# smart contract

A smart contract is a program comprising code and data that runs on a blockchain and enforces rules through executable logic.

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## Adaptive Budget Allocation for Smart-Contract Fuzzing: Why Online Feedback Fails to Improve Vulnerability Triage

DevFeed: [Adaptive Budget Allocation for Smart-Contract Fuzzing: Why Online Feedback Fails to Improve Vulnerability Triage](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/adaptive-budget-allocation-for-smart-contract-fuzzing-why-online-feedback-fails-to-improve-vulnerability-triage-139606.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.22430>)

Author: Yanzi Liu, Jiachi Tong

Published: 2026-11-18T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Fuzzing/Fuzz testing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fuzzing.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [aggregate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregate.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [budget](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/budget.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [feedback](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feedback.md>), [fuzzing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fuzzing.md>), [online](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/online.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [triage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/triage.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [vulnerability-triage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-triage.md>)

### AI overview

Trace replay on 143 annotated and 350 bug-injected smart contracts found that, at a mean budget of 100 executions per contract, uniform allocation reached 72% and 70% of the respective clairvoyant optima. All eight online allocation policies performed worse than uniform on aggregate triage; five online signals ranked imminent reports poorly, with AUCs of 0.32-0.51. Synthetic-oracle experiments indicate that accurate estimates of detection cost recover more of the performance gap than detectability rankings. The proposed offline allocator predicts first-report probabilities across budgets and allocates executions by predicted gain. In a frozen evaluation using four fresh seeds per corpus, it improved detection-budget AUC over uniform by 5.38% and 4.81% on the two source corpora and 1.99-6.54% on three additional public benchmark subsets.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.22430v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart-contract fuzzing campaigns share a finite budget and vary widely in the execution cost of a first correct-class vulnerability report. Using trace replay on 143 annotated and 350 bug-injected contracts, we test whether online feedback improves triage. At a mean budget of 100 executions per contract, uniform allocation reaches 72% and 70% of the respective clairvoyant optima. All eight online policies trail uniform on aggregate triage, as do the seven repeated on the bug-injected corpus. Five online signals yield ranking AUCs of 0.32-0.51 for imminent reports. Synthetic-oracle experiments show that sufficiently accurate detection-cost estimates recover more of the gap than detectability rankings. This motivates an offline probability-curve allocator that predicts first-report probabilities across budgets and allocates by predicted gain per execution. In a frozen evaluation on four fresh seeds per corpus, detection-budget AUC improves over uniform by 5.38% and 4.81% on the two source corpora and by 1.99-6.54% on three additional public benchmark subsets.

## iGRAIL: Blockchain-Based Generative Federated Learning for Trustworthy Healthcare Intelligence

DevFeed: [iGRAIL: Blockchain-Based Generative Federated Learning for Trustworthy Healthcare Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/igrail-blockchain-based-generative-federated-learning-for-trustworthy-healthcare-intelligence-136034.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17703>)

Author: Debashis Das, Sourav Banerjee, Saraju P. Mohanty

Published: 2026-11-16T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [data augmentation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-augmentation.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Machine learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/machine-learning.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data-augmentation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-augmentation.md>), [differential-privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/differential-privacy.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [federated-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated-learning.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [healthcare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/healthcare.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [malicious-update](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious-update.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [patient-data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patient-data.md>), [patient-records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patient-records.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [prediction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prediction.md>), [privacy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy.md>), [privacy-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/privacy-security.md>)

### AI overview

iGRAIL combines local generative data augmentation and differential privacy with cryptographic communication, blockchain verification, and smart-contract access control to protect federated healthcare model updates. Across four healthcare datasets, it was compared with conventional federated learning and blockchain-based FL. On two large diabetes datasets, it reportedly improved accuracy by about 5.4-5.6%, F1 by 14.6-16.9%, and MCC by 16.0-18.1% over the best baseline. Stronger differential privacy reduced the privacy-loss parameter ε by about 72.5% on cancer and 87.5% on diabetes, with limited predictive-performance loss. The abstract reports added computational overhead; it does not provide implementation details or enough results to assess the full scalability claims.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.17703v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Healthcare organizations collect huge amounts of patient data from clinical records, medical tests, monitoring systems, and healthcare services. Such data can underpin intelligent healthcare analytics but remains distributed across institutions and cannot be shared directly due to privacy, security, and trust concerns. Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative learning without sharing raw patient records, but the exchanged model information remains vulnerable to privacy leakage, tampering, replay, and unauthorized access. In this paper, we propose iGRAIL, a blockchain-enabled generative FL framework for trustworthy healthcare intelligence. iGRAIL combines local generative learning for data augmentation with differential privacy to protect sensitive information during local training. Model communication is secured using cryptographic mechanisms, and blockchain-based verification and smart-contract access control ensure that only authorized, authentic, fresh, and integrity-preserving updates are accepted for federated aggregation. The framework is evaluated on four healthcare datasets and compared with the conventional FL and blockchain-based FL (BC-FL) under predictive, privacy, non-IID, scalability, malicious-update, security-verification, and runtime settings. For the two large diabetes datasets, iGRAIL improves accuracy by about 5.4-5.6%, the F1-score by 14.6-16.9%, and MCC by 16.0-18.1% over the best FL or BC-FL baseline. Increasing the strength of differential privacy reduces the privacy-loss parameter $\epsilon$ by about 72.5% for the cancer dataset and 87.5% for the diabetes dataset, with only a limited loss in prediction performance. These results indicate that iGRAIL supports secure and scalable federated computing while preserving privacy, model integrity, and controlled participation, at the cost of additional computational overhead.

## Hybrid Mechanical and Agentic Specification Inference

DevFeed: [Hybrid Mechanical and Agentic Specification Inference](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hybrid-mechanical-and-agentic-specification-inference-134981.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.10005>)

Author: Wolfgang Grieskamp, Teng Zhang, Vineeth Kashyap

Published: 2026-11-16T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [agentic-coding](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-coding.md>), [Automated reasoning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automated-reasoning.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-lo](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lo.md>), [cs-pl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-pl.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [formal-verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/formal-verification.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [specification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/specification.md>)

### AI overview

The paper combines LLM-driven specification inference with weakest-precondition (WP) analysis in the Move Prover, a verifier for the Move smart contract language. The agent derives specifications from code and uses a tool that calls the prover to infer and verify contracts, including mechanical contracts needed to prove higher-level properties. In an evaluation of 26 targets--24 drawn from Aptos framework functions without specifications--the agent completed over 90% of runs with or without WP, using Sol 5.6 and Terra 5.6. Adding WP reduced cost by 11-21% overall and 40-64% on targets without loops. The evidence describes this evaluation, not broader performance across languages or programs.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2605.10005v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Adoption of formal verification has long been hindered by the cost of manual specification. To prove high-level properties, one must also write contracts for supporting functions, many of which are mechanical and low-level. Specification inference automatically derives such contracts from the program. We present a hybrid of mechanical and agentic inference for Move, a smart contract language, integrated into its verifier, the Move Prover. A large language model (LLM) agent drives inference and verification through a tool that calls the Move Prover and derives specifications from code by weakest-precondition (WP) analysis. We evaluate our approach on 26 targets, 24 of them extracted from public Move functions of the Aptos framework that have no specifications, under a frontier model and a mid-tier model of the same family (Sol 5.6 and Terra 5.6). With and without WP, the agent completes over 90% of its runs, so agentic inference is effective on its own. Adding WP lowers its cost by 11-21% overall and by 40-64% on targets without loops.

## CuEVM: Scaling Smart Contract Execution on GPUs

DevFeed: [CuEVM: Scaling Smart Contract Execution on GPUs](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cuevm-scaling-smart-contract-execution-on-gpus-131526.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14916>)

Author: Nhut-Minh Ho, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Quang Trung Ta, Fredrik Svantes, Xiaokui Xiao, Beng Chin Ooi

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Databases](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-databases.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [GPU optimization](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gpu-optimization.md>), [GPU](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gpu.md>)

Tags: [accelerate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerate.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-db](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-db.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [data-processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-processing.md>), [data-structures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-structures.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evm.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [gpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpu.md>), [gpus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpus.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [scaling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/scaling.md>), [security-testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-testing.md>), [semantics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/semantics.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

CuEVM treats EVM transaction execution as massively parallel GPU data processing, using GPU-aware scheduling and novel data structures to support EVM semantics natively rather than relying on host CPU operations for many tasks. The abstract reports 100% pass rates on Ethereum VMTests and 96.2% on the full execution-test suite. On one commodity GPU it executes over 8 million ERC-20 transfers per second, up to two orders of magnitude faster than existing baselines. Its CuEVM-fuzz tool achieves over a million end-to-end executions per second, reported as up to 23x faster than CPU-based and 4.8x faster than GPU-based baselines. These results are abstract-level claims; the supplied excerpt does not provide benchmark setup or limitations.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.14916v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts on Ethereum blockchain process transactions worth billions of US dollars daily. They run on top of Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) which executes transactions sequentially. This execution model creates a performance bottleneck, especially for new blockchain workloads with large numbers of transactions, such as security testing. We present CuEVM, a GPU-native and semantically complete EVM execution engine that treats transaction execution as a massively parallel data processing problem. It employs novel data structures and GPU-aware scheduling to accelerate execution. Unlike prior works that transpile the contract and rely on a host CPU for many operations, CuEVM supports complete EVM semantics natively on the GPU. It passes 100% of the Ethereum VMTests and 96.2% of the full execution-test suite. On a single commodity GPU, CuEVM executes over 8 million ERC-20 transfers per second, outperforming existing baselines by up to two orders of magnitude. We build a smart contract fuzzer, called CuEVM-fuzz, on top of CuEVM. The fuzzer achieves over a million end-to-end executions per second, up to 23x and 4.8x higher than the state-of-the-art CPU-based and GPU-based baselines, respectively.

## Your AI Agent Is Only as Reliable as the Blockchain State It Observes

DevFeed: [Your AI Agent Is Only as Reliable as the Blockchain State It Observes](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/your-ai-agent-is-only-as-reliable-as-the-blockchain-state-it-observes-129457.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/your-ai-agent-is-only-as-reliable-as-the-blockchain-state-it-observes?source=rss>)

Author: Atul Kumar

Published: 2026-11-11T15:22:52Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [state-management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/state-management.md>), [event-sourcing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/event-sourcing.md>), [consistency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/consistency.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent.md>), [ai-agent-reliability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agent-reliability.md>), [autonomous-blockchain-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous-blockchain-agents.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-indexers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-indexers.md>), [blockchain-state](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-state.md>), [blockchain-state-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-state-management.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [distributed-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed-systems.md>), [event-driven-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event-driven-architecture.md>), [event-idempotency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/event-idempotency.md>), [events](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/events.md>), [indexing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/indexing.md>), [pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pipelines.md>), [state](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/state.md>), [state-reconciliation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/state-reconciliation.md>)

### AI overview

AI agents acting on blockchain data can make sound decisions from an incorrect or outdated application state. The article identifies duplicate or out-of-order events, delayed indexers, chain reorganisations and concurrent database updates as causes of divergence between observed events and the state an application presents. It recommends durable event storage, idempotent processing with atomic concurrency controls, versioned state metadata, reconciliation against equivalent chain references, and revalidation of critical assumptions before execution. Transaction timeouts should remain explicitly uncertain until the original transaction is checked; agent memory should not be the authoritative status record. The article also recommends testing failure recovery and monitoring indexing lag, reconciliation and transaction lifecycles. Validation strength should match action risk: efficient projections can support routine analysis, while consequential transactions need fresh checks. Idempotency suppresses duplicate effects but does not handle reorganisations by itself.

### Source excerpt

Learn how stale blockchain data, duplicate events, and indexing delays can compromise AI agents, and how to design reliable state pipelines.

## DeFSM: Robust and Efficient Decentralization of Federated Submodular Maximization

DevFeed: [DeFSM: Robust and Efficient Decentralization of Federated Submodular Maximization](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/defsm-robust-and-efficient-decentralization-of-federated-submodular-maximization-125463.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11866>)

Author: Duc A. Tran, Dung Truong, Duy Le

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [2d](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2d.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [best](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/best.md>), [bounded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bounded.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [central](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/central.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [decentralization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralization.md>), [federated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated.md>), [robust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/robust.md>)

### AI overview

DeFSM replaces the single server in federated submodular maximization with a lightweight smart contract and independent, consensus-free agents, aiming to combine decentralization, efficiency, and Byzantine robustness. Its SafeGM rule makes robust aggregation decisions on 2D Gaussian projections, then lifts them to convex combinations of actual updates. It uses the projected geometric median only when its depth certifies it; otherwise it uses a Tukey median. The resulting bound on the influence of bad updates depends on their number, not their contents. The authors report that on CIFAR10 and PathMNIST, with up to 30% Byzantine clients and agents, DeFSM did not collapse and retained about 91% of the quality of a trusted central geometric-median reference. A decentralized geometric-median alternative retained about 96% in its best setting, but requires six times more data downloaded by each agent or twice as much by each client, and the contract cannot compute it.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.11866v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Submodular maximization seeks a small subset best representing a large dataset. In its federated setting, the server is a single point of failure and some clients may be Byzantine. Removing the server raises a trilemma of decentraliza- tion, efficiency, and security. We propose DeFSM, a Byzantine-robust and communication-efficient architecture that replaces the server with a lightweight smart contract and a pool of independent, consensus-free agents. Its aggregation rule, SafeGM, builds on two notions from combinatorial geometry: Tukey depth and safe points (the points lying in the convex hull of the good points wherever the bad points are). SafeGM makes the robust decision on 2D Gaussian random projections, which the contract can compute efficiently, and lifts it back as a convex combination of actual updates. Since lifting loses information, it uses the projected geometric median only when its depth certifies it, and otherwise a Tukey median. The share of bad updates is then bounded only by a count: how many there are, not what they contain. We prove, and confirm empirically, that this bound controls the solution quality. On CIFAR10 and PathMNIST, with up to 30% Byzantine clients and agents, DeFSM never collapses and retains on average about 91% of the quality of the ideal reference, the geometric median at a trusted central server. The geometric median decentralized in its best setting would retain about 96%, but the contract cannot compute it, and so each agent would have to download six times more data, or each client twice as much.

## Embedded Blockchain Infrastructure Management (eBIM): A RISC-V-Empowered Hardware--Software Co-Design Framework Towards Trustworthy Blockchain

DevFeed: [Embedded Blockchain Infrastructure Management (eBIM): A RISC-V-Empowered Hardware--Software Co-Design Framework Towards Trustworthy Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/embedded-blockchain-infrastructure-management-ebim-a-risc-v-empowered-hardware-software-co-design-framework-towards-trustworthy-blockchain-126892.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.07625>)

Author: Qinglin Yang, Yuan Liu, Yaoyao Zhang, Boya Wang, Zongjian You, Chunming Rong, Zhihong Tian

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [RISC-V](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/riscv.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Embedded Systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-systems.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>)

Tags: [acceleration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/acceleration.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [baas](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/baas.md>), [benchmarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarking.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-infrastructure.md>), [co-design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/co-design.md>), [control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/control.md>), [cryptographic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptographic.md>), [cs-ar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ar.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decentralized](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [governance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/governance.md>), [instruction-set-architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/instruction-set-architecture.md>), [isolation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/isolation.md>), [key-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key-management.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [post-quantum-migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-migration.md>), [processing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/processing.md>), [risc-v](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/risc-v.md>)

### AI overview

The survey proposes eBIM, a conceptual RISC-V hardware-software framework for anchoring blockchain infrastructure in hardware, motivated partly by concerns about operational control, confidentiality, and governance in third-party Blockchain-as-a-Service. It reviews RISC-V smart-contract execution, trusted execution environments, zero-knowledge virtual machines, and cryptographic acceleration against requirements such as deterministic execution, verifiability, extensibility, and secure key management. The authors distinguish demonstrated technologies from the proposed integration vision and identify open challenges in system-level benchmarking, blockchain-focused cryptographic extensions, TEE security, post-quantum migration, and deployable co-design. The supplied text is an abstract, so it does not establish detailed implementation results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.07625v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Blockchain systems are shifting from decentralized ledgers for digital assets to general-purpose trust infrastructures for verifiable computation, decentralized physical resources, and automated infrastructure management. However, deploying these systems through third-party Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS) offerings may introduce dependencies involving operational control, confidentiality, and infrastructure governance. Meanwhile, blockchain execution and verification impose demanding requirements on cryptographic processing, isolation, and reproducibility. RISC-V offers an open, extensible instruction set architecture that enables co-design of software execution environments and domain-specific security hardware. Inspired by the embedded identity and provisioning model of an embedded subscriber identity module (eSIM), this survey proposes embedded Blockchain infrastructure management (eBIM) as a conceptual hardware-software co-design framework that organizes existing RISC-V-enabled technologies into a hardware-anchored blockchain infrastructure stack. We systematically review RISC-V-based smart-contract execution, trusted execution environments, zero-knowledge virtual machines, and cryptographic acceleration, and analyze their relationship to blockchain requirements, including deterministic execution, verifiability, extensibility, and secure key management. Based on this evidence, we distinguish currently demonstrated capabilities from the proposed eBIM integration vision and identify major open challenges, including system-level benchmarking, blockchain-oriented cryptographic extensions, TEE security, post-quantum migration, and deployable hardware-software co-design. The survey provides an architectural reference for researchers and designers investigating open and verifiable blockchain infrastructure.

## SCDBench: A Benchmark for LLM-Based Smart Contract Decompilers

DevFeed: [SCDBench: A Benchmark for LLM-Based Smart Contract Decompilers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/scdbench-a-benchmark-for-llm-based-smart-contract-decompilers-122770.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29059>)

Author: Kaihua Qin, Dawn Song, Arthur Gervais

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/benchmark.md>), [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>), [Reverse Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/reverse-engineering.md>)

Tags: [abi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abi.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-security.md>), [bytecode](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bytecode.md>), [claude-opus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude-opus.md>), [compilation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compilation.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [glm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/glm.md>), [gpt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpt.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [reasoning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reasoning.md>), [repair](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/repair.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solidity.md>), [zero-shot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero-shot.md>)

### AI overview

SCDBench benchmarks smart contract decompilers on 600 real-world Solidity contracts, pairing bytecode with source code and replayable semantic checkpoints. Its cumulative evaluation measures format completeness, compilability, ABI recovery, and semantic consistency through differential replay, addressing the risk that plausible, compilable output may still behave differently from the original. Tests of Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.3-Codex, and GLM-5 variants found that even the best frontier model perfectly decompiled only 42 of 600 contracts. Same-model compilation repair substantially improved performance at modest additional cost.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2605.29059v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Smart contract decompilation aims to recover high-level source code from bytecode, but evaluating decompilers remains difficult because existing studies use narrow datasets, inconsistent metrics, and limited semantic consistency checks. This gap is increasingly important as large language models (LLMs) begin to generate source-like Solidity that may compile and appear plausible, even when its semantics diverge from the original contract. We introduce SCDBench, a dataset and benchmark methodology for LLM-based smart contract decompilation. The dataset contains 600 real-world Solidity contracts with paired bytecode inputs, ground-truth source code, and replayable semantic checkpoints. SCDBench evaluates decompiler outputs through four cumulative stages: format completeness, compilability, Application Binary Interface (ABI) recovery, and semantic consistency via differential replay. We evaluate Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.3-Codex, and GLM-5 in a zero-shot decompilation setting, including GLM-5 variants with and without extended reasoning and a zero-shot compilation-repair setting. The results show that frontier LLMs can often produce structured and compilable Solidity, but achieving semantic consistency remains far from solved: the best-performing frontier model perfectly decompiles only 42/600 contracts. We further show that introducing same-model compilation repair substantially improves performance at modest additional cost. SCDBench establishes a common ground for rigorous, reproducible evaluation and aims to accelerate the development of reliable smart contract decompilers for blockchain security and transparency.

## Tokenized Deposits Could Become Blockchain's Killer Enterprise Use Case

DevFeed: [Tokenized Deposits Could Become Blockchain's Killer Enterprise Use Case](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tokenized-deposits-could-become-blockchain-s-killer-enterprise-use-case-122684.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/tokenized-deposits-could-become-blockchains-killer-enterprise-use-case?source=rss>)

Author: Michael Chukwube

Published: 2026-11-08T17:16:38Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [17](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/17.md>), [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [act](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/act.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [apply](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apply.md>), [approach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/approach.md>), [asset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/asset.md>), [atomic-settlement](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/atomic-settlement.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [blockchain-banking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-banking.md>), [blockchain-interoprability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain-interoprability.md>), [cross-border-payments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cross-border-payments.md>), [digital-assets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digital-assets.md>), [enterprise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise.md>), [enterprise-blockchain-adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise-blockchain-adoption.md>), [faster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/faster.md>), [financial-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/financial-infrastructure.md>), [payments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/payments.md>), [tokenized-deposits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tokenized-deposits.md>)

### AI overview

Tokenized deposits are commercial bank liabilities represented as programmable tokens, with issuance and redemption kept aligned to the bank's ledger. Their enterprise value comes from atomic settlement: a smart contract can transfer payment and an asset together, or execute payment only when a documented condition is met. Within one bank, tokens could support continuous treasury transfers and liquidity rules; cross-bank use requires coordinated reserve settlement and cross-ledger finality. The excerpt distinguishes J.P. Morgan's permissioned JPMD on Base, Citi's bank-controlled transaction network, and HSBC's approved-wallet treasury service, each with different reach and governance boundaries. It identifies unresolved needs including shared identity and messaging, privacy, legal treatment of irrevocability, and controls for contract or data failures. The cited Project Agorá testing covered 17 scenarios and averaged about 80 seconds per transaction, without integration into existing core banking and settlement systems.

### Source excerpt

Explore why tokenized deposits could become blockchain's leading enterprise use case for faster, programmable and regulated payments.

## ContractLens: Latent Security Knowledge for Malicious Smart Contract Detection

DevFeed: [ContractLens: Latent Security Knowledge for Malicious Smart Contract Detection](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/contractlens-latent-security-knowledge-for-malicious-smart-contract-detection-119895.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04992>)

Author: Shuyi Miao, Xinyi Huang, Wangjie Qiu, Fei Shen, Jinchun He, Zhiming Zheng, Tat-Seng Chua

Published: 2026-11-06T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>), [Representation learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/representation-learning.md>), [ai security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-security.md>)

Tags: [activation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/activation.md>), [auditing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auditing.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [ecosystem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecosystem.md>), [evaluations](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluations.md>), [fine-tuning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fine-tuning.md>), [knowledge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/knowledge.md>), [large-language-models-llms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/large-language-models-llms.md>), [linear](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linear.md>), [llms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llms.md>), [logic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logic.md>), [malicious](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malicious.md>), [masking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/masking.md>), [model](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/model.md>), [models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/models.md>), [neuron](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/neuron.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>)

### AI overview

ContractLens detects malicious smart contracts by identifying security-relevant units inside pretrained language models, then using their activations with a lightweight classifier while keeping the models frozen. It selects candidate layers with linear probes, filters for sensitivity to removing malicious logic and stability under behavior-preserving surface changes, and ranks units using activation contrast, malicious-logic specificity, and probe weights. Masking these selected units harms detection more than masking random or activation-matched neurons, supporting their relevance to the task. The abstract reports higher average detection accuracy than evaluated methods across all three tested pretrained models, generalization to unseen malicious intents, and strong results from classifiers trained on few labeled samples when the selected units are fixed. It provides no numerical results or details of the evaluated baselines.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.04992v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting malicious smart contracts is essential to safeguarding the Web3.0 ecosystem. However, existing auditing methods based on large language models (LLMs) largely rely on prompt engineering or attack-specific fine-tuning, while the internal representations that support malicious logic detection remain poorly characterized. To address this gap, we propose ContractLens, a framework that localizes and uses latent security knowledge in pretrained LLMs for interpretable malicious smart contract detection. Specifically, we first use layerwise linear probes to identify candidate layers that distinguish malicious from benign contracts, then select critical layers based on their sensitivity to malicious logic removal and stability under behaviour-preserving surface modifications. Next, within these critical layers, we combine activation contrast, malicious-logic specificity, and probe weights into a tri-factor importance score and adaptively select malicious contract-discriminative units (MCDUs) using the knee point of the ranked score curve. Finally, we concatenate the selected units' activations into a compact representation and train a lightweight classifier for detection, keeping the pretrained model frozen throughout. Neuron masking experiments show that masking MCDUs causes larger drops in detection performance than masking randomly selected neurons or neurons matched in activation magnitude. ContractLens achieves higher average detection accuracy than the evaluated methods on all three pretrained models. Further evaluations demonstrate generalization to unseen malicious intents and show that, with the identified MCDUs fixed, a classifier trained on few labelled samples can still achieve strong detection performance.

## I Vibe-Coded a Layer-1 Blockchain to Give Everyone Free AI

DevFeed: [I Vibe-Coded a Layer-1 Blockchain to Give Everyone Free AI](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/i-vibe-coded-a-layer-1-blockchain-to-give-everyone-free-ai-118803.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/i-vibe-coded-a-layer-1-blockchain-to-give-everyone-free-ai?source=rss>)

Author: Yevhen

Published: 2026-11-05T07:04:26Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [free software](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/free-software.md>)

Tags: [adversarial](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversarial.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-assistance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-assistance.md>), [ai-compute](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-compute.md>), [ai-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-infrastructure.md>), [ai-models](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-models.md>), [analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analysis.md>), [app](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [apps](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apps.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [dapps](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dapps.md>), [decentralize-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralize-ai.md>), [decentralize-ai-hackathon](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralize-ai-hackathon.md>), [decentralized-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decentralized-ai.md>), [depin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/depin.md>), [developer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/developer.md>), [engine](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engine.md>), [fees](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fees.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [layer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/layer.md>), [mit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mit.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/review.md>), [zero](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/zero.md>)

### AI overview

AIcuNet is a live, early-stage Layer-1 blockchain designed to run on ordinary PCs and eventually use contributed resources to provide shared AI access. Its Phase 1 consensus has operated since July 12, 2026, using memory-hard mining based on CPU and RAM; the article reports over 2.5 million blocks but gives no measured throughput benchmark. The network has no transaction fees and includes a JavaScript smart-contract engine and dApp tools. Its first application, Miner's Hour, is in trial. Storage and light-compute contributions, GPU and AI services, and related compute credits remain roadmap concepts. The solo developer says the project builds on MIT-licensed Tera software, was developed with substantial AI assistance, and received multi-method review using several AI models; the review was not an outside security certification.

### Source excerpt

One developer, heavy AI assistance and multi-model review: an MIT-licensed Layer-1 that mines on ordinary PCs, with zero fees and a dApp engine.

## TxBench: A Benchmark of Attack Transactions and Evidence-Backed Negatives on Seven EVM Chains

DevFeed: [TxBench: A Benchmark of Attack Transactions and Evidence-Backed Negatives on Seven EVM Chains](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/txbench-a-benchmark-of-attack-transactions-and-evidence-backed-negatives-on-seven-evm-chains-116151.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04411>)

Author: Tamer Abdelaziz, karim Ali

Published: 2026-11-04T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/benchmark.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [Data pipelines](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-pipelines.md>), [Digital forensics](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/digital-forensics.md>)

Tags: [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [better](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/better.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [compromise](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compromise.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [datasets](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/datasets.md>), [either](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/either.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [evm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evm.md>), [examples](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/examples.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [exploits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploits.md>), [fixed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fixed.md>), [transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transactions.md>)

### AI overview

TxBench builds a benchmark of attack transactions and evidence-backed legitimate negatives across seven EVM chains, using a five-step pipeline that does not rely on detector labels. It collects transactions cited by BlockSec's incident library or the EVM Hack Registry, maps weaknesses to OWASP's SCWE taxonomy, and reconstructs executions from free data sources. Attacks must extract value during execution, match verified source claims, and be independently linked to an incident; negatives come from nearby chain traffic and require positive evidence of legitimacy. Of 1,850 cited transactions, 1,012 attacks across 602 incidents qualified, representing USD 868.1 million. A blind review confirmed 98 of 100 sampled attacks (97.7% weighted) and all 100 sampled negatives. Four zero-shot LLM baselines on anonymized traces were precise but detected at most 0.43 of attacks and no key compromises.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.04411v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Researchers evaluate detectors of malicious smart-contract transactions on datasets that each paper assembles anew. Their positives come from incident trackers, whose citations mix attacks with setup steps and transactions that never ran, or from a detector's own output, which makes the evaluation circular; their negatives are ordinary transactions. A shared benchmark needs positives whose own execution shows the attack and negatives that use the attacks' mechanisms, with no detector deciding either label. We present TxBench, a benchmark of attack transactions and evidence-backed negatives on seven EVM chains, with the five-step pipeline that builds it. The pipeline collects every transaction that BlockSec's incident library or the EVM Hack Registry cites, maps its weakness to OWASP's SCWE taxonomy, and rebuilds its execution from free data sources. A cited transaction qualifies as a valid TxBench attack only if it extracts value from others during execution, is consistent with all verified source claims, and is independently linked to the reported incident by corroborating evidence. Negative examples are sampled from each chain's traffic near the attacks and retained only when positive evidence confirms their legitimacy. Of 1,850 cited transactions, TxBench accepts 1,012 attacks from 602 incidents, worth USD 868.1 million: 846 contract exploits and 166 key compromises. A blind review under rules fixed in advance confirms 98 of 100 sampled attacks (97.7% weighted) and all 100 sampled negatives. As baselines, four zero-shot LLMs reading anonymized traces are precise but find at most 0.43 of the attacks and no key compromise, leaving ample room for better detectors.

## Trustworthy Blockchain-based Federated Learning for Electronic Health Records: Identity-Gated Participation against Sybil Attacks

DevFeed: [Trustworthy Blockchain-based Federated Learning for Electronic Health Records: Identity-Gated Participation against Sybil Attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/trustworthy-blockchain-based-federated-learning-for-electronic-health-records-identity-gated-participation-against-sybil-attacks-113979.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02629>)

Author: Rodrigo Tertulino, Ricardo Almeida, Laercio Alencar

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Adversarial attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/adversarial-attacks.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [abstract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstract.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [aggregation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aggregation.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [electronic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronic.md>), [electronic-health-records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/electronic-health-records.md>), [federated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated.md>), [federated-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated-learning.md>), [health](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/health.md>), [identity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/identity.md>), [learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning.md>), [records](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/records.md>)

### AI overview

TBFL uses an accountable authority's Verifiable Credentials, linked to hospitals' Decentralized Identifiers, and a smart-contract registry to admit only credentialed model updates. In a prototype for mortality prediction using MIMIC-IV records split across simulated hospitals, the gate rejected unauthorized submissions and maintained attack-free performance across strategies with up to 60% Sybils. Robust aggregators failed against a half-Sybil attack using real records with flipped labels; the gate alone did not stop credentialed hospitals that flipped their own labels, while the gate followed by the coordinate-wise median withstood both. On-chain checks added about 1% to local training time; fees made public-mainnet training impractical but a rollup affordable. The authors position identity gating as a complement to robust aggregation.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2602.02629v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Federated learning allows hospitals to train a shared clinical model without exchanging patient records, but its aggregation assumes that each participant is a distinct institution. In an open federation, an adversary can register many fake identities (a Sybil attack) and outweigh honest hospitals. Byzantine-robust aggregation mitigates such attacks only while the adversary is a minority. We ask whether binding participation to accountable institutional identity closes that gap, and at what cost. We present TBFL, a framework in which an accountable authority issues Verifiable Credentials to the Decentralized Identifiers of hospitals, and a smart-contract registry on a peer-to-peer ledger admits model updates only from credentialed senders. We evaluated a prototype on in-hospital mortality prediction with MIMIC-IV records split across simulated hospitals, comparing the identity gate with federated averaging, three robust aggregators, norm clipping, and a similarity-based defense. Robust aggregators held against a Sybil minority, and norm clipping only against random vectors; all failed when half the participants were Sybils trained on real records with flipped labels. The similarity-based defense stopped mutually similar Sybils but yielded to perturbed ones. The gate rejected all unauthorized submissions and maintained attack-free performance for every strategy up to 60% Sybils. It did not stop credentialed hospitals that flipped their own labels, whereas the gate followed by the coordinate-wise median withstood both. On a local node, on-chain checks added about 1% to training time; fees made training impractical on a public mainnet but affordable on a rollup. Identity gating complements robust aggregation rather than replacing it.

## RegionFence: Adaptive Concurrency Control for Blockchain Parallel Transaction Execution

DevFeed: [RegionFence: Adaptive Concurrency Control for Blockchain Parallel Transaction Execution](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/regionfence-adaptive-concurrency-control-for-blockchain-parallel-transaction-execution-113810.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02164>)

Author: Jiaying Feng, Linpeng Jia, Yi Sun

Published: 2026-11-03T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Distributed Systems & Parallel Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/distributed-systems-parallel-computing.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/transactions.md>), [blockchain consensus protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain-consensus-protocol.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [adaptive](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adaptive.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [concurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/concurrency.md>), [concurrency-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/concurrency-control.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/learning.md>), [online-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/online-learning.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [transaction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transaction.md>)

### AI overview

RegionFence adapts concurrency control to conflicts within blockchain blocks while preserving the result of serial execution in consensus order. It divides transactions into regions that touch contended keys, uses runtime fences to choose how each region handles conflicts, and applies online learning within and across blocks to anticipate conflicts. Implemented in go-ethereum and evaluated on Ethereum mainnet blocks from different periods over five years, it achieved 9.2x speedup over single-core execution on 64 cores. The abstract reports speedups over OCC of 2.9-5.4x and over PCC of 3.9-9.4x across those periods.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.02164v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts have turned blockchains into general platforms, and their throughput is increasingly limited by transaction execution. Parallel execution can relieve this bottleneck. However, most existing engines apply a single policy within a block, typically optimistic (OCC) or pessimistic (PCC) concurrency control, and thus re-execute or delay whole transactions. Although some database studies have proposed hybrid and adaptive mechanisms, these mechanisms cannot be applied directly to blockchains because the block fixes the serial order, accesses emerge only at run time, and real workloads vary widely. We propose RegionFence, an adaptive concurrency control mechanism for blockchain parallel transaction execution, based on three key designs. First, we propose regions to refine the granularity of control from whole transactions to the parts that touch contended keys. Second, we design fences to decide at run time how each region handles a conflict. Third, we introduce intra-block and inter-block online learning to anticipate likely conflicts. At the same time, the system still produces the same result as serial execution in consensus order. We implement RegionFence in go-ethereum and evaluate it on real Ethereum mainnet blocks from different periods of the past five years. Experimental results show that RegionFence achieves an overall speedup of 9.2x over single-core execution on 64 cores and outperforms OCC by 2.9-5.4x and PCC by 3.9-9.4x in speedup across these periods.

## AuditFL: A Contract-Backed Clearing Layer for Open Federated Learning

DevFeed: [AuditFL: A Contract-Backed Clearing Layer for Open Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/auditfl-a-contract-backed-clearing-layer-for-open-federated-learning-111564.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41278>)

Author: Alexandros Balla, Spyros Lalis

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>), [arXiv: Machine Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-machine-learning.md>)

Topics: [Federated Learning](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/federated-learning.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [cs-lg](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-lg.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [federated-learning](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/federated-learning.md>), [open](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open.md>)

### AI overview

AuditFL makes federated learning round decisions auditable through a contract-backed clearing layer while leaving training and aggregation off chain. Clients reserve update tickets with deposits and publish update identifiers; coordinators publish checkpoints and finalize rounds using deterministic settlement rules. The chain records content identifiers and economic state, while model artifacts reside in an assumed reliable off-chain store. The aggregator remains, but its round decisions become attributable, replayable, and economically constrained. In a 12-round MNIST evaluation with non-IID splits and up to 200 clients, learning tracked Plain FL. At 200 clients, the contract run used 5,026 transactions and 829.7M gas, mostly for per-client reserve and publish calls, alongside 2,413 off-chain artifacts totaling 144.9 MiB. Injected dropouts, invalid updates, and unavailable artifacts reduced inclusion nearly linearly, but rounds still finalized and final accuracy shifted by only a few tenths of a percentage point even at high failure rates.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41278v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) keeps raw data local, but most deployments still rely on a trusted coordinator for client admission, checkpoint distribution, update collection, aggregation, and rewards. This paper presents AuditFL, a contract-backed clearing layer for auditable FL in open settings. AuditFL keeps training and aggregation off chain, stores model artifacts in an assumed reliable off-chain artifact store, and records only content identifiers and economic state on chain. Clients reserve update tickets with deposits, publish update identifiers, and later claim refunds or rewards; the task coordinator publishes global checkpoints and finalizes rounds through deterministic settlement rules. The design does not remove the aggregator, but makes its on-chain round decisions attributable, replayable, auditable, and economically constrained. We implement AuditFL as both a deterministic state-machine prototype and a Solidity contract on a local Ethereum-compatible Anvil chain. On full MNIST with Dirichlet non-IID splits, 12 rounds, and up to 200 clients, AuditFL preserves the Plain FL learning trajectory while its overhead follows closed-form control-plane models. At 200 clients, the contract run issues 5,026 transactions, stores 2,413 off-chain artifacts (144.9 MiB), and consumes 829.7M EVM gas, dominated by per-client reserve and publish calls. Controlled dropout, invalid-update, and artifact-unavailability stress tests reduce inclusion nearly linearly but still finalize rounds, with final-accuracy changes remaining within a few tenths of an accuracy percentage point even under high injected failure rates.

## A Failure Mode Taxonomy and Severity Model for Ethereum Smart Contracts

DevFeed: [A Failure Mode Taxonomy and Severity Model for Ethereum Smart Contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/a-failure-mode-taxonomy-and-severity-model-for-ethereum-smart-contracts-112681.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41685>)

Author: Fernando Richter Vidal, Naghmeh Ivaki, Nuno Laranjeiro

Published: 2026-11-02T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [failure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/failure.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [taxonomy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/taxonomy.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a taxonomy of observable Ethereum smart contract failures and CIPER, a five-level model that ranks them by observable impact. Each failure mode is named for the malfunction and described by root cause, violated security property, impact, affected component, and nature. The authors developed the taxonomy from literature and tested it against a systematic review, the OpenSCV catalog, and later reported incidents; that saturation exercise yielded no additional failure modes or dimensions.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.41685v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts are a core component of blockchain systems, but their immutability makes failures in deployed code catastrophic and irreversible. Existing work classifies vulnerabilities, defects, and attacks, yet the observable failures of smart contracts, the deviations from intended behavior or the expected ledger state seen once a contract is deployed, have been largely disregarded. In this paper, we design and validate a failure mode taxonomy for Ethereum smart contracts, together with a severity model that ranks failures by their observable impact. Using a literature review as input, we follow the taxonomy development method of Nickerson et al. to derive the failure modes and their dimensions, and we subject the resulting taxonomy to a saturation exercise over a systematic literature review, the OpenSCV vulnerability catalog, and smart contract incidents reported after the search cutoff. Each failure mode is characterized along five dimensions, namely root cause, violated security property, impact (recorded as primary, secondary, and other), affected component, and nature, and is given a standardized name targeting the observable malfunction rather than the underlying vulnerability. From the taxonomy, we derive CIPER, a five-level severity model that groups failure modes by their observable impact. The saturation exercise produced no new failure modes or dimensions. The taxonomy offers a shared vocabulary for describing what smart contracts do wrong when they fail, and CIPER links that vocabulary to the severity of each observable outcome.

## What Is EIP-7702? Ethereum's Smart Account Feature Explained, and How to Stay Safe

DevFeed: [What Is EIP-7702? Ethereum's Smart Account Feature Explained, and How to Stay Safe](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-is-eip-7702-ethereum-s-smart-account-feature-explained-and-how-to-stay-safe-109866.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/what-is-eip-7702-ethereums-smart-account-feature-explained-and-how-to-stay-safe?source=rss>)

Author: MEXC Learn

Published: 2026-10-31T06:00:06Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Post Mortem](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-mortem.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [2025](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2025.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/3.md>), [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [abstraction](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/abstraction.md>), [account](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/account.md>), [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [added](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/added.md>), [all](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/all.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [crypto-exchanges](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-exchanges.md>), [crypto-wallet-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-wallet-security.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [delegation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/delegation.md>), [eip-7702](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eip-7702.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [ethereum-smart-accounts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum-smart-accounts.md>), [feature](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/feature.md>), [good-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/good-company.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [mexc-learn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mexc-learn.md>), [permissions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/permissions.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [smart](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart.md>), [what-is](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-is.md>), [works](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/works.md>)

### AI overview

EIP-7702 lets an existing Ethereum wallet delegate its account logic to a contract through a signed authorization; unlike a token approval, that can affect every asset in the account until revoked. The excerpt says Binance's October 29, 2026 hot-wallet drain used valid signed authorizations, while no flaw in EIP-7702 had been reported and Binance had not yet published a root cause. To check personal exposure, look up the wallet's Delegated Address on Etherscan; reset an unrecognized delegation through the wallet app, then check other EVM chains. A chain ID of zero can make an authorization valid on every supporting EVM chain. If you do not remember signing a delegation, the article advises treating the wallet as compromised and moving funds to a new wallet. Exchanges and their signing systems should decode authorizations and reject unapproved contracts.

### Source excerpt

What is EIP-7702? Learn how Ethereum smart account delegation works, its security risks, and how to check and revoke permissions.

## $6 Billion Binance Hack Bears Hallmarks of North Korea's TraderTraitor

DevFeed: [$6 Billion Binance Hack Bears Hallmarks of North Korea's TraderTraitor](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/6-billion-binance-hack-bears-hallmarks-of-north-korea-s-tradertraitor-107599.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/6-billion-binance-hack-bears-hallmarks-of-north-koreas-tradertraitor/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-10-30T08:16:26Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [Cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybercrime.md>), [Cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptocurrency.md>), [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Binance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/binance.md>)

Tags: [binance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/binance.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [crypto-heist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto-heist.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cybercrime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybercrime.md>), [engineer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/engineer.md>), [featured](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/featured.md>), [hack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hack.md>), [hackers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackers.md>), [laptop](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/laptop.md>), [lazarus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lazarus.md>), [north-korea](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/north-korea.md>), [theft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/theft.md>), [tradertraitor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tradertraitor.md>)

### AI overview

Blockchain analysts estimate that about $6.3 billion was taken from Binance wallets across ten blockchains on October 29, with most transfers completed in roughly 20 minutes. Binance's initial investigation points to a possibly compromised DevOps engineer laptop that may have enabled access to a service container; it reported no evidence of leaked private keys. TRM says the attackers tested preparations in advance and, on Ethereum, used pre-signed EIP-7702 permissions to delegate a hot wallet to an attacker-controlled contract. Validly signed transactions across the other nine chains led TRM to assess that the attacker likely gained control of Binance's hot-wallet signing system. TRM and Chainalysis attribute the attack with high confidence or probability to North Korea's TraderTraitor; Binance has not publicly identified the perpetrators. By October 30, issuers and Arbitrum had frozen or moved about $3 billion, while attackers sold USDT at a steep discount and retained assets they could not be frozen by issuers. Binance halted withdrawals and pledged reimbursement from company funds and SAFU.

### Source excerpt

Blockchain analysts link the record crypto theft to North Korean hackers, as Binance probes a possibly compromised engineer laptop. The post $6 Billion Binance Hack Bears Hallmarks of North Korea's TraderTraitor appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## Measuring Where Intent Gets Lost in Agentic Smart Contract Synthesis

DevFeed: [Measuring Where Intent Gets Lost in Agentic Smart Contract Synthesis](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/measuring-where-intent-gets-lost-in-agentic-smart-contract-synthesis-107363.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37830>)

Author: Abhinav Goel, Agostino Capponi, Alfio Gliozzo, Chaitya Shah

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [AI-assisted coding](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-assisted-coding.md>), [AI Agent](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-agent.md>)

Tags: [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agentic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agentic.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-hc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-hc.md>), [cs-ir](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ir.md>), [cs-ma](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ma.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [synthesis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/synthesis.md>)

### AI overview

The study evaluates whether AI-generated smart contracts preserve requested behavior by replaying transactions against the contracts they should reproduce. It reports that AI judges and standard analysis tools miss planted errors, and that checking only functions shared across systems concealed about half the pipeline differences. Across three AI models, asking clients clarifying questions before generation helped more than reviewing or patching code afterward; automated security fixes often disrupted requested behavior. The proposed workflow checks generated contracts against an independently written executable answer key and sends disagreements to the client. The authors say the work covers 600 tasks and releases its tools and results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.37830v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents can now write software from a plain-English description, but code that runs is not the same as code that does what was asked. This gap matters most for smart contracts, the programs behind Web3 applications that move money on a blockchain and cannot be fixed once deployed. We ask how to check whether an AI-written contract behaves as it should, and where the requested behavior gets lost. We design an evaluation built on execution rather than opinion. We replay the same transactions on an AI-written contract and on the original it should reproduce and measure how often they agree. We test every grading tool on planted mistakes, compare against an answer key written without the description, and audit our own scorer until known wrong answers cannot pass. Common methods, such as AI judges and standard analysis tools, miss obvious mistakes, and scoring choices matter too. Checking only the functions every system includes hid about half the difference between pipelines. We then propose an elicitation-first architecture. Before writing code, the agent asks the client a short checklist of questions, checks the contract against an independently written executable answer key, and returns disagreements to the client instead of silently rewriting code. Asking first matters far more than reviewing or patching afterwards, across three AI models, while automated security fixes often break requested behavior. A few well-chosen questions recover much of what a short description omits, and their value can be estimated without the original contract. To our knowledge, this is the first study in smart contract synthesis to gather missing requirements before generation and check the result against an independently written executable model. The lessons extend to any setting where AI agents turn requests into programs. We release our tools, 600 tasks and all results.

## When LLM Architectures Meet Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection: a Replication Study

DevFeed: [When LLM Architectures Meet Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection: a Replication Study](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/when-llm-architectures-meet-smart-contract-vulnerability-detection-a-replication-study-107382.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38621>)

Author: Gerardo Iuliano, Gabriele De Vito, Dario Di Nucci

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Large Language Model](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm.md>)

Tags: [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [gemma-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gemma-3.md>), [gpt-4](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gpt-4.md>), [llm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/llm.md>), [replication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/replication.md>), [smart-contract](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contract.md>), [vulnerability-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-detection.md>)

### AI overview

The study replicates Chen et al.'s smart-contract vulnerability detection protocol on GPT-4 and extends it to models with Mixture-of-Experts and RNN-like designs, with a preliminary attempt on State Space Models. The GPT-4 replication confirms a high-recall, low-precision pattern, but that behavior does not hold uniformly across evaluated models. GPT-4 and Gemma-3 show similar qualitative profiles despite a roughly two-orders-of-magnitude parameter-count gap, while two Mixture-of-Experts models behave differently. The results suggest architecture family alone cannot predict a model's detection profile.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.38621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart contracts are immutable programs deployed on blockchain platforms, where vulnerabilities can translate directly into financial loss. Among the techniques proposed for their detection, recent work has relied increasingly on Large Language Models (LLMs) guided by carefully crafted prompts. However, the evidence accumulated so far rests almost entirely on the dense Transformer architecture behind the GPT line and on model snapshots already scheduled for deprecation, leaving open the question of whether the reported behaviors reflect a general property of LLMs or an artifact of that specific design. This paper presents an extended replication of the empirical study by Chen et al. on LLM-based smart contract vulnerability detection. We replicate the original protocol on GPT-4 as a baseline, followed by a differentiated replication, executing the protocol on representative models based on Mixture-of-Experts and RNN-like designs, together with an attempted preliminary evaluation of State Space Models. The exact replication confirms the findings of Chen et al., including the high-recall, low-precision detection pattern they report on GPT-4. Nevertheless, the differentiated replication shows that this pattern does not transfer uniformly across the evaluated models. Those from the same architectural family may also exhibit different behaviors, indicating that architectural family alone is insufficient to predict the resulting detection profile. We observe the same qualitative dense-Transformer profile in both GPT-4 and Gemma-3, despite a gap of roughly two orders of magnitude in parameter counts, whereas two Mixture-of-Experts models from different lineages exhibit qualitatively divergent behaviors, indicating that architectural family alone is insufficient to predict the detection profile.

## How Do Solidity Versions Affect Vulnerability Detection Tools? An Empirical Study

DevFeed: [How Do Solidity Versions Affect Vulnerability Detection Tools? An Empirical Study](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/how-do-solidity-versions-affect-vulnerability-detection-tools-an-empirical-study-107324.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.05515>)

Author: Gerardo Iuliano, Davide Corradini, Michele Pasqua, Matteo Cicalese, Mariano Ceccato, Dario Di Nucci

Published: 2026-10-30T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Software Engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-software-engineering.md>)

Topics: [Solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/solidity.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Static code analysis](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/static-code-analysis.md>), [Tool](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tool.md>), [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>)

Tags: [compatibility](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compatibility.md>), [compilation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/compilation.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [crash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crash.md>), [cs-se](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-se.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/detection.md>), [development](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/development.md>), [effectiveness](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/effectiveness.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [framework](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/framework.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [solidity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/solidity.md>), [study](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/study.md>), [time](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/time.md>), [tool](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tool.md>), [tools](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tools.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [vulnerability-detection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-detection.md>)

### AI overview

The study finds that Solidity version changes can affect vulnerability detection tools' compatibility, effectiveness, and runtime. The researchers evaluated tools on 2,500 real-world contracts and a separate set of 270 contracts with injected vulnerabilities, extending SmartBugs with 11 tools. Most tools were crash-resilient on Solidity 0.4, while 20% had been updated to remain compatible. Performance varied across Solidity versions, and execution time was higher on version 0.4.x. The abstract does not provide tool-by-tool results or quantify detection effectiveness.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2504.05515v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Smart contract vulnerabilities pose significant security risks to the Ethereum ecosystem, driving the development of automated tools for detection and mitigation. Smart contracts are written in Solidity, a rapidly evolving programming language that continues to add features and improvements to enhance smart contract security. New versions of Solidity change the compilation process, potentially affecting how tools interpret and analyze smart contract code. We use Solidity as a case study to investigate a broader problem in software analysis: whether tool effectiveness remains stable as the underlying programming language and execution environment evolve. In this continuously evolving landscape, we investigated the compatibility of detection tools with different Solidity versions. More specifically, we analyzed detection tools by empirically assessing (i) their crash resilience, (ii) their detection effectiveness, and (iii) their execution time across different versions of Solidity. We collected 2,500 real-world smart contracts to construct a balanced wild dataset and created a separate injected-vulnerability dataset comprising 270 contracts. We extended SmartBugs, a framework that enables the execution of vulnerability detection tools for Solidity, adding 11 new tools. Results indicate that most tools are crash-resilient to version 0.4. However, 20% of the evaluated tools have been updated to remain compatible. Tool performance varies across Solidity versions and is affected by Solidity changes; execution time is higher in version 0.4.x, which was used for evaluation. We present a list of Solidity changes that affect tool performance and offer actionable takeaways for both researchers and practitioners.

## Why Irreversible Crypto Transactions Are Holding Back Web3 Adoption

DevFeed: [Why Irreversible Crypto Transactions Are Holding Back Web3 Adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/why-irreversible-crypto-transactions-are-holding-back-web3-adoption-104361.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/why-irreversible-crypto-transactions-are-holding-back-web3-adoption?source=rss>)

Author: Dora Milen

Published: 2026-10-28T08:08:34Z

Content type: opinion

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [Blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/blockchain.md>), [Finance](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/finance.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [human computer interaction](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/human-computer-interaction.md>)

Tags: [ach](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ach.md>), [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [crypto](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crypto.md>), [cryptocurrency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptocurrency.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [fintech](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fintech.md>), [human-psychology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/human-psychology.md>), [immutability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/immutability.md>), [iso](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iso.md>), [iso-20022](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iso-20022.md>), [psychology](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/psychology.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [transactions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transactions.md>), [web3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web3.md>)

### AI overview

The article argues that Web3 adoption is hindered by exposing blockchain finality directly to users without adequate error recovery. It contrasts this with banking safeguards: ACH separates clearing from settlement and permits specified reversals within a limited window, while ISO 20022 provides interbank cancellation and return messages; IBAN check digits can catch many transcription errors. Public blockchain transfers generally combine clearing and settlement, and EIP-55 checksums do not protect against address poisoning, clipboard substitution, or sending to the wrong chain. The proposed approach is to preserve immutable base-layer settlement while adding application-level buffers: ERC-4337 smart accounts with delayed execution and cancellation authority, and time-locked escrows that let senders cancel before release or require recipients to claim funds. The author argues these mechanisms preserve self-custody better than reversible token standards, which could expose downstream holders and DeFi protocols to clawbacks. These are the article's claims and recommendations; the excerpt does not establish their real-world performance.

### Source excerpt

Why blockchain immutability fails human psychology, how ACH and ISO 20022 handle errors, and how ERC-4337 smart accounts build a crypto undo button.

## BioZKFHE: Scalable Encrypted Biometric Identification via Verifiable Homomorphic Similarity Evaluation

DevFeed: [BioZKFHE: Scalable Encrypted Biometric Identification via Verifiable Homomorphic Similarity Evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/biozkfhe-scalable-encrypted-biometric-identification-via-verifiable-homomorphic-similarity-evaluation-103324.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.22065>)

Author: Rundong Xin, Taotao Wang, Xiaoxiao Wu, Weizhi Meng, Shengli Zhang, Shui Yu

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [FHE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fhe.md>), [homomorphic encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homomorphic-encryption.md>), [sensitive data](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sensitive-data.md>), [Facial recognition](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/facial-recognition.md>), [Embeddings](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embeddings.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>)

Tags: [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [embedding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedding.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [integrity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrity.md>), [matching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/matching.md>), [packing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/packing.md>), [parallel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parallel.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [similarity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/similarity.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [templates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/templates.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

BioZKFHE aims to protect biometric data during outsourced 1:N identification while verifying encrypted similarity results before release. It combines BGV homomorphic computation with committee-based threshold opening, verification, and decryption, with smart contracts enforcing verification attestations. SCMV packing uses base-T expansion to store multiple quantized embedding values per plaintext entry, reducing encrypted storage and avoiding rotation-heavy matching. PVSC uses BGV's Double-CRT structure to split blockwise similarity traces into parallel proof instances that are checked before results are released. The authors analyze security and integrity under standard lattice assumptions and explicit committee/verifier assumptions. FaceNet and MobileFaceNet experiments report near-lossless utility, up to 67% lower encrypted storage, and 22-44 seconds of end-to-end proof-verified runtime for 10,000-40,000 templates.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2607.22065v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large-scale biometric identification in outsourced settings requires two properties simultaneously: biometric templates and queries must remain protected during computation, and the encrypted similarity outputs produced by an untrusted compute node must be verifiably correct before any application result is released. Existing FHE-based biometric systems primarily address confidentiality, while practical verifiability introduces two bottlenecks in the underlying encrypted 1:N matching layer: rotation- and bandwidth-heavy similarity evaluation and the high cost of proving repeated homomorphic similarity traces. We present BioZKFHE, a framework for scalable encrypted biometric identification via verifiable homomorphic similarity evaluation that combines BGV homomorphic computation with committee-based threshold opening, verification, and decryption, and smart-contract enforcement of the committee's verification attestations. To reduce encrypted storage and avoid rotation-heavy encrypted 1:N matching, we propose Single-Coefficient Multi-Value (SCMV) packing, which binds multiple quantized embedding values into each plaintext entry through base-T expansion. To make proof generation practical, we propose Parallelizable and Verifiable Similarity Computation (PVSC), which exploits the Double-CRT execution structure of BGV to decompose each blockwise similarity trace into parallel proof instances that are opened and checked before result release. Under standard lattice assumptions and explicit committee/verifier assumptions, we analyze recoverability, noise growth, confidentiality, encrypted-output integrity, and finalized-result integrity. Experiments on FaceNet and MobileFaceNet show near-lossless biometric utility, up to 67% encrypted-storage reduction, and about 22-44 s end-to-end proof-verified runtime for 10k-40k templates.

## Merkle-Tree-Based Verifiable Public Data Auditing for Cloud Object Storage Using Smart Contracts

DevFeed: [Merkle-Tree-Based Verifiable Public Data Auditing for Cloud Object Storage Using Smart Contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/merkle-tree-based-verifiable-public-data-auditing-for-cloud-object-storage-using-smart-contracts-103342.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36001>)

Author: Siri Reddy Tadi, K. Gangadhara Rao, M. Venu Gopalachari, C. Chetann Reddy, Jaswanth Bhimireddy

Published: 2026-10-28T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Distributed Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-distributed-computing.md>)

Topics: [Ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ethereum.md>), [smart contract](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/smart-contract.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Data integrity in software engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/data-integrity-in-software-engineering.md>), [sha256](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sha256.md>), [Amazon S3](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-s3.md>)

Tags: [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [auditing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/auditing.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/contracts.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-dc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-dc.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [dataset](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dataset.md>), [downloads](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/downloads.md>), [ethereum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ethereum.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [files](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/files.md>), [hash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hash.md>), [merkle-tree](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/merkle-tree.md>), [object](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/object.md>), [object-storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/object-storage.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [smart-contracts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smart-contracts.md>), [storage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storage.md>), [third-party](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/third-party.md>)

### AI overview

The system audits cloud objects against a public Ethereum smart-contract record: each object's name and SHA-256 hash forms a Merkle-tree leaf, and an auditor checks a downloaded object against the stored root using a short proof. In five experiments using S3-compatible storage and a local Hardhat blockchain, it detected all tested modifications and deletions without false alarms. A proof for 10,000 objects used 14 hashes; auditing one object took about 10 ms and a 100-object sample about 150 ms, largely independent of dataset size. A full audit of 10,000 objects took 14.3 seconds, about as long as downloading them, so the reported time savings come mainly from sampling. Storing the root cost 91,863 gas, 252 times less than storing 1,000 hashes on-chain.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.36001v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Owners of data in cloud object storage cannot directly check whether the provider still keeps every object unchanged. Existing research mostly checks blocks inside files or relies on third-party auditors, and less attention has been given to checking each object against a public blockchain reference while measuring the cost. A full-data audit downloads every object and compares it with a saved hash list, which is slow and only as reliable as that list. We propose a public auditing system in which the SHA-256 hash of each object and its name forms a leaf of a Merkle tree, so the whole dataset is represented by one Merkle root. This root is stored in an Ethereum smart contract as a trusted public record, while the objects stay with the provider. An auditor downloads an object, rebuilds the root using a short Merkle proof and compares it with the stored root, marking the object as intact, modified or missing. In five experiments on an S3-compatible store and a local Hardhat blockchain (normal audit, single- and multiple-object tampering, deletion and scalability), the system detected 15 of 15 single modifications, 2,205 of 2,205 modified objects and 830 of 830 deleted objects with no false alarms. The proof needed only 14 hashes for 10,000 objects, so checking one object took about 10 ms and a 100-object sample about 150 ms regardless of dataset size, while a full audit of 10,000 objects (14.3 s) took about as long as downloading them (13.5 s). Storing the root cost 91,863 gas, 252 times less than storing 1,000 hashes on-chain. The system thus shows exactly which objects were modified or are missing, with its main savings coming from checking selected objects.

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