# side channel

A security attack technique that infers secrets by observing a program's non-functional characteristics or indirect system and hardware effects, often to exfiltrate cryptographic keys.

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## ToolPulse: Side-Channel Eavesdropping on Tool-Using LLM Agents

DevFeed: [ToolPulse: Side-Channel Eavesdropping on Tool-Using LLM Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/toolpulse-side-channel-eavesdropping-on-tool-using-llm-agents-146032.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.25470>)

Author: Zihao Dan, Jinyu Zhang, Jinzhao Lian, Yun Chen, Shinan Liu

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>), [Multi-step AI processes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/multi-step-ai-processes.md>), [OpenTelemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/opentelemetry.md>)

Tags: [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attack-surface](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack-surface.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [bench](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bench.md>), [cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [claude-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-code.md>), [codex](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/codex.md>), [cs-ar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ar.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [eavesdropping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eavesdropping.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [f1](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/f1.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [llm-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm-agents.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>)

### AI overview

ToolPulse shows how cache side channels can expose tool use by LLM agents even when inference runs remotely: tools execute on users' machines and often use shared system libraries. Across three hardware platforms, Flush+Reload enabled accurate real-time monitoring, while Prime+Probe had prohibitive overhead and cache-set aliasing. The Tool Recovery Attack reconstructed workflows for 11 LLMs evaluated with Codex and Claude Code, with every reported F1 score above 93%. Recovered traces supported task profiling across two Terminal-Bench categories and localization of sensitive calls in encryption/decryption and model training/inference. Both attacks reportedly retained high accuracy amid substantial noise on a server shared by about 20 users.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.25470v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that translate user requests into sequences of local tool invocations. While prior cache-based side-channel attacks target the locally deployed models, they typically require the adversary to share model-related components or hardware resources with the victim's inference process. These assumptions do not apply to the predominant agentic settings, in which commercial LLMs execute on vendor-controlled infrastructure. We show that agentic execution exposes a more practical attack surface: although inference remains remote, tools are executed on the user's machine and commonly rely on shared system libraries. In this paper, we first systematically evaluate Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe for monitoring agentic tool invocations. Our evaluation across three hardware platforms shows that Flush+Reload enables accurate, real-time tool monitoring, whereas Prime+Probe, despite supporting cross-VM attacks, incurs prohibitive monitoring overhead and suffers from cache-set aliasing. We present ToolPulse, a cache-based side-channel eavesdropping framework against tool-using agents. We first design the Tool Recovery Attack to reconstruct an agent's tool-execution workflow. We evaluate the Tool Recovery Attack on 11 LLMs across Codex and Claude Code. It consistently reconstructs tool workflows, with the lowest F1 score exceeding 93%. We further demonstrate two attack scenarios enabled by the recovered traces. Task Profiling Attack infers user intent across two Terminal-Bench task categories and the Trigger Localization Attack identifies sensitive tool calls in encryption/decryption and model training/inference workloads. Even under substantial system noise on a server shared by approximately 20 users, both Task Profiling Attack and Trigger Localization Attack maintain high accuracy.

## Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking

DevFeed: [Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/triosecuris-formally-verified-protection-against-speculative-control-flow-hijacking-145995.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.22978>)

Author: Jonathan Baumann, Yonghyun Kim, Yan Farba, Catalin Hritcu, Julay Leatherman-Brooks

Published: 2026-11-20T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Protection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protection.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Lean](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/lean.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [combines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/combines.md>), [compiler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compiler.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-pl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-pl.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [flag](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flag.md>), [flow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow.md>), [hardening](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardening.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hijacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hijacking.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [leaks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leaks.md>), [load](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/load.md>), [machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine.md>), [more](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/more.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>)

### AI overview

Triosecuris combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening to defend against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT. Its key mechanism uses CET-style protection to detect BTB misspeculation on indirect calls and RSB misspeculation on returns, then sets the SLH misspeculation flag. The authors formalize the transformation in Rocq and report a machine-checked proof of relative security: a transformed program running with speculation leaks no more than its source program does without speculation. They state that this guarantee applies to arbitrary programs, including those outside the cryptographic constant-time programming discipline.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2601.22978v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening (SLH). Triosecuris is based on the novel observation that in the presence of CET-style protection, we can precisely detect BTB misspeculation for indirect calls and RSB misspeculation for returns and set the SLH misspeculation flag. We formalize Triosecuris as a transformation in Rocq and provide a machine-checked proof that it achieves relative security: any transformed program running with speculation leaks no more than what the source program leaks without speculation. This strong security guarantee applies to arbitrary programs, even those not following the cryptographic constant-time programming discipline.

## A Bleichenbacher bit-by-bit oracle attack from partial message knowledge

DevFeed: [A Bleichenbacher bit-by-bit oracle attack from partial message knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-bleichenbacher-bit-by-bit-oracle-attack-from-partial-message-knowledge-139295.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.20277>)

Author: Juan Carlos Garc\\'ia Escart\\'in

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [bits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bits.md>), [channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/channel.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/knowledge.md>), [oracle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/oracle.md>), [padding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/padding.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>)

### AI overview

The paper describes a Bleichenbacher attack that uses knowledge of a few least significant bytes of an RSA message and a chosen-ciphertext padding oracle to recover the message bit by bit. With three known bytes, an oracle that only checks for the 00 02 prefix can reveal the next bit in one call; a full PKCS-compliance oracle needs, with high probability, a small constant number of calls, depending on message length and the desired success probability. The method separates known and unknown message portions and chooses transformations so padding validity depends on the next unknown bit. Fewer oracle calls can be traded for more local computation. Recovering the least significant bytes themselves costs more, chiefly because the attacker must find a second correctly padded message from the captured ciphertext.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.20277v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Oracle attacks show the importance of a correct implementation of cryptographic standards when translated into code. A notable example is the Bleichenbacher attack on RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding and all the improvements that have been suggested over the decades. This paper shows how an attacker knowing a few least significant bytes of an RSA message can take advantage of a server with an oracle side-channel to decrypt the full message bit by bit. We will consider two oracles that can be tested with chosen ciphertexts: one revealing whether the decrypted message starts with the 00 02 bytes and a second one revealing if the decrypted message is fully PKCS compliant. For an attacker knowing the three least significant bytes of the message, the first oracle provides an attack where one oracle call gives the next least significant bit of the message and the second an attack which requires, with high probability, a small constant number of oracle calls to the oracle, with a constant which depends on the length of the message and the desired probability of success. The attack divides the message bits into two sections, one with the known part and one with the unknown part, and then chooses transformations that will keep the unknown part, except for the last unknown bit, orders of magnitude below the integer coming from the known part. The resulting string either gives a valid padding or not depending on the value of the unknown bit. The attacker can minimize the number of oracle calls at the cost of some local computation. Finally, the same method is adapted to show how it can also be used to extract the few least significant bytes of the message with an increased cost where the main complexity is finding a second valid message with a correct padding starting from the original captured ciphertext.

## VellSSLH: Sound Type-Guided Selective Speculative Load Hardening for LLVM IR

DevFeed: [VellSSLH: Sound Type-Guided Selective Speculative Load Hardening for LLVM IR](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/vellsslh-sound-type-guided-selective-speculative-load-hardening-for-llvm-ir-136054.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18463>)

Author: Swarn Priya

Published: 2026-11-16T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [compiler hardening](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/compiler-hardening.md>), [LLVM](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llvm.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [data type](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-type.md>)

Tags: [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [hardening](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardening.md>), [ir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ir.md>), [llvm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llvm.md>), [llvm-ir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llvm-ir.md>), [load](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/load.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [secret](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secret.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [semantics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semantics.md>), [ssa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssa.md>), [transformation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transformation.md>), [type](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/type.md>), [type-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/type-system.md>), [x25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x25519.md>)

### AI overview

VellSSLH selectively inserts speculative load hardening in LLVM IR, using annotated Public and Secret inputs to infer which values may become secret during speculation and protect them where needed. Its extracted checker validates the IR; Rocq proofs establish speculative constant-time security for accepted programs and architectural behavior preservation for a reference transformation. Evaluated optimized variants are rechecked for security but are outside that preservation proof, and binary security still depends on backend and hardware assumptions. On 24 cryptographic entries tested on a bare-metal Intel processor, VellSSLH had 4.03% lower geometric-mean runtime than LLVM SLH (13 comparisons favored VellSSLH, eight favored LLVM SLH, and three were inconclusive). For X25519, it was 22.69% faster than LLVM SLH with 1.86% overhead over unprotected code; it also had 19.65% lower runtime than Ultimate SLH.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.18463v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Constant-time cryptographic programs written in C can still leak secrets during speculative execution. Mispredicted branches may allow instructions to access secret data and expose it through observable behavior. Speculative load hardening (SLH) addresses these leaks, but protecting values unnecessarily can introduce significant runtime overhead. We present VellSSLH, which selectively inserts speculative load hardening at LLVM IR. Programmers specify Public and Secret inputs in annotated C programs, and our analysis infers which values may become secret during speculation. The transformation then inserts misspeculation-flag operations and protections only where needed. VellSCT, our extracted checker, validates the resulting LLVM IR. We formalize speculative constant-time (SCT) security by extending Vellvm's LLVM semantics with speculative execution, attacker directives, and leakage observations. Our security type system reasons about SSA joins, symbolic values, poison, pointer provenance, and observable faults, and supports declared declassifications and trusted external services. In Rocq, we prove that programs accepted by the checker satisfy SCT, and that a reference hardening transformation preserves architectural behavior. Evaluated optimized variants are rechecked for SCT but are not covered by this preservation proof. Our mechanized guarantees apply at LLVM IR; security of the generated binary additionally depends on backend and hardware assumptions. We evaluate VellSSLH on 24 cryptographic entries on a bare-metal Intel processor. VellSSLH achieves 4.03% lower geometric-mean runtime than LLVM SLH, with 13 comparisons favoring VellSSLH, eight favoring LLVM SLH, and three inconclusive. For X25519, VellSSLH improves runtime by 22.69% over LLVM SLH with only 1.86% overhead over unprotected code. Compared with Ultimate SLH, VellSSLH achieves 19.65% lower runtime.

## MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters

DevFeed: [MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/mammothdp-private-boosted-decision-trees-ready-for-trusted-hardware-and-leakage-free-hyperparameters-128824.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14317>)

Author: Moritz Kirschte, Thorsten Peinemann, Kari Kostiainen, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi

Published: 2026-11-11T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [decision-trees](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decision-trees.md>), [differential-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/differential-privacy.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [machine-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine-learning.md>), [privacy-filter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy-filter.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [sensitive-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sensitive-data.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [tabular-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tabular-data.md>), [trusted-execution-environments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trusted-execution-environments.md>)

### AI overview

MammothDP combines a trusted execution environment (TEE) and timing side-channel hardening to protect processing, with differential privacy (DP) to protect released studies on tabular data. It builds on the S-BDT gradient-boosted decision tree learner and is described as provably DP when used within a privacy filter and deployed on a TEE. The abstract highlights two additions: adaptive early stopping chooses the number of trees without extra privacy overhead, and improved rollback protection addresses vulnerability to timing side-channel attacks. These are abstract-level claims; the supplied text gives no experimental results or implementation details.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.14317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Data spaces like the European Health Data Space (EHDS) require the protection of sensitive data in studies during the data's processing and the study's release alike. In this work, we investigate how to implement this mandate using established trusted execution environments (TEEs) and timing side-channel hardening to protect the processing even under a compromised server, and the state-of-the-art differential privacy (DP) notion to protect the release of studies on tabular data. This combined setup could seem to complete the picture, but in fact raises unexpected security challenges that we mitigate by introducing MammothDP: a significant milestone towards a holistic machine learning system based on the recent gradient boosted decision tree learner S-BDT that is provably DP if used within a privacy filter, timing side-channel hardened, and deployed on a TEE. To achieve a strong privacy-utility tradeoff, we introduce two novel components: an early stopping criterion that adaptively selects the number of trees without any privacy overhead, and an improved rollback protection that is no longer vulnerable under timing side-channel attacks.

## Covert System Identification Under Timing Constraints: A Static Linear Model and Its Detectability Implications

DevFeed: [Covert System Identification Under Timing Constraints: A Static Linear Model and Its Detectability Implications](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/covert-system-identification-under-timing-constraints-a-static-linear-model-and-its-detectability-implications-126990.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12579>)

Author: Victor Mattos, Guilherme Sobreira, Amit Bhaya, Alan Oliveira de S\\'a, Charles B. Prado, Raphael Machado, Gaurav Srivastava, Daniel S. Menasche

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>)

Tags: [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [boundary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boundary.md>), [cascade](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cascade.md>), [change](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/change.md>), [comparison](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/comparison.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-sy.md>), [cyber](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber.md>), [cyber-physical-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cyber-physical-systems.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [drive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/drive.md>), [eess-sy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eess-sy.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [lightweight](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lightweight.md>), [limit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/limit.md>), [linear](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linear.md>), [masking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/masking.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [monitors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitors.md>), [static](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/static.md>), [timing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/timing.md>)

### AI overview

A static linear model estimates setpoint-change execution time from commanded speed difference and captures ramp response on a Siemens PROFINET testbed, but misses terminal overshoot. The resulting residuals were detected on real traces by PASAD and CUSUM across the paper's cascade identification and staircase attack strategies. Under the adopted detector-calibration regime, the stealth boundary is tied to the plant's settling transients. Evaluated N4SID dynamic models trained at multiple excitation amplitudes did not improve stealth over the ramp model. Computation per cycle was negligible for both approaches; the central constraint is acquiring and refreshing a model without detectable perturbations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.12579v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies covert system identification in cyber-physical systems, where an attacker infers plant dynamics while attempting to remain stealthy. We introduce a lightweight static linear model in which the time to execute a setpoint change is proportional to the commanded speed difference. On a Siemens PROFINET testbed this gain captures the drive's ramp response accurately but not its terminal overshoot. That omitted transient becomes the attacker's main exposure: on real traces, the residual left by the linear masking procedure is detected by two anomaly monitors, Process-Aware Stealthy-Attack Detection (PASAD) and the CUSUM change detector. Across the cascade identification and staircase attack strategies defined in the paper, the stealth boundary relates to the plant's own settling transients, a structural limit for this class of models under the adopted detector-calibration regime. Comparison against dynamic models obtained by N4SID, trained at multiple excitation amplitudes, shows that the evaluated N4SID models do not improve stealth over the structure-informed ramp model. Since per-cycle computation is negligible for both procedures, the binding trade-off is not inference cost but whether the attacker can acquire and refresh a model without injecting detectable perturbations.

## Practice Makes (Im)Perfect: A Look Back at Benchmarking Practices for Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks

DevFeed: [Practice Makes (Im)Perfect: A Look Back at Benchmarking Practices for Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/practice-makes-im-perfect-a-look-back-at-benchmarking-practices-for-microarchitectural-side-channel-attacks-118676.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03893>)

Author: Iliana Fayolle, Antoine Geimer, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Cl\\'ementine Maurice

Published: 2026-11-05T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>)

Tags: [benchmarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarking.md>), [benchmarks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarks.md>), [completeness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/completeness.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [reproducibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reproducibility.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [survey](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/survey.md>)

### AI overview

A survey of 83 microarchitectural side-channel attack papers from top-ranked security and architecture conferences (2014-2024) finds an average of 5.72 recurring benchmarking flaws per paper. The 19 flaws affect evaluation completeness, relevance, soundness, and reproducibility, including unfair or missing comparisons, unavailable code or materials, and failure to measure key attack properties. The authors note that inherited benchmarks such as covert-channel bandwidth or key recovery on naive AES and RSA implementations may not assess newer primitives well, while small changes in experimental conditions can alter results. They propose relevant properties for evaluating new attacks and report trends over time and differences between security and architecture conferences.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2609.03893v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Microarchitectural side-channel research has grown at an exceptional pace in recent years, increasing the need for rigorous and meaningful benchmarking. Early attack papers typically relied on indirect proxies, such as covert-channel bandwidth or key-recovery on naive AES and RSA implementations, setting de facto standards that many subsequent works continued to replicate, sometimes by directly comparing against raw numbers from prior work. While these practices offer convenient points of comparison, current benchmarks may not be the most relevant to assess specific properties of new primitives. Even more problematic, microarchitectural attacks are notoriously sensitive to experimental conditions: minimal changes in the target system can significantly alter outcomes and performance. As a result, inadequate evaluation practices undermine reproducibility and cast doubt on the relevance of comparisons, even in top-tier venues where such issues should be identified. This paper tackles the core problem of proper benchmarking for microarchitectural side-channel attacks and examines its broader impact on research quality in the field. We survey 83 attack papers published in top-ranked security and architecture conferences from 2014 to 2024. From this corpus, we identify and define 19 recurrent benchmarking flaws that affect evaluation completeness, relevance, soundness, and reproducibility. These flaws include unfair or absent comparisons, missing code or materials, and the failure to evaluate the key attack properties. On average, each paper exhibits 5.72 such flaws, highlighting how widespread the issue is, even in highly selective venues. Based on our findings, we identify and suggest key properties that are relevant to properly evaluate new attacks. We also highlight trends over time and different practices between security and architecture conferences.

## Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)

DevFeed: [Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech-115787.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://semiengineering.com/randomized-caches-in-hw-overheads-and-limitations-rub-max-planck-georgia-tech/>)

Author: Technical Paper Link

Published: 2026-11-03T18:01:10Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Semiconductor Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/semiconductor-engineering.md>)

Topics: [CPU Cache](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cpu-cache.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Chip design](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/chip-design.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [asic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asic.md>), [cache-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cache-security.md>), [fpga](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fpga.md>), [georgia-tech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/georgia-tech.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [last-level-cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/last-level-cache.md>), [max-planck-institute-for-security-and-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/max-planck-institute-for-security-and-privacy.md>), [microarchitecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microarchitecture.md>), [processor-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processor-architecture.md>), [randomized-caches](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/randomized-caches.md>), [risc-v](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risc-v.md>), [ruhr-university-bochum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ruhr-university-bochum.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel-attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attacks.md>), [soc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/soc.md>), [spec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spec.md>), [technical-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-papers.md>)

### AI overview

The researchers implemented CEASER-S, ScatterCache, SassCache, and MIRAGE as last-level caches in a multicore, out-of-order RISC-V system-on-chip to examine practical hardware challenges that architectural descriptions leave unexplored. They report common and design-specific implementation challenges and practical solutions. Their complete FPGA implementations were evaluated by running SPEC CPU 2017 rate and GAPBS workloads to completion, providing, to their knowledge, the first comparative evaluation of these designs on a shared full-system hardware platform. The excerpt does not give the designs' specific overheads, limitations, or comparative results.

### Source excerpt

Researchers at Ruhr University Bochum, the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, and Georgia Tech published "Randomized Caches in Hardware: Challenges and Trade-offs." Abstract Excerpt: "Randomized caches protect against side-channel attacks by obfuscating the mapping of memory addresses to cache locations. Existing proposals typically describe architectural behavior, leaving practical hardware implementation challenges largely unexplored.... " read more The post Randomized Caches in HW: Overheads And Limitations (RUB, Max Planck, Georgia Tech) appeared first on Semiconductor Engineering.

## Side-Channel Attack Prevention for Post Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: A 3D-Shield Approach

DevFeed: [Side-Channel Attack Prevention for Post Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: A 3D-Shield Approach](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/side-channel-attack-prevention-for-post-quantum-cryptography-algorithms-a-3d-shield-approach-114043.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144>)

Author: Carl Benda, Eren Kurshan, Aydin Aysu, Paul Franzon

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>)

Tags: [3d-integration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3d-integration.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-et](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-et.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [ntt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ntt.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography-pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography-pqc.md>), [side-channel-attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attack.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a 3D-integration defense against side-channel attacks on post-quantum cryptography implementations. It uses decoy keys and physical shielding through hardware stacking, and moves Number Theoretic Transform computation to dedicated chips. The authors present it as a complement to masking and shuffling, and report validating the approach against a generic attack on intermediate computation inside an NTT butterfly. The supplied text does not describe quantitative results or establish protection against other attacks.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.01144v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Despite their theoretical quantum attack resistance, practical implementations of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms remain susceptible to side-channel attacks. This includes all standard algorithms selected the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) such as Kyber/ML-KEM, Dilithium/ML-DSA, Falcon/FN-DSA and SPHINCS+/SLH-DSA. This paper proposes an alternative defense for side-channel resilience based on 3D integration that uses 3D hardware to shield the underlying cryptographic activity by introducing decoy keys and physical shielding through stacking. The proposed approach can complement other security measures (such as masking and shuffling) on protecting Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) that move computation to dedicated NTT chips. We outline the construction of our approach and validate the effectiveness on a generic attack targeting intermediate computation inside an NTT butterfly.

## Enhancing Edge AI System Security with a Stacked Hardware Security Controller for Robust and Energy-Efficient Anomaly Detectio

DevFeed: [Enhancing Edge AI System Security with a Stacked Hardware Security Controller for Robust and Energy-Efficient Anomaly Detectio](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/enhancing-edge-ai-system-security-with-a-stacked-hardware-security-controller-for-robust-and-energy-efficient-anomaly-detectio-114044.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01150>)

Author: Carl Benda, Eren Kurshan, Paul Franzon

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Embedded Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-systems.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/trust.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-systems.md>), [ais](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ais.md>), [alternatives](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alternatives.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [anomaly-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/anomaly-detection.md>), [controller](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/controller.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-et](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-et.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [edge-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge-ai.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [enhancing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enhancing.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [robust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robust.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/system.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

The paper proposes a stacked hardware security mechanism for Edge AI that continuously detects anomalous execution using hardware performance counters and physical sensors. The authors argue it suits resource- and energy-constrained deployments because it offers low runtime overhead, tamper-resistant root-of-trust isolation, and resilience to compromised operating systems. Their experimental analysis reports that malicious or adversarial applications produce observable changes in sensor and thermal readings, which the hardware-based detection can use to identify anomalies. The supplied text is an abstract excerpt and gives no detailed measurements or comparative results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.01150v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In recent years, the growing adoption of Edge AI systems has been accompanied by a surge in security threats. Edge AI deployments face an rapidly evolving spectrum of security threats, from side-channel information leakage to ad- versarial model manipulation and physical device tampering. Conventional security mechanisms such as malware scanners and resource-intensive firewall solutions are unsuitable due to edge AIs typically limited computational resources, strict energy budgets and thermal constraints especially in battery-powered and field-deployed environments. This paper proposes a stacked, hardware-based security mechanism that enables low-overhead, continuous detection of anomalous execution patterns. Anomaly detection utilizing hard- ware performance counters and physical sensors outperforms software-based alternatives by providing key capabilities such as tamper-resistant root-of-trust isolation, negligible runtime overhead, and resilience against compromised operating systems. Experimental analysis shows that adversarial or malicious ap- plications produce observable deviations in sensor and thermal readings on Edge AI systems and hardware-based anomaly detection provides effective and low-overhead anomaly detection.

## Leaking secrets from air-gap computers by spelling radio signals from RAM

DevFeed: [Leaking secrets from air-gap computers by spelling radio signals from RAM](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/leaking-secrets-from-air-gap-computers-by-spelling-radio-signals-from-ram-112648.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.adafruit.com/2026/11/02/leaking-secrets-from-air-gap-computers-by-spelling-radio-signals-from-ram/>)

Author: Anne Barela

Published: 2026-11-02T20:45:05Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Adafruit Industries](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/adafruit-industries-makers-hackers-artists-designers-and-engineers.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/communications.md>)

Tags: [air-gap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/air-gap.md>), [air-gapped](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/air-gapped.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [electromagnetic-emissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electromagnetic-emissions.md>), [history](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/history.md>), [idea](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/idea.md>), [industrial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industrial.md>), [machine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine.md>), [machines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machines.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [one](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/one.md>), [paper](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/paper.md>), [radio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/radio.md>), [ram](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ram.md>), [reverse-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reverse-engineering.md>), [running](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/running.md>), [science](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/science.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/systems.md>), [vintage-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vintage-computing.md>)

### AI overview

The described attack turns RAM activity into a covert radio channel for removing data from an air-gapped computer. Software performs memory accesses in a controlled pattern; electromagnetic emissions from the memory bus form a signal that a nearby antenna can receive and decode, without a network connection, cable, or speaker. The excerpt says the 2024 arXiv paper covers the attack model, signal generation and modulation, data rates, distances, and defenses, but does not provide their specific details.

### Source excerpt

Air-gapped computers are machines kept off networks on purpose, the way classified systems and industrial controls often are. A 2024 paper posted to arXiv describes a way to get data off one anyway, using the computer's own RAM as a radio transmitter. The idea: software running on the isolated machine reads and writes memory in [...]

## Hardware Defense Blocks Memory-Dependent Prefetcher Leakage (KU Leuven)

DevFeed: [Hardware Defense Blocks Memory-Dependent Prefetcher Leakage (KU Leuven)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hardware-defense-blocks-memory-dependent-prefetcher-leakage-ku-leuven-115785.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://semiengineering.com/hardware-defense-blocks-memory-dependent-prefetcher-leakage-ku-leuven/>)

Author: Technical Paper Link

Published: 2026-11-02T19:24:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Semiconductor Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/semiconductor-engineering.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [rowhammer](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rowhammer.md>), [Automated reasoning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automated-reasoning.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [analyze](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analyze.md>), [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [blocks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocks.md>), [classes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classes.md>), [classification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classification.md>), [constant-time-code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/constant-time-code.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [data-memory-dependent-prefetchers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-memory-dependent-prefetchers.md>), [defense](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/defense.md>), [dmp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dmp.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [eurecom](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eurecom.md>), [existing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/existing.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [hardware-software-co-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-software-co-design.md>), [ku-leuven](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ku-leuven.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [microarchitecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microarchitecture.md>), [novel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/novel.md>), [prefetching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prefetching.md>), [processor-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processor-security.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [risc-v](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risc-v.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channels](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channels.md>), [spectre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spectre.md>), [technical-papers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-papers.md>)

### AI overview

KU Leuven and EURECOM researchers report that SecDMP prevents data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs) from encoding secrets in microarchitectural state. It requires secrets to be marked in memory and preserves DMP performance for public data. Their RISC-V evaluation found that the existing performance-preserving defense they examined left entire leakage classes unprotected; they report that SecDMP prevents all DMP leakage with minimal performance overhead and hardware cost. The authors formally prove it adds no leakage beyond a baseline without DMPs, and say that combined with speculative-execution defenses it restores complete microarchitectural security for constant-time code. These are claims from the supplied abstract excerpt.

### Source excerpt

Researchers at KU Leuven and EURECOM published "SecDMP: Provably Secure Data Memory-Dependent Prefetching." Abstract Excerpt: "In this work, we address this gap by designing a defense that is both secure and efficient. First, we propose a classification of DMP leakage, categorize existing and novel attacks, and analyze which leakage classes are mitigated by existing defenses.... " read more The post Hardware Defense Blocks Memory-Dependent Prefetcher Leakage (KU Leuven) appeared first on Semiconductor Engineering.

## Pinpointing Super-Quadratic Quantum Enumeration Speedups: Exact and Certified Evaluation of the Guessing-Moment Exponent under Product-Distribution Advice

DevFeed: [Pinpointing Super-Quadratic Quantum Enumeration Speedups: Exact and Certified Evaluation of the Guessing-Moment Exponent under Product-Distribution Advice](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pinpointing-super-quadratic-quantum-enumeration-speedups-exact-and-certified-evaluation-of-the-guessing-moment-exponent-under-product-distribution-advice-109001.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28226>)

Author: Carsten Schubert, Niklas Paskarbeit, Maximilian J. Kramer, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Marian Margraf

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Error Propagation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/error-propagation.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [advice](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advice.md>), [algorithm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithm.md>), [apply](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apply.md>), [arithmetic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arithmetic.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [bernoulli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bernoulli.md>), [binning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binning.md>), [black](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/black.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [distribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distribution.md>), [enumeration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enumeration.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [product](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [under](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/under.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a finite-size method for evaluating the quantum-classical guessing-moment separation under product-distribution advice, sharpening an earlier entropy-based estimate. It combines per-coordinate surprisal distributions to compute guessing moments. For commensurate surprisals, finite sums give the speedup exponent without discretization error, with exponential tilting improving numerical stability; for general product advice, grid discretization comes with an a-posteriori error bound. Applications include cold-boot leakage, template-attack posteriors, and synthetic Bernoulli models calibrated to reported residual ranks. The abstract reports exponents up to 3.92 for cold-boot advice and 3.12 for synthetic models, including cases where the earlier bound did not establish a value above 2.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2609.28226v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Grover's algorithm gives an optimal quadratic query advantage for black-box search. In cryptanalysis, however, the search often comes with additional probabilistic advice over the candidates, frequently of product form, e.g. from side-channel leakage on independent key coordinates. Classically, guessing in likelihood order is optimal in expectation. In the quantum setting, Montanaro showed how to achieve an optimal expected query complexity, beating plain Grover on every non-uniform advice distribution (up to a constant overhead factor). What has been missing so far is a finite-size method for evaluating the quantum-classical guessing-moment separation induced by a given advice distribution. We provide such a method for product-distribution advice, thereby sharpening the previous entropy-based estimate of Bashiri et al. We reduce the classical and quantum guessing moments to functionals of the one-dimensional surprisal distribution, obtained for product advice by convolving the per-coordinate surprisal laws. When the surprisals lie on a common arithmetic grid (the commensurate case), the logarithmic moments and hence the speedup exponent can be evaluated as finite sums without discretization error; exponential tilting makes this computation numerically stable. For general product advice, we discretize the surprisals onto a common grid and derive an a-posteriori bound on the resulting binning error. We apply the framework to cold-boot leakage on seeds and block-cipher keys, to template-attack posteriors, and to synthetic i.i.d. Bernoulli posteriors calibrated to average residual ranks reported for Keccak side-channel attacks on ML-KEM and ML-DSA. The resulting exponents substantially exceed 2 in several skewed-advice settings, reaching 3.92 for cold-boot advice and 3.12 in the synthetic models, and include cases where the previous entropy-based bound did not establish an exponent above 2.

## HAWC-Leak: Heterogeneous Architecture Workload Classification utilizing Side-Channel Leakage

DevFeed: [HAWC-Leak: Heterogeneous Architecture Workload Classification utilizing Side-Channel Leakage](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hawc-leak-heterogeneous-architecture-workload-classification-utilizing-side-channel-leakage-96580.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30400>)

Author: Muhtasim Alam Chowdhury, Arthur Kim, Rozhin Yasaei, Soheil Salehi

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [accelerators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerators.md>), [aes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aes.md>), [classification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/classification.md>), [cnn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cnn.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [ecc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecc.md>), [fpga](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fpga.md>), [fpgas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fpgas.md>), [hardware-in-the-loop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-in-the-loop.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [leak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leak.md>), [machine-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/machine-learning.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [power-consumption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power-consumption.md>), [profiling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/profiling.md>), [real-time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/real-time.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>)

### AI overview

HAWC-Leak identifies which accelerator workload is active by analyzing non-invasive power traces. The authors built a hardware-in-the-loop testbed on a ChipWhisperer CW305 Artix-7 FPGA and used a Hierarchical Random Forest to classify AES-128, ECC P-256, SHA-256, CNN, and idle activity in real time. They report 100% accuracy across evaluated controlled scenarios, where multiple accelerators were instantiated but only one ran at a time. The result demonstrates workload fingerprinting under those conditions; the excerpt does not establish performance in scenarios with simultaneous execution.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.30400v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern heterogeneous computing platforms, which integrate general-purpose processors with specialized accelerators such as FPGAs, have become the standard for high-performance and embedded applications. However, the shared physical resources of these systems introduce critical security vulnerabilities, where power consumption patterns can leak sensitive runtime information. While side-channel analysis is well established for extracting cryptographic keys from isolated algorithms, existing methods struggle to profile complex, dynamic systems where diverse workloads coexist on shared hardware resources. This paper presents HAWC-Leak, a dynamic workload classification framework designed to identify specific hardware accelerator tasks in real time using non-invasive power analysis. Unlike prior studies focused on extracting cryptographic secrets from isolated implementations, our approach profiles heterogeneous runtime behavior using machine learning to predict active workloads from features extracted from power traces. We implement a complete hardware-in-the-loop measurement testbed using the ChipWhisperer CW305 Artix-7 FPGA platform to capture high-resolution power signatures of diverse workloads including Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC P-256), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and a system idle state. We develop a Hierarchical Random Forest classifier that processes real-time power data to identify the executing application in controlled mixed-activity scenarios where multiple accelerators are instantiated but only one executes at a time. Experimental results demonstrate that this framework achieves 100% classification accuracy across all evaluated scenarios, confirming that power consumption patterns serve as a reliable and distinctive fingerprint for profiling heterogeneous runtime behavior.

## SPECTER: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Systems via USB Power Modulation

DevFeed: [SPECTER: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Systems via USB Power Modulation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/specter-covert-data-exfiltration-from-air-gapped-systems-via-usb-power-modulation-93837.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.28401>)

Author: Hyeongjun Choi, Ji Hyuk Jung, Ji Won Yoon

Published: 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [USB](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/usb.md>), [communications](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/communications.md>)

Tags: [air-gapped](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/air-gapped.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [antenna](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/antenna.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/channel.md>), [charging](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/charging.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data-exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-exfiltration.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [exfiltration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exfiltration.md>), [ios](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ios.md>), [mouse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mouse.md>), [power](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power.md>), [power-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/power-management.md>), [rf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rf.md>), [secrets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/secrets.md>), [software-defined-radio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-defined-radio.md>), [telemetry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/telemetry.md>), [ubuntu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ubuntu.md>), [usb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/usb.md>), [windows-10](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows-10.md>)

### AI overview

SPECTER demonstrates a post-compromise, low-rate covert channel that uses administrative control of USB power or device states to encode bits without sending payloads in USB data transfers. Receivers detect the resulting signals through smartphone charging states, visible peripheral behavior, or near-field RF. Tests on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 report 0.2-0.25 bit/sec via Android and iOS charging states and 1.0 bit/sec via a USB mouse on Windows; RF reception used a software-defined radio and a loop antenna touching the USB cable. Availability and side effects vary with host configuration, connected device, and receiver path. The authors identify USB power-management and device-state events as security-relevant telemetry. This overview is based on the supplied abstract.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.28401v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present SPECTER, a post-compromise covert channel that uses host-side USB power control to exfiltrate information from air-gapped and network-segregated systems. A transmitter with administrative privileges encodes bits through USB power-management or device-state operations without placing the payload in USB data transfers. The resulting signals are recovered through three alternative receiver paths based on smartphone charging states, visible peripheral behavior, and near-field RF activity. Experiments on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 demonstrate the channel on commodity hardware, with charging-state signaling at 0.2-0.25 bit/sec across Android and iOS devices and peripheral-state signaling at 1.0 bit/sec using a USB mouse on Windows. RF reception is demonstrated using a software-defined radio with a loop antenna in direct contact with the USB cable. Channel availability and observable side effects depend on the host configuration, connected device, and receiver path. These results identify host-side USB power control as a mechanism for low-rate exfiltration of short secrets and motivate treating USB power-management and device-state events as security-relevant telemetry.

## Advancing hardware security with open-source Integrated HSM technology

DevFeed: [Advancing hardware security with open-source Integrated HSM technology](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/advancing-hardware-security-with-open-source-integrated-hsm-technology-92611.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/advancing-hardware-security-with-open-source-integrated-hsm-technology/>)

Author: Mark Russinovich and Saurabh Dighe

Published: 2026-10-13T16:15:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Microsoft Azure](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/microsoft-azure-blog.md>)

Topics: [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [Embedded Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-systems.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [azure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure.md>), [azure-confidential-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-confidential-computing.md>), [azure-open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/azure-open-source.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [collaboration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/collaboration.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [explore](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/explore.md>), [first](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/first.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [open](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/source.md>), [technology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technology.md>), [with](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/with.md>)

### AI overview

Project Tessera makes Azure Integrated HSM's architecture, specifications, protocols, drivers, software, firmware, and reproducible builds open source, with a stated future goal of open-source silicon and broader hardware availability. The workload-attached design keeps keys inside an HSM security boundary while bringing cryptographic operations closer to workloads; Microsoft says it aims to reduce reliance on risky workarounds associated with remote HSMs and support FIPS 140-3 Level 3 protection and post-quantum cryptography. A summit demonstration connected Tessera with a Marvell LiquidSecurity 2 HSM for partition cloning and resiliency, using post-quantum cryptography for inter-HSM communication while keeping non-extractable keys within participating HSMs. The project is also opening a minimal unikernel firmware stack for confidential computing, initially using AMD SEV-SNP and OpenVMM. The article describes confidential computing as a broadly deployable option with a minimal trusted computing base, while dedicated integrated HSMs provide a tamper-resistant boundary intended for higher assurance and certification.

### Source excerpt

Explore how Microsoft is advancing hardware security through open-source Integrated HSM technology, collaboration, and cryptographic key protection. The post Advancing hardware security with open-source Integrated HSM technology appeared first on Microsoft Azure Blog.

## New Spectre v2 attack variant leaks Linux root password hash in minutes

DevFeed: [New Spectre v2 attack variant leaks Linux root password hash in minutes](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/new-spectre-v2-attack-variant-leaks-linux-root-password-hash-in-minutes-62174.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-spectre-v2-attack-variant-leaks-linux-root-password-hash-in-minutes/>)

Author: Bill Toulas

Published: 2026-09-29T17:10:11Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [sha256](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sha256.md>)

Tags: [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-security.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cpu-cache](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu-cache.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [infosec](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec.md>), [infosec-computer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/infosec-computer-security.md>), [kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kernel.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [processor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processor.md>), [root-password](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root-password.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel-attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel-attack.md>), [spectre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spectre.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

The Branch Target Reuse variant of Spectre v2 uses stale CPU branch-predictor information after JIT code reuses memory. Researchers demonstrated that it can expose Linux root password hashes in a few minutes; fixes have been merged into the Linux kernel, and the reported issues received CVE-2026-64507 and CVE-2026-64508.

### Source excerpt

A new Branch Target Reuse (BTR) attack has been devised that can recover root password hashes on Intel computers running Linux in 3-5 minutes on average. [...]

## Decades-old file security flaws found in Android, Linux, macOS, and Windows

DevFeed: [Decades-old file security flaws found in Android, Linux, macOS, and Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/decades-old-file-security-flaws-found-in-android-linux-macos-and-windows-59497.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/09/24/decades-old-file-security-flaws-found-in-android-linux-macos-and-windows/5298672>)

Author: Thomas Claburn

Published: 2026-09-24T17:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [theregister](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/www-theregister-com-articles.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [file](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/file.md>), [Android](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android.md>), [Linux](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/linux.md>), [macOS](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/macos.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>)

Tags: [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [file](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/file.md>), [leak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leak.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [macos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/macos.md>), [report](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/report.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

Security researchers report decades-old file security flaws affecting Android, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Microsoft considers the related side-channel leak of file events to be by design.

### Source excerpt

Security researchers report that Microsoft considers the side-channel leak of file events to be by design

## Researchers demonstrate electromagnetic side-channel audio eavesdropping from headphones and other devices

DevFeed: [Researchers demonstrate electromagnetic side-channel audio eavesdropping from headphones and other devices](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/researchers-found-a-way-to-eavesdrop-on-headphones-from-30-meters-away-and-encryption-can-t-stop-it-55481.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.techspot.com/news/113907-researchers-found-way-eavesdrop-headphones-30-meters-away.html>)

Author: Skye Jacobs

Published: 2026-09-19T20:09:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [TechSpot](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/techspot.md>)

Topics: [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardware.md>)

Tags: [audio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audio.md>), [china](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/china.md>), [eavesdropping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eavesdropping.md>), [electronics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronics.md>), [emissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/emissions.md>), [hacking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hacking.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [headphones](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/headphones.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [rf](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rf.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [signal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/signal.md>)

### AI overview

Researchers developed InjectEave, a technique that injects radio signals into consumer devices and analyzes the resulting electromagnetic leakage. Tests recovered intelligible headphone audio from up to 30 meters away with an RF amplifier, including through walls.

### Source excerpt

The research comes from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in Guangzhou and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. The team presented its paper, "Injected and Leaked: Actively Inducing Side-Channel Leakage Using Electromagnetic Injection and Hardware Nonlinearity," at USENIX Security 2026. Read Entire Article

## What we've been reading in May

DevFeed: [What we've been reading in May](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-we-ve-been-reading-in-may-47309.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://interrupt.memfault.com/blog/may-2023-roundup>)

Author: Tyler Hoffman

Published: 2023-06-06T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Interrupt](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/interrupt.md>)

Topics: [Embedded Software Dev](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-software-dev.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [C](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/c.md>), [C++](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/c-plus-plus.md>), [Compiler](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/compiler.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [make](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/make.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [reliability-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/reliability-engineering.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [c](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c.md>), [c-plus-plus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c-plus-plus.md>), [channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/channel.md>), [compiler](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compiler.md>), [dev](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dev.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineering.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [make](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/make.md>)

### AI overview

A May roundup of embedded-systems resources, including firmware meetups, an IoT reliability webinar, articles on CAN bus vulnerabilities, smaller C and C++ binaries, execute-in-place history, Zephyr development, microcontroller timing attacks, and Makefiles.

### Source excerpt

Here are the articles, videos, and tools that we've been excited about this May. Continue reading...

## Speculative Execution Threat Model

DevFeed: [Speculative Execution Threat Model](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/speculative-execution-threat-model-36981.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://shostack.org/blog/speculative-execution-threat-model/>)

Author: Adam

Published: 2018-03-15T00:00:00Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [Shostack & Friends Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/shostack-friends-blog.md>)

Topics: [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/execution.md>), [side channel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/side-channel.md>), [Vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vulnerabilities.md>), [Hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hardware.md>), [context](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/context.md>)

Tags: [context](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/context.md>), [disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/disclosure.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [prevent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prevent.md>), [side-channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/side-channel.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>)

### AI overview

A commentary on Matt Miller's threat model for speculative execution side-channel hardware vulnerabilities. It describes primitives such as conditional and indirect branch misprediction and exception delivery or deferral, along with disclosure gadgets and mitigation models.

### Source excerpt

[no description provided]