# Secure token management

Secure token management is the practice of securely storing, validating, renewing, and revoking authentication and authorization tokens to protect applications and user data.

This is one page of public article previews, not the complete archive. Follow Next page to continue. Summaries are not the original full articles.

## Secure token generation for Amazon IVS Real-Time Streaming with AWS WAF

DevFeed: [Secure token generation for Amazon IVS Real-Time Streaming with AWS WAF](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/secure-token-generation-for-amazon-ivs-real-time-streaming-with-aws-waf-146285.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/media/secure-token-generation-for-amazon-ivs-real-time-streaming-with-aws-waf/>)

Author: Leo Wong

Published: 2026-11-20T01:16:46Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [AWS for M&E Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-for-m-e-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Amazon API Gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-api-gateway.md>)

Tags: [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [amazon-api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-api-gateway.md>), [amazon-cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cognito.md>), [amazon-interactive-video-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-interactive-video-service.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automated-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated-traffic.md>), [aws-cloudformation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-cloudformation.md>), [aws-lambda](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-lambda.md>), [aws-secrets-manager](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-secrets-manager.md>), [aws-waf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws-waf.md>), [captcha](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/captcha.md>), [challenge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/challenge.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [real-time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/real-time.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

The example protects the Amazon IVS Real-Time token-issuing endpoint by checking caller country and the request's Origin header with AWS WAF before API Gateway invokes a Lambda signer. Lambda retrieves a private key from AWS Secrets Manager, looks up the stage endpoints, and issues a subscribe-only JWT with a configurable expiry; IVS validates it with the registered public key. The walkthrough deploys the components with CloudFormation and covers key setup, secret population, Lambda upload, testing, and cleanup. These checks filter token requests, but do not authenticate callers or stop VPN/proxy use, arbitrary Origin headers from non-browser clients, or token sharing before expiry. The post recommends caller authentication, identity-based capability authorization, short lifetimes, and WAF rate limits for production, and says the sample needs further hardening and review.

### Source excerpt

This post shows how to build a token-issuing service for Amazon IVS Real-Time Streaming with AWS WAF, Amazon API Gateway, AWS Lambda, and AWS Secrets Manager. It restricts a Real-Time stage by country and origin and signs tokens server-side with a cryptographic key pair.

## Use Amazon ECR global authentication token across AWS Regions

DevFeed: [Use Amazon ECR global authentication token across AWS Regions](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/use-amazon-ecr-global-authentication-token-across-aws-regions-146422.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/containers/use-amazon-ecr-global-authentication-token-across-aws-regions/>)

Author: Sourav Kundu

Published: 2026-11-19T20:09:23Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Containers](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/containers.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [AWS IAM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-iam.md>), [AWS CloudTrail](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-cloudtrail.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [amazon-elastic-container-registry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-elastic-container-registry.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-tokens.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [global](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/global.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [images](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/images.md>), [intermediate-200](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate-200.md>), [lifetime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lifetime.md>), [minutes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/minutes.md>), [one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one.md>), [partition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/partition.md>), [post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post.md>), [regions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/regions.md>), [request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/request.md>), [sign](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sign.md>), [sign-in](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sign-in.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>)

### AI overview

Amazon ECR global authentication tokens let one bearer token authenticate to ECR registry endpoints across AWS Regions within the same partition, simplifying multi-Region pushes and pulls. Request it through AWS Sign-In with `CreateBearerToken` for `ecr.amazonaws.com`; the caller needs `signin:CreateBearerToken`, and the token carries the caller's existing IAM permissions, which ECR checks for every operation. Its lifetime defaults to 12 hours and can be shortened to 5 minutes. AWS CLI 2.39.7 or later supports the command, and the ECR credential helper, Kubernetes credential provider, and GitHub Actions login action can opt in. CloudTrail records a shared sign-in session ARN on token issuance and authorized ECR events, supporting cross-Region tracing and session-specific denial. Registries and images remain Regional, existing regional tokens continue to work, and opt-in Regions require account enrollment. The walkthrough also cautions that credential tooling must accept variable-length tokens.

### Source excerpt

Amazon ECR now supports global authentication tokens: request one token from AWS Sign-In and use it to push and pull images across AWS Regions in the same partition, with a lifetime from 5 minutes to 12 hours. This post shows how to request a global token and use it with Docker in two Regions.

## Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code

DevFeed: [Rotate a leaked GitLab token and let GitLab Duo fix the code](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/rotate-a-leaked-gitlab-token-and-let-gitlab-duo-fix-the-code-144779.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://about.gitlab.com/blog/secret-detection-token-rotate-and-fix/>)

Author: Mark Mishaev

Published: 2026-11-19T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/gitlab.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>), [gitlab-ci](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab-ci.md>), [Pull Request](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pull-request.md>), [GitLab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gitlab.md>)

Tags: [acting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acting.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [after](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/after.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [beta](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/beta.md>), [branch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/branch.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cd.md>), [chat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chat.md>), [ci](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [duo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duo.md>), [features](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/features.md>), [gitlab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gitlab.md>), [let](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/let.md>), [product](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>)

### AI overview

Starting with GitLab 19.6 beta for GitLab Ultimate, an active leaked GitLab PAT can be rotated from its vulnerability finding: GitLab revokes it, stores a replacement in Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo opens an MR to update CI/CD jobs. The replacement value is not shown to the user or agent; rotation happens before the agent starts. Review and merge the MR, then resolve the finding. Rotation is immediate and irreversible, and the replacement is scoped to the current project, so scripts outside GitLab CI/CD or jobs in other projects need another token. The feature supports GitLab PATs, including fine-grained PATs, but not other detected secret types. GitLab.com users can rotate their own tokens; Self-Managed administrators can also rotate others' tokens. If the Duo session fails, rotation and secret storage still occur, leaving code updates manual. A dependency-free CLI can batch-rotate group findings and eligible CI/CD variable tokens; it defaults to dry-run, caps runs at 10 rotations unless configured, and omits token values from reports.

### Source excerpt

Secret detection alerts you when an active personal access token (PAT) is exposed in your default branch. Acting on that finding is harder: revoking the token breaks dependent pipelines, and replacing it safely takes several manual steps. While the finding waits in your vulnerability report, the token stays live. Starting in GitLab 19.6 in beta for GitLab Ultimate, you can remediate a leaked GitLab PAT directly from the vulnerability page. Select Rotate and fix, and GitLab revokes the token, stores a replacement in GitLab Secrets Manager, and uses GitLab Duo Agent Platform to open a merge request (MR) to update your CI/CD jobs. You review and merge the MR. GitLab never exposes the new token value to you or your agents. Why leaked tokens stay active after detection Imagine that secret detection flags an active PAT in deploy.sh: export GITLAB_TOKEN="glpat-..." Fixing this manually requires tracking down the token's owner, revoking it, generating a replacement with matching scopes, storing it securely, and opening MRs to update your scripts and CI/CD jobs. Because this process is tedious, remediations often stall or go wrong: The finding ages: Nobody wants to break the pipeline, so the finding sits in the vulnerability report while the token remains active. The fix stops halfway: Someone revokes the token immediately, breaking the build. In a rush to recover, they paste a replacement into a less secure CI/CD variable. The new token leaks: Someone shares the replacement token in a chat thread so a teammate can configure it. In the gap between detected and rotated, the token still works for anyone who can read the repository. Rotate and fix in a snap The Rotate and fix function closes this gap by combining secret detection and validity checks, GitLab Secrets Manager, and GitLab Duo Agent Platform. When you open an active PAT finding and select AI actions > Fix with AI > Rotate and fix, GitLab: Revokes the leaked token and creates a replacement with the same name, scopes,

## Step-up authentication: how to right-size authentication to risk

DevFeed: [Step-up authentication: how to right-size authentication to risk](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/step-up-authentication-how-to-right-size-authentication-to-risk-142070.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/step-up-authentication-how-to-right-size-authentication-to-risk/>)

Author: Abrom Douglas

Published: 2026-11-18T23:49:07Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Amazon Cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-cognito.md>), [MFA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/mfa.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>)

Tags: [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [account-balance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account-balance.md>), [acr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acr.md>), [amazon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon.md>), [amazon-cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cognito.md>), [amr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amr.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [balance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/balance.md>), [banking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/banking.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [intermediate-200](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate-200.md>), [risk](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risk.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [sign-in](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sign-in.md>), [step-up-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/step-up-authentication.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>), [users](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/users.md>)

### AI overview

Amazon Cognito step-up authentication lets applications match authentication strength and freshness to the risk of an action. The app requests a target level with OIDC `acr_values` and optional `max_age`, or `TARGET_ACR_VALUES` and `MAX_AGE` in the `USER_AUTH` API flow. Cognito reports the achieved level and factors in `acr` and `amr`; `auth_time` tracks interactive authentication, while token refresh preserves assurance and does not reset freshness. The application remains responsible for choosing required levels, validating returned claims, and enforcing access. Four patterns cover transaction-level checks, differing requirements across apps sharing SSO, API or SDK sign-in, and federated OIDC providers that map external assurance values. Step-up requires the Essentials or Plus plan; on lower tiers, API requests raise `FeatureUnavailableInTierException`, while managed login ignores `acr_values` and proceeds with normal authentication.

### Source excerpt

Not every action a user takes in an application carries the same risk. Viewing an account balance in a banking application isn't the same as wiring several thousand dollars to a new payee. In practice, though, many applications ask users to prove their identity once at sign-in and then treat every action the same from [...]

## CVE-2026-73969 - AnsibleForms: Authentication bypass via hard-coded default JWT signing secret

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-73969 - AnsibleForms: Authentication bypass via hard-coded default JWT signing secret](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-73969-ansibleforms-authentication-bypass-via-hard-coded-default-jwt-signing-secret-141189.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73969>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-18T20:14:51Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [ansibleforms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ansibleforms.md>), [ansibleguy76](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ansibleguy76.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-access](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-access.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authentication-bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication-bypass.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-73969](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-73969.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [full](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/full.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>), [self-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-service.md>), [signing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signing.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

### AI overview

Before version 6.2.1, AnsibleForms could accept forged administrator JWTs when ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET was unset: a public fallback signing secret let unauthenticated attackers create tokens with privileged claims, which the application trusted for authorization without reloading the user from the database. This enabled authentication bypass and privileged API access. The issue is fixed in version 6.2.1.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-73969 Published : Nov. 18, 2026, 8:14 p.m. | 39 minutes ago Description :AnsibleForms is a self-hosted web application that turns automation into self-service forms. Prior to 6.2.1, AnsibleForms uses a public hard-coded fallback JWT signing secret from server/config/auth.config.js when ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET is unset. An unauthenticated attacker can sign a self-contained token with privileged claims because server/src/auth/auth_jwt.js verifies the signature without reloading the user from the database, and server/src/lib/middleware.js trusts the token's roles and options for authorization. A forged token can therefore be accepted as an administrator session, resulting in authentication bypass and full privileged API access. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.1. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Hackers Are Now Targeting Proxmox. Here's How to Protect Yourself.

DevFeed: [Hackers Are Now Targeting Proxmox. Here's How to Protect Yourself.](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hackers-are-now-targeting-proxmox-here-s-how-to-protect-yourself-142863.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.virtualizationhowto.com/2026/11/hackers-are-now-targeting-proxmox-heres-how-to-protect-yourself/>)

Author: Brandon Lee

Published: 2026-11-18T12:50:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Virtualization Howto](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/virtualization-howto.md>)

Topics: [malware protection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/malware-protection.md>), [Proxmox](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proxmox.md>), [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Data Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-management.md>), [virtual machines](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/virtual-machines.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [2fa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2fa.md>), [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [administration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administration.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [esxi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esxi.md>), [hackers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackers.md>), [home-lab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/home-lab.md>), [home-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/home-server.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [proxmox](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxmox.md>), [ransomware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ransomware.md>), [ransomware-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ransomware-attacks.md>), [servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/servers.md>), [virtualization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virtualization.md>), [vmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vmware.md>), [vmware-esxi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vmware-esxi.md>)

### AI overview

The article describes an August 2026 ransomware incident in which The Gentlemen group accessed Proxmox after compromising an administrator's workstation and finding plaintext root credentials; they used the web UI to deploy ransomware across multiple hosts. It recommends isolating Proxmox management interfaces on a dedicated VLAN and restricting access to ports 8006 and 22 by source address; using role-based accounts and scoped API tokens instead of root@pam for routine integrations; enabling TOTP or WebAuthn two-factor authentication while keeping a recovery path; and preferring SSH public key authentication with password and keyboard-interactive authentication disabled. It cautions that SSH settings can affect cluster operations and should be tested. For recovery, it recommends multiple PBS copies and discusses S3-compatible storage for immutable backups. The article notes that its cited incident does not establish how widespread Proxmox-targeted ransomware is.

### Source excerpt

For quite a number of years now, we have heard about ransomware attacks that have targeted VMware ESXi servers in the enterprise. However, one of the downsides of gaining popularity... The post Hackers Are Now Targeting Proxmox. Here's How to Protect Yourself. appeared first on Virtualization Howto.

## Securely exposing Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime

DevFeed: [Securely exposing Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/securely-exposing-amazon-bedrock-agentcore-runtime-140906.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/securely-exposing-amazon-bedrock-agentcore-runtime/>)

Author: Meriem SMACHE

Published: 2026-11-17T20:31:30Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-bedrock-agentcore.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Amazon Cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-cognito.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [Amazon DynamoDB](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-dynamodb.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-management.md>), [agentcore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentcore.md>), [agentcore-runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentcore-runtime.md>), [agentic-workflow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-workflow.md>), [agentic-workloads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic-workloads.md>), [amazon-api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-api-gateway.md>), [amazon-bedrock](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock.md>), [amazon-bedrock-agentcore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock-agentcore.md>), [amazon-bedrock-guardrails](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-bedrock-guardrails.md>), [amazon-cloudwatch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cloudwatch.md>), [amazon-cognito](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cognito.md>), [amazon-dynamodb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-dynamodb.md>), [amazon-vpc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-vpc.md>), [api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-gateway.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [data-governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-governance.md>), [expert-400](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/expert-400.md>), [microvm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microvm.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [serverless](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/serverless.md>), [session](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/session.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>)

### AI overview

AgentCore Runtime's per-session microVM isolation does not control who reaches it or preserve user identity across the ingress path, so the document presents two layered access patterns. Amazon API Gateway validates the Cognito JWT at the edge and again through AgentCore Identity, binds sessions to users, and forwards the original token through a proxy Lambda and VPC endpoint. This suits teams with existing API Gateway and VPC controls, though long-running calls may exceed API Gateway timeouts. AgentCore Gateway validates the JWT, applies Cedar policies and Guardrails, binds identity claims for unattended work, and exchanges them for a machine token that Runtime requires; its managed entry point and native rate limiting reduce custom infrastructure. Both patterns call for WAF, least-privilege authorization, identity propagation, and audit logging. The document says both CDK samples are starting points, not production-ready deployments.

### Source excerpt

Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime delivers a secure serverless environment to deploy AI agents and tools at scale. When you start talking to your agent, the runtime launches a dedicated isolated session that runs in its own dedicated microVM with a completely sandboxed CPU, memory, and filesystem allocation. This provides strict data governance, helps to prevent [...]

## How your MCP server should call your API on the user's behalf

DevFeed: [How your MCP server should call your API on the user's behalf](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-your-mcp-server-should-call-your-api-on-the-user-s-behalf-140650.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/mcp-server-call-api-on-behalf-of-user>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-11-17T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [API](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>), [A Minimal View for Token Exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/a-minimal-view-for-token-exchange.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/act.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [bearer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bearer.md>), [cimd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cimd.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [consent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consent.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [dashboard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dashboard.md>), [error](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/error.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [token-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token-exchange.md>), [workos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/workos.md>)

### AI overview

An MCP server should exchange the user's MCP access token for a token scoped to the API, rather than forward the original: its audience is the MCP server, so the API should reject it. In WorkOS Connect, the server needs a first-party application with a client secret, both services registered as Resource Indicators, and token exchange enabled. It posts the user's eligible access token to `/oauth2/token`, naming the API URL as `resource`; it may request narrower scopes, which cannot be widened. The returned token keeps the user and organization, sets the API as `aud`, and records the exchanging app in `act`. The API should verify the signature, issuer, audience, actor and required scopes. The response includes no refresh or ID token and expires no later than the source token, so the server must exchange again when needed. Introspection can check current token status, but does not validate audience or return `act`; those claims still require separate checks. This overview reflects the supplied body text.

### Source excerpt

Use WorkOS Connect token exchange to swap the user's MCP token for one scoped to your API, then check the claims your API needs to trust it.

## Building a Secure MCP (Model Context Protocol) Server with Auth0

DevFeed: [Building a Secure MCP (Model Context Protocol) Server with Auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/building-a-secure-mcp-model-context-protocol-server-with-auth0-136615.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://auth0.com/blog/building-secure-mcp-server-with-auth0/>)

Author: Kevin Kimani

Published: 2026-11-16T17:06:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Auth0 Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/auth0-blog.md>)

Topics: [Auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/auth0.md>), [MSP MCP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/msp-mcp.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [Back end](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/backend.md>), [Test-driven development](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tdd.md>), [Remote Procedure Call (RPC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rpc.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth0.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [building](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/building.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [go](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/go.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learn.md>), [learn-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learn-how-to.md>), [mcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp.md>), [mcp-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mcp-server.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [model-context-protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model-context-protocol.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

The guide builds a Go MCP server that uses Auth0 Authorization Code with PKCE to issue user-linked access tokens, then validates JWT signatures, issuer, audience, and expiry against Auth0 JWKS. Auth0 RBAC supplies department permissions; the server authorizes from the token's requested-and-approved `scope` claim, mapping `read:engineering` or `read:hr` to a department. It registers only that department's resources for each session and returns "resource not found" for cross-department reads to reduce information leakage. Missing or invalid tokens receive 401 with OAuth resource metadata; valid tokens without a required scope receive 403. The walkthrough also configures OAuth Protected Resource Metadata and demonstrates requests with cURL. It distinguishes Client Credentials as suitable for automated machine-to-machine pipelines, while choosing Authorization Code for deployments governed by a real user. Production follow-ups include token refresh, client-secret rotation, richer audit logging, and finer-grained authorization for more complex access patterns.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to build an MCP server in Go and secure it with Auth0 using OAuth 2.1, PKCE, and RBAC-backed scopes, so AI agents only see the data their user is authorized to access.

## Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis

DevFeed: [Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/securing-fastapi-applications-jwt-authentication-and-rate-limiting-with-redis-134136.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.sitepoint.com/securing-fastapi-applications-jwt-authentication-and-rate-limiting-with-redis/>)

Author: Christian chimeremeze ezenwa

Published: 2026-11-14T13:51:10Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [SitePoint](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sitepoint.md>)

Topics: [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Redis](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/redis.md>), [FastAPI](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fastapi.md>), [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [fastapi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fastapi.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rate-limiting.md>), [redis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/redis.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt describes a FastAPI design that combines JWT authentication with Redis-backed revocation and rate limiting. FastAPI uses asynchronous Redis as shared state so token blacklists and request counts stay synchronized across server instances; python-jose signs and verifies JWTs, passlib[bcrypt] hashes passwords, and slowapi limits requests by client IP, returning 429 when a limit is exceeded. Protected routes reject missing, invalid, expired, or blacklisted tokens with 401. The described login stores a token in Redis with a TTL matching its expiration, while the sample credential check is hardcoded. The text says production deployment would need token refresh, per-user limits, highly available Redis, and secure secret management. It outlines conceptual validation scenarios rather than reporting test results.

### Source excerpt

null Continue reading Securing FastAPI Applications: JWT Authentication and Rate Limiting with Redis on SitePoint.

## Apify rotates API tokens, prompts 2FA resets after breach

DevFeed: [Apify rotates API tokens, prompts 2FA resets after breach](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/apify-rotates-api-tokens-prompts-2fa-resets-after-breach-130429.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/apify-rotates-api-tokens-prompts-2fa-resets-after-breach/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-11-12T14:36:47Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [secret rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-rotation.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [2fa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2fa.md>), [accenture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accenture.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [ai-boom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-boom.md>), [analyze](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analyze.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apify](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apify.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-breach.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [third-party](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/third-party.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>), [two-factor-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/two-factor-authentication.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Apify says an unauthorized third party accessed parts of its internal systems on November 9-10, 2026; it detected the incident the next day, cut off access and began investigating. Its response included rotating internal credentials and customer API tokens, resetting active sessions, and revoking some external OAuth connections, including GitHub. Apify said affected users would be emailed when reconnection is safe. Customer notices said there was no indication that platform-stored account data was affected, but advised some users to reset 2FA because codes may have been exposed; the company said passwords remained safe. The excerpt does not establish the investigation's final findings or the full scope of exposure.

### Source excerpt

Apify has rotated critical internal secrets and revoked some third-party OAuth connections after detecting unauthorized access to its internal systems. [...]

## What Are HttpOnly Cookies? A Simple Guide to Secure Sessions

DevFeed: [What Are HttpOnly Cookies? A Simple Guide to Secure Sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-are-httponly-cookies-a-simple-guide-to-secure-sessions-130198.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/what-are-httponly-cookies-a-simple-guide-to-secure-sessions?source=rss>)

Author: Mohsen

Published: 2026-11-12T07:14:02Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [frontend security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/frontend-security.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [XSS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/xss.md>), [LocalStorage](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/localstorage.md>)

Tags: [cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cookies.md>), [cross-site-scripting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-site-scripting.md>), [csrf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/csrf.md>), [express](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/express.md>), [httponly-cookies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/httponly-cookies.md>), [js](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/js.md>), [next-js](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/next-js.md>), [nextjs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nextjs.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sessions.md>), [theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/theft.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [web-application-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-application-security.md>), [xss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/xss.md>)

### AI overview

An `HttpOnly` session cookie keeps its value out of JavaScript while the browser still sends it to the server on matching requests. This blocks injected scripts from reading and exfiltrating the token, but does not stop XSS: malicious code running in the page can still make authenticated requests, and HttpOnly does not by itself prevent CSRF. Set the cookie server-side with `Set-Cookie`; client JavaScript cannot create an HttpOnly cookie. The excerpt recommends pairing it with `Secure` and `SameSite`, and notes that sensitive actions may also need a CSRF token. Its Express and Next.js examples differ in `maxAge` units: milliseconds in Express, seconds in Next.js. It also describes `SameSite=Lax` as a common session default and `Strict` as more restrictive, with usability tradeoffs.

### Source excerpt

What the HttpOnly flag does, what it stops (token theft via XSS), what it doesn't, and how to set it in Express and Next.js.

## Detecting credential-driven attacks on Databricks

DevFeed: [Detecting credential-driven attacks on Databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/detecting-credential-driven-attacks-on-databricks-129970.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.databricks.com/blog/detecting-credential-driven-attacks-databricks>)

Author: Solomon Boyd; Alexis Merritt; Arun Pamulapati; Sam Pezzino; David Veuve

Published: 2026-11-11T23:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/databricks.md>)

Topics: [databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/databricks.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [audit-logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit-logs.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [ci-cd](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ci-cd.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [controls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/controls.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [databricks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/databricks.md>), [platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/platform.md>), [security-and-trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-and-trust.md>), [security-threat-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-threat-research.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt recommends investigating credential-driven attacks as linked, potentially non-linear activity across identities, rather than treating audit events in isolation. A stolen engineer token may first enumerate secrets, catalogs, or repositories, then expose a service-principal credential that is used for code execution, persistence, or targeted exports. Databricks' `system.access.audit` logs and the Detection App's Genie agent can help hunt these patterns, including unfamiliar IPs, bursts of discovery APIs, secret reads, new functions or jobs, permission changes, and exports. Tune detections to normal automation and follow actions by every identity involved. Audit logs may omit query results or old and new setting values; empty searches can reflect a narrow time window or disabled verbose logging. Response should revoke the original and derived credentials and remove grants, tokens, functions, and jobs that preserve access. Context-based ingress restrictions and least privilege limit the reach of stolen credentials.

### Source excerpt

At Databricks, we know your data is your most valuable asset. Databricks has worked...

## What CIAM Teams Can Learn from the DHS Data Breach

DevFeed: [What CIAM Teams Can Learn from the DHS Data Breach](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-ciam-teams-can-learn-from-the-dhs-data-breach-134056.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://fusionauth.io/blog/dhs-data-breach>)

Author: Andrew Hatfield

Published: 2026-11-11T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [FusionAuth](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/fusionauth-blog.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [API Logging](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-logging.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Back end](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/backend.md>), [Data Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-management.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/breach.md>), [ciam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ciam.md>), [customer-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/customer-data.md>), [data-breach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-breach.md>), [dhs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dhs.md>), [education](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/education.md>), [multi-tenant](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/multi-tenant.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sso](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sso.md>)

### AI overview

The DHS breach exposed data about more than 40,000 employees and contractors, but the reported access method remains unverified. Its CIAM lessons focus on limiting what a valid login can do: enforce server-side permissions for every action and resource, minimize exposure of identity metadata in APIs and tokens, validate tenant membership and resource ownership on each request, and test whether compromised sessions and tokens can be revoked promptly. The article also recommends monitoring post-login activity--such as bulk retrieval, enumeration, and privilege changes--and linking API events to users, sessions, and tenants. It notes that ending an identity-provider session may not end application sessions, and revoking refresh tokens may leave issued access tokens usable until expiration. Sender-constrained tokens such as DPoP can reduce reuse of stolen tokens, while shorter lifetimes and stronger controls involve usability tradeoffs. A checklist covers authorization, identity-data exposure, tenant isolation, session and token handling, and incident response.

### Source excerpt

Explore 5 SSO security lessons for CIAM teams in the wake of the DHS data breach, plus a practical checklist to help protect customer data.

## Multi-Repository Security Analysis with CodeRabbit Secure

DevFeed: [Multi-Repository Security Analysis with CodeRabbit Secure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/multi-repository-security-analysis-with-coderabbit-secure-126472.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://coderabbit.ai/blog/multi-repository-security-analysis-with-coderabbit-secure>)

Author: Konrad Sopala

Published: 2026-11-10T12:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [CodeRabbit](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/coderabbit.md>)

Topics: [code security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/code-security.md>), [Static code analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/static-code-analysis.md>), [Multi Agent Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-agent-systems.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Repository](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/repository.md>)

Tags: [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-gateway.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [bootstrap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bootstrap.md>), [branch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/branch.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [charts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charts.md>), [configuration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/configuration.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [english](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/english.md>), [featured](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/featured.md>), [repositories](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repositories.md>), [repository](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repository.md>), [scan](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scan.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-analysis.md>)

### AI overview

CodeRabbit Secure's Deep Scan can use linked repositories as read-only context to trace settings, shared code, and deployment configuration while investigating findings in a primary repository. Architecture summaries and auto-linking help identify related repositories; teams can also configure links and source access. Agents use this context across recon, hunt, and verify, but linked repositories receive no findings or coverage from that scan and require separate scans. In two open-source experiments, linked startup code clarified that default administrator credentials applied during fresh installation, while a runtime check showed changing the bootstrap password did not rotate an existing account's password. In another experiment, supplying the runtime repository let the evaluator distinguish enabled from disabled reload configurations; the chart alone left both unresolved. Linked source is pinned to the default branch commit, which may differ from deployed code. Manual mode reads selected repositories; automatic mode reads eligible linked repositories up to the plan limit until the source list is customized. Supported platforms listed are GitHub Cloud, GitHub Enterprise Server, 

### Source excerpt

An application can have an authentication check and still expose data if a caller can bypass the service that enforces it. Multi-repository analysis in CodeRabbit Secure gives Deep Scan agents read-only context from linked repositories, so they can follow a configuration value, shared library, or deployment setting to the code that consumes it while investigating a finding.

## CVE-2026-119446 - Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-119446 - Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-119446-session-fixation-in-the-cli-login-flow-allows-an-unauthenticated-attacker-to-obtain-a-user-s-api-token-125787.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119446>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-10T11:16:40Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [personal access token](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/personal-access-token.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [auth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auth.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [button](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/button.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [click](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/click.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [csrf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/csrf.md>), [csrf-token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/csrf-token.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-119446](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-119446.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [form](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/form.md>), [hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hub.md>), [issue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/issue.md>), [login](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/login.md>), [nerves-hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub.md>), [nerves-hub-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub-web.md>), [nerveshub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerveshub.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [user](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/user.md>)

### AI overview

An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a signed-in NervesHub user's API token by persuading them to open a crafted CLI login confirmation link and click Confirm. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/cli_session returns a polling token and confirmation URL; confirmation creates and stores an API token for the user, which the login initiator can retrieve on the next poll. The displayed confirmation code is never checked, so it does not verify who initiated the login. CSRF protection and the page's framing restriction mean the user must open the link and click themselves. The excerpt says nerves_hub versions from 2.5.0 up to, but not including, 2.5.3 are affected.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-119446 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 11:16 a.m. | 1 hour, 14 minutes ago Description :Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/ returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3. Severity: 9.4 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Authentication and Authorization: What's New in .NET 11

DevFeed: [Authentication and Authorization: What's New in .NET 11](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/authentication-and-authorization-what-s-new-in-net-11-125616.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://auth0.com/blog/authentication-and-authorization-what-s-new-in-net-11/>)

Author: Andrea Chiarelli

Published: 2026-11-09T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Auth0 Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/auth0-blog.md>)

Topics: [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [.NET](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/net.md>), [ASP.NET Core](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/asp-net-core.md>), [SignalR](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/signalr.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>), [Auth0](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/auth0.md>)

Tags: [asp-net](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asp-net.md>), [asp-net-core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asp-net-core.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [net-11](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-11.md>), [what-s-new](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-s-new.md>), [what-s-new-in-net-11](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-s-new-in-net-11.md>)

### AI overview

.NET 11 adds targeted authentication and authorization refinements. SignalR can refresh a connection's identity in place: the client obtains a fresh token through its access-token provider, while the server rejects changes in subject; configure proxies to allow the new `/refresh` route, and pair refresh with `CloseOnAuthenticationExpiration` to close connections that fail to refresh. Custom authorization requirement attributes now work consistently across Minimal APIs, MVC, SignalR, and Blazor, though legacy MVC without endpoint routing retains its prior behavior. ASP.NET Core Identity can name known passkeys from authenticator identifiers and lets users rename unknown ones. Other changes include `TimeProvider` support for testable Identity time behavior, file-based `dotnet user-jwts`, and automatic TLS channel binding for Negotiate. The experimental Device Bound Session Credentials package was removed before RC2 because its implementation was incomplete.

### Source excerpt

Learn what's new in .NET 11 regarding authentication and authorization.

## Credit Card Authorization Form: Template and Guide (2026)

DevFeed: [Credit Card Authorization Form: Template and Guide (2026)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/credit-card-authorization-form-template-and-guide-2026-122575.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://dodopayments.com/blogs/credit-card-authorization-form/>)

Author: Deepak Jangir

Published: 2026-11-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Dodo Payments Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/dodo-payments-blog.md>)

Topics: [Authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authorization.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [billing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/billing.md>), [card](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/card.md>), [chargeback](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chargeback.md>), [checkout](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/checkout.md>), [compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compliance.md>), [consent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/consent.md>), [credit-card](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credit-card.md>), [form](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/form.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [online](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/online.md>), [payments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payments.md>), [rules](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rules.md>), [template](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/template.md>)

### AI overview

A signed credit card authorization records consent for a business to charge a card later or on a schedule, but it does not prevent chargebacks. The form should specify the cardholder, charge or pricing basis, frequency, cancellation terms and signature; vague variable charges weaken the evidence. PCI DSS prohibits retaining the CVV after authorization, even encrypted, and requires protection and restricted access if the full card number is stored. For most online businesses, the article favors hosted checkout: it captures consent and tokenizes the card, reducing handling of card data and PCI exposure. Dodo Payments can charge saved cards; the supplied example requires a billing address when using `confirm: true`, and payment success or failure should be determined from webhooks. Standard subscriptions suit fixed renewals, while on-demand subscriptions support later custom amounts. Signed forms may still support enterprise, phone or high-value irregular transactions, ideally alongside a payment link so the business does not handle the card number.

### Source excerpt

What a credit card authorization form is, what it must include, a free template, PCI rules for storing it, and when an online checkout with saved cards is the better option.

## CVE-2026-85295 - Chartbrew: Full account takeover via JWTs accepted under default CB\_SECRET

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-85295 - Chartbrew: Full account takeover via JWTs accepted under default CB\_SECRET](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-85295-chartbrew-full-account-takeover-via-jwts-accepted-under-default-cb-secret-121677.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85295>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-06T21:17:10Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [account takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/account-takeover.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [account-takeover](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account-takeover.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [chartbrew](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chartbrew.md>), [charts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charts.md>), [compose](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compose.md>), [container](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/container.md>), [create](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/create.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-85295](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-85295.md>), [depomo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/depomo.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [docker-compose](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker-compose.md>), [fallback](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fallback.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/id.md>), [issue](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/issue.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>)

### AI overview

Before Chartbrew 5.2.3, four authentication helpers accepted session JWTs signed with CB_SECRET, enabling an attacker who knows a weak, known, or default secret to forge an HS256 token and impersonate a chosen user across the API and socket layer, bypassing that user's password and two-factor authentication. The description identifies stock source and repository Docker Compose deployments as affected; a bare container with CB_SECRET undefined is not affected through this fallback path. The issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-85295 Published : Nov. 6, 2026, 9:17 p.m. | 53 minutes ago Description :Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, four authentication helpers accepted session tokens signed with CB_SECRET, including known, weak, or shipped-default values. The vulnerable surface is session JWT fallback in server/modules/verifyToken.js, verifyUser.js, getUserFromToken.js, and socketManager.js across the API and socket layer. A stock source or repository Docker Compose deployment retains a known, weak, or default CB_SECRET and an attacker submits a forged HS256 token decoding to a target user id. Knowing the symmetric secret lets the attacker create a token that the legacy verification fallback accepts as the target user without that user's password or two-factor authentication. The condition includes stock source and repository Docker Compose installs and any otherwise known or weak CB_SECRET; a bare container where CB_SECRET is undefined is not affected by this fallback path. A forged session impersonates the chosen user across the entire API and socket layer and exercises that user's Chartbrew privileges. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3. Severity: 9.8 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Article: Identity as an Architectural Concern: Enterprise IAM Beyond Authentication

DevFeed: [Article: Identity as an Architectural Concern: Enterprise IAM Beyond Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/article-identity-as-an-architectural-concern-enterprise-iam-beyond-authentication-120951.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/articles/identity-as-architecture/>)

Author: Vaishnavi Khosla

Published: 2026-11-06T09:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [rbac](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rbac.md>), [HashiCorp Vault](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hashicorp-vault.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [Publish-subscribe pattern](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/pubsub.md>)

Tags: [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [architecture-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture-design.md>), [article](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/article.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [don-t](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [event](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event.md>), [experience](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experience.md>), [governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/governance.md>), [graph](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/graph.md>), [iam](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iam.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [identity-as-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-as-architecture.md>), [identity-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity-management.md>), [java](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/java.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [oauth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth.md>), [rbac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rbac.md>), [scope](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scope.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service.md>), [single-sign-on](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/single-sign-on.md>), [stream](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/stream.md>)

### AI overview

At enterprise scale, identity design shapes data models, service boundaries, ownership governance, and revocation behavior. The author describes modeling ownership and time-bounded access as relationships in Neo4j, queried through GraphQL; this made common ownership and validity questions direct, though it adds datastore and modeling costs, and the article says flat RBAC remains suitable for small, single-app setups. A unified workflow for attestation, credential rotation, and vaulting reduced reported revocation time from about three days to under one. Because the vault is owned by another team, the integration fails closed and reconciles its state before marking vaulting complete. Across services, scoped OAuth 2.0 token exchange carries identity context while a policy decision point makes authorization decisions. Kafka distributes entitlement changes, so revocation is eventually consistent: consumers invalidate cached decisions, and a maximum cache age bounds stale access if an event is lost, at the cost of more source-of-truth checks when that limit is shorter.

### Source excerpt

The way you design your identities will drive your data models, your service scope, and your revocation policies; enterprise identity management is thus an architectural problem, not an afterthought. Based on our experience in service account governance, this article touches upon graph vs. RBAC, integrating a vault you don't own, and bounding revocation latency for an event stream. By Vaishnavi Khosla

## API key management: How to manage developer credentials and API keys securely

DevFeed: [API key management: How to manage developer credentials and API keys securely](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/api-key-management-how-to-manage-developer-credentials-and-api-keys-securely-119794.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://proton.me/business/blog/api-key-management-business>)

Author: Kate Menzies

Published: 2026-11-05T18:14:32Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [The Proton Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/the-proton-blog.md>)

Topics: [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [API keys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/api-keys.md>), [secret rotation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-rotation.md>), [identity and access management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/identity-and-access-management.md>), [hardcoded credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardcoded-credentials.md>), [CI/CD secrets management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ci-cd-secrets-management.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Single sign-on (SSO)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sso.md>), [Secret Scanning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secret-scanning.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [access-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-management.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [api-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key.md>), [api-key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key-management.md>), [api-key-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-key-security.md>), [api-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-keys.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business.md>), [business-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/business-systems.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [for-business](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/for-business.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [manage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/manage.md>), [passwords](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passwords.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>)

### AI overview

Developer credentials can grant automated access without MFA or human approval, so treat API keys, database passwords, SSH keys, and deployment tokens as privileged access. The article recommends storing secrets in controlled vaults, injecting them at runtime instead of hardcoding or sharing them, assigning each credential an owner and purpose, limiting its permissions, separating environments, and tracking scope, storage, rotation, review, and usage. Rotate keys after exposure, suspicious activity, device loss, a breach, or offboarding; revoke personal tokens and review shared secrets. Proton Pass for Business offers encrypted vaults, controlled sharing, group permissions, SSO and SCIM, logs, and a CLI for injecting secrets into scripts and pipelines or loading SSH keys into an agent. Its visibility does not extend to activity on the cloud or API platforms where keys are used, so the article says those platforms' logs and monitoring remain necessary.

### Source excerpt

Learn how to manage API keys, database passwords, SSH keys, and developer credentials securely without exposing business systems.

## Why JWT Signature Verification Alone Can't Prevent Token Replay

DevFeed: [Why JWT Signature Verification Alone Can't Prevent Token Replay](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-jwt-signature-verification-alone-can-t-prevent-token-replay-118812.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/why-jwt-signature-verification-alone-cant-prevent-token-replay?source=rss>)

Author: Sai Pavan Kumar Mandapaka

Published: 2026-11-05T07:05:57Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [JSON Web Tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/jwt.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-tokens.md>), [api-authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-authorization.md>), [api-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-security.md>), [cross-api-token-replay](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-api-token-replay.md>), [jwt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt.md>), [jwt-audience-validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-audience-validation.md>), [jwt-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-security.md>), [jwt-signature-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/jwt-signature-verification.md>), [oauth-2-0-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-2-0-security.md>), [oauth-access-tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-access-tokens.md>), [oauth-audience-restriction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oauth-audience-restriction.md>)

### AI overview

Signature verification proves a JWT is authentic; it does not prove the token was issued for the API receiving it. In a hypothetical shared-issuer setup, an API that checks signature, issuer, and expiry but skips `aud` may accept a token intended for another service, though resulting access still depends on its other authorization checks. The document recommends each resource server enforce an expected audience, alongside issuer, signature, expiry, token type, scopes, and endpoint or object permissions. RFC 8707 supports requesting resource-specific tokens; RFC 9068 requires audience validation for its JWT access-token profile; RFC 9700 recommends limiting tokens to one resource server where feasible, or a small set. Sender-constrained methods such as mutual TLS or DPoP can further limit who can present a token. The example Python correction is explicitly not a complete RFC 9068 validator. The scenario is illustrative, not a confirmed product vulnerability or tested finding.

### Source excerpt

A valid JWT isn't always authorized. Discover how missing audience checks expose APIs to token replay and how to prevent it.

## CVE-2026-115770 - Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-115770 - Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-115770-pocket-id-email-verification-token-remains-valid-after-address-change-enabling-arbitrary-verified-email-spoofing-117871.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115770>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-04T23:17:18Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [OpenID connect (OIDC)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/oidc.md>), [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>)

Tags: [2-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2-2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-115770](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-115770.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [email-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email-verification.md>), [impact](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/impact.md>), [link](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/link.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [oidc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oidc.md>), [passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/passkeys.md>), [pocket-id](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pocket-id.md>), [provisioning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/provisioning.md>), [spoofing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spoofing.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

### AI overview

Pocket ID versions 2.2.0 through before 2.12.0 can mark an unintended email address as verified: verification tokens are bound to a user ID, and changing the account email does not invalidate an outstanding token. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an unused address, then redeem the token to have that current address published with `email_verified=true`. The described default affected configuration has `emailsVerified=false` and `allowOwnAccountEdit=true`. A relying application that matches or provisions accounts based on verified email may link the attacker's identity to another user; this downstream consequence does not apply to applications relying exclusively on the stable OIDC `sub` claim. The issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-115770 Published : Nov. 4, 2026, 11:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 20 minutes ago Description :Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0. Severity: 9.6 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-54375 - VitaFit Android \< 2.8.1.0 Long-Lived Session Token Exposure

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-54375 - VitaFit Android \< 2.8.1.0 Long-Lived Session Token Exposure](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-54375-vitafit-android-2-8-1-0-long-lived-session-token-exposure-117785.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54375>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-04T21:54:23Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Secure token management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secure-token-management.md>), [sessions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sessions.md>), [Credential theft](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/credential-theft.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [backups](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backups.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-54375](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-54375.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [session-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/session-management.md>), [token](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/token.md>), [tokens](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokens.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

VitaFit Android (com.vt.vitafit) versions before 2.8.1.0 are described as storing unencrypted m_session_id tokens in application backups; the tokens remain valid for ten years. An attacker who extracts or intercepts one can read or modify the victim's account, or delete its authentication record and block the owner's login. The excerpt lists no affected product records and provides no remediation details.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-54375 Published : Nov. 4, 2026, 9:54 p.m. | 28 minutes ago Description :VitaFit Android application (com.vt.vitafit) before 2.8.1.0 contains an insecure session management vulnerability that allows attackers to extract or intercept unencrypted m_session_id tokens stored in application backups, which remain valid for ten years. Attackers can use a stolen session token to read and modify the victim's account or delete the account's authentication record, preventing the legitimate owner from logging in again. Severity: 8.6 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

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