)

### AI overview

Claude Code saves approved "don't ask again" shell commands in `.claude/settings.local.json`; because Git excludes it only through each developer's personal global configuration, the file can be committed with tokens or passwords. The excerpt reports 104,185 public copies identified by Apiiro in early November 2026, 1,122 containing a secret. It recommends preventing new leaks with a repository `.gitignore` entry, group push rules, Secret Push Protection, and scheduled Secret Detection. To assess exposure, current code search can find files on default branches, while the commits API with `all=true` and `follow=false` checks history; deleted files, other branches, and forks require history checks. Rotate every secret first, then remove the file and ignore it. Where secrets were committed, purge old blobs too; forks and shared object pools need special handling, and history rewrites can require rebases and fresh clones. The excerpt notes GitLab Duo can assist with group-wide checks and cleanup merge requests, but group settings must be changed by an owner.

### Source excerpt

This guide details how to find and remove secrets that were inadvertently committed to projects and repositories hosted on GitLab. We've confirmed that GitLab's own infrastructure secrets are protected. In Claude Code, Anthropic's coding agent, a developer can approve a shell command by selecting "Yes, and don't ask again." Claude then saves that exact command to .claude/settings.local.json in the project folder and runs it without asking in the future. If the command contained a password or a token, so does the file: { "permissions": { "allow": [ "Bash(npm test:*)", "Bash(curl --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: glpat-EXAMPLEdummyTOKEN1234\" \"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/1234567/issues?state=closed\")", ] } } Claude Code keeps the file out of Git through the developer's personal global excludes, not through the project's .gitignore. That protection lives on one laptop and does not travel with the repository, so the file gets committed and pushed wherever the repository lives. In early November 2026, Apiiro reported that this issue resulted in 104,185 copies of the file to appear in public repositories, 1,122 of them holding at least one secret. Hundreds more secrets were only in history, in files that had since been deleted. If your developers use Claude Code with repositories hosted on GitLab, this guide shows how to prevent this from happening moving forward, assess exposure now or in the past, and clean every affected project up at once. Prevent: Keep the file out of your repo There are a few actions you can perform to ensure a developer cannot commit the file by accident, and that if one slips through, you hear about it. There are four layers you can put in place, each a little more work than the last, and the order below is a reasonable one to follow. All of them are settings a group owner changes once; this is the one part of the process GitLab Duo can walk you through but cannot do for you, since its access to GitLab settings is read-only. Start with .gitignore

## Claude Code's "don't ask again" button is leaking passwords and API keys to public GitHub repos

DevFeed: [Claude Code's "don't ask again" button is leaking passwords and API keys to public GitHub repos](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/claude-code-s-don-t-ask-again-button-is-leaking-passwords-and-api-keys-to-public-github-repos-125810.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.techspot.com/news/114500-claude-code-dont-ask-again-button-leaking-passwords.html>)

Author: Skye Jacobs

Published: 2026-11-10T12:03:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [TechSpot](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/techspot.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [human-in-the-loop UX](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/human-in-the-loop-ux.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anthropic.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-ai.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [commands](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commands.md>), [file](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/file.md>), [full](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/full.md>), [general](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/general.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [json](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/json.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [leak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leak.md>), [local](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/local.md>), [machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine.md>), [options](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/options.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwords.md>), [pattern](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pattern.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [settings](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/settings.md>), [shell](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/shell.md>), [stored](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stored.md>)

### AI overview

Choosing "Yes, and don't ask again" in Claude Code can save the exact shell command in `.claude/settings.local.json`, including any credentials it contains. Apiiro found this file in over 100,000 public repositories; about 1,100 contained secrets from 63 organizations. A global Git ignore rule may not protect a repository cloned elsewhere or created around an existing file, and the article says Claude Code sometimes commits settings changes itself. Removing a leaked file does not remove copies in existing forks. Gitleaks and TruffleHog missed 215 of the exposed secrets. Claude Code team member Boris Cherny said the team was looking into safeguards, pointed to auto mode for routine permission prompts, and said built-in secret scanning was under consideration; a commenter noted auto mode could still save sensitive commands. The article describes earlier bug reports that closed without a fix and argues that storing raw commands leaves credentials dependent on ignore rules working across repository setups.

### Source excerpt

Claude Code asks for approval before it runs shell commands on a developer's machine. One of the options is "Yes, and don't ask again." Choosing it creates an allow rule in a file called .claude/settings.local.json. Sometimes the rule is a general pattern, but often it's the full command, stored word... Read Entire Article

## What a security leader should tell the CEO about leaked credentials

DevFeed: [What a security leader should tell the CEO about leaked credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-a-security-leader-should-tell-the-ceo-about-leaked-credentials-125028.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/10/eric-fourrier-gitguardian-leaked-credentials/>)

Author: Mirko Zorz

Published: 2026-11-10T07:40:43Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [credential-based attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-based-attacks.md>)

Tags: [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-tools.md>), [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [better](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/better.md>), [boardroom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boardroom.md>), [ceo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ceo.md>), [ciso](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ciso.md>), [counts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/counts.md>), [covers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/covers.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cxo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cxo.md>), [cyber-risk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-risk.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [devsecops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devsecops.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [don-t-miss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t-miss.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [gitguardian](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitguardian.md>), [handle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handle.md>), [help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/help.md>), [hot-stuff](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hot-stuff.md>), [interview](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interview.md>), [leader](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leader.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [opinion](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/opinion.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [strategy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/strategy.md>), [tips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tips.md>)

### AI overview

The interview argues that leaked credentials require fast, visible response and a culture where people can report mistakes without fear of blame. Security leaders should be ready to explain how they monitor public code--including repositories outside company control--identify exposed credentials that remain valid, route reports to someone responsible, and measure time from report to revocation. Revocation should come before deleting visible evidence, which does not disable access. To show progress, pair operational counts with measures of exposure duration, containment speed, recurring problems, credential ownership and rotation, and the slowest incident resolutions. Disclosure delays are justified while a live risk is being fixed or users need protection, but not merely for reputational or scheduling convenience. The interview also warns that AI tools and agents may spread credentials through personal accounts, side projects, and workflows beyond official repositories, widening where organizations need visibility.

### Source excerpt

In this Help Net Security interview, Eric Fourrier, CEO of GitGuardian, talks about leaked credentials and personal liability for security leaders and boards. He explains how fear of blame pushes mistakes out of sight, and what a security leader should be ready to tell a CEO about exposed keys. He also covers better ways to measure security progress beyond alert counts, how to handle disclosure deadlines, and why AI tools and agents are creating new ... More -> The post What a security leader should tell the CEO about leaked credentials appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Secret scanning detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs

DevFeed: [Secret scanning detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/secret-scanning-detects-secrets-in-github-actions-workflow-logs-124115.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-09-secret-scanning-detects-secrets-in-github-actions-workflow-logs>)

Author: Allison

Published: 2026-11-09T09:01:37Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [GitHub Actions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github-actions.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-security.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [github-actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-actions.md>), [improvement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/improvement.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [preview](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/preview.md>), [scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scanning.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [secret-scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-scanning.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [workflow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workflow.md>)

### AI overview

GitHub's public preview scans completed Actions workflow logs for supported provider secret patterns and adds findings to the repository's secret scanning alerts, with links to the logs. Validity checks run for supported secret types, and alerts remain after logs are deleted. Enterprise owners can enable the policy in GitHub Enterprise Cloud settings; it is off by default and applies only to licensed repositories where secret scanning is enabled. Only runs completed after activation are scanned. Generic and custom patterns, AI-detected secrets, and secrets masked by Actions are excluded. Preview alerts do not trigger notifications, so repositories must check the alert list directly.

### Source excerpt

GitHub secret scanning now detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs, in addition to issues, wikis, discussions, and pull requests. Actions workflow log scanning is available in public preview. How... The post Secret scanning detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs appeared first on The GitHub Blog.

## Claude Code's 'Don't Ask Again' File Exposes Passwords and Keys in 1,122 Public Copies on GitHub

DevFeed: [Claude Code's 'Don't Ask Again' File Exposes Passwords and Keys in 1,122 Public Copies on GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/claude-code-s-don-t-ask-again-file-exposes-passwords-and-keys-in-1-122-public-copies-on-github-122613.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://it.slashdot.org/story/26/11/08/1758242/claude-codes-dont-ask-again-file-exposes-passwords-and-keys-in-1122-public-copies-on-github>)

Author: EditorDavid

Published: 2026-11-08T18:34:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Slashdot](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/slashdot.md>)

Topics: [Claude Code](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/claude-code.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [secret rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-rotation.md>), [anthropic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/anthropic.md>), [versioning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/versioning.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwords.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>)

### AI overview

When a Claude Code user approves a command with "Yes, and don't ask again," the command may be saved verbatim in .claude/settings.local.json, including passwords or API keys. Apiiro found secrets in 1,122 of 104,185 public copies it searched; it did not check whether they were still valid. The excerpt reports database credentials, SSH logins, GitHub, GitLab and npm tokens, and AWS keys among the findings. Claude Code adds the file to that user's global git excludes when it creates it, but this does not protect files already committed or travel with a project. Removing a committed file also leaves exposure in Git history and forks. Researchers advise rotating every secret the file contained before cleaning up. Anthropic's Claude Code lead said secret scrubbing had not historically been performed and cited planned prototypes for secret scanning and improving auto mode; he also recommended enabling source-host secret scanning.

### Source excerpt

Be careful with the file .claude/settings.local.json, warns The Hacker News: Passwords and API keys that developers typed into commands they approved in Claude Code are sitting in public GitHub repositories, where anyone can read them. When a user selects "Yes, and don't ask again," Anthropic's AI coding assistant can save the command, word-for-word, including the secret, in a project settings file. Software security company Apiiro said that 1,122 public copies of that file hold at least one secret, though it did not test whether any still work. One company the researchers notified earlier this week confirmed its key had been live... Removing [the file] from a project does not undo the leak, because older versions stay in git history and in forks of the repository. The researchers' advice is to rotate first: change every password, token, and key the file has ever held, then clean up... Claude Code tries to keep the file out of git. The first time it writes the file in a git repository, it adds the file to the user's global git excludes, its settings documentation says. Git on that computer then ignores the file in every repository. That protection stays in one user's git settings on one computer. It does nothing for a file that was already committed, the researchers say. Claude Code never adds the file to the project's own .gitignore, so the protection does not travel with the project. In 539 of the 1,105 repositories the researchers traced, a commit listing Claude as a co-author changed the file. They take this to mean Claude often commits the file itself. Apiiro's search of public GitHub found 104,185 copies of the file in 103,617 repositories, its research write-up shows. About 1.1% of them, or 1,122 copies, hold at least one secret. Together they hold 1,379 different secrets... ]And "in half of those repositories it had been there for at least 217 days."] More than a third of the secrets open a database directly, including 379 database passwords. Others include

## Two Secret Scanners Found 5 of 7 Exposed Credentials Each, but Missed Different Secrets

DevFeed: [Two Secret Scanners Found 5 of 7 Exposed Credentials Each, but Missed Different Secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/two-secret-scanners-found-5-of-7-exposed-credentials-each-but-missed-different-secrets-122685.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/two-secret-scanners-found-5-of-7-exposed-credentials-each-but-missed-different-secrets?source=rss>)

Author: Bohdan Bozhenko

Published: 2026-11-08T17:12:12Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passwords.md>)

Tags: [17](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/17.md>), [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [am](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/am.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application-security.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [commits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/commits.md>), [costs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/costs.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [devsecops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devsecops.md>), [false-positive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/false-positive.md>), [false-positives-cpp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/false-positives-cpp.md>), [filter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/filter.md>), [found](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/found.md>), [github-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-security.md>), [gitlens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlens.md>), [regex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/regex.md>), [scanners](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scanners.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [secret-scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret-scanning.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [static-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/static-analysis.md>)

### AI overview

In an audit of 1,049 commits across 17 repositories, two scanners each found five of seven distinct credentials, but shared only three findings. The custom scanner's `test` path filter hid real device tokens; Gitleaks apparently missed two plain Postgres passwords, possibly because its entropy threshold filtered them (the author labels this explanation an inference). The custom scanner also cannot inspect history as shipped: it reads only the current default branch and limits scans to 30 files. The audit attributes much noise from both tools to a checked-in Python virtual environment and recommends history scanning, downgrading confidence rather than excluding test paths, and publishing aggressive vendored-dependency exclusions. The author cautions that the sample is small, exposure windows are uncertain, classifications involve judgment, and merge-commit coverage differed.

### Source excerpt

Two secret scanners, the same 1,049 commits, seven real credentials. Each found five - and not the same five. What every false-positive filter costs you.

## Same Attacker, Different Door: Our Canaries Caught Microsoft's Agentic AI Secret Hunter Exploiting Langflow

DevFeed: [Same Attacker, Different Door: Our Canaries Caught Microsoft's Agentic AI Secret Hunter Exploiting Langflow](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/same-attacker-different-door-our-canaries-caught-microsoft-s-agentic-ai-secret-hunter-exploiting-langflow-123529.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/microsoft-secret-hunter>)

Author: Patrick Garrity

Published: 2026-11-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [VulnCheck](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/vulncheck.md>)

Topics: [Agentic AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/what-is-agentic-ai.md>), [Azure](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/azure.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/microsoft.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-memory.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-services.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [azure-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-ai.md>), [entra-id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entra-id.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intelligence.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [langflow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/langflow.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [threat-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/threat-intelligence.md>), [tooling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tooling.md>)

### AI overview

Microsoft traced 199.19.77.84 to stolen GitHub credentials used against Entra ID, Key Vaults, and Azure AI services; VulnCheck canaries observed the same IP exploit Langflow (CVE-2025-3248) to extract credentials directly from a host. Across an approximately 36-minute session, 11 dependent payloads inspected environment files, databases, AI keys, container access, and prior intruders' artifacts, then derived Langflow's encryption key and returned results in error responses. The sequence resembles agentic, adaptive troubleshooting, though the authors cannot prove an AI agent ran it. A separate IP also targeted AI tooling, but VulnCheck does not attribute it to the same operator. Recommendations include patching and removing Langflow from public access, rotating stored provider and Langflow keys if exposed, checking for persistence and unusual AI API use, restricting container access to Docker and metadata services, and detecting behavioral patterns such as bursts of large validation requests.

### Source excerpt

On November 5, Microsoft Threat Intelligence published research on threat actors using agentic AI tooling to hunt for secrets exposed on GitHub. With those secrets they got into Entra ID tenants, Azure Key Vaults and Azure AI services.

## Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets

DevFeed: [Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/threat-actors-use-agentic-ai-tooling-to-find-and-abuse-exposed-secrets-120855.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/threat-actors-use-agentic-ai-tooling-to-find-and-abuse-exposed-secrets/>)

Author: Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Security Research

Published: 2026-11-05T23:46:50Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Microsoft Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/microsoft-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [Agentic AI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/what-is-agentic-ai.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Threat monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-monitoring.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [agentic-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-ai.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [artex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artex.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [credential-theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credential-theft.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intelligence.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [tooling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tooling.md>)

### AI overview

Microsoft reports threat actors using the ARTEX agentic offensive framework to scan public GitHub repositories for exposed credentials and then pursue cloud resources. In one observed case, an agent moved from searching for OAuth client secrets to exfiltrating Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. Follow-on activity included Entra service principal sign-ins, cloud resource discovery, credential and data access, and attempts to use Azure AI services. Microsoft says exposed credentials should be treated as compromised even if the code is later removed: revoke or rotate them, investigate historical use, review sign-in and cloud audit logs, and restrict application permissions. Recommended defenses include scanning repositories, enabling secret scanning and push protection, using managed identities where supported, applying least privilege, and protecting critical workloads. The text also describes honeypots, decoys, and tarpits as ways to divert agentic attacks, while warning that attackers can change IPs and other fingerprints. Several incident details and dates are tied to Microsoft's observations and may not represent all activity.

### Source excerpt

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed threat actors using the agentic offensive security framework ARTEX to search GitHub for OAuth application secrets, which can be used to compromise the associated OAuth application and perform authenticated actions in the application's tenant. Agents operating on behalf of threat actors then used the compromised OAuth applications to perform a variety of subsequent actions within compromised organizations. The post Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

## Truffle Security launches program to revoke 1.4 million live secrets

DevFeed: [Truffle Security launches program to revoke 1.4 million live secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/truffle-security-launches-program-to-revoke-1-4-million-live-secrets-119475.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/truffle-security-launches-program-to-revoke-14-million-live-secrets/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-11-05T20:15:08Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-coding-tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-coding-tools.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [config](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/config.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [container-images](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container-images.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [docker-images](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker-images.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [email-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email-security.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [exposed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposed.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [launches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/launches.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [program](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/program.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [trufflehog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trufflehog.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Truffle Security's free Secrets Revocation Program aims to invalidate publicly exposed API keys that remain usable after owner notifications. Using TruffleHog to verify leaked keys, it can call an issuer's revocation endpoint or send verified keys by webhook for revocation within 14 days. Sixteen issuers had joined, including Hugging Face, Notion, Vercel, RubyGems, and Twilio. Truffle reports that 81% of keys it notified owners about still worked six months later. It cites Google's automatic disabling of exposed Cloud service-account keys: the share remaining active fell from 72% when relying on owner notifications to 11% after automatic disabling. Customers can opt out, so the measure cannot eliminate every valid exposed key.

### Source excerpt

Truffle Security has launched the Secrets Revocation Program, a free initiative that helps API key issuers revoke 1.4 million publicly exposed secrets that remain valid. [...]

## Case Study: Kubescape Completes All Six Security Slam Badges with OpenSSF

DevFeed: [Case Study: Kubescape Completes All Six Security Slam Badges with OpenSSF](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/case-study-kubescape-completes-all-six-security-slam-badges-with-openssf-121203.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://openssf.org/blog/2026/11/05/case-study-kubescape-completes-all-six-security-slam-badges-with-openssf/>)

Author: OpenSSF

Published: 2026-11-05T19:02:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Open Source Security Foundation](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/open-source-security-foundation.md>)

Topics: [openssf](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssf.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [GitHub](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/github.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [case-studies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/case-studies.md>), [cncf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cncf.md>), [community](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/community.md>), [contribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contribution.md>), [contributors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contributors.md>), [cyber-resilience-act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-resilience-act.md>), [fall](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fall.md>), [kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes.md>), [kubernetes-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes-security.md>), [kubescape](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubescape.md>), [learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learn.md>), [maintainers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/maintainers.md>), [open](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [openssf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssf.md>), [openssf-scorecard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssf-scorecard.md>), [osps-baseline](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/osps-baseline.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/project.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-insights](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-insights.md>), [security-slam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-slam.md>), [slam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/slam.md>), [supply-chain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/supply-chain-security.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

Kubescape completed all six Fall 2026 Security Slam badges and reports passing OSPS Baseline Level Two, using OpenSSF tools to make security evidence verifiable and add recurring checks across its repositories. In the October 5-November 6 reporting period, about 45 direct Slam and OpenSSF pull requests were merged across 12 repositories, alongside roughly 40 broader security hardening changes. Five core repositories gained updated Security Insights files and weekly baseline scans; contributors also pinned GitHub Actions, narrowed workflow token permissions, and improved security documentation. The project estimates 25-30 hours of maintainer guidance enabled 125-150 hours of community contributions. Automation helps surface gaps as repositories change, while documentation and architectural assessments still require maintainer review. Kubescape plans to extend automated coverage and pursue OSPS Baseline Level Three.

### Source excerpt

Kubescape completed all six project-level badges in the Fall 2026 Security Slam, bringing maintainers and community contributors together to strengthen security across its open source Kubernetes platform. Learn how 150+ hours of community contribution helped achieve OSPS Baseline Level Two status and harden 12+ repositories.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTExLTA1VDE5OjAyOjMwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjFmMDdiZjI1LTBlYmQtNDRhZS1iMDAzLTU4NDFmMGM3NzJiOSJd>)